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This book examines security in Myanmar, focusing in particular on Myanmar’s
response to the international policies which have impacted on its development
since 1988. It analyses the nexus between political poverty and economic poverty,
arguing that Myanmar’s endemic poverty is not merely a collection of unenviable
socio-economic indices, but it is also a function of ‘political’ poverty and of the
lack of ‘capabilities’ for the general population to participate fully in the nation’s
governance, resources and future. It demonstrates that freedom from want and
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insecurity is a product of the political insecurity that arises from a lack of secure
property rights, a modern legal system, an independent judiciary and the
opportunity for most citizens to participate fully in the political governance of
their country.
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Foreword
Myanmar is a curious and sad example of a poor and weak state struggling with
the ever-increasing changes and growing demands of the modern world. As
Dr James points out, its history, its political and cultural sensitivity and its
fissiporous character have made this struggle particularly difficult and demand-
ing. The consequence has been a series of coups and repressive governments,
followed by isolation by the West and yet further impoverishment of Myanmar’s
people and still greater paranoia amongst the Myanmar military elite.
It is this dilemma for powerful Western states, led by the United States, and for
the leaders of the ASEAN and other states, which surround Myanmar, that
Dr James sets out to place in its historical context and to illuminate. The author
lived in Thailand for many years and has travelled extensively in Myanmar. She
is one of the few Western experts on the country. Her reflections on all concerned,
successive administrations in Washington, ASEAN governments and the
Myanmar armed forces challenge much of the conventional wisdom and are all
the more valuable as a consequence. Her conclusions about the short-term
prospects are gloomy; change in the military leadership offers the best prospects
for the establishment of a fairer, more open and thus more prosperous society in
Myanmar. Unfortunately, since General Khin Nyunt’s dismissal, the situation has
actually deteriorated, although the progress he made in quieting many of the
groups fighting central control has not been reversed.
Meanwhile Myanmar tries to balance its relationship between the growing
power of China on one side and the growing power of India on the other. China
has increased its investment in the country to fill the vacuum left by the with-
drawal of United States’ aid and investment. India has also been helpful fearing
that Sino-Myanmar rapprochement and Pakistani hostility could give it enemies
on almost all sides. Thailand is supportive because it dreads instability in
Myanmar leading to massive refugee flows. Japan has been Myanmar’s largest aid
donor and it is salutary for a Western reader to note Dr James’ suggestion that
Japanese friendship can be traced back to Tokyo’s invasion of the country in 1942
and the 100,000 Japanese who died there. British and Australian readers may have
rather different memories of Japanese actions and Dr James’ insights add to
the richness and interest of her text. Anyone reading what she has to say and
meditating her wide literary and political allusions will emerge challenged and
enlightened.
Philip Towle





This book is a companion to my earlier volume, Governance and Civil Society in
Myanmar: Education, Health and Environment (London: RoutledgeCurzon,
2005). Whereas that book examined Myanmar’s domestic policies and the frame-
work in which such policies were being implemented, the current volume, Security
and Sustainable Development in Myanmar, seeks to examine the country’s
response to the international policies that have impacted on its development since
1988. The short-lived ‘reform’ program (1997–2004) has come to a halt. By walk-
ing a tightrope between power groups that incline to no compromise with either
the domestic opposition or the international community (which has been urging it
to greater acceptance of democratic norms), the small band of internationally
savvy technocrats who were conscious that the country could not remain frozen in
the aspic of its socialist past, sought to transform the country from within; today,
most are either in jail or purged from their posts. For all sides in the acrimonious
debate that has ensued over the future governance of Myanmar, the concept of
security has been central; whether security from external invasion and internal
subversion, international pressure, cyber-attacks by the diaspora, or from the
arbitrariness of the oppressive authoritarian state apparatus, which, for over
40 years, has made the lives of ordinary (and not so ordinary) Myanmar/Burmese
citizens ‘insecure’. At the time of writing, the country is the object of a concerted
effort by its antagonists in the international arena to activate measures that they
hope could lead to UN Security Council sanctioned intervention. That such
measures are unlikely to succeed owing to the composition of the Security Council
and the counter-policies Myanmar has pursued internationally in aligning itself
with China, will not diminish the country’s sense of being under siege. In such an
environment, the well-being of the majority of Myanmar’s people is again hostage
to the larger agenda of the major powers who control world politics.
Myanmar’s endemic poverty is not only a collection of unenviable socio-
economic indices. It is also a function of ‘political’ poverty, of the lack of
‘capabilities’ for the general population to participate fully in the nation’s gover-
nance, resources and future. This book examines the essentially concomitant
nature of ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’ and how one is a function
of the other. Economic insecurity is a product of political insecurity, of lack of
secure property rights, lack of a modern legal system, lack of an independent
judiciary and lack of the opportunity for most citizens to participate fully in the
political governance of their country. ‘Famines’, both literally and symbolically,
as Sen and Dreze (1999b) have shown, are peculiarly absent from countries where
democratic governance is the norm, because the institutional underpinnings are
usually in place to respond promptly to unexpected crises in a manner consistent
with the duty of government to exercise its ‘responsibility to protect’ its citizens.
Myanmar is a country whose dearest wish is to be ‘secure’, and to be counted
an equal among other equal modern societies, yet imposes dire ‘insecurity’ on its
citizens. Enhancing the capabilities of the country requires its leaders to recog-
nize that the capabilities of its citizens need to be enhanced to realize their full
potential, if the country is again to be accorded the respect it deserves amongst
the family of nations. Only then will the country really be secure. At present, the
intergenerational promise of the sustainable development Agenda 21 programme
seems bitterly ironic, bequeathing, as it does, a legacy of endemic poverty, mal-
nutrition, poorly resourced education system and civil conflict. If this book has a
message it is that Myanmar needs to put aside its policies of ‘securitization’ of the
country’s political, economic and social life, and empower its people to be able to
benefit fully from participation in the international community.
Like its predecessor, this book has had a long gestation. Research commenced
in 1996 was initially set aside while other projects were completed. Sixteen vis-
its to the country since that time have included extensive travel by road and by air
to the north and north-east amongst the ‘poppy cultures’ of Shan State, Eastern
Shan State and the Wa-Kokang special region, as well as explorations of the cen-
tral ‘dry zone’ from Mandalay to Meiktila and Bagan, the Delta region and the
Eastern perimeter bordering Thailand. Whilst there are undoubtedly pockets of
vast wealth in the country coalescing with the ‘newly rich’ contractor-commercial
classes, the overall life experience of more than 50 per cent of the people is of
endemic poverty, of the struggle to live from day to day – all this in the face of an
obvious plenitude of natural resources, largely untapped. Macroeconomic and
microeconomic reform are urgently needed; but the institutional developments to
spread the subsequent benefits to the people are also necessary, lest the benefits
continue to accrue to only a small minority (as was the case in the 1960s and
1970s amongst Myanmar’s South-East Asian neighbours).
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The security discourse in the state of Burma/Myanmar has typically focussed on
regime and state perpetuation, sovereignty, peace and stability. Non-disintegration
of the Union is the foremost of the state objectives printed on every copy of the
New Light of Myanmar. These elements have traditionally formed the basis of the
‘realist’ paradigm of international relations theory. Since the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report 1994 initiated
the seven elements of the human security – as opposed to state security – concept,
the security discourse in the Asia-Pacific has attempted to evolve from the com-
mon and collective security of the earlier Cold War era, to that of comprehensive
security. However, this too is state-centric. There have been attempts to make the
human security discourse non-state-centric, but careful analysis of this concept
has concluded that freedom from want and freedom from fear are two sides of the
same coin, and indeed need to be fostered by the state. This book takes the seven
elements of the human security discourse to analyse their application in public
policy in the context of Myanmar’s transition to a peaceful, united, multiparty
democracy. Thus the book will show that sustainable development in Myanmar is
a code for freedom from fear of the state apparatus of repression through appli-
cation of policies of empowerment and participatory practices as advocated by
the global institutions of good governance, the World Bank, Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Asian Development Bank
(ADB) etc. This book shows that the threats to the security of the state and the
regime come from poverty, non-optimal relations with civil society and the
minority peoples, from diseases such as HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis,
from lack of a quality education system, from failure to address adequately envi-
ronmental degradation, the drug trade and human trafficking. Conversely,
addressing these ‘threats’ requires improved governance, development of civil
society, effective poverty alleviation through economic development – itself
requiring good macroeconomic and microeconomic management – ongoing envi-
ronmental conservation measures, continued economic reforms, and concerted
drug suppression and poppy-replacement operations. Even more than these
measures – which I call the seven horsemen of the apocalypse – I show that the
security of the people and the security of the state are in symbiotic relationship
with each other. The state cannot be secure unless the security of the people is
assured; thus freedom from want and freedom from fear are in effect one and the
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same. I argue that public policies supporting opportunity, empowerment and
participatory practices are the capstone of both human and state/regime security,
leading to a redefinition of the concept of security as holistic security.
My analysis will perforce include detailed assessments of human rights issues;
the drug trade, relations with the minority peoples and programmes for their
inclusion in a multi-ethnic state; political reforms and economic and social issues.
The overall theme of the book will focus on economic development and
educational development as prerequisites to formation of a context able to
produce and support a viable multiparty democratic state able to enhance and
protect the well-being of its citizens, not fear them. Holistic security, in effect
is predicated on the notion that the security and longevity of the state are dependent
on the security and well-being of its citizens.
This book includes an analysis of Burma/Myanmar’s external as well as
internal relations in the context of both the new regional and international secu-
rity discourses. Thus the state’s relations with its Asian neighbours – China,
Japan, India and Thailand – as well as its membership in various regional bodies –
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand-Economic
Cooperations (BIMST-EC), the Mekong Sub-region Development Project – will
be analysed in terms of this evolving security discourse. I also take into account
the state of Myanmar’s relations with the USA, EU and UK in terms of the
economic sanctions imposed and Myanmar’s international position, as well as its
cooperation in the War on Terror.
In this book I draw on the theoretical frameworks of political science, interna-
tional relations, political and social anthropology, development studies and his-
torical research. I also take into account the work of Amartya Sen, Martha
Nussbaum, John Martinussen and Jagdish Bhagwati on poverty alleviation and
sustainable development; that of Muthiah Alagappa, Barry Buzan, Alan Dupont,
Stuart Harris, Ramesh Thakur and Amitav Acharya on Asian security practice; the
policy positions of the World Bank, UNDP and international agencies in seeking
to encourage transitional states to embrace the principles of empowerment, par-
ticipatory practices and enhancement of opportunity for their citizens. I look at
the role of civil society in sustaining a redefined ‘secure’ state, and present a way
forward towards achievement of ‘freedom from want and freedom from fear’ in
the state of Burma/Myanmar which, since the loss of its independence to Britain
in the nineteenth century, has always put a premium on state and regime security,
but not the security of its people. This book says that the security of an empow-
ered citizenry able to participate in the decisions affecting their governance will
in turn engender the security of the state. Holistic security presupposes that whilst
state/regime security and security of the people are in symbiotic relationship, it is
the latter which is dominant in strong, successful states.
This book is timely in view of the changing international and Asia-Pacific
security discourse, the present political impasse in Myanmar following the
30 May 2003 incident, and the urgent need for sustained political, economic and
social reforms in this key regional state.
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This book is presented in seven chapters, plus an initial prologue. The content
focuses on the security discourse in Myanmar since independence from Britain
on 4 January 1948 and future policy directions. In my analysis, the role of civil
society in fostering improved human security and the concomitant sustainable
political and socio-economic development is closely examined. I use the term,
‘Myanmar’, to denote the country since 1989, as this is its officially registered
name with the United Nations. ‘Burma’ is used to denote the country as it was
prior to this date. I occasionally use the terms, ‘Myanmar/Burma’ or
‘Burma/Myanmar’ where the discussion is focusing on differently held views of
the country by the government and its antagonists. Since many other post-colonial
countries have exercised their right to slough off the former colonial terminology,
I see no reason why Myanmar also should not be enabled to exercise this
right. The government’s political opponents can of course choose to continue
using the former colonial name if they wish; in doing so, they make a recogniz-
able political statement. It might be instructive to note, that in 1893, as the British
colonial administration in Burma thought it was about to put an end to the first
phase of concerted Burmese resistance to the takeover of their country, a certain
C. T. Paske, published an otherwise unremarkable book entitled, Myamma: A
Retrospect of Life and Travel in Lower Burmah, London: W. H. Allen & Co. Even
Paske’s very Euro-centric book projects cognizance of the original name of the
country. Burma/Myanmar seems to be a case of ‘Plus ça change . . .’. And then,
unexpectedly, Myanmar seems to have the capacity to surprise even the most
experienced Burma watchers.
Focus and philosophy
Myanmar (Burma) has had a turbulent post-colonial history. Twelve years of
parliamentary democracy (1948–62) under the late Premier U Nu, ended with the
military takeover on 2 March 1962 led by the late General Ne Win. An unfortu-
nate legacy of this period, stemming perhaps even from the colonial government
during the Dyarchy (1937–41) period, and exacerbated by the bitter civil war
(1948–89) is an enduring suspicion of the motivations of civilian politicians. Such
suspicions amongst the country’s armed forces have long since atrophied and
become part of the standard ideology justifying continued military governance in
Myanmar – the need to prevent disintegration of the Union; the need to protect
national sovereignty. Such a perspective was an article of faith for General
Ne Win and continued in the pronouncements of his successors. Ne Win’s retirement
in July 1987 was followed by civil disturbances which culminated in August 1988
during which a large number of citizens died. Responding to obvious pressure for
change, the legal framework for the socialist-style command economy was
replaced by laws initiating the market economy which continues, haltingly, to the
present time. A new electoral law promulgated on 31 May 1989 prepared the way
for possible political change through the holding of multiparty elections. But
the promise was short lived. Refusal of the military government to acknowledge
the results of multiparty elections held on 27 May 1990 has meant that, since that
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time, the attention of international scholars has largely been directed to the political
situation and human rights issues. Comparatively little attention has been given to
the socio-economic institutional changes needed to underpin a viable multiparty
democracy. In view of the changing international security discourse since
September 11, 2001, this book looks at the security issues in Myanmar in both
international and national context and at the internal regeneration required to
achieve holistic security for both people and state.
This book breaks new ground and contributes significant new interpretation of
the security concept in Myanmar. It projects a way forward by which the political
impasse in Myanmar might be resolved within the context of the country’s
economic and social development. It suggests that a non-violent resolution of the
political impasse, particularly in view of the present crisis, needs to be accompa-
nied by comparable strengthening of the civil institutions, civil society and the
social structures to promote economic development and effective poverty
alleviation in this overwhelmingly agrarian country, more than 50 per cent of
whose citizens live below the World Bank designated poverty line of less than
USD 1 per day, and whose currency, in October 2005, had fallen to 1,250 kyat to
the US dollar (market rate, compared to the Myanmar government rate of 6 kyat
to the US dollar).
Freedom from want and freedom from fear
This book explores the integral nature of both ‘freedoms’ – ‘freedom from want’
and ‘freedom from fear’. It is not considered valid to privilege either over the
other. People struggling to overcome destitution, malnutrition and disease are
primarily more concerned with the difficulties of daily survival than they are with
casting a ballot at the next election; on the other hand, political empowerment, the
capacity to participate in the nation’s life through casting one’s vote at the ballot
box may result in electing a government with the capacity to put in place the
institutions which will obviate food shortages, provide quality health care for all,
alleviate poverty through proper macroeconomic reforms which generate
employment and implement measures to curb corruption. Elections, by them-
selves, however, are no guarantee that appropriate institutional arrangements will
be established to sustain human security; respect for the rule of law, an indepen-
dent judiciary, freedom of association and the press and secure property rights are
all part of the mix of required ingredients to make freedom from fear practicable.
In late 2005, Reporters Sans Frontieres ranked Myanmar at 163 out of 167 nations
in terms of Freedom of the Press; North Korea was ranked 167. Economic devel-
opment of itself also should not be seen as a substitute for political empowerment;
it is, however, an essential ingredient in fostering and sustaining the political
rights necessary to engender respect for human rights. There is increasingly
amongst both established democracies and the incipient demi-democracies, a
cynical public policy perspective which plays to the notion that people do not
mind if their political rights are curtailed as long as the economy is buoyant.
This is an unfortunate policy perspective. Oppression originates from curtailed
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political rights; freedom from fear requires constant vigilance on the part of those
citizens who enjoy political rights, that these are not inappropriately submerged
in the freedom from want formulae. When such a fusion occurs, the democratic
pendulum slides along the political parabola towards dictatorship and a correction
is required if the polity is not to sow the seeds of its own destruction, as did fifth
century BC Athens in face of the Spartan challenge.
This critical juxtaposition of values was highlighted by Daw Aung San Suu
Kyi, awarded the Nobel Peace prize on 14 October 1991. Now an icon of the
democracy movement in Burma/Myanmar, she articulated the linkage between
political rights and human security. In Freedom from Fear (1991) she writes that
even the least political citizens will say,
‘We just want to be able to go about our own business freely and peacefully,
not doing anybody any harm, just earning a decent living without anxiety and
fear.’ In other words they want the basic human rights which would guaran-
tee a tranquil, dignified existence free from want and fear.
(Aung San Suu Kyi 1991: 173)
That such a transformation in governance resides in a transformation in the
value systems governing the country’s institutions is one of her major insights
into the country’s long-term problems. The people of Burma [sic], she writes,
‘want not just a change of government but a change in political values’ in order
to move the polity away from the indigenous authoritarianism which has
conditioned their lives since pre-colonial times. Thus, she states,
The unhappy legacies of authoritarianism can be removed only if the concept
of absolute power as the basis of government is replaced by the concept of
confidence as the mainspring of political authority . . .
(Aung San Suu Kyi 1991: 178)
But is this iconic figure the ‘woman of destiny’, as Joseph Silverstein asked?
In 1991, in this same volume, this noted American scholar of independent Burma,
identified the paradox in Suu Kyi’s situation. Yet untried in a responsible national
leadership role, kept from the people through several periods of house arrest since
1989, Silverstein writes,
[S]he stands to inherit more problems than her father imagined; and although
she is intelligent and informed about Burma, she has given no clear answers
to the questions of how democracy can be institutionalized, how national
unity can be achieved, how the economy can be improved or how the viola-
tions of human and political rights by the military in the past and present will
be rectified. The Burmese people have been in search of leadership since the
death of Aung San and many believe that they have found it in his daughter.
So long as she remains untried in a responsible position and isolated from the
people, they will continue to believe that she is the one who can set them on
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a new course. But until she is given the chance to use her new-found skills of
democratic politics in the crucible of parliamentary politics and bears the
responsibility for her decisions, no one will know if she is destined to lead
Burma towards a new and better life than its peoples have had or if she will
be forced to compromise and accept the realities of Burma that developed
over the past forty-three years.
(Silverstein, in Aung San Suu Kyi 
1991: 282)
Despite brief periods of freedom from house arrest since 1995, ending with the
debacle at Depiyin on 30 May 2003 when her cavalcade in Upper Myanmar came
under attack by groups supporting the government, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi
appears further than ever from being able to form a government. Political vio-
lence has plagued the independent state since its inception and thwarted its early
promise of a prosperous life for the people.
Writing in 1950, as the post-independence civil war was still raging, Albert
Moscotti saw a ‘medieval Burmese society’ (Moscotti 1950: 150) on which the
British colonial administration had sought, unsuccessfully to graft Western polit-
ical and economic institutions without taking account of the cultural underpin-
ning in which such institutions would be operating. Measures introduced after
1917 and continuing until 1937 increasingly ran up against the boycott tactics of
the nationalist movement and the religiously based civil society groups – the
Young Men’s Buddhist Association (YMBA); the General Council of Burmese
Associations (GCBA) and the General Council of Sangha Sametgyis (GCSS).
Some 12,000 affiliated associations participated in the 1921 GCBA conference in
Mandalay (James 2004c: 540). From non-political origins, these groups became
more overtly political after 1923. Through the pongyis (the Buddhist monks) they
fed into the village association (athin) movement which became so deeply
involved in the boycott (hartal or non-cooperation) movement and local level pay-
back crimes that the British authorities enacted legislation to curb them (Moscotti
1950: 30). Such legislation also impacted adversely on personal freedoms, and
the way justice was administered, a fact not lost on the nationalist movement
(ibid.: 121). But the political reforms of the colonial administration did not give
the Burmese people experience at the national level with key portfolios such as
Defense and Foreign Affairs, two key functions which draw much of the criticism
of contemporary Burma/Myanmar. Moscotti considers that the political reforms
introduced in the colonial era limited Burmese political experience to the local
level of the administrative apparatus and did not adequately prepare for the post-
independence reality. ‘How could they?’ he asks. Their objective was to delegate
some functions to the Burmese (education, forests, posts and telegraphs) whilst
keeping control of the economy in British and non-indigenous minority hands.
The resulting plural society discriminated against the majority Burmese in eco-
nomic life, in the defense forces, in the civil service and in political participation.
Moscotti notes that as the nationalist movement got underway, its leaders became
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convinced that the key to restoring national sovereignty was not merely political
reform but also economic.
As the nationalist movement gained momentum there was an increasing
awareness among Burmese leaders that the transition from the status of a
colony to that of a modern state transcended mere political reform. They
insisted that Burmans must also take a significant part in the trade and
commerce of the country and share more fully in the returns of the national
economy.
(Moscotti 1950: 130)
Sovereignty was being expressed in both political and economic terms. Policies
pursued in the post-independence era have a direct correlation with this pre-
independence experience of economic exploitation and political disempowerment.
The subsequent legacy of ethnic conflict, high crime rates, political factionalism,
corruption and social malaise has still to be resolved. It has provided justification
in the official ideology for continued military governance and fear of freedoms.
The question of which comes first – political reform or economic development –
in order to enhance human security, is an ‘egg and chicken’ question.
Burma/Myanmar has been waiting over 50 years to have a future and the societal
problems are now so entrenched that it is immoral from one perspective, and
impracticable from another, to put the future of over 50 million people on hold
pending resolution of the political impasse. Freedom from want and freedom
from fear are two aspects of the same issue; both must be satisfied if human
security is to be enhanced.
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Introduction
Human security became prominent in the security lexicon in the mid-1990s, a
product of the international responses to fearful scenes of communal and ethnic
violence in the Balkans after the fragmentation of the former socialist republic of
Yugoslavia. Largely sponsored by the foreign policy establishments of Japan,
Canada and Australia, the human security concept aimed to promote the notion
that human well-being is of primary importance, whilst state or regime security
are secondary to this main objective. The approach gained considerable currency,
especially in UN circles, and has figured prominently in the speeches of UN
leaders. In 2001, Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the UN, set the fundamental
principles of human security in the context of world politics as he saw the
situation at that time. He highlighted the key security concepts which have
engaged the attention of policy makers since the UNDP Human Development
Report 1994 identified seven primary sources of threats to human well-being.
Kofi Annan stated,
During the Cold War, security tended to be defined almost entirely in terms
of military might and the balance of terror. Today, we know that ‘security’
means far more than the absence of conflict. We also have a greater appreci-
ation for non-military sources of conflict. We know that lasting peace
requires a broader vision encompassing areas such as education and health,
democracy and human rights, protection against environmental degradation,
and the proliferation of deadly weapons. We know that we cannot be secure
amidst starvation, that we cannot build peace without alleviating poverty, and
that we cannot build freedom on foundations of injustice. These pillars of
what we now understand as the people-centred concept of ‘human security’
are interrelated and mutually re-inforcing. And perhaps most crucially, no
country, however powerful, can achieve human security on its own, and none
is exempt from risks and costs if it chooses to do without the multilateral
cooperation that can help us reach this goal.
(McRae and Hubert 2001: xix–xx)
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From this perspective, human security privileges the human being, the non-military
aspects of security, in contrast to the parallel or earlier security concepts –
comprehensive, cooperative, and common security – which privilege the state.
For Kofi Annan, human security puts people first, and should be at the heart of
the international decision-making mechanisms which address common threats to
human well-being originating from a range of trans-state and intra-state sources.
These include both man-made and natural disasters such as genocide, terrorism
and human trafficking, drugs, HIV/AIDS and the SARS virus, environmental
degradation, endemic poverty, state collapse and the catastrophic consequences of
the 26 December 2004 earthquake off northern Sumatra and subsequent tsunami
which wreaked havoc on 10 countries along the Indian Ocean rim and caused over
290,000 deaths. The list is indicative rather than exhaustive. All of these threats
to human security may have intra-state origins with trans-state consequences. All
require multilateral, international cooperation and resources to combat and to
seek to develop practicable solutions.
This perspective presupposes that the risks to human security from inter-state
conflict have reduced, whilst those from trans-state or intra-state conflict have
increased. The statistics cited by the UNDP Human Development Report 2002
support this view: over 170 million people died in intra-state conflicts during
the twentieth century, far more than in inter-state conflicts (UNDP 2002: 5).
However, since the formal end of the Cold War in 1989, the anticipated peace
dividend is perceived not to have been realized; the succeeding 15 years have
been characterized by a very high incidence of intra-state violence originating in
ethnic or ideological conflict, or political power struggles in which over 80 per cent
of the casualties have been civilians, many of whom have been ‘targeted with
intent’ (McRae and Hubert 2001: 4). The UNDP Report states,
In the 1990s conflicts between countries killed about 220,000 people, a drop
of nearly two-thirds from the 1980s. But civil conflicts are more damaging
than ever. In the 1990s about 3.6million people died in wars within
states, and the number of refugees and internally displaced persons increased
50 per cent.
(UNDP 2002: 2)
Developing a set of international norms and principles to prevent these human
tragedies should clearly be a priority of the international community. In the wake
of the tsunami disaster of December 2004, and the worldwide outpouring of
support for victims in the affected countries, steps are being taken to put in place
in the Indian and Atlantic Oceans an early warning system parallel to the one
operating from Hawaii which alerts the Pacific Rim countries to impending
threats from such natural disasters. Profoundly affected by the scale of the
destruction and the palpable human suffering, Australian Minister for Foreign
Affairs, the Hon Alexander Downer, while visiting the disaster zone commented,
‘It makes you feel that the international community is able to come together in the
cause of humanity. It has touched the whole world and it is nice to see that the
whole world can work together so constructively’ (The Canberra Times, 5 January
2005, p. 1). Working constructively within the wider international community to
alleviate human suffering is perhaps the core value of the concept of human
security. If the global initiatives to provide both immediate relief to the victims
and longer-term reconstruction of the devastated communities prove to be
effective, they will go a long way towards demonstrating that the concept of
human security can be implemented in practicable ways.
The human security discourse: freedom from fear 
and freedom from want
Enhancing human security has been recognized as the principal role of the UN
and its related agencies since its inception. Since the end of the Second World
War, the principles to enhance human security have been expressed in a range of
international initiatives – in the UN Charter, the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR), the four Geneva Conventions and two Additional
Protocols on international humanitarian law and armed conflict; the 1948
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; the two
1966 Covenants on civil and political and on social, economic and cultural rights
and the 1998 initiative to establish an International Criminal Court. Together with
a number of interrelated treaties, protocols and conventions they provide the insti-
tutional and legal framework which impels states to enhance the well-being of
their citizens through their domestic public policies, if they also wish to be seen
to be behaving responsibly in international affairs. This body of international law
represents a concerted attempt by the 192 members of the United Nations to reify
the right of human beings to be protected from inter-state, trans-state and intra-
state sources of insecurity.
The human security discourse creates a special space in civil society – state
relations in which state performance can be monitored and assessed. Recourse to
states’ rights and notions of national sovereignty, whilst still pre-eminent in inter-
national relations theories as the primary loci of relations between nation states,
are no longer in themselves adequate measures of the efficacy of public policy,
either in its domestic or international dimensions. Increasingly, what James
Rosenau terms the ‘frontier’ between domestic and international policy, is a
seamless world of often contested authority in which threats to human security
can proliferate (Rosenau 1997: 6, 168). Along this frontier frequently erupt the
violent communal conflicts between different ethnic groups which may have var-
ious patrons in the wider world of trans-state society. These international linkages
often make the domestic conflicts more intransigent and more difficult to reach a
solution. The tragedy at Beslan, southern Russia, in which between 400 and 500
people, mostly children, lost their lives as a consequence of a terrorist attack
on the local school, is the most recent in a continuing series of such intra-state
conflicts with international dimensions where the domestic–foreign divide is
transparent.1
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Since the formal end of the Cold War in 1989, civilians have been the main
victims of these many violent intra-state conflicts – Kosovo, Rwanda, Bosnia,
Sierra Leone and, now, Darfur where over a million people have been rendered
homeless by ‘ethnic cleansing’ activities of the pro-government militia, the
Janjaweed.2 Similar distressing spectacles of human suffering led Lloyd Axworthy,
former Canadian Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Trade, to call for
formulation of an international policy which privileges the protection of the human
being, rather than the state. He advocated a change in the concept of what ‘being
secure’ means and stipulated that ‘the language of foreign affairs should include
protecting civilians, war-affected children, the threat posed by terrorism, drug-
trafficking and forced migration – not just states’ rights and national sovereignty’.
(McRae and Hubert 2001: 3). As David Dickens has asserted, the Canadian
approach focuses on human insecurity arising from violent conflict and non-violent
threats (Dickens 2002: 2). In Dickens’ view, the Canadian formulation of human
security ‘entails taking preventive measures to reduce vulnerability and minimize
risk, and taking remedial action where prevention fails’ (ibid.).
The Canadian approach gives priority to ‘freedom from fear’ and the concomi-
tant civil and political rights of individuals. It is thus closely aligned with the
Western human rights policy agenda. By contrast, the policy of Japan has been to
emphasize ‘freedom from want’ in pursuing a strategy which the Japanese
government considers is less confronting for developing societies. In December
1998, in Hanoi, the then Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi announced in his
‘Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow’ the establishment of a Trust
Fund for Human Security to be located in the United Nations Secretariat with an
initial funding base of 500 million yen. The objective of the fund is to ‘translate
the concept of human security into concrete activities by supporting projects . . .
that address . . . various threats to human lives, livelihoods and dignity currently
facing the international community, including poverty, environmental degrada-
tion, conflicts, landmines, refugee problems, illicit drugs and infectious diseases
such as HIV/AIDS.’ Since then, human security has become a key aspect of
Japanese foreign policy.
Initial steps to implement the Japanese policy were taken in September 2000,
at the UN Millennium Summit, when Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori
announced the creation of a Commission on Human Security. Its membership
includes 12 internationally prominent figures led by co-chairs Sadako Ogata,
former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and Nobel Prize
winner, Professor Amartya Sen, former Master of Trinity College, Cambridge
University. The role of the commission is to make recommendations to the inter-
national community on guidelines for concrete action which will translate the
concept of human security into action. By the end of June 2002, the Trust Fund
for Human Security had provided USD 84 million for 61 projects which included
assisting refugees in Kosovo and East Timor. Citing the widening gap between
rich and poor nationally and internationally, despite the improvements in the
standard of living brought by globalization and liberalization of trade and invest-
ment measures, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its explication of the
human security concept gives priority to the individual human being and
human potential. It asserts, ‘Each country, as a nation state, is still responsible to
its people for ensuring state security and the importance of security and economic
policies at the state level has not lessened at all. However, such policies
should now be complemented by efforts focused on individuals to ensure human
security.’3
Consistent with this policy perspective, Japan was amongst the first and most
generous (USD 600 million) donors to the international fund to assist victims of
the 26 December 2004 tsunami which followed the undersea earthquake off the
north-west Sumatra coast. Others have followed suit: on 7 January 2005, at the
leaders summit in Jakarta to plan how best to address the human consequences of
the disaster, Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, announced an unprece-
dented AUD 1 billion aid package to Indonesia (The Australian, 7 January 2005,
p. 1). Other substantial contributions were made by the World Bank and the
governments of Germany, the US, Norway, Britain, Sweden and Canada. In these
countries, the private sector contributions both from individual citizens and the
corporate sectors were also overwhelmingly generous. By the end of the first
week of January 2005, Kofi Annan announced that some USD 5 billion had been
pledged to the tsunami assistance fund, demonstrating the global recognition of
the sense of mutual responsibility of peoples and governments to address the
consequences of this disaster.
Whilst the Japanese approach is more palatable in Asia than the Canadian
approach, the crucial interlinkage between freedom from want and freedom from
fear in the human security concept has been delineated at great length by Amartya
Sen (1999) and Amitav Acharya (2002a) who observes that ‘no serious advocate
of human security would condone the pursuit of economic and communitarian
approaches at the expense of the safety and dignity of individuals and peoples.
The tolerance of human rights violations for the sake of economic development
or social stability should have no place in the human security paradigm’ (Acharya
2002a: 10). Acharya is surely correct in asserting that the two perspectives are
complementary. ‘Pursuing “freedom from want” in the absence of “freedom from
fear” is bound to be of limited utility’ he argues (Acharya 2000a: 17).
Both the Japanese and the Canadian perspectives are broader than the
Norwegian view articulated by Sverre Lodgaard of the Norwegian Institute of
International Affairs who defines human insecurity narrowly as ‘vulnerability to
physical violence during conflict’ and excises the notion of threats arising from
socio-economic or natural disasters (Acharya 2002a: 8). Lodgaard’s view would
seem to take scant account of the human tragedies arising from the Asian
financial and economic crisis of 1997 and the several subsequent regime changes
in South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia and The Philippines which it precipitated. The
broader view of human security encompassed by both the Japanese and the
Canadian approaches is, as Acharya (2002a: 8) has pointed out, more closely
aligned with the Asian comprehensive security agenda discussed in the next
section. Summarizing the various interpretations of the human security concept,
Acharya is at pains to emphasize that these are mutually reinforcing and
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contribute to making the concept potentially an ‘instrument of a just and secure
world’. Thus he states,
Human security has been presented variously as a means of reducing the
human costs of violent conflict, as a strategy to enable governments to
address basic human needs and offset the inequities of globalization, and as
a framework for providing social safety nets to people impoverished and mar-
ginalized by sudden and severe economic crises.
(Acharya 2002a: 5)
The key question of course is how should the international community react when
human security is in jeopardy either from natural disasters or from the actions of
the guardians of the nation state?
These are thorny issues. The concept of national sovereignty has been the
capstone of international relations since the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia ushered in
the era of secular nation states and ended the legitimacy of the concept of sacred
universal empire in Western Europe. Extension of the concept of secular nation
states to the non-Western world had to await the establishment of the UN and the
rollback of colonialism after the Second World War. The pre-eminence of nation
states and states’ rights since 1945 has been the main theoretical perspective in the
various schools of international relations, from realist to neo-realist, liberal and
neo-liberal to constructivist. The inviolability of sovereignty and non-interference
in the internal affairs of nation states has been strongly upheld by the newly inde-
pendent states emerging from colonialism.4 Along these lines, Hedley Bull (2002)
proclaimed that the ‘fundamental principle of world politics in the present era is
the idea of a society of sovereign states’, which he asserted is the ‘supreme
normative principle of the political organization of mankind’. From this notion of
a society of sovereign states, he declared, stem not only the basic rules of coexis-
tence among states and other actors in international society, but also the capacity
to ‘mobilise compliance with the rules of international society’ (Bull 2002: 134).
It is a perspective which also finds its place in the work of James Mayall who
emphasizes that there would appear to be no viable alternatives. He writes,
[There is] no immediate prospect of transcending the national idea, either as
the principle of legitimization, or as the basis of political organization for the
modern state. For the time being, international society cannot develop in ways
which are inconsistent with the continued existence of separate national states.
Islands of supra-national sovereignty may arise here and there, but the
principle of popular sovereignty will not easily translate into supra-nationalism.
The original conception of international society has survived into the
modern world with its basic structure intact. It is a conception of a society of
states which recognize each other’s sovereignty, engage in regular diplomatic
relations with one another and uphold international law. The theoretical
alternatives to this scheme have not materialized.
(Mayall 1990: 145)
The concept of the sovereign state, however, has been under challenge both
from transnationalists who assert that the exigencies of the market are making the
territorially bounded sovereign state obsolete (e.g. Ohmae 1995: 5, 12–13 ff.;
Strange 1996: 5–33) and from reformers who, appalled by the various spectacles
of states’ violence perpetrated against their own citizens, have attempted to
reformulate the notion of sovereignty in terms of the nation state’s ‘responsibility
to protect’ the citizens and minorities living within its jurisdiction. This term has
been given currency by the work of the International Commission on Intervention
and State Sovereignty (ICISS) whose report, The Responsibility to Protect, was
released in late 2001, after the tragedy of the September 11 terrorist attacks on the
World Trade Center, in which around 3,000 citizens from 80 countries lost
their lives.
The proper exercise of sovereignty by any nation state, the ICISS proposes, is
the responsibility to protect its citizens and minorities from avoidable catastro-
phe. Whilst defending the concept of sovereignty and the nation state’s conven-
tional monopoly on the right to wage war in defence of its territorial integrity, the
ICISS report proposes a significant modification of the concept consistent with
developments in human rights and international law. The concept of sovereignty
as the responsibility of the state to protect its citizens from avoidable catastrophe
further erodes the domestic–foreign divide, bringing domestic and international
policy into alignment in considerations of what constitutes proper governance. In
the Commission’s view,
The defense of state sovereignty, by even its strongest supporters, does not
include any claim of the unlimited power of a state to do what it wants to its
own people. The Commission heard no such claim at any stage during our
worldwide consultations. It is acknowledged that sovereignty implies a duel
responsibility externally – to respect the sovereignty of other states, and
internally, to respect the dignity and basic rights of all the people within the
state. In international human rights covenants, in U.N. practice, and in state
practice itself, sovereignty is now understood as embracing this dual respon-
sibility. Sovereignty as responsibility has become the minimum content of
good international citizenship.
(International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty 2001: 8)
The Commission’s modification of the conventional concept of state sover-
eignty paves the way for considerations of a framework under which international
intervention might be considered, and how it might be implemented in order to
protect people when their state either fails, or is unable to do so. This sensitive
issue goes to the heart of the concept of human security in practice and takes it
out of the realm of idealistic theory. The failures by both the international
community and the state, at Srebenica and Rwanda in the 1990s and the
Cambodian genocide in the mid-1970s, for example, underpin the need for such
a framework, if the human security concept is to be implemented. Such twin
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humanitarian and security considerations led Australia, in 1999, to organize
ASEAN support for an international intervention force in East Timor in the wake
of the widespread post-referendum violence against the civilian population by
pro-Indonesia militia opposed to independence for the new nation. The interven-
tion was undertaken in spite of the anticipated difficulties it would cause in the
Indonesia–Australia relationship and only after the international community had
applied intense pressure on Jakarta (Goldsworthy 2003: 255). There was a sense
that previous failures by the international community to protect vulnerable
civilian populations needed to be redressed.5 The ICISS report plainly delineates
the transnational impact of multiple failures in the responsibility to protect.
Intra-state warfare is often viewed, in the prosperous West, simply as a set of
discrete and unrelated crises occurring in distant and unimportant regions. In
reality, what is happening is a convulsive process of state fragmentation and
state formation that is transforming the international order itself. Moreover,
the rich world is deeply implicated in the process. Civil conflicts are fuelled
by arms and monetary transfers that originate in the developed world, and
their destabilizing effects are felt in the developing world in everything from
globally interconnected terrorism to refugee flows, the export of drugs, the
spread of infectious disease and organized crime.
These considerations reinforce the Commission’s view that human
security is indeed indivisible. There is no longer such a thing as a humani-
tarian catastrophe occurring ‘in a faraway country of which we know little.’
On 11 Sept 2001 global terrorism, with its roots in complex conflicts in dis-
tant lands, struck the US homeland: impregnable lines of continental defense
proved an illusion even for the world’s most powerful state. At the same time,
around 40 per cent of the victims of the World Trade Center attacks were non-
Americans, from some 80 countries. In an interdependent world, in which
security depends on a framework of stable sovereign entities, the existence of
fragile states, failing states, states who through weakness or ill-will harbour
those dangerous to others, or states that can only maintain internal order
by means of gross human rights violations, can constitute a risk to people
everywhere.
(International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty 2001: 5)
There could be no clearer exposition of the seamlessness of Rosenau’s
domestic–foreign divide, or the transnational implications of the human security
discourse. This principle is implicit in the spontaneity with which both ordinary
people and the governments of the world’s most prosperous nation states have
responded to the overwhelming need for assistance acknowledged and requested
by both the people and the governments, except India, in the tsunami affected
countries. Although India along the Tamil Nadu and Kerala coasts and in the
Andaman and Nicobar Islands has been one of the worst affected countries, the
Indian government with its 8.7 per cent economic growth in 2003–4 is determined
to be acknowledged as an economic power able to attend to its own problems.
It remains to be seen whether this stance will continue or be modified in view
of the scale of the disaster, India’s increasingly important role in regional and
international security and objective to become a major power. To paraphrase John
Donne, if no man is an island, neither can any single country thrive solely on its
own resources.
The seven vectors of human insecurity
In 1994, the UNDP Human Development Report cast the spotlight on the seven
vectors it considers constitute the key threats to human security. The report
identified these as economic security, food security, health security, environmen-
tal security, personal security, community security and political security (UNDP
1994: 25). These are what I call the seven horsemen of the apocalypse – the seven
elements which may bring unexpected disaster to the human being and over
which the individual may have little direct control. The perception that human
security would be enhanced by addressing these sources of insecurity led the
UNDP to call for ‘a profound transition in thinking – from nuclear security to
human security’ (UNDP 1994: 22). Feelings of insecurity, it stressed, arise within
the patterns of our daily lives ‘more than from the dread of a cataclysmic world
event’ (ibid.). The report defined human security as ‘safety from such chronic
threats as hunger, disease and repression . . . it means protection from sudden and
hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life’ (UNDP 1994: 23).
The seven vectors of human insecurity identified earlier encompass two major
elements: they include both freedom from want and freedom from fear. Freedom
from want subsumes the economic and social aspects of human insecurity;
freedom from fear, the political and civil aspects. These have been foremost in the
UN’s formulations of international law, covenants and protocols since its
inception; however, owing to the ideological divide during the Cold War the
concepts of freedom from want and freedom from fear became dispersed into
separate entities as reflected in the 1966 Covenants on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights and on Civil and Political Rights, with one side in that era
privileging freedom from want – the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights – and the other side privileging freedom from fear – the Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights. In 1945, the then US Secretary of State had proclaimed ‘only
victory on both fronts can assure the world of an enduring peace’ (UNDP 1994:
24). This universal note has been heard more often since the 1993 Vienna
conference on human rights, particularly in the pronouncements of the former
Secretary General of the UN, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and Mary Robinson, the
former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.6 Only since the end of the
Cold War, has there been a concerted return to recognizing the indivisibility of
both sets of ‘freedoms’, for both are essential to enhancing human capabilities7
and security.
In this report, the UNDP distinguishes human security from human development
which it sees as a ‘broader concept’. Whilst human development is considered to
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be a ‘process’ of expanding the choices available to human beings – thus
enhancing their capabilities – human security provides a policy framework in
which to ‘exercise these choices safely and freely’ (UNDP 1994: 24). The nexus
between the two concepts, human security and human development, is obvious:
war and insecurity entrench underdevelopment, inhibit human development and
heighten the impact of the seven vectors of human insecurity. Whilst the human
security concept has been criticized as being too encompassing to be practicable
and too awkward to be implemented, its contribution lies in its people-centred
focus and the emphasis it brings to our consciousness that security cannot be
achieved or maintained through military arms alone. The two sides of human
security – freedom from want and freedom from fear – impel us to re-examine the
concept of security and an appropriate policy framework for its realization, in
holistic terms. The UNDP 1994 report asserts,
The concept of human security stresses that people should be able to take
care of themselves: all people should have the opportunity to meet their most
essential needs and to earn their own living. This will set them free and help
ensure that they can make a full contribution to development – their own
development and that of their communities, their countries and the world.
Human security is a critical ingredient of participatory development. Human
security is therefore not a defensive concept – the way territorial or military
security is. Instead, human security is an integrative concept . . . It cannot be
brought about through force, with armies standing against armies. It can
happen only if we agree that development must involve all people.
(UNDP 1994: 24)
The human security concept thus necessarily entails redefining the concept of
state sovereignty and the moral purpose of the state. The modern nation state is
perceived to exist for the benefit of the people, to serve the people in providing
public goods and services and to protect them against unexpected disaster. The
people do not exist for the benefit of an inchoate state, dictator or ruler. Unlike
former formulations of the sovereign state, which had pretensions to ‘ownership’
of their citizens, the modern nation state is held accountable, through the system
of contractual international law underpinning modern international society, for
the well-being of its citizens. In democratic governance, sovereignty resides in the
people not in the state. Commenting on this different social ontology which marks
the modern nation state from its conceptual predecessors, Chris Reus-Smit argues
that the ‘moral purpose of the modern state lies in the augmentation of the
individual’s purposes and potentialities, cultivation of a social, economic and
political order that enables individuals to engage in the self-directed pursuit of
their “interests” ’ (Reus-Smit 1999: 152). This transformation in the concept of
sovereignty and what constitutes rightful state action, he perceives to have given
rise to a ‘new set of basic institutional practices’ (Reus-Smit 1999: 163). His
approach represents a marked divergence from that of Hedley Bull and leads to
considerations of what the international community should do, if a state is
perceived to engage in action which infringes the notion of ‘rightful state action’ –
that is, when is international intervention justified in the name of protecting peo-
ple, when their state has manifestly failed in its obligations to do so? When is
intervention justified, indeed required, to put in place the institutions to enhance
human security? The Canadian sponsored report by the ICISS sought to provide
answers to these questions with its proposed principles and framework for justi-
fiable international intervention, including non-military intervention and targeted
economic, diplomatic and travel sanctions. It states,
The current debate about intervention for human protection purposes takes
place in a historical, political and legal context of evolving international stan-
dards of conduct for states and individuals, including the development of new
and stronger norms and mechanisms for the protection of human rights.
Human rights have now become a mainstream part of international relations
law, and respect for human rights a central subject and responsibility of inter-
national relations.
(International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty 2001: 6)
The ICISS report responds to the views of civil society and humanitarian aid
agencies that the concept of ‘humanitarian intervention’ should not be ‘securi-
tized’ or ‘militarized’. It therefore applies the notion of ‘intervention for human
protection purposes’ (ICISS 2001: 9) to the principles and framework it proposes
to guide international action when human security has been impugned by the
government of the sovereign state itself. In view of the overwhelming failures of
the international community at Srebrenica, Rwanda and in Cambodia, the report
proposes that the international community no longer has an option of ‘doing
nothing’; the ‘responsibility to protect’ applies to both national governments and
the international community. The report defines the term ‘intervention for human
protection purposes’ as
[A]ction taken against a state or its leaders, without its or their consent, for
purposes which are claimed to be humanitarian or protective. By far the most
controversial form of such intervention is military . . . But we are also very
much concerned with alternatives to military action, including all forms of
preventive measures, and coercive intervention measures – sanctions and
criminal prosecutions – falling short of military intervention. Such coercive
measures are discussed in this report in two contexts: their threatened use as
a preventive measure, designed to avoid the need for military intervention
arising; and their actual use as a reactive measure, but as an alternative to
military force.8
(International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty 2001: 9)
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The principles and framework which may guide international intervention,
according to the ICISS, emerge from four basic objectives. They are:
 to establish clearer rules, procedures and criteria for determining whether,
when and how to intervene;
 to establish the legitimacy of military intervention when necessary and
after all other approaches have failed;
 to ensure that military intervention, when it occurs, is carried out only for
the purposes proposed, is effective, and is undertaken with proper concern
to minimize the human costs and institutional damage that will result; and
 to help eliminate, where possible, the causes of conflict while enhancing
the prospects for durable and sustainable peace.
(International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty 2001: 11)
These objectives highlight the concern evident throughout the ICISS report that
military intervention can do more harm than good, can exacerbate underlying causes
of ethnic conflict, can give primacy to the international linkages of domestic
opposition groups without improving the quality of life of the people and can have
heavy human costs in the indirect casualties of military intervention. The report
suggests that alternative means of resolving the causes of intra-state conflict and
sustaining any resultant peace settlement are preferable to military intervention.
The title of the ICISS report, The Responsibility to Protect, refers to both the
domestic policies of sovereign states in relation to their citizens, and to interna-
tional society which, it is suggested, has concomitant responsibilities to prevent
human crises occurring through activation of early-warning measures; to react
with measures which in the first instance do not include military action and to
enact measures to re-build conflict-torn societies through appropriate develop-
ment policies involving a mix of economic, social and political measures. The
report’s preference for non-military intervention is noteworthy, given the ongoing
spectacle of the turmoil in Iraq resulting from full-scale, unilateral invasion of a
sovereign state by a ‘coalition of the willing’, resulting, arguably in less, rather
than more, security for the average citizen of that war-torn country, caught in the
cross-hairs of what is so recognizably a civil war.
At the same time as it proposes these principles and framework for interven-
tion when human security has been seriously jeopardized, the ICISS report yet
upholds the basic principle of international society, that of non-interference in the
internal affairs of a sovereign state, lest intervention do ‘more harm than good,
especially to civilian populations’ (ICISS 2001: 29). Citing this ‘principle of non-
intervention’ as the ‘norm from which any departure has to be justified’, the
ICISS draws attention to the dire consequences of ill-considered interventions.
The norm of non-intervention is the equivalent in international affairs of the
Hippocratic principle – first do no harm. Intervention in the domestic affairs
of states is often harmful. It can destabilize the order of states, while fanning
ethnic or civil strife. When internal forces seeking to oppose a state believe
that they can generate outside support by mounting campaigns of violence,
the internal order of all states is potentially compromised. The rule against
intervention in internal affairs encourages states to solve their own internal
problems and prevent these from spilling over into a threat to international
peace and security.
(International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty 2001: 31)
Whilst the ICISS acknowledges that military intervention is sometimes
unavoidable when state collapse leads to such wholesale civil violence and
repression, massacre, genocide, or ethnic cleansing that it ‘shocks the conscience’
of the international community ‘or which present[s] such a clear and present dan-
ger to international security, that [it] require[s] coercive military intervention’
(ICISS 2001: 32) to redress, yet the ICISS emphasizes that
Most internal political or civil disagreements, even conflicts, within states do
not require coercive intervention by external powers. The non-interference
rule not only protects states and governments: it also protects peoples and
cultures, enabling societies to maintain the religious, ethnic, and civiliza-
tional differences that they cherish.
(International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty 2001: 31)
Given that the concept of international society rests on an international order
of sovereign, interdependent states cooperating with each other, the ICISS
upholds the norm of non-interference as a general principle underpinning
relations between states. Except under the extreme circumstances alluded to
above, the ICISS avers that the interests of all members of the UN, ‘are best
served if all states, large and small, abstain from intervening or interfering in the
domestic affairs of other states’ (ICISS 2001: 31).
It is a position espoused also by Genee M. Lyons and James Mayall, whose
work highlights the interactions between the individual and the group, and the
impact of multiple identities within minorities whose ethnic and political linkages
may predispose them to severe human rights violations from the guardians of the
nation state. International laws setting out human rights protections must extend
to groups as well as individuals; yet intervention by the international community
to protect such groups, Lyons and Mayall acknowledge, is fraught with difficul-
ties, even though it is these areas of contested authority which, historically, have
spawned the violent civil conflicts of the post-Cold War era (Lyons and Mayall
2003: 210). ‘Recent violations of rights . . . have resulted from the individual’s
identity with a group, be it ethnic or religious, an indigenous people or as women’
Lyons and Mayall assert. The formulation should also include ‘children’ in the
wake of the tragedy at Beslan, where the terrorists obviously did not accede
to the UN conventions protecting the rights of the child, and where children
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were ‘targeted with intent’. Lyons and Mayall ask the question, ‘How can the
international community respond effectively to violations of group rights, espe-
cially in cases of divided societies where governments have failed and political
leaders have authorized violations as a matter of official policy?’ (Lyons and
Mayall 2003: 200). It is in such societies which have failed to implement pluralist
policies protecting minority group rights that severe inter-ethnic violence has
flared. As Woosang Kim (2002) has convincingly argued, the human rights of
minorities may be ‘insecure even in democratic societies’ for the apparent
adoption of democratic institutions in a society or polity ‘does not automatically
guarantee the human rights of minorities’. There needs to be an appropriate
institutional and legal framework underpinning minority rights (Kim 2002: 49).
The social, cultural and political exclusion experienced by minorities and
indigenous peoples whose well-being is jeopardized by adverse circumstances
often leads to such deprivation, destitution and hopelessness that conflict is
inevitable, with consequential implications for transnational security. As Lyons
and Mayall argue
The failure to meet pluralist aspirations not only threatens the stability of
domestic society, but also calls into question the solidarity of international
society, first through its impact on the immediate region and then more
broadly through the processes of contemporary globalization.
(Lyons and Mayall 2003: 211)
Protection of human rights issues goes to the heart of the human security
discourse. How can freedom from want and freedom from fear be restored in
divided societies without exacerbating an already fragile human security situation?
In the post-Cold War era, Lyons and Mayall have identified the two most serious
challenges to the UN’s human rights regime – group identity as a source of civil
conflict and the proper role of the international community in the face of gross
human rights abuses which create extreme humanitarian emergencies (Lyons and
Mayall 2003: 209). It is this nexus of issues which the ICISS has presented as the
international community’s ‘responsibility to react’ so that gross human rights
violations cease; and the ‘responsibility to rebuild’ in the event that international
intervention – military or non-military – should be effected. Rebuilding the
economic, social and political institutions becomes essential to sustaining the
peace in post-conflict societies so that freedom from want and freedom from fear
can be realized. Effective conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding
strategies require the promotion and protection of human rights – economic,
social and cultural as well as civil and political – if the seven vectors of human
insecurity are to be held in check, for ‘peace that is not accompanied by strate-
gies for the promotion and protection of human rights is unlikely to be a lasting
peace’ (Ramcharan 2002: 5). A central plank in this policy approach is alleviat-
ing poverty and putting in place socially inclusive policies which will redress
marginalization of dispossessed, disadvantaged groups. Ramcharan argues, ‘The
assault on poverty is an integral part of the quest for dignity, equality, respect, and
decent life-chances in the world. The world beyond September 11th must pursue
a determined assault on poverty. Global security would simply not be possible in
a world of increasing poverty’ (Ramcharan 2002: 3).
For more than 50 years, it has been a fundamental plank of Western, liberal
political theory that human rights are better protected in prosperous, pluralistic,
democratic societies where minorities have equal access to the protections and
opportunities under law as other groups in the society. Both assimilationist (the US
approach) and multicultural (the western European approach) policy frameworks
have evolved to guarantee such rights and to seek to minimize inter-ethnic group
conflict. Economic and social opportunities supporting civil and political rights in
pluralistic societies promote the theoretical position that achievement of the
freedoms unleashes the creative capacity of the individual, which in turn enhances
his potential to contribute to the well-being of the larger group. Conversely, human
potential is inhibited where the freedoms are lacking as in controlled economies or
in societies beset by corruption and political oppression. Such impoverished soci-
eties – impoverished both in economic terms and in the lack of opportunity for
human beings to realize their potential – are generally characterized by widespread
abuses of human rights, economic, social and cultural as well as civil and politi-
cal. The nexus between improved protection of human rights and poverty allevia-
tion in all its dimensions imbues the public policy agenda of ‘good governance’
delineated by Sen (1999), the World Bank (2002), UNDP (2002) and a host of
other writers. Indeed, the horizontal dispersion of comparative affluence has been
identified as the crucial factor in establishing viable frameworks for the protection
and respect of human rights (Land and Ersson 2000: 280–5). Protection of human
rights is considered integral to good governance and central to human security
(Ramcharan 2002: 81). In developing, impoverished countries such as Myanmar
(Burma) with an unenviable, international reputation for gross violations of human
rights against all sectors of its citizens, seeking to repair the ravages of decades of
civil and ethnic conflict, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights has outlined
the path to improved governance.
Once prima facie evidence has been established that violations of human
rights have occurred, the government has the burden to disprove the allega-
tions or to show that it has taken, is taking, or intends to take measures to
guarantee respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
(Ramcharan 2002: 89)
This is the fundamental responsibility of the state: the ‘responsibility to
protect’. However, the logic of the protection of human rights being at the heart
of human security, has led to questions being raised, whether in the changing
relations between states since the terrorist attacks on the US on September 11,
2001, human security is not once again being submerged in a security agenda
which privileges the state. Brunnee and Toope raise the spectre of international
human rights protections being ignored, subverted, and over-ridden by the major
powers’ political imperatives to shore up their all too obvious vulnerability to the
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attacks of the dispossessed and the disenchanted. The doctrine of the right to
pre-emptive strike, enunciated by the US and now by Russia, has the capacity
to destroy the principles on which international society has operated since 1945, the
notion of a society of equal, independent sovereign states, observing the norm of
non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. Brunnee and Toope write,
Around the globe, the debate over response to global terrorism has raised
hard issues concerning the interplay of security concerns, human rights,
democratic governance and the use of force. Within the US, influential voices
are articulating a merging of these concerns in a way that fundamentally
challenges the concepts of state sovereignty, non-intervention and political
independence. Fear seems to be the driving force for normative change. This
fear is accentuated by the now-recognized vulnerability of modern society . . .
All values are becoming subsumed within the value of security, justifying the
use of force against other states in an everbroadening set of circumstances.
(Brunnee and Toope 2004: 248)
The ‘human’ seems to have been lost; and only a perverted concept of ‘secu-
rity’ remains, again privileging major states with the capacity to launch inter-state
aggression against weaker opponents. The propensity for allegedly democratic
states to blatantly subvert their own human rights norms when implementing the
doctrine of pre-emptive strike as a defensive measure against trans-state terrorism
has become a component of the post-September 11, state-privileging security
agenda. This new formula appears to relegate humanitarian responsibilities to
second place, sets aside the norms of international justice and disregards the
Geneva Conventions in the pursuit of revenge. In the US, the second Bush admin-
istration’s (2001–6) cynical policy of ‘rendering’ prisoners (at least some of
whom may be innocent) to other states for the express purpose of being tortured,
not only diminishes the international stature of that beacon of democracy, but also
jeopardizes the entire human rights framework enshrined in international law. As
Ramesh Thakur (2005), senior vice rector of the United Nations University, has
observed, the Manichean international foreign policies pursued since September 11
are suborning the very values for which democracies stand. ‘We must not’,
Thakur states, ‘privilege security and order to such an extent as to destroy our
most cherished values of liberty and justice in the search for an unattainable
absolute security.’ Abrogating civil rights leads to the type of shocking extrajudi-
cial executions of innocent citizens such as Jean Charles de Menezes, the young
Brazilian shot seven times in the head by British police in a tragic case of
mistaken identity. No matter what the provocation, as Thakur (2005) states, ‘No
government has a licence to kill.’ Suborning these principles of civil rights in the
name of an elusive ‘absolute security’ places in jeopardy the very framework of
international law and domestic justice on which the universal human rights
agenda has been based. Brunnee and Toope present this phenomenon of the
Western democratic industrialized world actively espousing the strategies and
mindsets of the non-democratic polities of yesteryear, whose murderous practices
the UDHR was intended to circumscribe, as a confronting ‘confusion of
international legal norms that threatens to undermine constraints on the use of
force in international society’. In their view,
This confusion occurs when attempts are made to collapse legally distinct
categories such as human rights, refugee protection, and threats to interna-
tional peace and security into one super-category of threat pre-emption,
using the other categories simply as examples of dangers that can be invoked
to justify action as defensive, rather than aggressive.
(Brunnee and Toope 2004: 249)
Their discomfort with military intervention, its obvious capacity to be misused
to disguise old-fashioned, naked aggression, leads them to call for a reassessment
of the human security agenda and particularly the role of Canada, one of the main
sponsoring nations for the human security concept. They assert,
The basic premise of that agenda has been that security concerns should be
evaluated primarily on the basis of the well-being of people rather than the
physical security of states. In the vast majority of cases, the promotion of
human security calls not for the resort to military force but for measures that
build social and economic capital and improve local governance. In the face
of recent developments, Canada must reclaim, and probably recast,
the human security agenda. It should also resist arguments for excessive reliance
on the use of force. Moreover, caution is warranted where human security
arguments are deployed to bolster defensive considerations that do not actually
rise to a level justifying the use of armed force under international law.
(Brunnee and Toope 2004: 249)
To intervene or not to intervene, that is the Security Council’s dilemma. Under
the conditions of global governance it is the Security Council’s task to authorize
interventions and to stigmatize interventions such as that in Iraq, which proceed
without its authorization, as ‘illegal’; yet its dilemma whether to do so, or not, and
its perceived paralysis of will on various occasions have resulted in a proposed
parallel coalition of democratic states which would take on this responsibility
when the Security Council fails to act.9 Such a coalition is considered ‘highly
problematic’ (Brunnee and Toope 2004: 253), reminiscent of the coalitions of
Western powers which stripped imperial China of its sovereignty in the late
nineteenth century. Acknowledging that the Security Council’s standing may have
been impugned by its incapacity to balance its responsibility to restrain the use of
force with its responsibility to mobilize forces for human protection, Brunnee and
Toope warn that were such a proposal to be implemented it would ‘only serve to
further poison international relations’ without resolving the basic dilemma.
‘Developing states’ they assert, ‘have been fighting for years to destroy the
outmoded notion that there is a core group of “civilized states” that provides the
sole model to emulate, if a state seeks international credibility’ (Brunnee and
Toope 2004: 253). Not only does such a coalition evoke the nineteenth-century
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era of ‘gunboat diplomacy’, but also it raises the spectre of neocolonialism,
against which the developing world is constantly on guard. Moreover, in view of
some of the actions by the core of so-called civilized states, it is a moot point
whether they could still be called ‘civilized’.
The ethical issues inherent in the notion of intervention for human protection
purposes are thus not easily resolved. In the case of Iraq, the cry of ‘oil for blood’
is only one amongst many such issues which have beclouded that enterprise. To
obviate further undermining of the Security Council, whilst clarifying the
framework for intervention for human protection purposes, Brunnee and Toope
urge the international community to resist ‘a blending of humanitarian and security
justifications that could eviscerate the constraints on the unilateral use of force’
(Brunnee and Toope 2004: 254). Upholding the norms which have guided
international society since the establishment of the UN enhances international
solidarity. In Brunnee and Toope’s view, norms matter; subverting them puts the
whole architecture of international law at risk. They caution, ‘States continue to
define their relationships with each other through political choices that are
influenced by prevailing norms. That is why the promotion of norms matters in
international relations’ (Brunnee and Toope 2004: 249). If the human is to be put
back into security and not overwhelmed by renewed state-privileging doctrines, the
human security agenda needs to be implemented and upheld consistent with inter-
national norms and human rights law. The paradox is, can this ever be achieved
through military force alone or is there a much broader socio-economic agenda nec-
essary to put in place the foundations of a sustained peace in conflict-riven soci-
eties, and to bring the formerly excluded, marginalized groups within an inclusive
policy agenda which promotes opportunity, participation and empowerment for all
citizens regardless of ethnic or group affiliation? The ‘greed or grievance’10 theory
of war and civil conflict suggests that sustaining the peace requires a multifaceted,
socio-economic and political approach to rebuilding war-torn societies, if, in Kofi
Annan’s words, the ‘pillars of human security’ are to be built on firm foundations.
Common, cooperative and comprehensive security 
in Asia-Pacific perspective
Security is seen to be integral to sustainable development. At the Second
Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow (1999) Pamela J. Noda and her
colleagues delineated the crucial linkages between human security, sustainable
development and civil society. At this dialogue, keynote speaker, Amartya Sen,
emphasized the critical interface between participatory, democratic governance and
the capacity for governments to exercise their responsibility to protect their citizens
from sudden disasters. With an eye on the precipitate destitution suffered by many
vulnerable groups at the onset of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, Sen argues,
[I]n ensuring security in the form of avoidance of disaster – whether
originating in natural calamities or in policy blunders – democracy and
participatory politics have important roles to play . . .
The challenge of development includes both the elimination of persistent
and endemic deprivation, and the prevention of sudden and severe
destitution . . . the otherwise highly illuminating literature on ‘sustainable
development’ often misses the fact that what people need for their security is
not only the sustainability of overall development, but also the need for social
protection when people’s predicaments diverge and some groups are thrown
brutally to the wall while other groups experience nothing like that.
(Sen 1999a: 26–9)
Conscious of the historical predilection of Asian governments to value
economic development over participatory politics, Sen dismisses the notion
that economic deprivation can be better addressed by authoritarian governments.
He states,
That authoritarian regimes are better in fostering economic growth (a claim
largely based on selective evidence) has not received any serious general
empirical support in extensive intercountry comparisons . . . success of a
market economy is facilitated by a supportive economic environment, rather
than by the harshness of the political climate.
(Sen 1999a: 31)
Following Japanese PM Obuchi Keizo at the First Intellectual Dialogue on
Building Asia’s Tomorrow (1998), Sen takes the position that denial of basic
political freedoms and civil rights represents serious human deprivation as much
as does economic destitution. Both Obuchi and Sen emphasize the need to take a
broad view of security, if human beings are to avoid, what Henry David Thoreau
(1854, rpt. 1949) has called, ‘lives of quiet desperation’, and instead lead ‘lives of
creativity, without having their survival threatened or their dignity impaired’ (Sen
1999a: 31). Human security is seen as a comprehensive approach to dealing with
the ‘menaces that threaten the survival, daily life, and dignity of human beings
and to strengthening the efforts to confront these threats’ (ibid.).
The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 demonstrated conclusively that state and
regime security were interlinked with human security. Formerly authoritarian or
pseudo-democratic regimes fell from power in Indonesia, Thailand, South Korea
and The Philippines amidst the clamours of the vulnerable whose human security
had been so fearfully imperilled. Succeeding governments in these countries saw
the necessity of moving to implement more transparent systems of democratic
governance which would both enhance the political and civil rights of the
people and strengthen their economic, social and cultural rights. The crisis
demonstrated not only the inextricable linkage between freedom from want and
freedom from fear, but also that state and regime security were dependent on
human security, a concept, which, as Pranee Thiparat has stated, ‘has emerged as
a major area of debate within ASEAN’ (Thiparat 2001: 1). ASEAN, she asserts,
‘has to adopt a new policy direction that is more people-centred’ (ibid.) and less
state-centric.
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The reform programmes in these countries which followed the 1997 financial
crisis highlighted the long road some Asian governments have travelled since 1945
when national security was seen solely in state-centric terms. In the developing coun-
tries of Asia, the three dominant paradigms privileging the state security policies of
the newly independent countries after the Second World War – common, cooperative
and comprehensive security – all looked to economic security as the legitimating
credentials of government. In the Asian region, the economics–politics–security
nexus, as Harris and Mack (1997) have shown, has underpinned the security practice
of most governments both during the Cold War and since its demise. These para-
digms have all asked: security for whom and against what? Security of the state or
regime has been paramount and national resources have therefore been marshalled
against threats to the state or regime arising from ethnic and communist insurgencies
and internal instability. Security policy has been built around protecting the core
values of the state rather than the individual; and insecurity has been perceived to
arise primarily from domestic, internal challenges to political and social order rather
than from external threats. A prime source of domestic insecurity was endemic
poverty; hence the prominence accorded to economic development by post-colonial,
mostly authoritarian Asian regimes that feared internal instability even more than
external aggression initiated either by their neighbours or by one of the major
powers. Until comparatively recently, the Asian view of security – in both realist
and liberal paradigms – has been state-centric, inward-looking, focussed on ethnic
and communist insurgency, subversion and suppression of political dissent
(Acharya 2002: 72), characterized by a predominant focus on state sovereignty and
non-intervention, and in which promotion and protection of human rights and demo-
cratic governance have not been the key legitimating principles of government. In
2001, Thiparat called for ASEAN to include ‘more forces from civil society such as
NGOs, educational institutions, think tanks, foundations, into the process of
reformulating its security policy’ (Thiparat 2001: 3).
In recent years, ASEAN’s approach to security has been reviewed and
modified, in line with the realization that economic development alone cannot
sustain state or regime security. As Rizmal Sukma acknowledges, ASEAN has
come to query whether it needed to choose between human security and political
and economic stability, or whether each was a function of the other. Sukma states,
While it might be presumptuous to argue that the emphasis on human
security will automatically ensure political and economic stability, one can
make a reasonably strong claim that ignoring it will definitely serve as a
recipe for disaster.
(Sukma 2001: 62)
Since the 1997 financial crisis, a more holistic approach has been signalled
among ASEAN states, which gives greater prominence to the democratic
governance and human rights issues integral to human security, and the need to
be seen to act as responsible international citizens. The human deprivation and
insecurity generated by the financial crisis had such severe impacts on regime,
national and regional security, that it engendered new policy directions. Sukma
points out that the crisis demonstrated conclusively to ASEAN governments that
‘when human security was ignored, the people would challenge the state’
(Sukma 2001: 64). Recent conflicts between the Muslim and Buddhist commu-
nities in Southern Thailand also support this view. The growing strength of civil
society in Thailand may be gauged by the pressure exerted on Prime Minister
Thaksin Shinawatra to properly investigate the violence against Muslims in
Narathiwat province in late 2004 when at least 80 people died in horrific
circumstances at the hands of Thai security forces. It is clear that the absence
of political security, especially human rights, can itself pose a threat to overall
political and economic stability (Sukma 2001: 65).
On the international scene, participation in the ‘War on Terror’ has yoked together
the twin poles of this redefined moral responsibility of the state. Seeking to formu-
late their own responses to these demands, consistent with their individual views on
national or regime security, Asia-Pacific states appear to have evoked aspects of the
common security paradigm of the late Cold War era. First articulated by the 1982
Palme Commission, common security emphasized the responsibility of international
society to manage the global commons in the interests of joint survival, rather than
to continue to operate conflictually in a ‘them’or ‘us’mode. The end of the Cold War
in 1989 and the onset of the War on Terror in 2001 have given new meaning to com-
mon security’s dictum that the ‘legitimate security interests of “them” as well as “us”
be acknowledged’ (Thakur 1997: 67–8). The commitment to joint survival inherent
in common security has taken on renewed significance in the context of the rising
incidence of global terrorism. Whilst originating in the need to limit the arms race,
common security’s principle of achieving security with, rather than against others,
has led to new security initiatives in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly with regard
to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and possibly North Korea, although the
solution to this problem is still emerging, which, as Alan Dupont (ABC radio inter-
view, 13 November 2004) has articulated, could well be bound up with the problem-
atic security relationship between Japan and the PRC. For the moment, the US needs
the cooperation of both the PRC and Japan in the War on Terror. Ultimately it will
need to underpin long-term accommodation between the moderate Muslim world
and international society, if the War on Terror is to have closure, as did the Cold War.
In seeking to come to grips with these new demands on concepts of national, state
or regime security, some Asia-Pacific governments are moving away from state-led
economic development as the legitimating principle towards a new accommodation
between the principles of human security and state security. This new accommoda-
tion may be termed ‘holistic security’ and will be discussed more fully in the
following section. Suffice it to draw the congruence at this point between human
security and political and economic stability. For Sukma,
Human security serves as a pre-requisite for the attainment of sustainable
political and economic stability. And political and economic stability serve
as an important condition within which human security can be attained.
(Sukma 2001: 55)
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The two organizations devoted to enhancing regional security in the Asia-Pacific,
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN – established 1967) and
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF – established 1993) have both attempted to
formulate new approaches to Asian security policy suited to the post-Cold War era.
These concepts, comprehensive and cooperative security, remain state-centric.
Comprehensive security, a term derived from the Brundtland Commission report,
has the advantage of giving prominence to the non-military aspects of security.
It recognizes the potential threats arising from environmental degradation, popu-
lation pressures, limited water resources, health crises and state collapse. As
announced at the second meeting of the ARF in 1995, comprehensive security was
defined by the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) as
‘the pursuit of sustainable security in all fields (personal, political, economic,
social, cultural, military and environmental) in both the domestic and external
spheres, through cooperative means’ (Tan and Cossa 2001: 32).
At first sight, comprehensive security appears to reflect the seven key elements
of the UNDP’s human security agenda designed to achieve both freedom from
want and freedom from fear. However, as the ASEAN–Institute for Strategic
International Studies (ISIS) fifth memorandum sets out, comprehensive security
appears to be a re-packaging of the common security policies of the late-Cold War
era, with the additional ingredient of what is designated ‘national and regional
resilience’. Comprehensive security is said to promote ‘balanced national develop-
ment through endeavours in every aspect of life: ideological, political, economic,
social, cultural and military’ (ibid.). While the concept does reflect the security-
development nexus, its objective – to strengthen ‘national and regional resilience’ –
revives the state-led national security formulae of the Cold War era and ASEAN’s
anti-Communist predecessor, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).
In the view of Tan and Cossa, ‘national and regional resilience’ is ‘an inward-
looking concept aimed at developing a so-called resistance capability against
external pressures and internal subversion in a holistic way’ (Tan and Cossa 2001:
32). It does not move Asian security policy towards the human security agenda.
Each state is encouraged to pursue its own national interests and militarization as
a contribution to ‘regional resilience’. This concept is designed to enhance
regional autonomy, whilst inhibiting the potential for unwanted intervention in
regional affairs by the major powers, but at the same time maintaining the advan-
tage of the American security umbrella to prevent the emergence of a regional
hegemon.11 The interactions of the 10-member ASEAN and the 23-member
ARF are perceived to be moving towards a recognizable ‘security community’,
but not a ‘defense community’ (Acharya 1998: 218). Multilateral dialogue, norm
sharing and confidence-building exercises through both Track II (senior official
level) and Track III (civil society/non-state actors) processes reinforce the under-
standings of the long-established bilateral treaty mechanisms between individual
members of both ASEAN and the ARF, and institutionalize the expectations that
differences will be resolved peacefully in accordance with the ‘ASEAN Way’,
without recourse to the formal conflict resolution mechanisms of the European
CSCE/OSCE.12
The sister concept of cooperative security, proposed as a possible policy
platform for the ARF by former Australian Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans (also
co-editor of the ICISS report discussed earlier) has the advantage of encouraging
multilateralism over bilateralism, and favouring dialogue on a multilateral basis
which can contribute to the development of the norms and values at the heart of
the constructivist approach to international relations. Non-military solutions are
preferred to military ones; it is inclusive rather than exclusive with regards to both
membership and issues to be discussed and while states are recognized as being
the main parties, non-state actors are also recognized as significant players who
may be part of both the problem and the solution. Tan and Cossa point out that
the notion of a communal understanding of power embodied in the concept of
cooperative security allows it to incorporate elements of common, collective and
comprehensive security reflecting both the ‘realist’ and ‘liberal’ perspectives – the
notion of a cooperative balance of power maintained through solidarity and
reciprocity principles espoused by Metternich; and the value of multilateral
dialogue favoured by Castlereagh (Tan and Cossa 2001: 33). It has been said that
the concept of cooperative security is a process for managing security, whilst
comprehensive security provides the substance for what is to be protected
(Caballero-Anthony 2001: 28). The limitations of cooperative security are identified
by Ramesh Thakur.
Cooperative security seems to be a remarkably similar beast to collective
security. Does it really take us substantially ahead of the U.N. Charter? The
limitations to operationalizing a cooperative security system are also very
similar to the shortcomings of the U.N. system. Cooperative security does not
avoid the contradictions and dilemmas inherent in a system of collective
security. In the real world, cases of aggression and genocide are rarely clear-
cut. Ambiguities would destroy cooperative security just as surely as they
thwart collective security. Alternatively, if all the Charter principles were to
be operationalized, then would not a cooperative security system be in place?
(Thakur 1997: 69)
Thakur thus finds both cooperative security and the earlier Cold War concept
of collective security unable to achieve their stated aims. He notes that the intrinsic
tension in the collective security concept caused by the veto clause (Article 27.3
of the UN Charter) means that in practice only the major powers can threaten
international peace. Since, in his view, war between smaller powers cannot
of itself jeopardize world peace, collective security does not apply to small states;
and since it is not enforceable against the major powers owing to the veto capac-
ity of the permanent members of the Security Council, collective security is
impossible to operationalize (Thakur 1997: 69–70). What he has labelled the
‘extensive decision-blocking competence of the permanent members’ (ibid.) has
in effect had the anomalous consequence of the unilateral US-led aggression by
a major power against Iraq, a much smaller power – what might be interpreted as
the pre-UN situation in the relations between states.13
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In comparison to cooperative security, comprehensive security may be seen as
a peculiarly Asian formulation of security which is given expression through
ASEAN norms of regional and national resilience, consensus, consultation and
collective decision making and non-interference in the domestic affairs of
member states. Asian security practice, as Harris and Mack argue, straddles both
the realist and liberal camps. ‘All regional states’ they believe ‘pursue security
policies which embrace both liberal and realist assumptions and prescriptions’
(Harris and Mack 1997: 27). Whilst pursuing confidence-building measures and
developing norms which presuppose peaceful resolution to potential conflicts,
they simultaneously pursue bilateral alliances with the intention of inhibiting the
emergence of any regional hegemon. The relations of South-East Asian states
with North-East Asia, particularly China and Japan, and with the US are pursued
within a mix of political and economic policies aimed at maintaining a balance of
power among potential regional hegemons.
Amitav Acharya has argued that whilst ASEAN has enjoyed the indirect support
of the major Western powers and has provided a framework for broad regional secu-
rity cooperation despite its eschewing of a formal military alliance among members
in favour of long-established bilateral ties which pre-date ASEAN, in practice
ASEAN has sought to inhibit the scope for great power intervention in regional
security matters (Acharya 2002: 1). However, ASEAN’s avowed support for
regional identity and autonomy have been severely tested, first by the Cambodian
settlement, then by the 1999 East Timor intervention and intermittently by crises
arising from Myanmar’s membership since joining ASEAN in 1997. ASEAN has,
however, recently upheld the principles of regional cooperation and solidarity in
insisting, successfully, that Myanmar participate in the Asia–Europe Meeting
(ASEM) meeting held in Hanoi on 7–9 October 2004. The argument here presented
has been that if ASEAN is to agree to the 10 new members of the EU participating,
then the EU must accede to all 10 ASEAN members participating similarly in the
meeting. Since 1997, the new security policy which ASEAN has pursued through
its economic agenda – as expressed in the moves to establish a viable ASEAN Free
Trade Area – and its political agenda, including extensive use of Track II dialogues
in regional security issues, is transforming it from being an inward-looking sub-
regional grouping to one which is proactively developing strategic economic and
political linkages able to sustain its regional position in future.14 Nevertheless,
amongst the original six members of ASEAN (Thailand, Singapore, The Philippines,
Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei) it is doubtful any would wish to be without the
additional insurance of their US alliance, particularly in view of the uncertainties
associated with the rise of China’s power and prestige in the region; and the reshap-
ing of the US–Japan alliance to enable Japan to take a more active military role in
regional security affairs, a controversial development which does not sit well either
with major sections of Japan’s population, or with its neighbours, especially China,
who have bitter memories of Japan’s aggression before and during the Second
World War. As John Chipman asserts, ‘Regional emperors who shed their links with
external powers which play a balancing role will find in their regional relations that
they have no clothes’ (Chipman 1997: 29).
Holistic security – definition and practice
In this context, the answer to the question of ‘Whose security?’ is being protected
by the comprehensive security agenda would clearly favour regime and state
security ahead of human security. Yet Thakur’s observation that security policy
appears to be developing along parallel lines – one favouring the logic of a
national security agenda in accordance with Article 2.7 of the UN Charter which
prohibits interference in the domestic affairs of states, and the other, by contrast,
urging the responsibility of the international community to intervene when there
are gross violations of human rights in any country (Thakur 1997: 67) – obscures
the possibility that the two tendencies may in fact intersect. States or regimes
chary of their sovereignty and autonomy (as all states are, including the major and
middle powers) may seek to reduce the possibility of international intervention on
human protection grounds by implementing public policies which enhance
human security, and subsequently seeking to be recognized as responsible
international citizens. If sustainable development, with its conceptual links to
strengthening civil society, is at the heart of the comprehensive security concept
in principle (Devitt and Acharya 1996: 3), then state-led policy initiatives which
enhance human well-being provide the possibility for transforming the compre-
hensive security concept into one which may be termed holistic security – the
development and application of public policy which privileges human well-being
within the context of state resilience, yet acknowledges ‘the ongoing centrality
that military-related issues play in state and interstate relations’ (Devitt and
Acharya 1996: 10).
Holistic security takes into account the threats to human and national security
arising from endemic poverty, environmental degradation and other transnational
issues, yet gives due weight to Denny Roy’s argument that economic prosperity in
itself does not guarantee peace (Roy 1997: 3); economic interdependence can
increase state vulnerability, a perspective developed by Paul Dibb who observes,
‘Historically, economic prosperity and growing interdependence have not
seen the avoidance of war’ (Harris and Mack 1997: 100). Highlighting the inter-
connections between human, comprehensive and holistic security, Stuart Harris
has drawn attention to the liberal thesis which presents economic development as
a precursor to political liberalization in authoritarian states, since it creates the
resources and conditions for the growth of civil society (Harris and Mack 1997:
60), a concept which underpins sustainable development. Holistic security then
draws attention to the fact that neither the new security agenda implicit in human
security, nor the state-privileging agenda of comprehensive security can, of them-
selves, achieve their stated aims. Analysing the new security issues, Paul Bracken
comments, ‘contrasting the traditional and non-traditional security issues is mis-
leading’ and has made the military dimension seem ‘an outdated type of security
except in highly unlikely circumstances’ (Bracken 2001: 72). In seeking to correct
this imbalance, holistic security gives due weight to both the traditional and the
non-traditional security agenda, from the perspective that each complements
the other. It recognizes the validity of Bracken’s position that it is simplistic to
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simply substitute the ‘new’ – non-military threats – for the ‘old’ military-based
threats in the traditional security paradigm (Bracken 2001: 74).
Holistic security – the merging of human security and comprehensive security
in a framework which privileges human well-being rather than state or regime
survival – places a premium on the public policies inherent in the state’s respon-
sibility to protect its citizens and minorities, by both non-military and military
means. This security concept is foreshadowed in Alan Dupont’s incisive and
timely volume, East Asia Imperilled (2001). Dupont argues,
Even though the territorially constructed state remains the principal actor in
the international system and the standard vehicle for political expression, it
ought not to be enshrined as the only legitimate security referent. As advo-
cates of human security argue, more weight should be given to protecting the
individual from hunger, thirst, disease and repression since the security of the
state has no real meaning if divorced from its human constituents. Human
security and national security are threatened in equal measure by transna-
tional phenomena. The forced displacement of people by governments is
injurious to the security of those individuals compelled to move. Conversely,
the large-scale, unregulated movement of people across borders threatens the
sovereignty and internal cohesion of affected states, especially when illegal
migrants and refugees are of different ethic or religious backgrounds.
(Dupont 2001: 239)
Noting the changes to the international security agenda to take account of
transnational threats such as environmental degradation, unregulated people
movements and transnational crime, Dupont cautions that the causal connections
between these and inter-state conflict have not been demonstrated adequately in
empirical research (Dupont 2001: 11). Tilting towards the holistic security
concept he writes,
Human security as a concept is not without its own failings. Its advocates need
to explain better . . . how the concept can be effectively made operational. There
may be no clear answer to this particular dilemma because human security is
more a statement of principle than a guide for action in areas such as defence
and foreign policy. Protecting people from the manifold hurtful disruptions to
daily life is a worthy societal goal, but giving meaningful effect to it may be
problematic. Nevertheless, the concept of human security underlines the
inefficacy of enshrining the state as the exclusive object of security and
serves a useful purpose in providing an alternative criterion for evaluating the
harmful effects of transnational threats.
(Dupont 2001: 9–10)
Dupont’s work helps to redress the imbalance in the new security discourse.
Along similar lines, the view has been put forward that the new security agenda,
which emphasizes the non-military threats to human and state security, is
essentially an artificial construct promoted by the technologically advanced major
powers to reflect and ‘lock in’ their advantageous power relationships vis-à-vis
the developing world, and thereby control the modernization processes underway
in China and other parts of Asia (Bracken 2001: 73–4). Bracken observes that this
new security agenda delegitimizes the use of military force, but privileges
comparative technological advantage. He states, ‘When the West had total military
advantage, there was little talk about new non-traditional non-military dimen-
sions of security in Western discourse’ (ibid.). In his view, changing the focus of
security to include perceived non-military threats is essentially about control of
the security discourse which is designed to clarify the fault lines of power
relationships among the status quo powers. It does not reflect the underlying
reality of the insecurity which plagues the lives of over a billion people in the
developing world whose lives are frequently in jeopardy from the military
guardians of the state-security apparatus (e.g. Darfur, Myanmar, Zimbabwe).
Nevertheless, in some parts of Asia the new security agenda has served to bring
about civilian control of the military (as in Thailand and South Korea) and to
strengthen the forces of civil society. Holistic security seeks to redress the
imbalance in the new security agenda by bringing both non-military and military
threats to human security into equilibrium. This perspective recognizes the valid-
ity of Sheldon Simon’s observation that the ‘intertextuability of discourses and
texts’ create political discourses that do not necessarily correspond to an existing
social reality, but to other previously existing discourses and the conventions gov-
erning them (Simon 2001: 16). The conventions governing the human security
discourse require that the voices of marginalized groups – both in domestic and
in international society – be heard; but to give effect to this policy position
requires the instrumentality of the state. It is in the marriage of these two
perspectives, seeking to identify the state as the servant of the people, that the
concept of holistic security may make a substantial contribution.
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Since joining ASEAN in July 1997, Myanmar has increasingly pursued an
international policy based on winning and influencing regional friends, and
enhancing its relationships with China (PRC) and India, as counterweights to
Western (US, UK, EU) sanctions and criticism of its human rights record. This
move into the international arena has been a distinct modification of the neutral-
ist and isolationist policies pursued during the era of the late General Ne Win,
who ruled the country from 1962 to 1988, and indeed of the era of Parliamentary
democracy under the late Prime Minister U Nu, during whose terms of office
(1948–58, 1960–2) the country was a founding member of the Non-aligned
Movement (NAM) at the Bandung conference in 1955.1 It is, however, only a
modification, albeit a significant one. In mid-2004, Myanmar’s foreign policy
was described by a government spokesperson in these terms: ‘Since day one, we
are everybody’s friends; we are nobody’s ally’ (Hla Min 2004: 149). Being
everybody’s friends and nobody’s ally marks Myanmar’s re-integration into the
international community, a policy which is likely to continue, whichever military
faction is ultimately in charge in Myanmar. Moreover, it is unlikely that Myanmar’s
military government will revert to the extreme isolationist policies of the Ne Win
era. Whatever the outcome of the National Convention, which reconvened
17 February–31 March 2005,2 the processes of re-integration into the world
economy (initiated with the formal dissolution of the legal framework of the
socialist economy in 1989–90) and international society are likely to continue,
Myanmar style, despite the country’s relinquishment in July 2005 of the ASEAN
chairmanship which it had been due to take up in 2006.
This stance has underpinned the recent security discourse in Myanmar. With no
obvious external threats to the country’s cherished sovereignty, not even from the
US (which is unlikely to invade Iraq-style despite the urging of some of the
Burmese Diaspora), security for the state of Myanmar has been seen primarily as
a function of its domestic politics, a response to the civil war and ethnic insurgen-
cies which erupted at independence from Britain in 1948, the Kuomintang (KMT)
incursions (1950–61), the activities of political dissidents and pro-democracy
activists, the determination of the military regime to cling to power, a fragile
2 The security discourse in
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economy and a socio-economic fabric desperately requiring remedial attention.
Decades of unrest, and constant displacement of many of Myanmar’s people, have
been the people’s legacy since the Japanese invasion in early 1942 abruptly ended
the British colonial administration which had swallowed up the country in three
wars, 1824–6, 1852 and 1885. Myanmar (and its earlier identity as Burma) exem-
plifies the quintessential facets of human insecurity – political, civil, economic,
social and cultural – in all its elements. It is small wonder that the public policies
intended to weave together the threads of the security discourse have been
expressed in official parlance in terms of stability, peace, unity and development.3
Yet the tragedy of modern Myanmar, as many observers and writers have noted,
is that the very policies meant to give effect to these watchwords have privileged
regime and state security at the expense of human security. The consequence of
these policies has been the evolution of a ‘strong regime, [but] weak state’.4 It is
the contention of this book, that the balance in the security discourse in Myanmar
needs to be reversed: a strong and stable state is a function of public policies
which make human security the pre-eminent focus of government policies as well
as provision of goods and services. Not to do so, imperils the very state security
which the military regime seeks to protect as justification for its own continuance
in power.
On 18 October 2004, Myanmar’s regional neighbours in ASEAN and the
international community at large received with some concern the news that the
reformist Prime Minister, General Khin Nyunt, had been relieved of his duties –
‘permitted to retire for health reasons’ in the terms of the official announcement.
He was subsequently reported to have been incarcerated in Myitkyina, in northern
Myanmar, reputedly having been sentenced to 44 years jail, with the possibility
of execution not ruled out, while his former colleagues were subject to rigorous
interrogation in an attempt to obtain information which would implicate him in
an alleged plot against the state. The words of Henry VIII’s Cardinal Wolsey come
to mind as he reflected on his similar calamitous fall from power: fame, Wolsey
said, was like floating on a pig’s bladder, these manner summers in a sea of glory.
The fall of General Khin Nyunt has been similarly precipitous. In mid-2005,
negotiations with Senior General Than Shwe and Vice Senior General Maung Aye
of the SPDC, resulted in the former prime minister’s sentence being commuted to
house arrest, a mercy not accorded to many of his followers who endure lengthy
jail terms.
The former head of the National Intelligence Bureau for some two decades,
and former Secretary-1 of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC),
General Khin Nyunt had received a certain amount of international acclaim, since
being elevated to the Prime Ministership in August 2003, for his guiding of the
military government’s seven-point ‘Roadmap to Democracy’ and initial
reconvening of the National Convention in late 2003 which is charged with draft-
ing the country’s new Constitution. It was reported that the Thai Prime Minister,
Thaksin Shinawatra, who in early December 2004 was invited by the new Prime
Minister, Lt Gen. Soe Win, to pay an official visit to Myanmar, even offered to
send a bouquet of flowers to assist General Khin Nyunt ‘to recover’. Shortly
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afterwards, Prime Minister Thaksin made a brief trip to Yangon, allegedly to
attend the Buddhist Conference and have an opportunity for private talks with
Myanmar leaders. The new Indonesian Foreign Minister made a sudden
unannounced visit to Yangon to check on the situation himself. Such was the
concern that regional economic initiatives, set in train between August 2003
and October 2004 for the express purpose of improving human security, state (and
thereby regional) resilience, might be derailed. Prime Minister Thaksin had called
these initiatives ‘sharing the prosperity’, a visionary, strategic policy reminiscent
of former Thai Prime Minister Chatchai Choonhavan’s policy to ‘turn battlefields
into marketplaces’ which was initiated in the late 1980s to bring the former
Indochina countries into a regional economic co-prosperity sphere.
Thailand’s ‘good neighbour’ policy of course reflects its own security interests.
It is not to the advantage of any of the 10 ASEAN states that any one of them
should collapse; nor is it to the advantage of any that human security in any other
ASEAN state should be so imperilled that refugees fleeing civil unrest should
flood across porous borders, as has happened in the wake of earlier conflicts in
Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and Myanmar. Regional initiatives which enhance
human security in Myanmar by fostering economic development, investing in
human resource development and strengthening social cohesion are insurance
against state collapse, facilitate sharing intelligence related to the ‘War on
Terrorism’ and make for an improved security environment for all Myanmar’s
neighbours. ASEAN’s ‘constructive engagement policy’ with Myanmar is thus
mutually beneficial and recognizes the political realities of transitional states like
Myanmar where incremental enhancement of the key aspects of human security
is more practicable and achievable than sudden, dramatic transformations
unlikely to be sustainable. Such incremental enhancement is implicit in the
Myanmar government’s vaunted seven-point Roadmap to Democracy – ‘disci-
plined democracy’ in the government’s terms – by which is outlined the series of
processes the state intends to pursue in its plan to return the country to democra-
tic governance, albeit with strong military involvement and oversight of policy
formulation and implementation. ASEAN’s ‘constructive engagement policy’
however, has not been able to achieve any major political concessions or the
release from house arrest of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.
Recognition of the interplay between human, state and regime security was
publicly aired at the seminar on ‘Understanding Myanmar’ held in Yangon, 27–28
January 2004, hosted by the Myanmar Institute of Strategic and International
Studies (MISIS). The government’s mantra – peace, stability, unity – is articulated
in the opening address of the former Prime Minister, General Khin Nyunt, in
stating,
I would like to stress that democracy can only be established in an environ-
ment of peace and stability. It must take into account the historical back-
ground and objective conditions of the country. Democratic change is never
easy and cannot be imposed from the outside. What works for one country
may not work for another. If the transition to democracy is not built on firm
foundations and is not accompanied by steps to establish credible
institutions, it will result in disintegration of national unity. Like a toddler
taking its first steps, we must proceed step by step before larger strides can
be taken.
(MISIS 2004: 2)
The nexus between state, regime and human security was expressed in terms of
both political and socio-economic development, and efforts to strengthen
Myanmar’s fragile social cohesion. The former Prime Minister envisaged this
nexus as programmes for effective poverty alleviation, sustainable economic
growth and eradicating the barriers to enhanced well-being for both the minority
groups and the majority Burman population. In expressing appreciation for the
support and assistance rendered to Myanmar by regional neighbours, General
Khin Nyunt drew attention to initiatives arising from the four-nation (Cambodia,
Laos, Thailand and Myanmar) economic cooperation summit held in Bagan in
November 2003. These initiatives are designed to generate economic growth,
reduce income disparity and alleviate poverty particularly in the border areas
where the minority peoples have long been disadvantaged. Referring to the
ceasefire agreements with 17 formerly insurgent groups, negotiated since 1989,
General Khin Nyunt stated, ‘The peace and stability that now reigns in the
country is unprecedented and augers well for the future of the country’ (MISIS
2004: 4). The advent of these ceasefires has provided the possibility of develop-
mental infrastructure projects, especially in health, education, transportation and
communication services, for the peoples of the border areas. Since its establish-
ment in 1992, the Ministry for the Progress of the Border Areas and National
Races has put in place such projects in the 18 areas it administers at a reputed cost
of around USD 550 million.5
Since the northern border areas contiguous with China, Thailand and Laos
were first mapped by Sir James George Scott, K.C.I.E., and his Chinese counter-
parts in the 1890s (an ongoing exercise still in process at the time of the Iselin
Commission in 1935 and not finally resolved until the 1950s) these regions have
been considered prime sources of insecurity for the state and the various regimes
in power in Yangon (Rangoon). Together with the western border regions abutting
India and Bangladesh, and the south-eastern littoral adjacent to Thailand, these
areas have hosted the numerous insurgent groups which challenged state power
and identity and sought to delineate contested spheres of authority utilizing
revenues drawn from taxation of local cross-border trade, smuggling and the drug
trade. Although all insurgent groups have not yet made peace with the Yangon
government – and negotiations with one of the main challengers to state authority,
the Karen National Union (KNU) have still not been concluded – it is no mean
feat that since 1989 government negotiators have been able to reach agreement
with 17 of the 20 formerly insurgent groups, including the Wa, Kokang, Kachin,
Mon and Pa-O. Moreover, the peace negotiations were set in train and successfully
concluded without international brokerage. Indeed, at times there have been
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indications of intervention from certain Western states in order to maintain
a state of conflict between some of the insurgent groups and the Myanmar
government.
It is in these border regions where, during the decades of civil war up to the
present, some of the most egregious human rights abuses have been reported. HE
Dr Kyaw Win, former Myanmar Ambassador to the UK, made this sensitive topic
the focus of his contribution to the MISIS seminar in January 2004. He chose to
discuss three key issues, religious toleration, use of child soldiers and forced
labour (MISIS 2004: 130–5) together with Myanmar’s implementation of the
right to development. In refuting Western criticism on these issues, Dr Kyaw Win
drew attention instead to Myanmar’s achievements in some aspects of social
policy: to increased enrolment and literacy rates, extended life expectancy at birth
and achievements in primary health care. Whilst there is clearly considerable
scope for enhanced civil and political rights, as well as economic, social and
cultural rights, Dr Kyaw Win articulated the priority Myanmar had been giving
within limited national resources to the improvement of certain aspects of the
social fabric.6
It has been the possibility of this incremental improvement which has attracted
the attention of the formerly insurgent groups and in which some of their leaders
decided they wanted to share, so that the benefits of the peace could be extended
directly to the minority peoples. After the collapse of the China-supported
Communist Party of Burma (CPB) in the northern Wa-Kokang regions in 1989,
war-weary groups simply decided that they needed to try alternative strategies for
improving human security and well-being, and providing a better future for their
children. The major ceasefire groups decided that those strategies lay within the
fold of the nation state rather than outside it, and led to their participation in
the reconvened National Convention in 2003.7 This change of policy within the
formerly insurgent groups, and their participation in the National Convention
processes, is holding out the possibility of a fundamental transformation of the
security discourse within Myanmar, and a change in the relations between
regime, state and people.
Officially there are over 135 different ethnic groups in Myanmar, in a popula-
tion of more than 52 million people. Their future well-being and relations with the
nation state will determine the success or otherwise of Myanmar’s intermittent
progress towards inclusive democratic governance. In the process, they will assist
the government in Yangon to move away from the policies which Mary Callahan
(2003) has vividly characterized as ‘making enemies’ of the people by the state,
towards a new perception that only when the state serves the people, and the
people have no need to fear the state, will the much-desired peace, stability and
unity be sustainable.8 In the wake of the 18 October 2004 removal from office of
General Khin Nyunt and his reform faction, it was queried whether the policies
of rapprochement with the minority peoples would be continued, or whether some
parts of the Myanmar army (the tatmadaw) would exploit the delicate situation to
ensure that the ceasefires broke down. In early 2004 the former Deputy Minister
for Foreign Affairs, H. E. U Khin Maung Win had reflected on this possibility in
the following terms:
Myanmar today is enjoying unprecedented peace and stability. With the
return to the legal fold by 17 armed groups the issue of armed insurgency that
has plagued the nation since the time of the regaining of independence is
almost over. However, it should be remembered that these groups have
approximately one hundred thousand people still under arms, since the
agreement is to allow them to retain their arms for their own security until
the emergence of a new constitution. These groups would not have returned
to the legal fold if they were asked to give up their arms. Moreover, it should
be mentioned that the agreements were verbal ones like gentlemen’s agree-
ment [sic] and there were no signed documents. The danger is that should
there be major differences, the possibility exists for them to take up arms
against the Government, thus re-igniting the circle of violence. As such,
extreme care must be taken in dealing with these groups.
(MISIS 2004: 9–10)
Although the policy environment has hardened since 18 October 2004, indica-
tions are that for the moment, the SPDC will not initiate a change of direction
with respect to the ceasefire groups, although in mid-2005 there were reports that
the SPDC was now demanding unconditional surrender of arms. The situation,
however, is precarious and could again dissolve into open conflict; in late
2004–early 2005 there were reports of clashes between units of the Myanmar
army and the Wa in Eastern Shan State occasioned purportedly by demands that
the Wa turn in their arms. At the time of the removal from office of the former
Prime Minister, General Khin Nyunt, rumours were spread in Yangon that he had
intended to stage a coup against the SPDC with the assistance of the Wa armed
groups (over 20,000 strong). Such rumours appear to have had no foundation,
merely serving as one of the pretexts given for his removal from office. However,
in January 2005, reports circulated that a unit of the Chinese People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) was moving into Wa territory as insurance against further pressure
on the Wa by the Myanmar government for these groups (United Wa State Army –
UWSA) to disarm and move further north back into Chinese territory. The situa-
tion is clearly very volatile, and could deteriorate, lapsing back into the violence
of the pre-1989 period. The question has been mooted, would the Wa, who speak
Chinese as their mother tongue, seek Chinese military support again as in the pre-
1989 period, against the Myanmar government, perhaps with a view not only to
shore up their position, but also to attempt a ‘rescue’ of the former Prime
Minister? Would China, to protect its significant strategic investments in
Myanmar and to counter the growing Indian economic cooperation with the
SPDC, be prepared to launch on such a perilous path? The potentially dire con-
sequences for Myanmar state and regime security of returning to open conflict
with the formerly insurgent groups should give the SPDC cause to pause, before
embarking on a policy of subverting the ceasefire arrangements. In the longer
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term, more inclusive policies towards all the minority and ethnic peoples will be
required, if the necessary adjustment in the relations between people, state and
regime is to be effected.
The collective and the individual
Human security and the state – well-being or ill-being?
At first glance, human security appears to give pre-eminence to the well-being of
the individual and to reify individual human dignity. It sits comfortably within the
main Western human rights agenda as articulated in the UN conventions and
international law. However, the human security concept significantly also
sets individual well-being within the context of the community in which the
individual operates and holds out the possibility of recognition that the well-being
of the community in turn has a crucial relationship to that of the individual
member. That the well-being of the individual and that of the community are
integral to each other is dramatically explored by Carson McCullers (1948, rpt.
1965) in her novel The Member of the Wedding, as she has her leading character,
12-year-old Frankie Addams, repeatedly articulate the phrase, ‘They are the we
of me.’ The wider circle of people surrounding her is the community to which
she needs to relate and from which she seeks reassurance of her human worth,
dignity and justification for existence. Her well-being is tied up with her inclu-
sion in the wider community, as it is impugned when she is excluded from that
community.
This insight into the complex relationship between the individual and the
community is at the heart of much theorizing about social theory and political
concepts, law and philosophy and the nature of civil society, Asian and Western;
it underpins concepts of social exclusion and marginalization. That is, is the
individual to be privileged? Or is the collective, the community to which the
individual relates, or are they mutually interdependent? The horrific individual
suffering caused by ‘ethnic cleansing’ policies in the Balkans, Rwanda and Darfur
in modern times, evocative of those unleashed against the Jews and Moriscos in
fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Spain, or the Huguenots in seventeenth-century
France, clearly indicate that the individual’s well-being is inextricably linked to
that of the community with which he is identified.9 Protecting the rights of
groups, as Lyons and Mayall (2003) argue, has become one of the critical issues
of contemporary international law.
The one and the many and the relationship of the individual to the community
have been at the heart of explorations of notions of civil society since Aristotle. It
forms the core of much early American writing on the nature and obligations of
democratic man and, until recently, represented the fundamental fault line
between those states who gave pre-eminence to civil and political rights as
opposed to those states which privileged economic, social and cultural rights.
It has formed the basis of Western sponsored human rights law, and critiques
of states judged to be violating that law. It forms the divide between exponents of
the notion of universal human rights such as Donnelly (1989, 1993) and
those scholars who have argued for cultural relativity – the ‘Asian values’
debate – pointing out the shortcomings in Western practice as opposed to theory.
It is of course the basis of the notion of ‘intervention for human protection
purposes’ discussed in the previous chapter. A Chinese dissident, recently
released from long imprisonment, advised those who doubted the applicability of
the concept of universal human rights, to visit a Chinese prison (Schak and
Hudson 2003: 114–39). Similar allusions could be made to Myanmar prisons, or
indeed, prisons in many Western societies, or to the Guantanamo Bay complex.
This is the perspective exemplified in the reports, for example, of Amnesty
International, Human Rights Watch and other international non-governmental
organizations (INGOs) to bring to light appalling abuses of human rights and
dignity such as those at Abu-Ghraib prison in Iraq.
Yet reification of the individual itself can also be destructive and disadvanta-
geous to the wider community, with adverse impact on the social fabric, a
discourse which also finds its place in much early American writing about the
relationship of the individual to the community, as expressed in the fiction and
non-fiction of James Fenimore Cooper. In The American Democrat (1838, 1969)
Cooper analysed the impact of private interest on public institutions, foreshad-
owing many of the present anti-corruption discourses.
On the manner in which the publick duties of the private citizen are
discharged, in a really free government, depend the results of the institutions.
If the citizen is careless of his duties, regardless of his rights, and indifferent
to the common weal, it is not difficult to foresee the triumph of abuses,
peculation and frauds. The American citizens are possessed of the highest
political privileges that can fall to the lot of the body of any community; that
of self-government. On the discreet use of this great power, depends the true
character of the institutions.
(Fenimore Cooper 1838, 1969: 141)
Cooper has here articulated not just the relationship of the individual to his com-
munity, but also the concepts of individual rights versus duties which permeate
different approaches to what constitutes ‘civil society’. This debate can again be
heard in the arguments of civil libertarians opposed to some of the laws being
drafted to deal with the threat posed by international terrorism.
These views are particularly pertinent to Myanmar which has been listed as one
of the most corrupt societies on Transparency International’s anti-corruption
index, a product of lack of accountability in public policy, opaque business oper-
ations, patron–clientelist relations dominating society and politics, and extensive
military involvement in the economy, all of which underscore Cooper’s perspec-
tive above – the ‘triumph of abuses, peculation and frauds’ when private interest
takes priority over ‘publick duties’. The relationship between the individual and
the community has been, and will always remain, contested, a plaything of
various political perspectives, and differing value systems. Seligman (1992)
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sees these contrasting perspectives at the root of different priorities given to the
individual and the community in Eastern and Western European politico-cultural
envelopes. In the East, he writes, civil society
[E]vokes a strong communal attribute, that, while apart from the State, is also
equally distant from the idea of the autonomous and agentic individual upon
which the idea of civil society rests in the West. The very pluralism that so
many in the West identify with the idea of civil society rests on an almost
Durkheimian idea of the individual as infused with moral and transcendental
attributes, which is lacking in the East.
(Seligman 1992: 202)
Whilst decrying the socialist fusion of political and civil society in which the
rights of the individual are subsumed to those of the state, a fusion which results
in widespread states-sponsored violence against their own citizens, Seligman is
also conscious of what he calls ‘the problem of liberal-individualist ideology’
which he identifies as ‘how to constitute a sense of community among and
between social actors who are conceived of in terms of autonomous individuals’
(Seligman 1992: 204). He sees this as the problem for civil society in contempo-
rary times. The problem of the individual and the collective, he says, is
the problem of uniting individual and social wills – of articulating a model
of society that would at the same time represent the autonomy of its individ-
ual members – that is, the essence of the problem of civil society.
(Seligman 1992: 131)
As definitions of citizenship replaced the historical preoccupation with theo-
rizing civil society, Seligman re-states the modern problem as that of ‘formulat-
ing the relation of the individual to the collective in terms other than that of an
instrumental reason mediating between exclusive, universalized, and particular
individuals’ (ibid.). In post-socialist, transitional societies like Myanmar, with
weak civil societies and definitions of citizenship which reflect the socialist
fusion of political and civil society, the relation of the individual to the collective,
the community in which the individual operates, is at the heart of concepts of
human security, respect for human rights, and the state’s relationship with the
wider international community.
Calling into question the universalist Western paradigm of civil society with its
overwhelming privileging of individual rights as opposed to community rights,
Chris Hann and Dunn (1996: 6) asserts, ‘At the end of the day, debates about civil
society lead us to a renewed awareness of the fusion of the moral, the social and
the political in the constitution of all human communities.’ Hann identifies the
sense of isolation of many individuals in contemporary Western society and asks,
‘Where is “collective identity and security” now?’ (ibid.). As does McCullers, the
social context of the individual, he argues, is crucially related to the experience
of security.10
This interplay between the individual and the larger community was expressed
in terms of both political and religious culture by H. E. U Khin Maung Win,
former Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, at the MISIS seminar in Yangon in
January 2004. His address, ‘Myanmar Roadmap to Democracy: the Way
Forward’ articulated the Myanmar perspective on harmonious social relations
arising from a balanced relationship between the individual and the community.
He states,
Good society to Myanmar is the equilibrium of atta (individual desire)
and para (working for the good of the community). Thus, for Myanmar,
democracy is not just conferring basic rights but also obligations and duties
to the state.
(MISIS 2004: 7)
Achieving and maintaining that balance between the rights of the individual
and the individual’s duties to the state, will be the major challenge for Myanmar,
if the security discourse is to become centred on the well-being of the people. A
concomitant discourse will be the state’s duties to the people, if the imbalance
in Myanmar social and political culture is to be redressed. Reflecting on the 
ill-being in Myanmar society during the decades when this discourse has been
imbalanced, Seng Raw, an ethnic Kachin and director of the Metta Development
Foundation, an indigenous NGO engaged in development of the ethnic minority
peoples, provides a snapshot of the major fault lines in Myanmar’s social and
political culture over the past six decades.
[O]ver the years ethnic minority discontent has continued to grow as the gap
in development between the minority states and central Myanmar has
widened, despite the interdependence of these areas in terms of resources.
This uneven distribution in wealth and power between central Myanmar and
the ethnic minority states – as well as inadequate communications and infra-
structure – has led both urban and rural minority peoples to side frequently
with the armed opposition. During decades of conflict, almost every family
among the minority communities had at least one member join an armed
opposition group, or suffer imprisonment on suspicion of insurgent connec-
tions, or both. As a result, the cause of ethnic rights and justice, which
originated as a political struggle, increasingly took on overtones of civil
discrimination. These attitudes became more entrenched through fighting
and abuses committed during counter-insurgency operations. Society in
Myanmar, in turn, became polarized, with mistrust between the minority
peoples and majority Burmans becoming a deep-rooted problem.
(Seng Raw 2004: 67–8)
If trust is fundamental to the creation of social capital, Myanmar’s emerging
civil society sector will have a crucial part to play in redressing the imbalance in
the security discourse. Again, let us return to Seng Raw. Whilst not resiling
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from the need to give prominence to individual human dignity and worth, she
recognizes the several communities to which the individual may belong; the
imperative for humanitarian and infrastructure development aid to be provided to
impoverished local communities struggling to find an alternative economy to that
of the poppy culture and the anomaly that the international community has failed
to acknowledge the significance of the peace processes for the advancement of
the ethnic minority peoples. She articulates the basic difference also between
Western notions of civil society operating in opposition to the state, and the
Asian/Myanmar approach wherein civil society organizations will mostly operate
in tandem with the state. In Seng Raw’s view,
In any aid and development process, it is essential that local institutions are
enhanced rather than undermined by international efforts. This means that
contact and mutual understanding must be established with all parties
involved in Myanmar’s ethnic crisis, including those that have long been in
the front-line of the problems affecting the country.
For this to happen effectively, informed and sophisticated approaches will
be needed to support sustainable solutions. . . . Psychological factors are now
in play, with the interests of local farmers [i.e. poppy farmers] frequently pit-
ted against concerns of local authorities, including several of the cease-fire
groups. In particular, poor farmers feel that they are often singled out for
persecution and blame, while local leaders may, for their part, be reluctant to
take action against struggling farmers and communities who were their main
supporters during the difficult years of armed conflict.
To address this complex challenge, broad-based engagement will be
needed by non-governmental and governmental organizations alike, by
community and religious-based groups, as well as ethnic cease-fire parties.
All should be sustained if they can work with each other through forward-
looking and well-crafted programs crucial to building civil society.
(Seng Raw 2004: 69–70)
The relations between the one and the many, the individual and the collective are
never as simple as they appear in some political paradigms. Where the individual
may appear divine or demonic, self-sacrificing or self-aggrandizing, so too may the
collective, the community, be nurturing or destructive. Seng Raw’s vision encapsu-
lates the varying dimensions of this oft juxtaposed dichotomy. Beyond the binary
opposites, she sees the organic relationship required to transform the security
discourse to one wherein the people are no longer regarded as enemies of the state.
The individual state of Myanmar and the international 
community
Myanmar was to have taken over as chair of ASEAN for 2006–7. However, at the
summit in Vientiane on 26 July 2005 Myanmar Foreign Minister, U Nyan Win
informed the meeting that Myanmar would defer its turn to chair the association.
The decision was hailed as a victory for the country’s Western opponents who had
brought pressure to bear: institute democratic reforms and release Daw Aung San
Suu Kyi, or suffer the embarrassment of having Washington, London and the EU
boycott ASEAN during Myanmar’s chairmanship. However, amongst other
Myanmar watchers, the decision from Yangon seemed to reflect more a decision
to press ahead with the government’s own priorities, and coping with the unnec-
essary aggravations involved in chairing ASEAN was something the SPDC
decided it could do without. The Senior General is known not to be entranced
with international organizations and in the weeks preceding announcement of
Yangon’s decision, there were moves afoot suggesting that the government was
about to expel international NGOs from the country and rescind its membership
of the International Labour Organization (ILO). If these eventuated, it was
thought that Myanmar’s retreat from the international community might follow.
The decision to forego its turn to chair ASEAN is thus one more move to reduce
the opportunities for Western leverage against the government in urging it to
undertake genuine reforms. Seen in this light, Yangon’s decision, as one
commentator expressed it, is ‘hardly a reason for a victory parade’ (Free Burma
Coalition, 28 July 2005; accessed 29 July 2005). The retreat from the interna-
tional community would make the reopening of substantial political dialogue
more difficult; reduce the possibility of nudging the regime in directions of
change; and further entrench domestic policies aimed at maintaining political and
social control by the military government. How unimportant chairing ASEAN in
2006 really was to Senior General Than Shwe can be gauged by the felicity with
which the Chinese Foreign Minister, Li Zhaoxing, left the ASEAN summit and
flew, not to Beijing, but directly to Yangon.
If the decision really signals a renewed retreat from the international commu-
nity, it should be of some concern to those who want to bring about democratic
reform in Myanmar. It would also be at odds with the assurances to the contrary
which emerged from the new SPDC leadership line-up after the ouster of the for-
mer Prime Minister, General Khin Nyunt. During the previous ASEAN summit
held in Vientiane, Laos, in November 2004, the new Myanmar Prime Minister,
Lt Gen. Soe Win, had assured his counterparts that the Myanmar government
remained committed to national reconciliation and a return to Myanmar-style
democratic governance as outlined in the ‘Roadmap’. This was interpreted as a
sign that the new line-up intended to push ahead with the policy path outlined in
the Roadmap and the commitment to reform it suggested, and which had been
welcomed at the Ninth Bali summit in 2003. Whilst the November 2004 Vientiane
summit was in progress, the announcement was issued from Yangon that Daw
Aung San Suu Kyi, Secretary General of the opposition National League for
Democracy (NLD), would continue to be held under house arrest until at least
November 2005, a sign that no amount of external pressure would induce the
government to change the path it had resolutely set for itself. At that time,
Myanmar’s ASEAN colleagues declined to offer public criticism, regarding the
matter, in accordance with ASEAN norms, as an internal affair. The new Foreign
Minister, H. E. U Nyan Win, present at the summit, stated that he was unaware of
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the announcement as he had left Yangon on 25 November 2004. Clearly, the
decision was taken at the highest levels of government. Also coinciding with
the 2004 ASEAN summit in Vientiane, was the announcement by Yangon of the
release of some 9,000 prisoners, some of whom were long-serving political pris-
oners, said to be in jail at the behest of the now disbanded National Intelligence
Bureau (NIB), a clear public relations gambit by the SPDC leadership, but much
welcomed by the former prisoners. It is uncertain how many were former politi-
cal prisoners as compared with those who were merely common criminals. In the
‘theatre’ of the July 2005 Vientiane summit, when Daw Suu Kyi’s release was
presented by the West as a prerequisite to Yangon’s being able to assume the chair
of ASEAN in 2006, it became an easy decision for Yangon: domestic internal
stability and control had much higher priority for the government than did a
ceremonial role in a regional organization.
Initially, after the 18 October 2004 purge, the individual state of Myanmar,
under its leader, Senior General Than Shwe, gave indications of defining its pres-
ence within the international community on the same terms as those previously
employed by the allegedly reformist Prime Minister, General Khin Nyunt. At first
glance, the individual state’s policy of enhancing its security through participation
in regional fora was continuing. The state did not withdraw into the isolationism
predicted by Larry Jagan (Bangkok Post, 7 December 2004), but sought to
strengthen its position within the wider regional community which had been the
primary objective of its diplomatic initiatives over the previous couple of years.
In the words of Carson McCullers, the ASEAN community has provided the ‘we-
ness’, the external security cocoon of interrelatedness within which the individ-
ual state of Myanmar has had the opportunity to repair the psychosis at the heart
of its social fabric. Indications were that continued selective integration into the
regional political, economic and security networks would remain SPDC policy, as
this would not only strengthen state and regime security, but also increase the psy-
chological spoils of the victors in the recent internal power struggles. Ironically,
it has been observed that international tendencies to laud the former Prime
Minister as the key agent of change, whilst withholding the resources to bring that
change about in an evolutionary manner, may have contributed to his sudden
removal from office.
The decision to forego chairmanship of ASEAN in 2006 also coincided with
announcements in Yangon of the government’s intentions to move key ministries –
Defence, Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs – to a new purpose-built centre of gov-
ernment up-country at Pyinmana, not far from the old monarchical capital at
Mandalay. To many Myanmar watchers, this was interpreted as the SPDC going
into the ‘bunker’, a move consistent with interpretation of its decision on ASEAN
as heralding a retreat into isolationism again. The projected move to the new
government, site, however, has been in the pipeline for some time and emerges
from the Senior General’s determination to reassert personal control over the key
sectors of national, state and regime security. All in all, Yangon seems to have
decided that domestic concerns needed to take priority over international forays
which would not return high interest on the investment of time and resources.
Like the Chinese, Myanmar leaders have simply chosen to go around an obstacle
and wait for another day.
In 1995, 2 years before Myanmar became a full-fledged member of ASEAN,
Muthiah Alagappa asked the question, ‘Why, how, at what levels and within what
limits can regionalism contribute to the preservation and enhancement of
security? How does it relate to self-help and global approaches to enhancing
security?’ (Alagappa 1995: 152). Whilst the global-level security dynamic, 
post-September 11, has changed since Alagappa wrote this, his perception that
regionalism, defined as ‘sustained cooperation, formal or informal, among
governments, non-government organizations or the private sector in three or more
contiguous countries for mutual gain’ (Alagappa 1995: 158), remains a powerful
force in conflict prevention, is worthwhile pursuing in the context of Myanmar’s
relations with the wider ASEAN community. His focus is on the international
security context. Regionalism, for ASEAN member states, has contained intra-
Asian conflict. However, with respect to internal domestic conflicts, Alagappa
considers regionalism less effective in that ‘Governments tend to support each
other’ (Alagappa 1995: 177) reinforcing the ASEAN norm of non-intervention in
the internal affairs of member states, a principle which in practice privileges the
party in power. Alagappa thus considers regionalism less efficacious in respond-
ing to internal conflicts of member states. From this perspective, the moral land-
scape conditioning the dynamic between the individual (state) and the collective
(regional community) is opaque.
However, in recent times, ASEAN announcements on internal matters
normally not within the purview of public comment have been modified from
‘non-interference’ in the internal affairs of members’ states, to ‘open and frank
discussions’ (Katsumata 2004: 237–54) and even ‘enhanced interaction’.
Certainly, there was international consternation expressed, indeed outrage, at the
30 May 2003 attack on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s cavalcade at Depiyin in north-
ern Myanmar. Former Prime Minister of Malaysia, Dr Mahathir, even raised the
spectre of Myanmar being expelled from ASEAN. Japan, Myanmar’s long-time
friend and main source of external aid, temporarily halted provision of additional
aid. Similar disquietude was obvious over the events surrounding the removal
from office of General Khin Nyunt, particularly as rumours began to circulate of
the underlying links to the Depiyin incident and the mysterious disappearance of
the Depiyin files from the Directorate of Defense Services Intelligence (DDSI).11
Questions are thus being raised whether membership of ASEAN is becoming
somewhat of a stinging nettle for the government in Yangon. Yet, if the SPDC
leadership wishes to continue to benefit from the enhanced political legitimacy
which membership of the regional organization brings, enjoy the economic
advantages of regional trade and participation in the Asian Free Trade Agreement
(AFTA), it will need to continue to develop and strengthen its relations with the
regional community.
This interdependence draws the Myanmar leadership closer within ASEAN
norms, exposes it to collective action and none-too subtle persuasion to continue
to move along the reform path, at least in public perception, as a means of
strengthening regional cohesion. In this case, the community envelope may
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operate to mitigate the anarchical tendency in the individual state. Alagappa’s
argument projects forward to the longer-term benefits of regionalism in drawing
fragile states like Myanmar into a framework of shared norms and values which
can ‘strengthen international society and in the long run make for the develop-
ment of a pluralistic security community’ (Alagappa 1995: 178). Alagappa states,
The key assets of regionalism are coordination, collaboration and the power of
collective action. . . .Through the construction of security regimes in the areas
of confidence- and security-building measures, pacific settlement of disputes,
and defensive defence, it can mitigate the negative effects of anarchy.
(Ibid.)
The sociological aspects of international relations, particularly in the beneficial
consequences of constructed security communities, have been explored further by
Amitav Acharya (1998). His view that ASEAN has now become a nascent secu-
rity community highlights the contributions which the socializing processes of
South-East Asian leaders and elites make to the development of regional norms,
values and expectations of peaceful resolution of differences. He cites, for exam-
ple, the situation that Malaysia has unresolved border disputes with all its regional
neighbours, but that since the signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
(TAC) in 1976 and the symbolic enthronement of the ‘ASEAN Way’ of consen-
sus and consultation, no one expects such disputes to lead to inter-state violence.
Since the ending of the Indo-China War in 1975, the most violence-fraught border
has been that between Thailand and Myanmar, which in 2001–2 hosted a number
of incidents in the Kengtung–Tachilek–Mae Sai north-eastern region, and along
the southern border. The ascendancy of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra has
sought to replace the historical mistrust between Thailand and Myanmar (Burma)
with diplomacy and conciliation aimed at drawing Myanmar further into the
socializing processes of the nascent ASEAN security community. Acharya (1998)
intimates that these processes of collective identity formation and symbol gener-
ation within ASEAN hold the key to bringing the newer, less prosperous, and
non-democratic members of the nascent security community within the purview
of the norms and values shared by the five original members Thailand, Malaysia,
The Philippines, Indonesia and Singapore. He argues,
In the ASEAN context, collective identity may be understood as a process
and framework through which its member states slowly began to adapt to a
‘regional existence’ with a view to reducing the likelihood of use of force in
inter-state relations.
Moreover,
[B]oth in Deutschian and in constructivist formulations, collective identity is
a process that leads to the structural transformation of the Westphalian states
system from anarchy to authority.
(Acharya 1998: 207–8)
It is the underlying implications of this sense of collective identity for policy
formulation and governance modes in the domestic context, as well as for behav-
ioural norms in the international context, which has been underrated and misun-
derstood by proponents of the rational and liberal analyses of ASEAN and critics
of ASEAN’s constructive engagement policies. If ASEAN had followed through
on Dr Mahathir’s suggestion of expelling Myanmar from ASEAN following the
attack on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s cavalcade at Depiyin in May 2003, the con-
sequences both for Myanmar and for the ASEAN norm of regional solidarity
would have been profound. But no one considered for a moment that such an
expulsion would happen; it would have shaken the foundations of ASEAN’s
regional collective identity. On the other hand, Dr Mahathir’s very public sugges-
tion (together with ‘friend’ Japan’s curtailing of additional assistance measures)
probably assisted considerably in moving the Yangon government towards taking
remedial steps in damage control, announcing the Roadmap and reconvening the
National Convention. In this case, the individual state, Myanmar, recognized that,
through its own actions, it was jeopardizing its security cocoon within the wider
ASEAN community. Myanmar’s participation in the resulting ‘Bangkok’ process
in December 2003, evidenced its commitment to that multilateralism which
Acharya considers the basic element in ASEAN’s collective identity formation, a
framework for ‘encouraging the socialization of elites, which facilitates problem-
solving’ (Acharya 1998: 208). That collective identity is underpinned by the
ground rules of inter-state relations within the ASEAN community as articulated
in the TAC at the first meeting of ASEAN leaders in Bali in 1976. They are
Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity of all
nations;
The right of every state to lead its national existence free from external
interference, subversion and coercion;
Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; 
Settlement of differences and disputes by peaceful means; and
Renunciation of the threat of use of force.12
Of these, perhaps the most challenged has been the third one: non-interference
in the internal affairs of one another. It gave rise to the concept of ‘flexible
engagement’ articulated in 1998 during the term of former Thai Foreign Minister,
Surin Pitsuwan, whose notion was supported by The Philippines, but rejected out-
right by other ASEAN members, especially Indonesia and Malaysia. These two
countries considered that any resiling from the principle of non-interference at
that time would not only jeopardize their own regimes, but also lead to the unrav-
elling of the ASEAN Way.13 The symbolic power of the ASEAN Way, as noted by
Acharya (1998: 210), has been a significant element in the construction of
ASEAN’s collective identity, and one adhered to resolutely by the more authori-
tarian members of ASEAN.14
But if the sense of community and regional solidarity has underpinned
ASEAN’s refusal to countenance the Western sanctions approach to Myanmar, its
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continued support for Myanmar’s membership in the regional organization and
its staunch determination to ensure Myanmar a place in the ASEM–EU meeting
in Hanoi in October 2004, it also underpins an unspoken, but equally firm
determination by ASEAN to ensure that Myanmar does not bring discredit or
embarrassment to the ASEAN security community – that is, to cause ASEAN to
lose its collective face, and hard-won respect as a diplomatic entity within the
international community. It is this element which motivates certain ASEAN
leaders to encourage Myanmar, within the framework of the ASEAN Way, to move
towards closer alignment with regional neighbours in terms of its domestic reform
policies. The socializing experience of the ASEAN elites has produced a we-ness
which is imperilled if any member fails to live up to expectations generated by the
symbolic norms. Whilst it has been said that the new troika in Yangon (Than Shwe,
Maung Aye and Soe Win) have less regard for ASEAN than ASEAN would like, it
is also noteworthy that they continue to participate in regional fora and do not give
any sign of withdrawing from the Association, suggesting that the socialization
experience both for them and their colleagues may pay dividends in future.
Certainly, Acharya is correct in highlighting the present deficiency in ASEAN
community building and collective identity formulation in that it appears to be
confined to the elite intergovernmental level. He notes, ‘This kind of regionalism
does not translate into cooperation or development of “we-feeling” at the societal
level’ (Acharya 1998: 215). However, in recent years, and particularly since the
fall of Suharto (1998), the greater prominence of civil society organizations
in bringing about socio-political change in key ASEAN countries – Thailand,
Indonesia, The Philippines, Malaysia – suggests that there is a regional network
developing at the societal level, amongst educational institutions, non-governmental
organizations, religious, professional and business associations which is moving
ASEAN governmental elites towards greater consideration of human security
issues (Noda 1998, 1999; Thiparat 2001). Moreover, the devastation wreaked by
the tsunami on 26 December 2004 has demonstrated the necessity for govern-
mental elites to work together with both the international community and their
own civil societies in coming to terms with, raising funds for and alleviating the
human suffering involved in the mass destruction. Acharya draws attention to the
growing capacity of regional civil society to oppose official ASEAN regionalism
on human rights, environment and democracy issues, and what he calls the
‘incompleteness of the community-building enterprise led by the ASEAN elites’
(Acharya 1998: 216); but it is also possible that ASEAN regionalism is changing
under the combined effects of its civil society groups and the obvious exigencies
of the need to mitigate human insecurities. Not the least of these are those origi-
nating from nature which clearly could have political, as well as dire social and
economic consequences for the states and governments in the affected countries,
if their policies for the alleviation of the human suffering caused by the tsunami or
similar natural disasters are judged inadequate. If this is so, then the ‘we-feeling’
at the societal level is already present, nascent, perhaps subdued, but ready to pre-
sent a more overt community presence both internationally and in the domestic
sphere. Enhancement of these trends will be conditional on the continued
strengthening of domestic civil society groups in ASEAN member countries and
their networking interactions with international counterparts.
Human rights and the security discourse
Protection and enhancement of human rights, as discussed in Chapter 1, are at the
heart of the human security concept. Whilst the UDHR (1948) and the two related
international covenants (1966) on Economic, Social and Cultural, and Political
and Civil Rights have given rise to a formidable body of international law on the
responsibility of governments and the international community to protect human
rights, the central position which human rights policy now occupies in interna-
tional relations has become prominent only since the end of the Cold War (1989).
Prior to that, democratic governments often chose to ignore the human rights
violations of their Cold War (1950–89) dictator allies, if the exigencies of
international politics required. Former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet is one
example; the late Philippines dictator Ferdinand Marcos is another.
Coinciding with the international policies of the US Clinton Administration, in
the legislative and normative practices of the Security Council, human rights have
been ‘securitized’; part of an evolving framework of democratic legitimacy which
is seen to be mandatory to maintaining international peace and security
(Ramcharan 2002a). International tribunals and the International Criminal Court
(ICC) set up to prosecute those accused of war crimes and crimes against human-
ity as in cases arising from the civil wars in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia,
are a measure of the international community’s commitment to the protection of
international human rights and humanitarian law. Recent prosecutions under their
own national justice systems of British and American military personnel accused
of egregious human rights abuses against Iraqi prisoners are testimony to the
domestic socialization of these international human rights norms. Yet ‘securitiza-
tion’ of human rights in the wake of the September 11, 2001, tragedy, saw the
debate on ‘intervention for human protection purposes’ take a sharp turn away
from ‘intervention on behalf of others’ to ‘intervention in self-defence’. Serious
concern for the implications of this development for human rights led Secretary
General of the UN Kofi Annan, to ask, ‘How much freedom do you give up for
security and safety? And if you give up too much, do you in the end have secu-
rity or safety?’(Ramcharan 2002a: 8). From this perspective, both national and
international security are impugned when individual human rights are set aside in
favour of the collective good,15 a harbinger of the potential return to authoritarian
governance in the halls of democracy, which sends an unfortunate message to
those countries whose governments routinely disregard human rights in the name
of collective security of the state and regime in power. In the words of Stefan
Collignon (2001: 74) ‘democracy dies when a group, regardless of whether it
represents a majority or minority, exerts its power without respect for these
individual rights’.
The securitization of human rights has been a characteristic of Burmese/
Myanmar state ideology since independence in 1948. During the 50 years of
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civil war, ethnic insurgencies and domestic challenges to the identity of the state,
repression of human rights – economic, social and cultural as well as civil
and political – has been justified by whichever group was in power in Yangon,
both during the era of so-called parliamentary democracy (1948–58, 1960–2)
and successive military governments (1958–60, 1962–to the present) on the
grounds of the need to maintain state unity, peace and stability. Systemic, egre-
gious and ongoing abuses of human rights in Myanmar have been the subject
of numerous reports by the UN rapporteur on Human Rights, HE Professor
Paulo Sergio Pinheiro and international organizations (Human Rights Watch,
Amnesty International, International Committee for the Red Cross) as well as
academics and journalists (Smith 1991, rpt. 1999; Lintner 1994; Roy 1997;
Lambrecht 2004). It is not my intention to revisit these scenes, but rather to seek
a way forward to realizing a future framework wherein Myanmar may be released
from her violent past.
During the term of office of the late General Ne Win (1962–88) the ‘securiti-
zation of human rights’ was justified in the military government’s manifestos, the
Burmese Way to Socialism and Correlation of Man and His Environment. Under
this ideology, the individual egotistical human nature was to be strictly subordi-
nated to the social, economic, cultural and political requirements of the state.
Such an approach to governance has seen the ‘capabilities’ of Myanmar’s people
minimized. Endemic poverty – both material and political – has limited their
opportunities and disempowered the majority of the population. Periodic purges
arising from internal power struggles have often removed from office those
capable of moving the country towards norms of governance more in accord with
contemporary international expectations.
The dire economic consequences of these policies which led to the state being
declared a Least Developed Country (LDC) in 1987, spurred the military
government (SLORC–SPDC) which took over from General Ne Win, to repeal
the socialist economic framework and enact legislation in 1989–90 giving effect
to a titular market economy. Although the economy still includes considerable
state intervention, subsidies of deficit producing state-owned-enterprises and an
inefficient tax and revenue collection system, these initial reforms saw the 
re-emergence of a nascent civil society in Myanmar (Tin Maung Maung Than
1998; Steinberg 2001; James 2003, 2005), a development which may eventually
assist in rolling back the securitization of human rights in this country. Such a
development will require the transformation of the paradigm of mutual fear
which has governed state–people relations for more than half a century; in
essence, a transformation of the systemic structure and operational norms of the
Myanmar state.
Along these lines, Collignon (2001) has called for the replacement of the cur-
rent cognitive model of Myanmar society based on hierarchy, status, authority and
patron–client relations with one based on interest, wealth and rights. Collignon
observes that ‘The idea that the collective may have an obligation towards an indi-
vidual and that, therefore, citizens may be entitled to make claims against the
state, simply has no meaning’ in Myanmar (Collignon 2001: 80). Thus, he argues,
the cognitive reference system for human rights in Myanmar is missing because
dialogue and compromise are not an integral part of Myanmar social, political
and cultural norms. Rather, systemic reforms of the Myanmar state will be
required, to ‘lay the foundations for a society where human rights will become a
constitutive norm’ (Collignon 2001: 85). In a state characterized by highly
insecure human and property rights, Collignon draws attention to the need for far-
reaching social and economic reforms as precursors to the creation of a modern
values system which privileges individual rights over the collective perspective.
He argues,
Respecting human rights in Burma requires more than just a change of
government. That may be necessary, but it is not a sufficient condition. What
is needed is a profound change in culture where the universal norms of a
modern world are accepted and reproduced as a basis for everyday life. These
norms underlie the concepts of human rights and property rights. Both pro-
tect the individual, the former against collective, the latter against individual
encroachment.
(Collignon 2001: 104)
Contrary to some views held in the international community and in Myanmar’s
domestic opposition groups, Collignon argues that improving respect for human
rights in Myanmar requires that political and economic reforms must go in tan-
dem: neither one nor the other seen as primary, but both mutually reinforcing the
other. Comparison with other emerging and robust democracies (Japan, Thailand,
Korea, Taiwan, The Philippines) confirms the views of Land and Ersson (2000:
280) that human rights are better protected in prosperous societies. ‘There is a
strong positive correlation between economic freedom and human rights (ie
democracy).- affluence is the crucial factor’ they argue (Land and Ersson 2000:
280). Reconstructing the Myanmar state therefore will require not just financial
and economic reforms to remove the permanent condition of macroeconomic
instability arising from budget deficits; nor redefining centre–periphery relations
to institute a set of modern administrative structures and functional responsibilities
at the central, provincial and local levels of government; nor even finding com-
mon ground for dialogue and compromise among the mutually distrustful SPDC,
opposition and ethnic nationality groups – although all of these are important –
but fundamentally transforming the sociocultural and political norms to create
what Colignon (2001: 83) calls, ‘the normative validity of human rights’ so that
the cognitive underpinning of human rights is not considered an alien concept.
The question remains, how can such cognitive underpinning be institutional-
ized within the state of Myanmar’s domestic policies? One avenue will be through
the norm generating and enhancing socialization processes of ASEAN and
participation in other similar international and regional bodies. If human security
issues are finding greater space on ASEAN’s agenda as Noda (1998, 1999) and
Thiparat (2001) claim, then continued participation in the summits, dialogues and
negotiations of the regional forum should theoretically assist in socializing the
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association’s norms within the domestic policies of the Myanmar state. But all
ASEAN governments are not democracies, and observance of human rights
within ASEAN member countries is still problematic as exemplified by the
repression of the Muslim population in Southern Thailand. Then again there is the
issue of transfer of normative change between the elite levels and the societal
networks.
In the ‘spiral’ model of Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (1999) domestic institution-
alization of international human rights norms within an abuser country proceeds
through a series of socialization phases. The first, or denial phase, exhibits the
abuser country denying that certain incidents occurred. According to Risse, Ropp
and Sikkink by the time the abuser country has entered this phase, it has already
implicitly acknowledged the validity of international human rights norms. In
effect, the socialization process has already begun and is moving from the elite
levels into the intermediate or bureaucratic policy-making and implementing
levels of government. They argue,
[T]he fact that the state feels compelled to deny charges demonstrates that a
process of international socialization is already under way. If socialization
were not yet under way, the state would feel no need to deny the accusations
that are made. Governments which publicly deny the validity of international
human rights norms as interference in internal affairs, are at least implicitly
aware that they face a problem in terms of their international reputation. It is
interesting to note . . . that denial of the norm almost never takes the form of
open rejection of human rights, but is mostly expressed in terms of reference
to an allegedly more valid international norm, in this case national sover-
eignty. Nevertheless the denial stage can also last for quite a long time.
(Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999: 23)
An abuser state moving into the next phase offers tactical concessions: release
of political prisoners, moves towards constitutional government, even punishment
of human rights offenders. But this, in their view, is motivated by an objective to
buy time, rather than fundamental and sustainable change in human rights behav-
iour. Only in the final phase, in the institutionalization of what Land and Ersson
call ‘constitutive government’, that is, governed by a robust constitution and a
vigorous civil society which place practical limits on the capacity of state leaders
and bureaucrats to use the resources of the society for personal benefit does the
former abuser state exhibit full socialization of human rights norms in their
domestic policies. Clearly, Myanmar is certainly within the first or denial phase
(as shown by H. E. Dr Kyaw Win’s statement to the UN General Assembly,
November 2003) and may be moving hesitantly into the second phase (as shown
by the release of some 9,000 prisoners in November 2004), but certainly has a
long way to go before entering the final phase.
What can encourage an abuser state, such as Myanmar, Risse, Ropp and
Sikkink ask, to enter the final phase – to slough off the ‘pariah’ status clamped on
it by the international community in response to its long history of human rights
abuses and authoritarian governance? Their answer is fairly simple: pressure both
from what they call ‘above’, that is, the international community, and from
‘below’, the network of domestic and international civil society groups which not
only spotlight continuing deficiencies in human rights protection, but also posi-
tively move the offender country towards more constructive measures which will
enhance human capabilities within the broader social fabric. Modern statehood
then is recognizable by how thoroughly international human rights norms have
become institutionalized within the modes of domestic governance and have
obviated the offender polity’s reflexive reaction to ‘national sovereignty’ to justify
failure to protect human rights. Moving to this final stage requires the efficacy of
argumentation and persuasion in a process of state identity transformation such
as occurred in The Philippines after the deposing of President Marcos, and is
ongoing in Indonesia in the post-Suharto era.
ASEAN elites would argue that the opportunities to spur Myanmar into this
final phase occur through its constructive engagement policy. However, in the
view of Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, ASEAN’s constructive engagement policy with
Myanmar is only likely to be effective in the final stage of Myanmar’s evolution
from traditional polity, wherein individual rights are subordinated to the collec-
tive will, to modern state (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999: 277–8); and may be
ineffective in earlier stages. It could be argued, however, that opportunities for
persuasion and argumentation which they see as critical to the socialization
processes and institutionalization of human rights within the domestic policies of
the pariah country, will be present in the two earlier phases of their spiral model,
and without such opportunities progress through their various phases will be
impeded. Moreover, if moving to phase three is spurred by the offender state’s
desire to be well-regarded in the international community, their model presup-
poses that state leaders care about their international image, or desire some other
tangible benefit such as restoration of international aid. This, however, may not
always be the case and suggests a reversion to an instrumentalist rather than
ideationalist perspective of how international human rights norms become
institutionalized within former offender polities. One recalls the Myanmar state’s
outright rejection of the 1998 World Bank offer of considerable economic assis-
tance (USD 20 million) if the government would move substantially towards
restoration of democratic governance. Such an offer was at odds with Myanmar
elite cultural values and domestic norms; and served to encourage nationalistic
fervour.
Greater efficacy is likely to be generated through processes of state identity
transformation produced from within the polity by changing cultural norms,
rather than imposed externally. As Collignon has argued above, in Myanmar’s
case, this will require changing the cognitive paradigm for human rights within
the country’s sociocultural fabric. One notes the efforts of the Australian govern-
ment to contribute to such transformation through the series of Human Rights
Workshops it conducted for middle level public servants in Myanmar; these have
been suspended since the 30 May 2003 incident at Depiyin. The fact that permis-
sion was given by the Myanmar government for them to be held, however, could
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be seen as a sign of Myanmar moving into phase two of Risse, Ropp and Sikkink’s
model of state behavioural change. A further sign could be the establishment of a
Human Rights Commission in Myanmar, also done with international encour-
agement, and the opening of an office of the ILO to monitor incidents of forced
labour and related practices. However, state actions subsequent to the purge of
former Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt and his circle and the continuing
detention of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi suggest that Myanmar has not moved beyond
the first phase of the spiral model. Much persuasion, encouragement, argumentation
and socialization of international norms will be required. As Risse, Ropp and
Sikkink argue,
The process of human rights change almost always begins with some
instrumentally or strategically motivated adaptation by national governments
to growing domestic and transnational pressures. . . . Even instrumental
adoption of human rights norms, if it leads to domestic structural change
such as re-democratization, sets into motion a process of identity transfor-
mation, so that norms initially adopted for instrumental reasons are later
maintained for reasons of belief and identity.
(Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999: 10)
In the following chapter, I turn to examine the dynamics of this necessary identity
transformation in the border regions amongst the ethnic minority peoples where
some of the most egregious human rights abuses have been recorded and where
human insecurity has been the predominant life experience of the peoples since
the inception of the independent state in 1948. Improvement in their well-being
will be the litmus test of a changing corporate identity in the state of Myanmar.
Introduction
Since 1948, the border regions, home of the indigenous ethnic minority peoples1
which make up approximately one third of Myanmar’s population, have been
perceived by successive governments in Burma/Myanmar to constitute the prime
security threat to the unity and stability of the independent state. The resulting
dynamic of conflict and resistance between the core, Burman heartland and the
indigenous ethnic minority peoples on the ‘periphery’ of the nation state, for
more than five decades has drained the resources of the country and made war,
famine, conquest and pestilence the predominant life experience for those living
in both ‘core’ and periphery. Insecurity in economic matters, food, health, envi-
ronment, personal insecurity, community insecurity and political insecurity – the
vectors I designate ‘the seven horsemen of the apocalypse’ – have diminished the
opportunities to enhance both the material and non-material aspects of human
security and well-being for the people of Myanmar.
In a very poor country where per capita income for 2001 was estimated by
UNDP (2001: 143) at USD 1,000 (purchasing power parity), the border regions
provide evidence of widespread and dire indigence. In these border regions where,
since the late nineteenth century the economy has been based primarily on
cultivation of the opium poppy, endemic poverty has been the lot of children for
generations. In 2004, the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimated
annual income for poppy farmers was a mere USD 214, as distinct from the for-
tunes made from the opium poppy trade by the middlemen and downstream drug
syndicates tied into international networks operating out of Thailand and Hong
Kong. Poverty and poppy farming in the mountainous border regions of Myanmar
go hand in hand, the one indicative of the other.
Likewise, poverty and insecurity go hand in hand. Poppy farmers till their small
plots, often located on the tops of mountain ridges where other crops will not grow,
and frequently have sufficient food for only 6 months of the year (personal
communication, CCDAC, February 2004). Food insecurity in these conditions is
prevalent, in addition to all other types of insecurity which can beset a human
being. To the extent that the border regions of Myanmar suffer from widespread
and endemic poverty, they do indeed place the security of the state in jeopardy.
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The dynamic of poverty and insecurity extends well beyond the localized
state-centric discourse of intra-communal conflict which has marred the modern
history of Burma/Myanmar. The international dimensions of the poppy cultures
and their attendant socio-economic and politico-civil insecurities require, as Renard
(1996) has argued, international cooperation to resolve; effective poverty-alleviation
strategies involving synthesis of local, domestic and international policies,
resources and leadership are fundamental to achieving long-term, sustainable
solutions to the problems of supply and demand for the drugs emanating from
Myanmar’s northern border regions. As Renard stated in 1996,
Burma is thus confronted with the question of how to control a problem that
extends well beyond its borders. Any Burmese government . . . would agree . . .
If Burma’s Nobel Peace Prize winner, Aung San Suu Kyi, somehow came
to power in a democratic or federal government, the opium and other traders
on the border would not stop their activities in a show of respect for the
country’s new leadership. . . . solutions will require the cooperation of neigh-
bouring countries. . . . Regardless of Burma’s politics, economy, or human
rights record, there is agreement among the interested parties that narcotics
problems in Burma can only be solved through the active assistance of the
Burmese government.
(Renard 1996: 5–8)
Whilst the border regions which hosted the ethnic insurgencies (1948–89) have
been conceptualized in terms of state security in the public discourse of succes-
sive Burmese/Myanmar governments – and the indigenous ethnic minority
peoples treated as ‘enemies of the state’ – it is the primary experience of human
insecurity in these areas which should be the focus of local, state and international
policies. State security is jeopardized when poverty and inequality plague the
lives of millions; global order is compromised by the deepening poverty and
inequality between core industrialized countries and the periphery develop-
ing world. At UNCTAD, Bangkok, in 2000, Michael Camdessus, then Managing
Director of the IMF declared: ‘Poverty is the ultimate systemic threat facing
humanity’ in face of the global statistic of 1.2 billion people living on less than
USD1 per day. Enunciation of the UN’s Millennium Development Goals to com-
bat poverty, and the 2002 Johannesburg Conference on Sustainable Development
have contributed little in practical terms to improving the livelihoods of the
world’s poor, nations as well as individuals. This gap between rhetoric and reality
is painfully clear in Kofi Annan’s 22 March 2005 announcements of a thorough-
going overhaul of the UN’s operations, including its Human Rights Commission,
with his call for more concerted resources to be focussed on alleviation of poverty
in the developing world.
This interlinkage between poverty and security, the likely catastrophic effects
for world security of the uneven distribution of the benefits of globalization, led
Caroline Thomas (2000) to investigate the causes of human insecurity and the
concomitant pursuit of human security, through what she calls the ‘convergence’
of development and security. She dissociated her research from what she styled
‘the competitive, possessive notions of security of the individual conceived in the
currently fashionable neoliberal sense’ and declared that human security, for
the majority of human beings is pursued ‘as part of a collective, most commonly
the household, sometimes the community defined along other lines such as reli-
gion, caste, ethnicity or gender, or a combination of these. States play a critical
role in the achievement of human security; they have the authority and the respon-
sibility to attend to the human security needs of their citizens’ (Thomas 2000: xi).
Such needs, Thomas declares, are both material and non-material, require
satisfaction of basic needs – food, shelter, education, health care, clean potable
water – but also fulfilment of the capacity to participate fully in the life of the
community, local and global, that is, the elements which enhance the human dig-
nity at the core of the human security concept, and whose absence imperils both
human and state security. The security of the state is thus contingent on meeting
the human security needs of the individual, shedding ‘oppressive power struc-
tures’ and putting in place the institutions for unhindered participation in sub-
stantive democratic governance (Thomas 2000: 6). The seven vectors of human
insecurity discussed in Chapter 1, can be borne by the structures of both state and
global governance. The consequential impoverishment of the political, social,
economic and cultural lifeways undermines human security at the local, national
and global levels.
Spotlighting the convergence between development and security has enabled
Thomas to centre poverty alleviation as a core issue for international relations and
international politics, a perspective articulated by outgoing President of the World
Bank, James Wolfensohn, who stated in his address to the Security Council, ‘If
we want to prevent violent conflict, we need a comprehensive, equitable, and
inclusive approach to development’ (Thomas 2000: 3). Entrenched poverty in the
marginalized LDCs exacerbated by inequitable development policies generated
by the industrialized world undermines the security of all. It remains to be seen
whether Paul Wolfowitz, President George W. Bush’s nominee to replace James
Wolfensohn as President of the World Bank, will continue to consider the
eradication of global poverty the primary pillar for enhancing security – human,
as well as state and global. As Ross Buckley, Tim Fischer Centre for Global Trade
and Finance, Bond University, has warned: ‘global poverty and inequality fertilise
the fields of anger and hatred in which terrorism flourishes’ (The Canberra
Times, 21 March 2005).2 Security, poverty and development are thus inextricably
intertwined.
Security and development
Development of the border areas and indigenous ethnic 
minority peoples
Conscious of the nexus between security and development, following the 1989
ceasefires with key ethnic minority insurgent groups, the Myanmar government
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in 1992 established a Ministry for the Progress of Border Areas and National
Races and Development Affairs, with a budget of 1,000 million kyat. Resources
for development were a critical aspect of the peace negotiations, for ethnic minor-
ity leaders held vivid memories of the asymmetrical development between the
core heartland of the majority Burman population and the periphery homelands
of the indigenous ethnic minority peoples. This issue had caused grievance even
during the post-independence era of parliamentary democracy under the late
premier, U Nu, and was a significant contributing element in the irruption and
prolongation of the civil war in Burma/Myanmar, as indigenous ethnic minority
leaders keenly felt the sense of institutionalized discrimination against their
peoples by the newly created nation state. As Keal argues,
The story of the expansion of international society is one of state formation
which often resulted in the decimation of indigenous peoples or, if not that,
at least the destruction of their cultures. Indigenous peoples were isolated
from state formation and largely excluded from the full rights enjoyed by
citizens of the states that are the members of international society.
Understanding the reasons for this exclusion and how the rights of indige-
nous peoples are more recently being incorporated into the norms of inter-
national society is necessary to making the story of the expansion of
international society more complete than it has been.
(Keal 2003: 3)
Such norms encompass inclusion within the UN’s human rights and self-
determination agenda; recognition of and participation in the ‘right to develop-
ment’ as a human right, as articulated at the 1993 Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action; and legal protection within the scope of the UN covenants,
the ICCPR and the ICESCR. The Myanmar government’s 1992 creation of the
new Ministry for the Progress of Border Areas and National Races and
Development Affairs was to initiate the first step towards the right to development
and effective poverty alleviation in the border regions.
A key responsibility of the new Ministry, in collaboration with other Ministries
(Health, Education, Home Affairs, Agriculture, Transportation, Religious Affairs)
was to put in place the infrastructure for socio-economic development: education,
health care, communication and transportation networks. However, implementa-
tion of this policy presupposes government control of such areas; even at the
present time (2005), after ceasefires with some 17 formerly insurgent groups
have been in place for a number of years, government control is problematic and
constantly subject to re-negotiation as demonstrated by the clash in Eastern Shan
States in late 2004 between UWSA troops and a unit of the Myanmar army
precipitately sent to disarm them, in contravention of the ceasefire agreements.
According to official documentation, over 400 primary schools, 49 sixteen-bed
hospitals, 78 health clinics, 26 rural health centres, and 43 sub-rural health
centres (Ministry of Health 2001) have been constructed in the border regions
since 1992 (Plate 3.1). A separate University for the Development of the Border
Areas and National Races has been opened and a second one at historic Panglong.
On a trip to the Eastern Shan States in February 2004 to inspect some of this
infrastructure, I was struck by its newness, its apparent lack of use, pupils, or
patients, but this may have been a temporary situation not indicative of the oper-
ations of the development programme at other sites (Plates 3.2 and 3.3). A 50-bed
rehabilitation hospital for drug addicts at Mong Pauk, a site on the China border,
for example, was well patronized, with most of the beds occupied by Shan-speaking
patients undergoing detoxification. This hospital had been established with
funding from China; it carries large Chinese characters on its front façade.
In view of inadequate resourcing, how effective these institutions are in raising
educational levels and delivering improved health care to the ethnic minority peo-
ples they purportedly serve, is open to question. Nevertheless, it is better to have
such infrastructure, than for it to be absent, and to gradually work on the issues
which inhibit its effectiveness. This is not a criticism of the development policy
as such, given the political and economic difficulties which beset the programme;
rather a statement about the practicalities of bringing effective poverty-alleviation
programmes to this vast region marked by impenetrable jungles, towering
mountain ranges and precipitous gorges, much of which is accessible only by
helicopter, or on foot. As Martin Smith asserts, despite criticism of the quality of
the development programme from anti-Government groups and cynicism regard-
ing its strategic objectives, its implementation is tangible evidence of a substan-
tial level of cooperation between the formerly insurgent groups and the Myanmar
government which has ‘decisively changed the military and political balance in
much of the country’ (Smith 1991, rpt. 1999: 441).
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Plate 3.1 Mong Pauk hospital on Myanmar–China border.
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Visiting 10 sites in Eastern Shan States in February 2004 where there was an
official programme, with international support from UNODC (funded by Germany,
Japan and the US), to replace the poppy culture with an economy of alternate cash
crops (cashews, various rices, coffee, fruits, mixed farming) I was conscious that
our party of 38 (mostly international visitors) was there very much by the grace of
our ethnic minority hosts, the Wa leadership (Plates 3.4 and 3.5). Upon asking
Plate 3.2 Yong Kha hospital and market gardens.
Plate 3.3 Front view of Yong Kha hospital.
whether this was ‘autonomy, or decentralization’ in practice, a government
representative told me: ‘Not autonomy, not decentralization. The central government
is working through the ethnic minority leaders, i.e. the Wa.’ However, it seemed
quite apparent that actual control on the ground, at the local level was indeed in the
hands of the Wa leadership, and that government forces, representatives, and inter-
national guests entered that locality by invitation – that is, government presence in
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Plate 3.4 Helen James with the United Wa State Army (UWSA).
Plate 3.5 Lunch outside Kengtung.
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the area was still very much a negotiated entity, not a given. Living on the margins
of the nation state, the Wa leadership was continuing to negotiate the terms of their
inclusion. Marginality, as Sam Nolutshungu (1996: 19) has observed, ‘is not always
unilaterally imposed on a group that otherwise wishes to be fully integrated’. In this
sense, the Wa (of ethnic Mon-Khmer origin, as distinct from the Kokangese who
are ethnically Chinese) differ from some other ethnic minority populations in nation
states in Europe which have been forcefully marginalized and subject to ‘ethnic
cleansing’ operations (e.g. The Romany or Gypsy population in Eastern Europe) as
the new state imposes its corporate identity (Rae 2002).
The indigenous ethnic minority peoples in Burma/Myanmar who fuelled the
insurgencies 1948–89 (and even up to now in the case of the Karen with whom
peace negotiations are ongoing, despite a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ with the
Myanmar government in early 2004) have embraced marginalization as a means
to maintain their own cultural identity, political autonomy, and economic inde-
pendence, removed from the administrative reaches of the central government
(Plates 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8). Their experience may be distinguished from that of the
Muslim Rohingya in south-western Rakhine state. Refugees from the state in
the early 1990s and late 2003, the Rohingya experience comes perilously close to
ethnic cleansing as violence committed by Buddhist groups forced the Muslim
population to seek sanctuary across the border in Bangladesh. The Chin of Chin
state in north-western Myanmar are also distinguished as the only major ethnic
minority group in 1948 not to have taken up arms against the newly constituted
nation state.
Asking ‘Who is marginal?’ Nolutshungu identifies marginal populations as
‘distinguishable minorities within states whose integration to the society and state
is markedly incomplete so that their participation either is partial or intermittent
Plate 3.6 Ethnic minority (Shan) women, Kengtung market.
or subject to special qualifications and restrictions’ (Nolutshungu 1996: 17). Such
peoples are ‘usually disadvantaged and oppressed’ (ibid.: 19), undergoing the
seven vectors of human insecurity (UNDP 1994: 25) – economic, food, health,
environment, personal, community and political – as the primary life experience.
In the words of David Laitin (1996: 37) ‘the livelihood of marginal populations is
egregiously insecure’. For the ethnic populations who fought the 50-year civil war
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Plate 3.7 Helen James, Kengtung hill.
Plate 3.8 The tallest tree, 500 metres in height, Kengtung hill –  used during civil war as
target practice.
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in Burma/Myanmar – the Mon, Shan, Kachin, Wa, Kokang, Karen, Kayah and
others – such insecurity has defined their relationship with the emerging nation
state. Overcoming the dynamic of secession–integration requires a fundamental
policy shift within the leaderships of both the nation state and the indigenous
ethnic minority peoples to negotiate the terms of inclusiveness on a mutually sat-
isfactory basis, neither by state imposed patterns of domination and submission,
nor by artificially maintained boundaries of exclusion which perpetuate
indigence and insecurity. As Nolutshungu argues,
Marginality as linked to inequality and differential participation within a
given political and economic space, and the accompanying vulnerability and
insecurity, were well-known in pre-modern states and in political formations
that preceded nation-states. State formation is very much a process of
drawing conceptual frontiers of inclusion and exclusion. Moreover, non-state
entities like ethnic groups – in their complex articulation to prevailing sys-
tems of power and states – also define themselves largely by the boundaries
they maintain.
(Nolutshungu 1996: 289)
In mainland South-East Asia, drawing populations taken by war into the
dominant polity was a standard practice in pre-modern state formation (Koenig
1990; Chutintaranond 1995); it was an essential strategy in maintaining power
and pre-eminence. On the contrary, withdrawing as far as possible from the cen-
tre of power was said to be the strategy of the wise or the desperate. The dynamic
of secession–integration which has marked the relations between the ethnic
minority peoples and the nation state in Burma/Myanmar since independence
from Britain in 1948 could be seen as a continuation of this indigenous pattern,
rather than a novel phenomenon created by the exigencies of constituting a new
corporate identity for the independent state.
From this perspective, at the local level, the poverty and deprivation experi-
enced by the indigenous ethnic minority peoples of Myanmar has been a function
of the political and cultural marginality they embraced during the decades of the
civil war as a means of maintaining their distinctive lifeways. Their marginality
has been what Sommers, Mehretu and Pigozzi call ‘systemic’ (2001: 28), a prod-
uct of the national political economy which resulted in Myanmar as an LDC
being on the periphery of international trade and commerce, thus making it
more vulnerable to the exploitation and poverty which are characteristic of
communities on both national and international peripheries. They argue,
LDCs in the global peripheries have been on the receiving end of decentral-
ized industrial enterprise. By virtue of their position of being poor and
dependent, LDCs have little or no power to negotiate business deals
favourable to the long-term economic development of their respective
nations.
(Sommers, Mehretu and Pigozzi 2001: 25)
As does Thomas, Sommers, Mehretu and Pigozzi (2001: 27) articulate the link
between ‘uneven’ development, poverty and security and perceive these to be a
consequence of the condition of marginality leading to community and individ-
ual deprivation: economic, political, social and cultural. The process of state
creation in the modern world has itself been frequently marked by
unitarist and centralizing nation-building ideologies [which] have
contributed significantly to the marginalization of some populations –
reinforcing old prejudices or creating new ones, inciting hostility to forms of
cultural expression and social organization deemed incompatible with the
preferred national ideal.
(Nolutshungu 1996: 289)
‘Internal colonialism’ and group rights
It is useful to employ Keal’s concept of ‘internal colonialism’ to explore such a
paradigm of power. Decolonization after 1945 often resulted in the new elites in
the majority populations within the emergent nation states following policies of
assimilation to compel the indigenous ethnic minority peoples within their
territorial boundaries to adopt the language, customs, dress and lifeways of
the majority ‘settler’ populations; the alternative was forced expulsion or
marginalization within the political economy of the new nation state. Demands by
indigenous ethnic minority peoples for self-determination, applicable in interna-
tional law only to formerly ‘colonized’ peoples, were viewed as threats to secede
and to break up the unity of the newly reconstructed nation state (Keal 2003: 45).
In 1958, for example, the Shan threat to invoke the ‘right to secede’ after 10 years,
from the Union of Burma, as agreed at Panglong in February 1947 with the late
General Aung San, precipitated military action and widespread reports of egre-
gious human rights abuses in the Shan States by the Burmese military during the
‘Caretaker’ government of the late General Ne Win. Painful memories from this
and the earlier campaign by the Burmese military in the Shan States in 1952–4
provoked the subsequent dynamic of conflict and resistance which has been ongo-
ing. The spectre of secession again emerged on 19 April 2005 when a number of
venerable Shan elders living in exile unilaterally declared the ‘independence’ of the
‘Federated Shan States’, a formula harking back to the colonial-era administration
with its implicit autonomy from centralized rule. It is noteworthy that both the
central government in Yangon and the opposition National League for Democracy
(NLD) denounced this ‘declaration of independence’as unhelpful and divisive. This
experience of ‘internal colonialism’ has left the bitter legacy of civil conflict in
many post-colonial multi-ethnic societies which have been unable or unwilling to
implement policies designed to sustain a pluralistic, multicultural society.
Keal argues, however, that the demand for self-determination by many indige-
nous ethnic minority peoples needs to be reconsidered; self-determination should
not be equated with secession, but as the right to maintain cultural difference as
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a positive feature of indigenous peoples’ lifeways and fundamental to maintain-
ing their distinctive identities (Plates 3.9 and 3.10). Significantly, this is
conceived as being attained within the parameters of the nation state in which
they are located. He suggests that ‘the meaning of self-determination emphasized
by indigenous peoples is not of separate statehood, but control over decisions
affecting their cultural survival and distinctive identities within the existing
institutional structure of states’ (Keal 2003: 132).
Plate 3.9 Villagers Mong Pyan (1).
Plate 3.10 Villagers Mong Pyan (2).
This perspective is very close to the situation I witnessed in the Wa Special Region
of Eastern Shan States in February 2004 and resembles the political framework of
local government exercised through local ethnic minority leaders. The cooperation
between the ceasefire groups and the Myanmar government in implementing the
‘right to development’ – though imperfect as many human undertakings are – is
nevertheless an essential component in this redefined ‘self-determination’ whereby
the leaders of the indigenous ethnic minority peoples of Myanmar seek alternate
means – other than civil conflict – for ensuring the survival of their distinctive
lifeways and culture within the nation state. Such alternate means are now perceived
by some of the ceasefire groups to be through embracing the opportunities for
development available through the agency of the nation state.3
Curtis Lambrecht is therefore misguided in his analysis (2004: 151–81) of the
relationship between the Myanmar government and the ceasefire groups. Not
only does the government not ‘exert control over the border regions and populace
to an extent that is historically unprecedented’ (Lambrecht 2004:172), but also it
is clear to anyone who takes the trouble to go to these regions that government
presence in the border regions, beyond the big towns, is a constantly re-negotiated
entity. The Myanmar government does not have undisputed control of these areas.
The indigenous ethnic minority leadership of the ceasefire groups negotiate the
terms on which ‘development’ comes to the border regions, is implemented and
distributed. Such regions are not criss-crossed by strategic highways such as those
built by the US/Thai governments in North-East Thailand during the Vietnam War
for express strategic purposes to facilitate transport of troops and weaponry
destined for Vietnam. As one flies over the impenetrable mountainous areas of
Myanmar, still largely pristine forests, such strategic highways are notable by
their absence (Plates 3.11, 3.12 and 3.13). Such roads as there are, outside of the
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towns and main north-south highway along the Ayeyarwaddy river corridor, are
of poor quality, require four-wheel drive access, and are used mainly to transport
produce to market. Many are unusable during the monsoon season, May–October.
At Heho outside Taunggyi in Shan State in January 2000, I witnessed market day.
Most of the agricultural produce had been brought over these unsealed arterial
roads by ox-cart, some dozens of which, with their beasts of burden still in yoke,
were parked behind the market stalls. At the present time, almost 50 per cent of
Plate 3.12 Mong Pyan truck and welcome (1).
Plate 3.13 Mong Pyan truck and welcome (2).
Myanmar’s roads are unsealed.4 Installation of a usable land transportation
network in the border regions would therefore seem to be of primary practical
importance in any programme to alleviate poverty in these areas; the former
poppy farmers, being encouraged to follow an alternate cash crop economy, must
be able to take their farm produce to market to sell it, if the poppy-replacement
programme is to have any chance of being sustainable (Plate 3.14). If the
infrastructure to support the alternate economy is not provided, it is inevitable the
farmers will return to poppy growing to make a living. Development of the border
regions is thus inextricably linked with security – of the individual and the state,
and in the case of the drug trade, the wider international community.
The agreements made by the Myanmar government with the ceasefire groups
are therefore the essential platform on which policies to enhance development and
security can be based. As Seng Raw (2004) and Martin Smith (1991, rpt. 1999)
have emphasized, this achievement has been inadequately recognized by the inter-
national community. Moreover, it has been a domestic achievement which did not
receive any financial or strategic support from the international community, some
of whose members actively stoked the fires of civil conflict. In the 15 years since
the first of these ceasefires took effect, some measures towards Keal’s view of self-
determination within the life of the nation state have been instituted for some of
the indigenous minority peoples in Myanmar. The Pa-O and Palaung, for example,
as officially recognized indigenous ethnic minority groups, have been granted
tracts of land in upper Myanmar outside Mandalay, under terms which could be
considered to be ‘self-determination within the life of the nation-state’. The
10 communities in the Wa Special Region of Eastern Shan States which I visited
in February 2004 had similarly been granted tracts of land in arable valleys where
rice, fruits and vegetables could be grown as cash crops, and mixed farming could
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be practiced, on the condition of coming down from the mountain tops where they
had formerly grown poppy for a living. The irrigation networks, electricity grid
and communication infrastructure which had been installed in these new land
tracts were testimony to the extent of cooperation between the indigenous leader-
ship and the government. Land rights, as Keal points out, are central to the UN’s
human rights regime. In the case of indigenous peoples, these are usually group or
community rights deriving from their cultural mores and ties to the land.5
In the International Year of Indigenous Peoples (2003), the UN’s
Working Group on Indigenous Peoples (WGIP) resulted in preparation of a Draft
Declaration (GA Res 1514) which ‘if adopted will give indigenous peoples a
“legal personality” ’; and pave the way for establishing indigenous rights as new
international norms (Keal 2003: 121) in the sense in which Lyons and Mayall
(2003) called for international recognition of group rights within the purview
of the UN’s human rights accords.6 This would strengthen the new approach to
self-determination by indigenous ethnic minority peoples within the life of the
nation state and, theoretically, reduce the propensity for nation states to view
self-determination as a challenge to their unity and security. As a state’s human
rights performance is increasingly being integrated into international perceptions
of legitimacy, upholding the group rights of indigenous ethnic minority peoples
will become an important element in a state’s legal responsibility to protect both
its people and its ‘peoples’. Such a reconceptualization of self-determination as a
group right, Keal (2003: 154) suggests, is ‘vital to the development of an inter-
national civil society’ which includes indigenous peoples within its purview.
The logical result of such a move would be to obviate the former disparity
between individual rights and collective rights; states which abuse either would run
the risk of having their ‘legitimacy’ challenged in the international arena. From this
perspective, recognition of group rights as human rights enhances the viability of
the reconceptualization of the notion of self-determination and becomes a key
plank in any effective global-level poverty-alleviation strategy for indigenous
ethnic minority peoples; moreover, it heightens the imperative for states which
wish to be recognized as legitimate members of international society to implement
policies for the improved well-being of the indigenous ethnic minority peoples within
their borders. Such an approach would assist in reducing the conflict-secession
dynamic between the centralizing nation state and its indigenous ethnic minorities,
and contribute towards eliminating the propensity of the nation state to consider
them ‘enemies of the state’. The security–poverty–development nexus would thus
be transformed, resulting in enhanced human security both in the border regions
and the core areas of the nation state.
Drug-suppression operations
Crop-substitution programmes in Eastern Shan States
In March 2004, the tenth annual joint Myanmar–US opium poppy survey was
conducted in Eastern Shan States, one of the largest poppy growing and opium
producing areas in the world, second only to Afghanistan. Stung by international
criticism and the ignominy of being identified in various publications as a ‘narco-
economy’, the Myanmar government had initiated a series of measures including
‘Operation Hell-Flower’, the ‘New Destiny Project’ and a 15-year plan, com-
mencing in 1999 to rid the country of poppy. However, highly publicized seizures
of drugs in the government-controlled press, their public destruction and arrests
of drug traffickers failed to win the international approval the government sought.
Following the March 2004 survey, however, there seemed to be some progress
achieved in reducing the area under cultivation and moving towards the total
elimination of poppy promised, by June 2005, by the Wa leadership in Eastern
Shan States. In northern Kokang, along the border with China, the official
cultivation of poppy was purportedly eliminated in 2002.
Myanmar’s Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control (CCDAC) within its
Home Affairs Ministry could report that the findings of the joint Myanmar–US
survey team (officials from the US Counter Narcotics and Crime agency)
supported a decline in poppy cultivation by 34 per cent compared with the previ-
ous growing season in 2003. This allegedly represented a decline of the area
under poppy cultivation from 47,130 hectares to 30,888 hectares, equivalent to a
reduction in opium production by 39 per cent – a fall from 484 tons to 292 tons
of raw opium, according to Police Colonel Hkam Awng, the joint secretary of the
CCDAC (first established 1975). A similar survey by the UNODC in the same
period is also said to have confirmed a significant reduction both in the area
under cultivation and the opium yield (Myanmar Times, 13 September 2004).
To put this in perspective, Western sources estimated the area under poppy culti-
vation in the 1988–97 period at 180,000 hectares in total, which were said to have
declined to 89,500 hectares by 2000 (said to be half that of 1997, the peak year);
the same sources estimated that the opium yield for the 2002 poppy crop was
630 metric tons, ‘about one-quarter the level of 1996’ (Gibson and Haseman
2003: 7); at a time when annual worldwide production of raw opium was said to
be 4,000 tons (Trocki 1999: 110). Myanmar government reports also indicate
concerted destruction of poppy grown illegally (Myanmar Information Sheet,
No. D-3018 (I) 3 May 2004) ranging from 1,500 hectares in the 2003 growing
season to 7,500 hectares in the 2004 season.7
Whilst an element in this marked reduction may have been the adverse drought
conditions affecting the poppy crop, there is also no doubt that the cooperative
measures launched in conjunction with the Wa-Kokang leadership, the prevailing
conditions of comparative peace, and international financial assistance particu-
larly through the UNODC and neighbouring countries, Thailand and China, have
played a significant role. Although it may be true, as Lambrecht (2004: 169)
asserts, that such poppy reduction and eradication measures are greeted with
scepticism in certain international quarters and that ‘Government officials are
also involved in the drug trade’ – as indeed they are in many other countries
(including Western countries) also – there is no doubt that the poppy reduction
and eradication programme is a high priority for the Myanmar government and
its neighbours, China and Thailand. It is also very significant that the success of
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these measures is viewed by the Myanmar, Chinese and Thai governments as a
product of the participation by the indigenous ethnic minority leadership; the
programme is not a ‘top-down’ policy implemented solely by the authority of the
central government, but a practical exercise in participatory development
undertaken with the active cooperation and support of those directly involved in
replacing the poppy culture with a standard agricultural ecology.
At Wan Hong and Yong Kha, in the Golden Triangle in February 2004, I
witnessed the results of some 5 years of this crop-substitution programme. Here,
‘model villages’ have been established with funding support from Thailand (Plate
3.15). The former poppy farmers, through the agency of their ethnic minority
leadership, had been brought down from the mountain tops where they had pre-
viously grown the poppy, to a fertile valley, well-watered, which now supports a
stable, mixed-farming economy based on vegetables, fruits, rices, poultry, pigs,
nuts and pulses. A hospital, school and electricity infrastructure have been
provided in what has been made into a very attractive environment, the results of
5 years of hard work, planning and cooperation (Plates 3.16–3.21). The first
couple of seasons, after being brought down from the mountain tops, must have
been very hard indeed for the former poppy farmers, uprooted from their usual
homes and transplanted to this new location where they had to develop an entirely
new economy. This phase of the transition cycle is presently being implemented
in the northern Kokang region along the border with China, where donations of
food and salt are essential to sustain the people during the transition phase. There
was a view that if the political and social priorities were eradication of poppy,
then there was no alternative: limited resources precluded the provision of costly
infrastructure on mountain tops, not to mention the detrimental impact on the
environment in such a location.
Plate 3.15 Yong Kha village project.
There is no doubt that all the players are conscious of the hardship involved in
accomplishing the changeover to a non-poppy economy, with government sources
frequently reporting on the distribution of free rice, salt, agricultural seeds, live-
stock and household items to the former poppy farmers who have handed over
poppy seeds and participated in the crop-substitution programme (Myanmar
Information Sheet No. D-3018 (I) 3rd May, 2004). Following the March 2004
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Plate 3.16 Yong Kha school and market gardens.
Plate 3.17 Yong Kha school and school bell made from wheel hub.
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opium yield survey with its apparently satisfactory results, it was reported that
Thailand was providing further funding of 30 million baht (or about
USD 700,000 on top of the 40 million baht – USD 960,000, already invested in
the crop-substitution programme) for additional poppy substitution and infra-
structure projects in villages outside Yong Kha in south-eastern Shan State (Plate
3.22). This two-way cooperation with Thailand, which has a significant vested
interest in ensuring the interdiction of the drug trade flowing into its territories
Plate 3.18 Nurses Yong Kha hospital.
Plate 3.19 Patient examination room Yong Kha hospital.
from Myanmar, includes provision for the former poppy farmers to be able to sell
their new agricultural products duty-free across the border to Thailand. Not only
is the rice deficit being addressed, but also now a surplus is available for export.8
The cross-border trade is harnessing an economic boom in the border towns such
as Tachilek. Local indigenous leaders told me that the internal export, within
Myanmar and around the neighbouring countries bordering the Golden Triangle,9
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Plate 3.20 Young soldiers in the UWSA – Wan Hong welcome band.
Plate 3.21 Welcome at Wan Hong poppy replacement project, showing fruit (Mandarin)
trees, in background.
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of surplus farm produce from the crop-substitution programmes had earned the
participating communities a substantial income in the previous agricultural year.
Certainly the outlook for the children in this village seemed considerably better
than in those further north where the crop-substitution programme was just com-
mencing. Food security was being enhanced – the people now had food all year
round, instead of merely the 6 to 7 months of the year previously when their econ-
omy was based solely on poppy farming – and improved access to education and
health care, transport and communications infrastructure held out the prospect of
greater socio-economic security. Personal and community security were not only
significantly improved since the implementation of the peace accords, but also the
ceasefire groups for the first time in 50 years were becoming part of a legal inter-
national economic network which was beginning to deliver them the anticipated
benefits of greater local autonomy and control over their distinctive lifeways. This
does not mean that the poppy economy has been totally replaced, or that illegal
growing, harvesting of opium and production of illegal drugs does not continue;
but that the first necessary steps have been taken to provide the former poppy
farmers with an alternate economy which holds out the possibility of gradually
reducing the supply of the drug. In March 2004, Jean-Luc Lemahieu, Country
Representative, Yangon, for UNODC, called on the international community to
provide another USD 26 million to sustain the alternate income and community
development projects in (Plate 3.23) the Kokang and Wa regions of Shan State
(Myanmar Times, 8–14 March 2004). Without such assistance, he warned, poppy
farmers would be hard-pressed to make a living in the transitional phase of the
crop-substitution programme and would be likely once again to face a food deficit.
Plate 3.22 Provincial Headquarters, Wa Special Region No. 1, showing fruit orchards in
background.
Provision of the necessary infrastructure to support the economic and social
transformation in these border regions has therefore been an essential policy
initiative. Recognition of the impact of infrastructure-provision strategies in
promoting pro-poor growth and the significance of interweaving national and
sub-national relationships with initiatives taken in the international community
were key aspects of the discussions at the World Bank’s seminars on ‘Poverty
Day’ October 2003 when it was acknowledged that such an approach contributes
to realization of the Millennium Development Goals. From this perspective, the
policy initiatives by the Myanmar government, through the CCDAC and the
Ministry for the Progress of Border Areas and National Races and Development
Affairs, in cooperation with the leadership of the ceasefire groups, are consistent
with policy principles for effective poverty alleviation espoused by this key
international agency.
Burma/Myanmar in the international drug trade
The Wa-Kokang regions of Eastern, Northern and Southern Shan States, usually
referred to as the ‘Golden Triangle,’10 host over 16 indigenous ethnic minority
groups. They include the Lahu (Plates 3.24 and 3.25), Lisu, Akha, Meo (or
Hmong) in addition to the Wa, Shan and Kokangese. Early in the British colonial
administration of these border regions, James George Scott, C. I. E., then
Superintendent of the Northern Shan States, in 1897, wrote, ‘The Lahu and Akha
smoke opium because [they claim] it is the best thing for their health they know
of’ (Scott MS U.L. 1.5–1.6).11 Over a century later, Andre and Louis Boucard,
touring these regions in the mid-1980s, observed the cultivation and smoking of
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Plate 3.23 UNODC funded water viaduct for rice fields – Mong Ka.
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opium among the Lahu, Lisu and Akha. They commented that the Lahu, of whom
about 20,000 were then in Thailand, had migrated secretly from southern China
and Burma, and were heavily involved in the drug trade. ‘The Burmese army and
Lahu are ferocious enemies and engage in merciless combat’ (Boucard and
Boucard 1992: 32); the Akha, an animist group with a strictly patriarchal social
organization, practice ‘poppy cultivation as one of their major activities’ (ibid.);
whilst the Lisu have long been associated with poppy cultivation as witnessed by
Plate 3.24 Lahu dancers Kengtung hotel (1).
Plate 3.25 Lahu dancers Kengtung hotel (2).
the missionaries, J. O. Fraser (Fraser of Lisuland) (Taylor 1944: 43, 139, 159) and
John and Isobel Kuhn (1956). Boucard and Boucard describe the following scene:
In one of the fields we visited, Alima, a stunning Lisu, was supervising the
work of her companions. She was married to a wealthy trafficker and enjoyed
the privilege of not collecting the opium herself. The others would harvest
opium from the end of January until mid-March. Large balls of opium stuck
to their spatulas. They would wrap them in flower petals to scent them before
returning to the village at the end of the day.
(Boucard and Boucard 1992: 38)
For these hill-tribe peoples, cultivating the opium poppy was an intrinsic part of
their everyday lives.
Although the opium poppy has been cultivated in other areas of northern
Burma/Myanmar in the Hukawng Valley of Kachin state, and in the Naga regions
along the Indian border, it is the Wa-Kokang regions east and west of the Salween
river which have been recognized to produce the highest grade of raw opium
(from which heroin is made) which meets the requirements of the international
drug trade.12 The opium poppy has been cultivated here for over a century,
brought by Chinese Haws (Panthay Muslims) from Yunnan, fleeing the retribu-
tion of the central Chinese government after the collapse of their rebellion in
1873. The final battle in that conflict was fought at Taw Nio, the main market in
Kokang. In 1875, the Haws established the town of Panglong, where, without land
rights, they became traders. When J. G. Scott was again exploring this region as
a member of the Burma–China Boundary Commission in 1899–1900, he wrote,
We were now entering a land of famine, the difficulties of obtaining food
having steadily increased since leaving Muang La. Here, already, we were
unable to obtain either fruit or vegetables, but we were destined to fare worse
later on. Opium is imported by the Ho [i.e. Haw, the Panthay Muslims] car-
avans, salt comes from the fields in the district, and iron from a mine near
the sources of the Nam Ko, worked liked [sic] the lead mines by Khamus,
who pay revenue to Luang Prabang.
(Scott MS U.L. 1.9)
The conditions he witnessed remained substantially unchanged until very
recent times. During the colonial era, these regions, governed indirectly through
their own leaders, were permitted to continue to cultivate poppy. Serious regula-
tion of the trade was not attempted until the post-Second World War indepen-
dence era, and particularly the advent of the military government in 1962.
In approaching the role of Burma/Myanmar in the international drug trade, it
is necessary therefore to distinguish between Upper and Lower Burma/Myanmar
because diverse policies and historical developments impacted on the two areas
in different ways with differing consequences for the national destiny. Since the
Wa-Kokang areas have been historically the core of the opium poppy cultivation
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in Burma/Myanmar, policies to reduce the supply of drugs have been concentrated
here by means of the integrated development projects discussed earlier. It should
be emphasized, however, that this approach is a product of contemporary
international development policies and the pressures brought to bear by the
international narcotics suppression regime which has developed since 1906, and
particularly since the Second World War. During the high colonial era of the
nineteenth century and even in the early years of the twentieth century, these areas
which produced the best opium were specifically exempted, by the British
colonial administration, from the developing legal machinery of drug control. As
several writers have noted (Renard 1996; Farooqui 1998; Wong 1998; Trocki
1999) both the colonial administration in India and the British home government
were addicted to the revenue derived from the opium trade, which, as John Wong
(1998: 27) has emphasized, indirectly, through the levy on imported Chinese tea
purchased from the proceeds of the opium sales, covered more than 57 per cent
of the annual cost of operating the Royal Navy. Until the end of the Second World
War, and the advent of the independence era in Burma/Myanmar, cultivation of
the opium poppy in the Wa-Kokang regions was not only unregulated, but posi-
tively encouraged. Attempts to regulate the drug trade in these northern regions
were only undertaken after 1948, first by the late Prime Minister U Nu, then in
the post-1962 era by the late military dictator, General Ne Win. The problem was,
that in the independence era after 1948, the Burmese/Myanmar government in
Yangon did not have effective control over these northern regions, so edicts
against the drug trade were little more than symbolic expressions of disapproval.
The crop-substitution programme implemented in a systemic way since the
ceasefires took effect in the 1989–98 period is perforce a comparatively recent
initiative which has the advantage of being able to benefit from lessons learnt dur-
ing the past 30 years when neighbouring Thailand has experimented with various
approaches to development amongst the similar poppy-growing peoples living
in northern Thailand (Renard 2001). Whilst Renard, a supporter of the poppy-
crop-replacement approach, could nevertheless express caution about the long-term
viability of the projects in Eastern Shan States, Kengtung, Tachilek and the Wa-
Kokang regions (Renard 1996: 87),13 he categorically asserts that there is ‘no
proof that the top government [i.e. Myanmar government] leaders are personally
involved in the drug trade’; however, this ‘does not apply to the lower ranks of the
military’ (Renard 1996: 106). Gibson and Haseman (2003: 3–4) agree ‘officials
of both the U.S. Department of State and the Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) have confirmed to the authors what they say publicly – they know of no
evidence to support charges of state-sponsored drug trafficking in Myanmar’.
Such clarity does not, however, extend to the autonomous regional military
commanders (said to have amassed large personal fortunes) where ‘the potential
for collusion between the security forces and drug traffickers is particularly
strong’ (Gibson and Haseman 2003: 4). The type of local level collusion
described by Lintner (2000) whereby officials in the border regions (Plate 3.26)
implicitly ‘turn a blind eye’ to drug trafficking activities in return for ‘gifts’
of expensive furniture and foreign alcohol is totally credible, indicative of the
systemic corruption which has been one of the legacies of the decades of civil
war. In Taunggyi, Shan State, in early 2000, I witnessed a transaction taking place
in the dimly lit foyer of the government hotel where my delegation was staying.
That it was a clandestine transaction was obvious from the furtive glances and
body language of those involved, a transaction which, for our own safety, we pre-
tended not to see. Describing the overseas connections of the drug operations in
Upper Myanmar, Lintner writes,
Historically, local merchants, mostly of ethnic Chinese origin, bought opium
and sent it down to the Thai border. Shan, Kachin, Lahu, Wa and other indige-
nous ethnic rebels, who controlled most of northern Burma, taxed opium grow-
ers and the drivers of convoys who passed through their territory. Officers from
the Burmese government’s army, who were supposed to fight the rebels and
suppress the opium trade, happily looked the other way if bribes were offered.
But this was only ‘tea money’, and usually consisted of small amounts of cash,
fancy furniture from Thailand, golf clubs, and foreign liquor . . .The real money
was made when the drugs entered the Thai frontier, where the opium was
refined into pure ‘number four’ heroin, and shipped on to the drug markets in
Southeast Asia, Australia, North America, and Europe. The refineries were
owned and operated by ethnic Chinese crime syndicates that collaborated with
local warlord armies . . . Profits from those operations were laundered in banks
in Thailand, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, and reinvested in often
legitimate businesses such as hotels, real estate, department stores, and similar
operations which showed an almost undetectable fast turnover.
(Lintner 2000: 164)
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Plate 3.26 Tachilek–Mae Sai Border Gate, Thai–Myanmar Border.
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This snapshot of the international dimensions of the drug trade, has focussed on
its ‘downstream’ consequences and distracted attention from the need for policies
to interdict the cultivation and production of drugs at their source in the northern
border regions. It also overlooks the need for innovative socio-economic policies
and political initiatives which will both reduce the demand for the drug and
provide for effective enforcement measures. No friend of the Myanmar government,
Lintner yet readily admits that ‘Not a single insurgent group in the jungles of
Burma had the international contacts that were needed to distribute tons of heroin
world-wide, to launder millions of dollars in banks in Singapore and the Cayman
Is, and to hire couriers in Amsterdam, London and Lagos’ (Lintner 1994: 259).
Without the international networks, the opium poppy farmers in the Kachin and
Shan hills and along the Cis- and Trans-Salween states in the Wa-Kokang regions,
may have continued on as they had prior to the Second World War, small scale,
some eating the opium, others smoking it, using it for ritual and medicinal pur-
poses in the treatment of diarrhoea, malaria, typhoid and cholera, without taking
the step towards heroin production and other synthetic drugs.14 As Lintner asserts,
Yunnanese traffickers with direct access to people such as Khun Sa [drug
warlord] and General Li [KMT general] were responsible for smuggling
opium from northern Burma to the heroin refineries along the Thai border,
[but] it was the Chiu Chao [i.e. Chinese] syndicates who financed and
controlled the major heroin shipments destined for the international market.
(Lintner 1994: 252)
The hill tribes grew the opium; the ethnic insurgents in Shan State transported it;
the Yunnanese Chinese taxed it and the Chiu Chao Chinese bought and exported
it, mostly through Thailand, with the connivance of the Thai authorities and the
Sino-Thai business community.15
When Andre and Louis Boucard travelled through these poppy growing
regions of Upper Burma/Myanmar in the mid-1980s, foreign assistance with
drug-suppression operations and poppy-replacement programmes was still being
received. They reported,
A portion of the opium produced is consumed by tribesmen. The balance is
bought by drug traffickers, mainly Chinese Haw [i.e. Panthay Muslims], who
live on the mountain slopes and act as middlemen between the town Chinese
and the hilltribe peoples. The Haws barter: they exchange opium for essentials
like salt, sugar, fabric, and light industrial products such as flashlights and
watches. The locals buy these, run up debts and then have to plant even more
poppies. One thing is clear: rather than being the root of insurgency, drug
trafficking merely provides the means by which the insurgents make a living.
(Boucard and Boucard 1992: 22)
That international assistance with drug-suppression operations was curtailed in
response to the 1988 civil violence in Myanmar is a misfortune, an example of
policy confusion and knee-jerk reaction by the international community, rather
than a carefully thought-through approach to the problems of the country.16 A per-
suasive case could be made for suggesting that the upsurge in opium production
in the 1990–6 period could be traced to this reduced capacity within Myanmar
to enforce drug-suppression operations. The fact that some members of the inter-
national community are again contributing through the UNODC and through
bilateral arrangements to programmes designed to reduce both the supply and the
demand for drugs, as well as the enforcement side of drug suppression, is perhaps
a measure of the recognition that poverty alleviation amongst the peoples of
the poppy cultures has far-reaching implications for global security. As a result
there is greater recognition by some international agencies that policies to
improve the well-being of the indigenous ethnic minority peoples in the Golden
Triangle should be disentangled from those designed to bring about civilian rule
in Myanmar; in the long run, empowerment of the indigenous ethnic minority
peoples must have political as well as socio-economic dimensions. It is only too
obvious that no solution to the issue of returning Myanmar to democratic civilian
governance will be practicable without empowerment of the indigenous ethnic
minority peoples within a pluralistic, multi-ethnic framework.
Boucard and Boucard not only recognize the different administrative and legal
regimes applied to Lower and Upper Burma/Myanmar in historical and recent
times and what this has meant for the increase in poppy cultivation in the north-
ern regions since the Second World War, but also they distinguish between the
different poppy growing areas of Upper Myanmar – those east or west of the
Salween; the Wa-Kokang regions, Kachin state and the Hukawng valley and
Southern Shan State. Thus, until 1945, poppy in Kachin state was grown only in
the Hukawng valley, was of poor quality, and not sought after by the international
drug syndicates (Boucard and Boucard 1992: 24), in contrast to that from the
Kokang region which was recognized as producing the highest grade of opium
from which ‘number four’ heroin was made. Boucard and Boucard attribute the
upsurge in poppy cultivation in both Kachin State and Shan State to the parallel
increase in insurgencies in the early 1960s following the military takeover by the
late General Ne Win on 2 March 1962. Government policies at the time, particu-
larly the Four Cuts policy,17 the demonetizations and socialization of the economy
both stoked the insurgencies and precipitated the increase in poppy cultivation.
Their views accord with those of Smith (1991, rpt. 1999) and Lintner (1994) who
have detailed the story of opium and insurgency in the border regions since 1948,
and its direct links to the rise of the Burmese Communist Party (CPB) which took
over Kokang in 1968. Here, some of the fiercest battles of the Burmese civil war
took place. So, although it is true that between 1886 when the British took over
Upper Burma, and 1948 when Burma regained its independence, large caravans
from Yunnan (where it had become the dominant crop after 1875) protected by
armed soldiers, would bring the drug illicitly into the northern regions of Burma,
Thailand and Vietnam, ‘there was no large-scale production [of poppy] in the
Triangle region before the 1940s, since Burma (under British rule), Siam
and French Indochina deterred the hilltribes from cultivating poppy in order to
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preserve their own monopolies’ (Boucard and Boucard 1992: 26). The poppy
brought by these traders, or grown by the migratory hill tribes moving out of
southern China into the northern border regions of neighbouring countries
throughout the nineteenth century, was mainly for local consumption until the
post-Second World War period and Cold War regional security politics changed
the balance from opium for local consumption to heroin for international export.
In this changing dynamic, the Kuomintang (KMT) incursions in Upper Burma
(1950–61) encouraged by the CIA and US foreign policy specialists supportive of
Taiwan (McCoy 1991, 3rd rev. edn 2003; Smith 1991, rpt. 1999; Lintner 1994;
Renard 1996) saw opium become the currency of the north, purchasing weapons,
equipment and manpower, in quixotic attempts by remnant Chinese Nationalist
bands to dislodge Mao’s communists from mainland China.18 In 1961 the
‘Mekong Operation’ launched by Chinese premier Chou En-lai, possibly with
Premier U Nu’s tacit consent, saw the PLA cross the border and resoundingly
defeat the KMT troops entrenched in Kokang. Subsequently, some 4,200 of the
KMT’s 10,000 strong force, were repatriated to Taiwan; the remainder stayed in
their strongholds along the Burma–Thai border, ‘well-protected by the CIA and
the Thai army for their anti-communist buffer role, but increasingly financing
their activities in the Shan State with opium, jade, arms and other black-market
trafficking’ (Smith 1991, rpt. 1999: 189).
The dynamics of opium production in these northern regions on the threshold
of the twentieth century were accidentally witnessed by James George Scott,
C. I. E., then Superintendent of the Northern Shan States, during his 1897 tour of
the Wa states. He wrote in his diary,
The Wa seemed in danger of forming the opinion that when we came to the
country we either walked through it in a great hurry, paying for everything,
told them to be good, and not fight with one another, or made a sudden raid,
with no very apparent cause, burnt a lot of villages and retired with equal
precipitation to the unknown distance of Lashio. The Chinese, on the
other hand, came up, killed all the pigs and smoked all the opium [italics
mine] – two easily comprehensible and entirely convincing facts, especially
when there was no hint of payment – and then tranquilly went back again to
the hills which could be seen with the naked eye on the other side of the
Nam Hka.
(Scott MS U.L. 1.6, Burma Political Department, 
Report dated 1 June 1897, Tour to 
the Wa States, and Chinese border)
Scott had been investigating rumours of an anti-British confederation of five Wa
states. Despite orders to tread softly and warily, and basically leave the fearsome
Wa alone, Scott determined that there was some substance to the rumour, burnt
villages which opposed his column, and brought the Wa states, both friendly and
hostile, within the scope of the British colonial administration.19 His extensive
experience in Burma and among the frontier peoples, however, convinced him
that opium was not a menace at that time to the hill-tribe peoples’ cultures. He
opposed official measures to make poppy growing illegal and saw it as part of
their lifestyle. By 1900, when poppy had become the dominant crop in the 
Wa-Kokang region, it was already spreading into south Hsenwi, west Mang Lon,
and on hills everywhere higher than 1,200 metres (Scott and Hardiman 1901,
pt. 1, vol. 2: 358). Scott wrote, ‘There are no victims of opium in these opium-
producing districts, any more than there are in Ssu-ch’uan, where the people are
the wealthiest in China and half the crops are poppy. It is only in places where
opium is prohibitive in price that there are victims to opium. There, to buy his
opium, the poor man must starve himself. . . . Where opium is cheap, the people
are healthy and stalwart.’20 The cultivators included the Chinese, Shan, Kachin,
Palaung and Lahu, Akha, Yao and Hmong (Meo) as opium poppy cultivation
followed the trade routes south into Kengtung State. Renard (1996: 29) writes,
‘Opium then began to be smuggled over the virtually unpoliced border into Siam
where the artificially high rates charged at government dens gave the Shan States’
opium a ready market.’ In Kokang, ruled by the Yang family since the 1840s,
opium produced huge profits;21 the Yang family’s control of the trade remained
unchallenged until the changing domestic and international political scene of the
1960s entrammelled the Yangs in insurgent and Cold War politics, leading the
military government in Yangon in 1962, to remove Olive Yang and her brother,
Edward, from control of Kokang. The CPB and other drug warlords then moved
in to fill the power vacuum.
As Boucard and Boucard suggested, the international networks trading in
opium, before 1945 were supplied from the monopolies established by the former
colonial powers during the nineteenth century. Most raw opium traded on these
networks had come from British India, with smaller amounts from Turkey and
Iran. It was transported in the ships of private companies such as Jardine-
Matheson, Dent and Company and Russell and Company. In the countries
fronting the Golden Triangle today – China, Vietnam, Thailand, Myanmar/
Burma – local rulers before the colonial era had edicts in place which made
opium consumption illegal. Their opposition to opium consumption was over-
taken during the nineteenth century when the colonial tide rolled over Asia;
opium became the prime commodity shoring up the global economy, paying for
the administrative costs of empire and the wars of imperial expansion (Walker
1991; Jennings 1997; Wong 1998; Trocki 1999). At the end of the nineteenth
century, China was said to have over 15 million addicts (Jennings 1997: 5). In this
global trade, Lower Burma was a pawn, a ready market for excise opium shipped
from India; and in the Shan States of Upper Burma, a lucrative contributor, to the
British Empire’s opium monopoly. Indeed, Walker (1991) and Jennings (1997)
have shown that control of the opium trade was a major contributing factor to the
outbreak of the Second World War in South-East Asia, shaping Japan’s strategy
in China, Manchuria and Burma; and in Churchill’s response and determination
to deny Japan the control she sought. Japan must not get India, Churchill said.
When nationalistic, post-colonial governments commenced drug-eradication
measures to free their populations from opium addiction, their initiatives ran up
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against the complexities of Cold War era regional security politics, ethnic and
communist insurgencies financing their activities through the drug trade, and the
rapid expansion of international drug marketing syndicates. Only Mao’s China,
after 1949, was able to institute a successful, if draconian, drug-eradication
programme. Despite years of propaganda to the contrary, the US implicitly
acknowledged this in 1971 on the eve of Nixon’s visit to China in February 1972.
However, since that time, the operations of the international networks operating
out of northern Myanmar, Laos and northern Thailand have seen a resurgence in
drug addiction in China, particularly South-West China. It has been estimated that
some 80 per cent of the drugs produced in northern Myanmar and Laos are
smuggled into China through such border towns as Riuli (The Irrawaddy Magazine,
3 March 2004). As a result, cooperation between China, Myanmar and the
countries bordering the Golden Triangle has recently been stepped up to try to
interdict both the supply and the demand for drugs. Such cooperation extends to
enforcement operations and sharing intelligence, including with the agencies of
the international community. Along these lines, in recent years, Myanmar has
been cooperating with Australia in training programmes for officials and police
engaged in drug-suppression and enforcement operations.
From domestic use to international commodity
Opium has long been an item of international commerce. It is said to have been
introduced by Arab traders to India and China between the seventh and ninth cen-
turies.22 Until the seventeenth century, it appears to have been used mainly for
medicinal purposes and was taken internally. By contrast, the smoking of opium
mixed with tobacco was well established in the Dutch East Indies, and Formosa
(Taiwan) by the end of the seventeenth century when Engelbert Kaempfer made
his voyage. According to the Chinese imperial edicts of 1729 and 1799 banning
the smoking of opium and then the import of the commodity to China, this more
pernicious method of usage was already widespread, particularly amongst the
elite classes. Opium played a dominant role in the commercial strategy of the
English East India Company (EIC) in the eighteenth century; the Company had
taken over the networks of its predecessors in the East, the Dutch and the
Portuguese, who in turn had taken over from the Mughal emperors in India (Owen
1934: 8–22). From 1773 during the administration of Warren Hastings as
Governor of Bengal, the EIC moved to stamp its control on the Indian states, and
then asserted monopoly rights to poppy cultivation in India for export in the
‘country ships’ of private traders to East and South-East Asia.
In China, opium became the cassus belli of the war with Britain, 1839–42.
After the EIC monopoly controlling the cultivation, supply and auctioning of
raw opium in India was dissolved in 1834, private traders, both British and 
non-British, took over the opium industry, transporting vast amounts of Indian
Patna, Benares and then Malwa (grown in the ‘independent’ states in
Gujarat/Sind) opium to China where it was still illegal.23 Farooqui (1998: 91)
shows how competition from the cheaper Malwa made such inroads into the EIC’s
supply monopoly that in 1823 the Government in Bengal decided to tax the
transport of the drug through EIC territory when it could not prevent the opium
being smuggled out onto the sea lanes to South-East Asia and China. But this
proved a failure and from 1829, the Indian traders involved were recognized as
partners in the opium trade who could legally send their product out through
British territory.24 Thereafter, Bombay became a major port for the export of
Malwa opium to China (Farooqui 1998: 142). Family companies such as that of
Sir Jamsetjee Jeejeebhoy, one of Jardine-Matheson’s agents in Bombay in the
1840s–50s, became exceedingly wealthy on the profits of the opium trade,
endowing hospitals and other public institutions.
It was a lesson well-learnt at mid-century, when David Sassoon and Sons, a
family of Sephardic Jews originally from Baghdad, emerged as the prime com-
petitors to the established opium transporting companies. They had been shipping
opium to China on their own account from at least 1834 (Le Fevour 1968: 27).
They initially used Malwa opium to dominate the export market to China. Sassoons
purchased the crop in advance, at source (from the Indian peasant farmers, or ryots)
at rates which undercut their rivals.25 When the Chinese Commissioner Lin at
Canton sought, in 1838, to implement the Imperial edicts banning opium, he
confiscated 21,000 chests of opium from the foreign traders in Canton, for which
the Chinese government by the Treaty of Nanking, paid compensation of
USD 21 million. The good Commissioner Lin, who in 1839 had sent a letter to
Queen Victoria asking ‘Where is your conscience?’ and urging her to stop the
export of opium to China, was retired in disgrace, not for confiscating the opium,
but for embroiling China in a war which she ultimately lost (Lodwick 1996: 27).
Notable amongst the private trading companies built on the profits of the drug
trade were Dent and Company, and Jardine-Matheson and Company (founded
1832), which became the dominant private business enterprise on the
India–China opium trade route after the former went bankrupt in 1867. William
Jardine, a redoubtable Scotsman, known to the Chinese as ‘iron-headed old rat’,
made his fortune in the opium trade, then on 26 January 1839 retired to England
just before the outbreak of hostilities, which he overtly fostered from his retire-
ment haven in Scotland. A surgeon by training, he had spent some years with the
EIC before meeting up with James Matheson in India where the latter was already
involved in the opium trade. Both educated at the University of Edinburgh, they
initially did business as Magniac and Company before the formal establishment
of the firm which bore their name. Hong Kong, ceded to Britain under the terms
of the Treaty of Nanking, became the headquarters for Jardine-Matheson’s east-
ern operations. A second outbreak of hostilities, 1856–60, which John Wong
(1998) has correctly identified as ‘The Arrow War’ rather than a ‘second opium
war’, opened more of China to penetration by international opium merchants and
gave access to the interior of the country by foreign merchants and missionaries.
By the treaty of Tientsin 1858, opium was not initially made legal in China,
despite the demands of the British and other foreign merchants, including
American merchants (Russell & Co., Augustine Heard & Co.). To achieve the
desired aim of it being no longer treated as contraband, the foreign merchant
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community in Canton manipulated the treaty process so that it was agreed a tax
would be imposed on opium brought into the country, thus making it ‘legal’ by
default. John Wong describes the process thus:
The Treaty of Tientsin was signed on 26 June 1858 without opium being
legalized, to the dismay of British opium smugglers in China.
In desperation, one U.S. merchant thought of an ingenious way to rectify
the situation. Article 26 of the Treaty of Tientsin stipulated that the ‘tariff
shall be revised.’ If the Chinese could be persuaded to revise the tariff in such
a way as to include opium among the taxable imports, then opium would
have been legalized de facto. He lobbied his minister, William Reed, to this
effect, and Reed was persuaded. In turn, Reed lobbied Elgin, appealing to his
lordship’s ‘high sense of duty’, urging him to ‘induce or compel an adjust-
ment of the pernicious difficulty’ and assuring him that ‘in such an attempt I
shall cordially unite.’ The conference on 13 October 1858, fixed the tariff to
be levied on opium, thus legalizing it by default.
(Wong 1998: 413–14)
Ironically, the indirect ‘legalization’ of opium led to a vast increase in Chinese
domestic cultivation of poppy and production of raw opium, especially in
Szechuan and Yunnan in south-west China where it had been grown for the
domestic market since at least the 1820s. This was a marked exercise in ‘import
substitution’.26 The consequent fall in profits, and competition from other India-
based merchants such as the Sassoons, eventually led to Jardine-Matheson with-
drawing from the drug trade in the mid-1870s and diversifying their business into
shipping, banking and insurance. As the ‘Arrow War’ got underway, in 1858, the
firm was writing from Hong Kong to its factor, Robertson, in Calcutta,
I have just learnt privately from Shanghai that it has been arranged by Lord
Elgin and the Chinese commissioner [Yeh] that opium is to be legalized and
allowed to enter the same way as other merchandize on payment of a duty of
$20 per chest. The immediate effect of this when once in force will be
I should imagine to increase the demand for drug rather than otherwise – but
on the other hand it will doubtless tend to stimulate the native production of
the Poppy which unless the price of Foreign Opium is again materially
reduced will be thus sure to come into competition with it as was the case ten
or twelve years ago – It might be well therefore to warn the government of
such a contingency so that they may take the necessary steps to check it in
the bud should they see fit – notwithstanding what is stated above with
reference to demand, I would not have you calculate upon much higher prices
ruling for some time to come . . . our stock of Bengal drug is now again very
heavy, while supplies of new Malwa will doubtless come forward freely and
keep it at a comparatively moderate figure . . .
(Private Letter Books, J-M C9/8, 5 November 
1858, to Robertson, Calcutta)
In 1860–1, Patna, Benares and Malwa opium were fetching Jardine-Matheson
between Hong Kong dollars 1,100 and Hong Kong dollars 1,300 per chest, more
than double the prices fetched for the same items in 1854. Their Private Letter
Books record this monumental rise; prior to the war, the three types of opium
were selling in the range Hong Kong dollars 500–600 per chest (at 133 pounds to
the chest for Patna; 140 pounds to the chest for Malwa; and 160 pounds to the
chest for Bengal drug) which had risen precipitately at the outbreak of hostilities.
In these years, and up to 1880, Jardine-Matheson alone imported between 2,000
and 2,500 chests of opium to China every month. By 1875, when competition
from Chinese domestic poppy and aggressive purchasing tactics by the Sassoons
in India drastically reduced prices and profits, Jardine-Matheson took the
decision to diversify and cease their direct involvement in the opium trade. They
were correct in predicting increasing demand arising from the turbulent social
conditions of the mid-century when China was beset by the Taiping and the
Panthay rebellions; and had foreseen the vast increase in the domestic crop. By
1875 south-west China, Yunnan, the regions bordering northern Burma, were said
to be awash with poppy blooms. Correspondence of Jardine-Matheson from Hong
Kong, 19 July 1859, to George Brown, Calcutta states,
I regret that I am unable to advise any improvement in our opium market
which has continued at the same dull unsatisfactory position . . . Sales of
Bengal are with difficulty now made at $755 for Patna and $745 for Benares.
The arrival of the Fiery Cross with confirmed accounts of the short coming
in next year’s supply at first caused holders to advance their rates some
$10 above present quotations, but as there was no demand for consumption
they could not be maintained . . .
There is now no reasonable doubt that Chinese grown drug is coming more
and more into favor and from its low cost say, $450 per picul, is likely to
affect to no small extent the consumption of Foreign Opium, at the present
comparatively high rates. Should the range of prices in India continue exces-
sive for any lengthened period I fear the cultivation of the Poppy in China
will be so much increased as ultimately to interfere with, if not altogether
exclude, opium of foreign growth. To this and the heavy duties now being
levied all along the coast as well as at most of the Inland custom houses
I attribute the prolonged stagnation in our market . . .
(Private Letter Books, J-M C9/8)
But then the drought hit the domestic opium crop in south-west China, leading to a
sharp jump in demand and steep rise in prices, up to Hong Kong dollars 900 per
chest by December 1860, then over Hong Kong dollars 1,000 per chest in 1861. In
March 1861, Jardine-Matheson was writing to their agents in Bombay and Calcutta
with great excitement at the enormous increase in the price, but with the realization
that such prices could not be maintained for long and were likely to provoke a large
expansion in the area of poppy under cultivation within China. Correspondence
from Hong Kong to George Brown, Calcutta, on 26 March 1861 states,
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The small quantity of opium brought on by the ‘Thunder’ took me quite by
surprise, for in anticipation of her having some 1600 chests or so, I had
nearly cleaned out of Bengal drug. The excitement caused here on her
arrival was very great, and prices were at one time run up to $1140 for new
and $1135 for old Patna and $800 per picul for Malwa. Our market is
now very dull for all descriptions, nominal quotations being $1130 for
new and $1120 for old Patna, $1115 for old and new Benares and $785
for Malwa.
(Private Letter Books, J-M C9/8)
This was the high tide of prices for foreign opium of Indian origin in China. Once
the domestic Chinese crop recovered, prices of Indian opium dropped sharply, as
Jardine-Matheson had anticipated. Their correspondence shows the decline starting
by June 1861 and then going rapidly into free fall, until by 1868 they had difficulty
obtaining between Hong Kong dollars 400 and 500 per picul for all three types of
Indian opium, Patna, Benares and Malwa. Writing from Hong Kong, 19 October
1868, to their agent, Rustomjee Eduljee, Bombay, Jardine-Matheson state,
It is now admitted that the extension of the cultivation of the poppy in the
Western provinces [of China] has thrown so great a quantity of native pro-
duced drug on the markets of the interior as to interfere very considerably
with the consumption of the foreign imported [opium].
(Private Letter Books, J-M C9/9)
Similar advice was sent to their agent, Lidderdale, in Calcutta. The expansion
of poppy cultivation in the west and south-western provinces of China coincided
with the turmoil of the Panthay rebellion in those regions (1855–73) and the
Taiping (1851–64) along the Yang-tze basin, as well as other uprisings in north
west China. As John Wong (1998) notes, the social instability and insecurity in
much of China in the middle decades of the nineteenth century probably con-
tributed significantly to the rise in demand for the drug which was met by a vastly
increased rise in supply at prices which the local populace could afford, and
which undercut the imported item.
The expansion in poppy cultivation in south-west China also coincided with
various attempts by British colonial administrators in Burma between 1855, 1868
and 1875 – Clement Williams, Edward Bosc Sladen, Horace Browne, Augustus
Margary and John Anderson – to find a feasible route through King Mindon’s
realm of Upper Burma to south-west China, from ‘Mandalay to Momien’.
Writing of the 1868 expedition to Momien (Teng-yueh) John Anderson described
their arrival at the beginning of May amongst the Hotha Shans of far south-west
Yunnan, just north of the Burmese border.
[T]he valley from one end to the other appeared an immense watery tract of
rice plantations glistening in the sunshine, while the bed of the river was left
half dry by the subtraction of the water. Tobacco, cotton and opium are grown
on the well-drained slopes of the hills, the two former for home use; but the
white-flowered poppy is cultivated to supply the requirements of Chinese,
Kakhyens [i.e. Kachins] and Leesaws [i.e. Lisus]. A considerable quantity of
Shan opium finds its way to Bhamo, and thence to Mandalay, and also to
Mogoung, whence it is distributed among the Singphos.
(Anderson 1876: 299–300)
Having forced open the ports on China’s eastern seaboard, then having gained
access to the interior, the British at mid-century were obsessed with finding what
they called the ‘backdoor’ to China; they fancied that here the merchants of
Manchester could find the millions eager to purchase British cotton and woollen
goods which they were unable to sell elsewhere in China. Tragically, the social
and economic cost of opium detracted from the Chinese capacity to buy the goods
which British merchants thought they could and should purchase.27 Instead,
British explorers, travellers, and later, missionaries of the China Inland Mission
(CIM) saw the opium fields of Yunnan, which, after an initial attempt at eradica-
tion after the Chinese revolution in 1911, blossomed to fuel the activities of the
warlords in the era of President Yuan Shih-k’ai. Peasants in Yunnan were com-
pelled to plant poppy by those charged with eradicating it. Social upheaval and
communal violence in south-west China in the 1911–16 period was so extensive
that the missionaries of the CIM., J. O. Fraser and his colleagues, were advised to
seek temporary sanctuary in northern Burma at Bhamo.
In Lower Burma, the story was rather different. That some form of opium
consumption was present in Lower Burma during the Konbaung dynasty
(1752–1886), can be adduced by the draconian edicts issued by King Bodawpaya
(1784–1819) prohibiting both drugs and alcohol in the Burmese empire. Siamese
kings, Rama II and Rama III, of the early Chakri dynasty (1782–) were issuing
similar injunctions against opium smoking. In the mid-sixteenth century, a son of
the Burmese King Bayinnaung, died from opium addiction; and the Siamese king-
dom of Ayudhaya (1350–1767) had issued laws prohibiting opium consumption in
the mid-fourteenth century. Opium addiction in Lower Burma only became wide-
spread after the irruption of the EIC following the first Anglo-Burmese war of
1824–6, when Burma lost its two Indian Ocean provinces, Tenasserim and Arakan,
to the invader. From 1826, the colonial administration in Lower Burma actively
encouraged first the use of opium – which was given away free dipped in betel
leaves to establish a taste for it – and later its spread through licensed dens and the
system of registering users (Renard 1996: 25). Lower Burma in 1841 was said to
have the largest number of users of any province of British India. By the time of
the Arrow War in 1856, Konbaung Burma had lost all of Lower Burma after the
second Anglo-Burmese War in 1852; and the responsibilities of the EIC, in 1857,
had been subsumed by the British Government. Excise opium from India was then
traded in large quantities to British Burma. Jardine-Matheson, with ships trading
opium to Penang, Singapore and down to Australia, also traded opium from India
to colonial Lower Burma through their agents, Bullock Brothers.28 This emerges
in their correspondence when their ship, the Reiver, was wrecked on Preparis reef
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off the Burmese coast in 1868. To John Skinner in Calcutta, 20 October 1868, the
following curt note was sent:
On the 18th inst. I received a telegram from Messrs Bullock Brothers of
Rangoon reporting the total loss of the ‘Reiver’ on the 10th ultimo on the
Preparis Reef. The bare fact of this great disaster is all that I know and I am
very anxious for full particulars. The loss of such a steamer and cargo is a
public calamity, and in the opium trade will be severely felt by many. I trust
the captain and officers will be acquitted of all blame at the naval court of
enquiry which I presume will be held at Rangoon. We have no particulars
from you yet of the risks upon the cargo taken, or the various officers
in which we are interested, but as usual I feal [sic] all lives have been taken.
It is curious that the craft should have been unfortunately kept back by you,
that you should have so thoughtlessly put all our opium on board of her
although our other steamer was leaving within a short time of her, and that
on her first voyage with a new captain she should have been lost. It is a sad
misfortune.
(Private Letter Books, J-M C9/9)
Still bewailing the loss of the Reiver and its opium cargo, the company informs
its Bombay agent, Lidderdale, on 2 November 1868,
The opium trade has changed from the days when a disaster like the above
would have caused an important advance in price. Speculation appears to
have become extinct, and the Chinese dealers now buy only to meet current
consumption. The supply of native grown opium too at a low cost in the inte-
rior is certainly curtailing the consumption of Indian drug, and will continue
to do so as long as the heavy imposts on the latter render the cost of its
conveyance into the interior of the country so great.
(Private Letter Books, J-M C9/9)
The British colonial administration differentiated between Upper and Lower
Burma not only in their administrative arrangements which applied direct rule to
the core heartland areas of Burma after the Third Anglo-Burmese War in 1885,
and indirect rule to the frontier areas where the ethnic minority peoples lived, but
also in their international dealings. By its conquest of the remaining kingdom of
Upper Burma in 1885, Britain gained access to one of the world’s richest opium-
growing areas (Renard 1996: 25). The Burmese king’s prohibition on opium was
abolished and The Opium Act of 1875 was extended to Upper Burma in 1886;
however, the Trans-Salween states where the best poppy was grown were
exempted from application of the Act. As Renard observes,
The Opium Act sanctions applied only to areas of direct control known
collectively as Burma Proper. . . . The trade in excise opium between Burma
Proper and India continued, and excise opium was legally available through
government-regulated opium dens. However, since the cost of opium in these
dens was kept high as both a deterrent and a source of revenue, the grounds
for smuggling were laid. The rail lines and other transportation links built by
the British facilitated smuggling from the growing regions in the north to
users in Rangoon and other cities in the Burma delta. Since control over use
was not implemented outside of Burma proper, and since the British lacked
the means to interdict contraband successfully, smuggling grew steadily.
(Renard 1996: 25)
As the impulse to develop an international regulatory regime to control the
narcotics trade developed after the 1909 Shanghai conference, British interna-
tional policy on opium took evasive measures. On specious grounds, in 1923
the British colonial administration excised the main poppy-growing areas of the
Trans-Salween states from the emerging international drug-suppression regime.
During the Second World War, opium was used in the frontier areas of northern
Burma to pay for intelligence provided by the Kachins to Allied Forces fighting
the Japanese (Lintner 1990: 61; Walker 1991: 148, 162).29 At independence in
1948, Premier U Nu was conscious that he had a major problem on his hands to
bring the approach to drug suppression in the frontier areas into line with that
applying in Lower Burma.30
Development of an international drug control regime
Ironically and perhaps with poetic justice, the Chinese government in the last
days of the Ch’ing dynasty, initiated the steps which would bring to an end the
opium trade operating out of India which, as Wong (1998) has shown, sustained
the expansion of the British empire. Encouraged by the 1906 House of Commons
declaration that the opium trade was immoral, on 20 September that same year
the Chinese government issued an Anti-Opium Edict forbidding the planting of
poppy, its usage and smoking of opium. Every opium shop was ordered to regis-
ter and the sale of opium lamps, pipes and smoking paraphernalia was prohibited
after 6 months. The elections that year saw the Liberals take office in Britain;
John Morely became head of the India Office, while Sir Edward Grey became
Foreign Secretary. As Lodwick states, ‘The tide finally turned in favor of the
Anti-Opium movement’ (Lodwick 1996: 122). A predominance of members in
the new parliament were middle class and came from the non-conformist
churches. Sir Edward Grey took a significant role in ending the official opium
trade out of India.
On 26 January 1907, the Chinese government formally requested the British
government to end the export of opium to China. On 12 August 1907, Britain
agreed; the annual export of opium from India would be reduced by one tenth
each year for 10 years, if China itself made corresponding reductions in its
domestic crop. From the base figure of 51,000 chests provided by the
Government of India, the trade was to be reduced by 5,100 chests per year. The
agreement went into effect on 1 January 1908, and China launched into concerted
drug-suppression operations. At the instigation of Sir Edward Grey, and with the
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blessing of the Chinese government, Sir Alexander Hosie, consul general in
Tientsin, went on an inspection tour of those provinces where poppy eradication
measures had been taken; he saw that in Yunnan and Szechwan a considerable
degree of success had been achieved (Owen 1934: 341). Greedy opium merchants
had stocked up supplies, said to be in the vicinity of 20,000 chests worth 10 mil-
lion British pounds (Owen 1934: 347) on the assumption that China would not be
able to meet its end of the agreement (Walker 1991). But they were wrong; they
had not counted on Chinese tenacity and public opinion. On 8 May 1911, a fur-
ther agreement with Britain acknowledged the success of the Chinese suppression
operations and looked towards total eradication by 1917.
In the end, it was the opium merchants themselves who requested that further
exports from India be curtailed. They could not sell their stocks, and the banks
which had advanced some 4 million British pounds on the expectation of prof-
itable sales, were becoming nervous of widespread business failures. In March
1911, opium belonging to the Sassoons was seized by Chinese officials at Amoy
and another shipment in April that year. They complained that they could not sell
their stocks (frequently uncertified opium, in contravention of the export rules).
Up to this time, China’s domestic crop in Yunnan, Kweichow, Shensi and
Szechwan produced 250,000 piculs of raw opium per year for the estimated 15
million addicts in the country (Walker 1991: 12–14). By 1911, the year of the
Chinese revolution, nearly four fifths of all opium land had been converted to
food crops (ibid.) thanks largely to concerted effort by inspectors and public
opinion. Walker (1991: 14) asserts that ‘major exceptions could still be found’ in
Hupei, Anhwei, Kansu, Kweichow and Szechwan’. By 1913, it was being
suggested to London that the 1908 agreement be revised owing to changing
conditions in China.31 On 31 March 1917 Britain formally prohibited the opium
trade from India; it became ‘a criminal offense for any British subject to have an
interest in opium’ (Lodwick 1996: 178).
How did the opium get onto the international agenda, by what agencies, and
how did this impact on Burma/Myanmar? Opposition to the opium trade on moral
grounds had been building in Britain since 1843 when Lord Ashley (Shaftesbury)
and the missionary societies sought to raise awareness of its pernicious effects on
the populations to whom it was sold. Opium at this time was legal in Britain itself,
taken mostly in medicinal form such as laudanum or as a cough elixir, and cele-
brated by DeQuincey in Confessions of an English Opium-Eater (1853, rpt. 1960).
That Shaftesbury was not initially successful did not deter those implacably
opposed to the trade; nor those equally committed to its staunch defence. By the
mid-1880s when 80,000 chests (at 133 pounds per chest) of opium per year were
being shipped from India to East Asia, the lines of the arguments on both sides
can be seen from the following two discourses, both published in 1884: the first,
by Fellow of St. John’s College, Cambridge, J. Spencer Hill (1884) The
Indo-Chinese Opium Trade: Considered in Relation to its History, Morality, and
Expediency and its influence on Christian Missions, attacks the Jardine-Matheson
position and quotes one of the company’s own, Donald Matheson, who had left
the company to take a leading role in the anti-opium movement in Britain. ‘Our
connection with the traffic is wholly unjustifiable’ Matheson states. The opium
trade is ‘an unmitigated evil, positively and very extensively injurious to the
Chinese’ (Spencer Hill 1884: 47–8), by which ‘we are still year by year doing a
grievous wrong to China’. Spencer Hill’s essay clearly demonstrated that the
connection between opium cultivation and famines was already well documented
in international discourse. He quotes Donald Matheson showing the negative
impact on international commerce,
[T]he effects of the opium trade on legal commerce have been most
disastrous. . . .
In the decade between 1845 and 1855, while our exports to all countries
rose from 60,000,000pounds to 95,000,000pounds, to India they fell from
2,394,000pounds to 1,277,000pounds and our imports from that country rose
from 5,500,000pounds to 8,500,000pounds; and the opium import to China
rose from 5,000,000pounds to 8,000,000pounds; figures which . . . obviously
point to only one conclusion, and clearly show that, in supplying the Chinese
with an intoxicating drug, we are drying up their natural capacity to consume
our manufactures.
(Spencer Hill 1884: 62–3)
On the moral question, he raises the Chinese position: ‘Why do the Christians
bring us opium?’ In China, anti-opium pills were known as ‘the Jesus Opium’.
Missionaries had arrived on opium clippers; and had served as interpreters to the
opium merchants. Now they were leading the charge against its widespread
usage. Spencer Hill states,
Dr Medhurst [London Missionary Society, Shanghai] tells us:
‘Almost the first word uttered by a Chinese when anything is said
concerning the excellence of Christianity is, Why do Christians bring us
opium, and bring it directly in defiance of our laws? The vile drug has
destroyed my son, has ruined my brother, and well-nigh led me to beggar my
wife and children. . . . ’
(Spencer Hill 1884: 77–8, 87)
After 1860, the missionaries were able to provide eloquent testimony to the
harmful effects, widespread use and concerted efforts in far-flung corners of
China from Hopei to Yunnan, to counter addiction to the drug. From 1868, the
Presbyterian Mission Press in Shanghai published the ecumenical Chinese
Recorder, in which missionaries could express their views on the trade. Periodic
regional and national missionary conferences also provided avenues for their
voices to be heard. In 1897, Shanghai, for the first time, hosted the Anti-Opium
League to which the Chinese contributed. The Presbyterian Church in England
had passed resolutions calling for the abolition of the opium trade at synod
meetings in 1858, 1880, 1881, 1887 and 1898.
But the opposite position was enunciated by C. R. Haines (1884) A Vindication
of England’s Policy with Regard to the Opium Trade, who took issue with
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‘misguided Philanthropists’ and whilst acknowledging the rapid spread of opium
use in the Province of Burma and elsewhere among Britain’s colonial possessions,
professed to believe that this was due to Burmese people giving up their indige-
nous cultural and religious values. Citing the expressions of concern coming from
Burmese community elders, Haines argues,
The Government, as a recent writer in The Times says, promptly took advan-
tage of this feeling to close forty out of the sixty-eight opium shops, and raise
the price of opium 30 per cent, at a loss to the provincial revenues of from
50,000 pounds to 70,000 pounds. No one will question the wisdom of these
measures; but there can be little doubt that on the one hand the demoraliza-
tion caused by the spread of the vice was exaggerated, while on the other the
guilt of the Government is not so flagrantly evident, for there never were
more than sixty-eight shops in 87,000 square miles of country. No one could
lawfully possess more than one ounce of opium outside a licensed shop, and
the law, if broken, was promptly vindicated.
(Haines 1884: 46)
Haines’ arguments were typical of the specious rationales used by the pro-
opium powers to counter the moralists’ position. The view was purveyed that
China wanted the opium exports from India curtailed in order to monopolize the
trade herself. However, the Anti-Opium League considered the Chinese govern-
ment position robust. Even at the time of the 1893 Royal Commission, some
British government officials were expressing determination to continue the
opium trade. Lord Kimberley, Secretary of State for India, threatened to resign
rather than agree to the opium revenue from India being foregone. The Royal
Commission met in London for a week in September 1893, took evidence from
officials who had been in India and other British colonies, and proceeded to
distort or ignore the evidence from missionaries, the anti-opium societies and the
Women’s Christian Temperance Union. The Royal Commission then moved to
India where, between 18 November 1893 and 22 February 1894, it took evidence
from people from Burma, India and other parts of Asia. It did not, however,
visit China. The findings of the Royal Commission, as Lodwick notes, were a
‘whitewash’ (Lodwick 1996: 38) and a great disappointment to the anti-opium
movement.
However, by 1909, the ‘misguided Philanthropists’ had achieved the first steps
in the development of the international narcotics regulation regime, driven by
American missionaries who were repelled both at the social effects of the world-
wide opium trade and their fellow countrymen’s history of involvement in that
trade. In 1881, by Treaty between the US and China, Americans were prohibited
from being involved in the opium trade (first engaged in, in 1805). The Shanghai
International Opium Commission of 1909, which formally set the stage for inter-
national regulation of the narcotics trade, originated in the 24 July 1906 proposal
by missionary Charles E. Brent, Episcopal Bishop to The Philippines, to President
Theodore Roosevelt, that the US take the lead in ‘promoting some movement that
would gather in its embrace representatives from all countries where the traffic in
and use of opium is a matter of moment’ (Jennings 1997: 62). The 13 nations
attending the 1909 Shanghai International Opium Commission (the US, Britain,
Japan, China, France, the Netherlands, Germany, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Italy,
Persia, Portugal and Siam) entered a series of non-binding resolutions which
advocated restricting the trade in non-medicinal narcotics. Japan’s participation
recognized its increasing involvement in the international opium trade since 1897,
despite its own ‘opium free’ policy since the 1858 Treaty with Townshend Harris.
Over the next three decades, Japan’s expansionist policies in Formosa (Taiwan),
Manchukuo (Manchuria), Korea and China itself after 1937, would put it in
control of some of the world’s largest opium-producing areas, a role which earned
it an undesirable place in 1945 at the International Military Tribunal for the Far
East (IMTFE), where those considered responsible for using opium as a strategic
weapon to undermine the health and morale of the Chinese people (Jennings
1997) were prosecuted as war criminals. That Jennings (1997) and Walker (1991)
have both investigated the charges and come to the conclusion that Japan was
demonized as a drug empire during the interwar years because this served
American and British foreign policy interests highlights similar approaches to
China after 1949, when evidence suggests that Mao’s communist regime was
quite effective in enforcing drug suppression and control. Cold War politics made
drug suppression hostage to international security politics.
In the decades preceding the Second World War, a further series of interna-
tional drug control conferences was held: in The Hague (1911–12), Geneva
(1924–5) and Bangkok (1931). Narcotics control hit the international agenda with
the rise in supply following the First World War when vast quantities of opiates
were required to minister to the wounded.32 The League of Nations established its
Opium Advisory Committee (OAC) to monitor the drug trade. Largely ineffective
in view of Japan’s and other great powers’ (e.g. Britain’s) lack of cooperation, the
OAC proved to be a battleground for international rivalries, rather than effective
narcotics control. Japan left the League of Nations in 1935, and the OAC in 1938,
and its experiences here undoubtedly contributed to the policies it pursued in East
Asia and the Pacific in the Second World War. Britain, too, resented US efforts to
bring it to account over the drug trade (Jennings 1997: 64). In the 1920s, as
Jennings has detailed, the ‘recurring pattern of embarrassing revelations followed
by pledges to take strong action against the drug traffic that ultimately came to
nothing’ (ibid.: 61) undermined the credibility of the OAC.
The 13 nations present in Shanghai in 1909 had promised to assist China erad-
icate opium; instead, the international community witnessed its expansion under
Japanese domination. At the 1924–5 conferences, the eight nations attending the
first conference on control of opium smoking called on the colonial powers in
Asia to replace existing opium farms with government monopolies on the import
and distribution of opium; the second conference attended by 30 nations resulted
in a convention which established an international opium and narcotics supervisory
body, the Permanent Control Board. It devised a system requiring governments to
provide certificates for drug imports and exports. The US proposal for a 10 year
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deadline for the prohibition of opium smoking was rejected; Britain and other pow-
ers proposed instead that the League of Nations form a commission to determine
when the opium producing nations were controlling output, such determination to
be the trigger for a 15 year deadline on prohibition. This seemed like ‘Sunday too
far away’; the US delegation withdrew in protest from the second Geneva confer-
ence, followed by China. However, the conference had achieved a ban on heroin.
The 1931 Bangkok conference achieved little; China refused to attend. In her
absence, the Geneva convention was tightened; commission payments to opium
retailers were abolished and smoking opium by persons under 21 years of age was
prohibited. The advent of the Japanese initiated Manchukuo regime in 1932
heralded an opium monopoly regarded as ‘the most significant threat to drug
control in Asia’ (Jennings 1997: 76). It took the victory by Mao’s communist forces
in 1949 to enforce the prohibition in China on non-medicinal use of narcotics.
As a province of British India, Burma was a signatory to the 1912 International
Opium Convention. With the rise in nationalism after 1920, agitation to con-
trol the sale of opium in Burma proper increased. In response to the international
environment, the Government of Burma sought to suppress poppy cultivation in
the Kachin Hills where many Chinese from Yunnan had settled. However, the
northern opium producing areas in the Shan States were free to continue to grow
poppy. In 1922, the Federated Shan States (FSS) were created, which modified
the system of indirect rule, replacing the authority of the traditional Shan rulers,
the Sawbwa (or Saopha), with that of British advisers. In 1923 the Shan States
Opium Order made non-medical opium illegal in most states except the most pro-
lific producers, the Trans-Salween states, Kokang and Kengtung. As Renard
observes, ‘This meant that cultivation was allowed where poppies had been grown
on a high level, but not allowed where there had been a lower level of cultivation’
(Renard 1996: 30). Misleading reports presented to the League of Nations justi-
fying this piece of chicanery contended that the production of opium in Kokang
was small (ibid.).33 In 1937, the British-controlled Government of Burma banned
opium production in the Kachin States, but not in the major poppy growing area
of the Hukawng Valley. Poppy cultivation remained legal in the Wa States, the
Naga Hills on the Indian border and in the Trans-Salween States. Despite many
initiatives by the government of Premier U Nu to rid independent Burma of the
drug menace, it was not until 1964 that concerted drug-suppression initiatives
were launched.34 An Opium Enquiry Committee was formed to compile statistics
on the number of addicts, revise existing laws and advise on substitute crops.
From 1 October 1965, the cultivation and sale of opium in the Shan States was
prohibited; and the Kokang Development Project was initiated to improve the
socio-economic conditions in the primary poppy growing areas (Renard 1996:
50). Up until 1965, these areas had been
[F]ree to grow, sell and consume opium in the territories east of the Salween,
where opium cultivation was more than two centuries old. The Burmese govt
[under Ne Win] issued licences to shops in the western territories to produce
opium. It allowed production for registered opium smokers, who were
entitled to two viss (3.2kilograms) per smoker, per annum. Throughout the
rest of Burma, the use of opium for non-medical purposes was prohibited.
(Renard 1996: 50)
For the first time since 1826, all of Burma was treated as an administrative unit
with uniform drug-suppression laws applying throughout the sovereign state.
Enforcement of these laws, however, has been hostage to the changing national
security priorities during the decades of civil war and domestic politics
since 1988. When international concerns led to the abandonment in 1973 of the
Ka Kwe Ye (KKY) militia policy whereby local drug warlords such as Lo Hsing-
han and Khun Sa were permitted to use government-controlled roads to transport
their opium caravans in return for using their resources to combat the CPB, the
government of Burma under Ne Win entered into agreements with the US in 1974
to suppress and control the narcotics trade. Both Lo Hsing-han and Khun Sa were
later prosecuted and jailed, not for their involvement in the drug trade, but for
having contact with insurgent groups such as the Shan State Army (SSA).35 Both
were later released from custody under amnesty orders. Despite the cyber attacks of
the Burmese Diaspora, the Myanmar government continues to enforce stringent
narcotics control laws consistent with its ‘strict moral code’ (Renard 1996: 2); and
imprisonment of offenders against these laws is frequently highlighted in the
government controlled media. The official government perspective, as evinced by
Senior General Than Shwe in 1992, is ‘Opium endangers the entire human race’
(Renard 1996: 2). In this the Myanmar government is at one with the early Burmese
kings who prohibited its use and enforced severe penalties for those caught using it.
Conclusion
Drug-suppression operations, reduction of both demand and supply, are therefore
central to effective poverty-alleviation strategies in Myanmar. Enforcement of
narcotics control laws is vigorously pursued, and whilst corruption and the drug
trade go hand in hand, efforts to combat both are evident. Development policies
which expand the basic infrastructure in the poppy producing areas are as integral
to narcotics control as are enforcement laws; socio-economic policies to improve
the well-being of the peoples in the poppy-producing areas are important aspects
of policies to reduce both the demand and the supply of the drugs. Beyond this,
sustaining the prevailing conditions of peace in the formerly insurgent strong-
holds, is critical to being able to interdict the supply of drugs which finds its way
onto the international networks operating out of the Golden Triangle. When
human security in these areas is enhanced, so too will be both the national
security of Myanmar and the broader security of the international community.
From this perspective, resources and programmes which enhance the effective-
ness of poverty-alleviation projects in the poppy-producing areas contribute to
enhanced human security in the wider community – and the seven horsemen of
the apocalypse which have brought so much suffering to the peoples of the poppy
cultures – will have been overcome.
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Introduction
As discussed in previous chapters, Myanmar’s overarching search for national
security is both political and economic reflecting its tortuous modern history,
colonial experience and legacy of civil conflict since 1948, when the insurgencies
of every major indigenous ethnic minority except the Chin erupted just as the
newly independent state came into existence. Then, in 1988, as the state was
emerging from 26 years of socialism and seeking to re-engage with the interna-
tional market economy, international economic sanctions designed to undermine
the regime and the state made that search for security problematic. In this sense,
Myanmar reflects the prevailing liberal/constructivist view of security in the Asia–
Pacific which privileges economic development, political stability and social
passivity more than the traditional militaristic Western approach of the realist par-
adigm,1 although South-East Asian governments, including Myanmar, are
inclined to revert to the realist balance-of-power paradigm when taking measures
to ensure that no regional hegemon can emerge. From time to time, this approach
is apparent in their international policies towards China, Japan and the US.
Thus, in early 2004 it appeared that Myanmar’s spate of diplomatic initiatives
subsequent to the 25 August 2003 top structure changes, put in place to divert
international criticism following the 30 May 2003 incident at Depiyin, northern
Myanmar, were the latest in a series of strategies designed to deliver regime and
state security to Yangon. As emphasized in previous chapters, the important
correlative of human security is yet to achieve prominence in state discourse. The
sudden removal from office of former Prime Minister, General Khin Nyunt on
18 October 2004 and subsequent wide-ranging purge of his followers, however,
are clear indications of Myanmar reverting to indigenous paradigms of central-
ized authoritarian, personalized power, and resiling from the brief attempt to
emerge into a modern pluralistic state. The situation in mid-2005 may yet prove
to be a ‘holding pattern’ as Myanmar endures its worst period since 1974; human
security is at its lowest ebb as demonstrated by the series of bomb explosions in
Yangon in May 2005, and earlier in the market at Mandalay, and the recent
food shortages which forced the SPDC to re-negotiate with the World
Food Programme the terms on which assistance would be provided. Such an
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environment may yet impinge adversely on regime security. However, only
substantive change in the top structure military leadership could usher in a more
sustainable, modern approach to governance, and with the demise of the reform
group, no alternative source of ‘home-grown’ domestic leadership appears obvi-
ous. The civilian opposition is in disarray, ageing, its leader under very restrictive
house confinement; the former Prime Minister is similarly under house arrest;
and the SPDC is in the process of retreating to the northern ‘bunker’ at Pyinmana.
All suggest signs of a faltering regime desperate to reassert the trappings of con-
trol. For all its overweening concern with state and regime security, the SPDC
may yet implode from within. If this occurs, it will be largely because of inept,
inadequate and incompetent attention to the policies required to ensure the human
security of Myanmar citizens. In mid-2005, no external nation is a credible threat
to the state of Myanmar; threats to state security arise only from the policies
pursued by its own leadership.
Since becoming a full member of the ASEAN in July 1997, Myanmar’s domes-
tic policies prior to October 2004 had been channelled towards convincing the
international community that the concerted domestic reform programme under-
way in various sectors would accelerate opening the economy to full market
status, and that this in turn would eventually lead to pluralistic governance. These
objectives were reiterated in the 30 August 2003 plan announced by former Prime
Minister, General Khin Nyunt. His colleagues amongst the Heads of Government
at the Ninth ASEAN Summit held on Bali, 7–8 October 2003 were prepared to
accept this plan, with its notable use of the term, ‘disciplined democracy’,
intended to serve as a contrast to what the Myanmar leadership perceives as the
‘undisciplined democracy’ of the 12 years of the era of Parliamentary democracy
(1948–58, 1960–2). The former Prime Minister’s plan was perceived as the most
positive approach to come out of Yangon for some time, and which could deliver
the democratic governance said to be desirable by all parties – the government,
the opposition, the minorities and the international community. The diplomatic
initiatives accompanying both the plan and the government’s responses to impo-
sition of further sanctions by the US following the tragic 30 May incident at
Depiyin in Upper Myanmar, suggested recognition in some senior echelons of the
Myanmar leadership group that the country’s overarching search for security must
be pursued on both the political and the economic fronts.2 In response to political
tensions after the Depiyin incident, the fragile economy faltered; citizens experi-
enced further deprivation and the government’s hold on power appeared shaky.
Drastic measures were required to prevent a lurch into that instability which
Myanmar’s neighbours feared could be detrimental to the region as a whole.
It is an article of faith amongst South-East Asian demi-democracies3 that state
security and economic prosperity go in tandem; state-led economic development
has been a feature of South-East Asian governance since emerging from the
colonial era. However, South-East Asian governments are also conscious that eco-
nomic development alone does not keep authoritarian governments in power, a
fact made plain by the demise of the Suharto regime in Indonesia, and previous
authoritarian governments in Thailand and The Philippines. The ‘dictator’s
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dilemma’ has always been how to achieve regime legitimacy and state security
through economic development that fosters the growth of pluralistic alternate
centres of power which may eventually challenge the authoritarian centre for
control of the political life of the country. This is a dilemma also facing China;
and has played out its assigned role in Taiwan, South Korea and Thailand in the
decade of the 1990s where increasing prosperity arising from economic develop-
ment eventually rolled back the tide of authoritarian governance.
In seeking state and regime security through economic development, the gov-
ernment of Myanmar implicitly acknowledged what James Rosenau (1997) has
called the ‘domestic–foreign divide’; that is, domestic security is a function of a
country’s international relations policy. In effect, domestic policy and interna-
tional policy have become functions of each other. In Myanmar’s case, this is
demonstrated in the flurry of multilateral economic–political relationships which
the country has overtly fostered, particularly since 30 August 2003. It is notable
that this approach has continued even after the displacement of General Khin
Nyunt in October 2004. Senior General Than Shwe’s state visit to India was
undertaken immediately after the purge was launched; his visit was seen as a
measure of how secure the Senior General felt in his position that he could afford
to be out of the country at such a time. The new leadership line-up also attended
the ASEAN summit in Vientiane, Laos, in late 2004, and has continued to host a
number of international visits from dignitaries from neighbouring countries.
Concern for the regional implications of Myanmar’s domestic developments led
new Thai Foreign Minister, Kanthathi Suphamongkonon, to visit Yangon
in August 2005, to discuss the political situation. Until the ASEAN summit
in Vientiane in late July 2005, Myanmar’s international, integrationist strategy
had been in marked contrast to that of the neutralist stance independent Burma
had followed, when the country was a founding member of the Non-aligned
Movement (1955–79). The Senior General’s withdrawal from the ASEAN chair-
manship at that summit is being interpreted as one of a series of signs that
Myanmar may be preparing to again retreat from the international community, or
at least from some sections of it. More likely, the SPDC leadership is preparing
to focus its resources only on those sectors of the international community which
it considers will pay dividends in terms of its own regime security interests –
China, Vietnam, India and its primary trading partners, Thailand and Singapore.
This menu of issues is behind the Thai Foreign Minister’s talks in Yangon.
Part of the motivation underlying the SPDC security strategy until recently has
been to seek immediate international support from neighbouring Asian countries,
especially those which share sensitive, strategic borders with Myanmar. The other
part has been to build a longer-term strategy for state security through economic
development. But perhaps most importantly, in view of the implications of the
changing international environment post-Iraq, and the US doctrine of pre-emptive
strike, Myanmar had been building its strategic regional alliances through
ASEAN and other regional groupings, with China, India, Japan and Thailand.
These alliances may eventually form a regional bloc with sufficient collective
power able to exercise considerable leverage against any future US moves
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intended to diminish the sovereignty of regional states, either individually or
collectively. Such a set of economic–political alliances carries overtones of the
realist balance-of-power approach to international relations. Given ASEAN’s
hard-won international credibility as a significant regional bloc, the internal dis-
quiet amongst its members caused by the displacement of General Khin Nyunt,
and the threat of boycott by major Western powers, if the current SPDC line-up
were to have taken on the chairmanship of the Association, the original ASEAN
members seemed relieved when Myanmar stepped back from assuming the chair
in 2006; however, the sense of relief may be short-lived, if Myanmar again
descends into that internal chaos which the pre-October 2004 regional strategies
were trying to circumvent.
The overall regional strategies pursued towards Myanmar by key ASEAN
states, and by Myanmar in regard to its fellow members in the Association, could
be called a ‘safety in numbers’ game. The prosperous regional states like Thailand
and Malaysia, perceive that their individual future security could be tied to that of
their neighbours; instability in one regional state has flow-on effects for others. In
2003–4, Thailand’s Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, explicitly recognized the
interrelated aspects of economic security for all the region when he launched a
series of initiatives to encourage Thai investment in Myanmar as part of his ‘share
the prosperity’ policy. Myanmar’s neighbours have vivid memories of the 1997
financial crisis, propelled by transnational financial interests based in the US, and
the dire effects on the standard of living it had for their peoples. There is a deeply
held view in the region, rightly or wrongly, that this crisis was artificially engen-
dered in order to short-circuit the economic growth and increasing power, which
the region had been experiencing up to that time. In Thailand, the rise of Thaksin
Shinawatra’s Thai Rak Thai political party is a reflection of this view of the
ASEAN financial crisis, which severely challenged the ASEAN norms of
‘national and regional resilience’. Subsequent diplomatic initiatives amongst the
several regional organizations, and China, can be seen as designed to enhance
their economic and political security, for what they perceive to be the coming con-
test between China and the US, a contest which may result in a return to bipolar
centres of power, notwithstanding the goodwill visit to the US by Chinese
Premier, Wen Jiaobao, during which President Bush publicly rebuked Taiwan for
its proposed referendum on ‘independence’. Southeast Asian states, aware of the
dangers of US ‘containment’ policy towards the rising economic growth and
power of China, will try to balance between China and the US, allowing neither
one, nor the other to be able to dictate their futures, whilst benefiting both from
China’s economic growth and, where appropriate, as in the cases of Thailand, The
Philippines and Singapore, the US military security umbrella. Until mid-2005,
Myanmar’s international relations policy has been part of this complex web of
manoeuvres undertaken with the objective of consolidating regime and state
security through close economic and political relationships with prosperous
neighbouring states.
With the exception of the US, which, with the enactment of the Burma
Freedom Act (2003) will now not accept any imports from Myanmar, the
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country’s major trading partners are all within the Asian region. In financial year
2002, Myanmar’s exports to Thailand were worth USD 831 million; to the United
States USD 348 million; to India USD 194 million; to China USD 130 million;
to Singapore USD 97 million; to Japan USD 97 million. Corresponding imports
were: from China USD 636 million; from Singapore USD 576 million; from
Thailand USD 355 million; from Korea USD 277 million; from Malaysia
USD 217 million and from Japan USD 132 million (Asian Development Bank
2002). Given this trading pattern, and continuing sanctions by the US and the UK,
it has been logical for Myanmar to focus its economic–political security strategy
within the Asian region.
Relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
China has been Myanmar’s most important international backer, enabling
Myanmar to survive the 17 years of Western economic sanctions. From very pre-
carious relations during the ascendancy of Chairman Mao Tse-tung when China
was ‘exporting revolution’ and providing financial support to the CPB, the new
era in cooperation and investment initiated under Deng Xiaoping culminated in
the state visit by President Jiang Zemin in December 2001. Discussions during
this visit precipitated a new round of Chinese investment in Myanmar, already
substantial, particularly in Upper Myanmar around Mandalay where considerable
Chinese migration and land purchases are evident. The November 2003 visit by a
senior Myanmar delegation to China purportedly resulted in Chinese interest in
further investing in the mining sector (Myanmar Times, 20 November 2003). The
importance of the commercial relationship can be seen in the trade transacted: as
noted earlier, according to Asian Development Bank figures, in financial year
2002, Myanmar exported USD 130 million to China and imported USD 636 million
from China, a considerable trade surplus in China’s favour. Strengthening the
strategic commercial relationship underpinned the 14 December 2003 visit to
Yangon by Chinese Assistant Minister of Commerce, Qian Jiang.
In January 2003, this special relationship saw China announce a further
USD 200 million loan to Myanmar for improving electricity-generating capacity
with obvious ramifications for development of Myanmar’s industrial sector. This
followed the earlier USD 250 million loan in 1998 when China funded a
280 megawatts hydroelectric power plant at Pyinmana, now to be the new centre of
the Myanmar government. Implementation details of the new loan, pointedly, were
announced at the same time as US President George W. Bush was signing into law
the most recent round of economic sanctions preventing Myanmar from export-
ing to the US. These sanctions impacted adversely on Myanmar’s textile exports
and led to hardship for low-paid factory workers, mostly women, who were
thrown into destitution when the factories employing them closed. The US sanc-
tions also prohibited financial services (credit card facilities such as American
Express, Mastercard, Visacard) from being provided to Myanmar in an attempt to
further disrupt the country’s trade. On 20 November 2003, the Myanmar Times
announced that alternate markets for Myanmar’s textiles were being developed.
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Since then further initiatives have been set in train to implement alternate credit
facilities utilizing Euros to sustain the country’s international trade and tourist
industry. In this context of increasing, punitive US sanctions, China has been an
important source of international political and financial support to Myanmar,4 a
relationship of mutual satisfaction given public prominence during former Prime
Minister, General Khin Nyunt’s July 2004 visit to China when 12 new agreements
between the two countries were signed (Taipei Times, 24 July 2004).
Does China regard Myanmar as being part of her ‘sphere of influence’?
Undoubtedly so, along with other South-East Asian countries. Since 1990 China
has been the largest supplier of arms and military equipment to the Myanmar mil-
itary, although not the only source; others are Israel and Singapore (Selth 1996).
A USD 1 billion arms deal with China in 1991 provided Myanmar with
11 Chinese F7 jet fighters, naval patrol boats, armoured personnel carriers, anti-
aircraft guns and missiles, tanks and ammunition and initiated a series of state
visits to each other’s countries by the leaders of both Myanmar and China.
The framework for bilateral relations and future cooperation agreed in 2000
paved the way later that year for the opening of the new special trade zone along
the Myanmar–China border facing Yunnan, now experiencing economic ‘boom’
conditions. China has funded both the development of the new deep-sea port at
Tilowa facing the Bay of Bengal and the new six-lane highway connecting the
port with Yangon and Mandalay, which runs up the Ayeyarwaddy Valley to
Yunnan. Such a highway provides essential infrastructure for Myanmar’s devel-
oping industrial sector and for the marketing of its agricultural products.
But such a highway is not just for commercial uses. In times of conflict, if nec-
essary, this highway would provide the transportation route for rapid transfer of
troops across the length of Myanmar. The Myanmar government is conscious
both of China’s desire to be able to re-victual her Indian Ocean nuclear submarine
fleet from Tilowa and the possible strategic uses of this highway in any future
conflict in the region. Firmly committed to maintaining its autonomy and inde-
pendence from all comers, Myanmar at the present time does not allow any for-
eign power to establish bases on its territory, or to allow its territory to be used
for incursions by guerrilla forces against neighbouring sovereign states. In 1998,
it took the then Indian Defense Minister, George Fernandes, to task for suggest-
ing that Yangon was permitting China to set up bases within its territory.
However, in 2000, Myanmar accepted the assistance of Chinese engineers in the
construction of two naval bases in the southern Tenasserim region. Myanmar thus
takes the stance of a sovereign power enjoying the political, economic and inter-
national support of China whose backing has been critical in minimizing the
impact of Western sanctions imposed since 1988.
Although China has been a good friend and financial backer for Myanmar in
time of need, this friendship has not been viewed without considerable misgiving
in certain quarters of the Myanmar government, conscious of the past history of
conflictual relations with China, despite being the first country to accord official
recognition to the PRC in 1949. At the present time, as demonstrated by the
discussions between former Prime Minister, General Khin Nyunt and Chinese
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Premier Wen Jiaobao after the 7–8 October 2003 Ninth ASEAN Summit in Bali,
Myanmar and China are enjoying a period of warm friendship. This has contin-
ued despite the removal from power of General Khin Nyunt, about which China
pointedly refrained from making any public comment. Mutual interests in
strengthening their trade and investment, enhancing economic growth and
outmanoeuvring incipient US containment policy towards China, draw the two
countries together. Conscious that it needs to keep its own economic growth on
the boil, if it is to continue both its domestic reform agenda and position itself in
future to take its place as a pre-eminent power on the world stage, China is seek-
ing every opportunity to develop its trade and investment in the region, and to
show that it is a responsible international player.5 It is thus in China’s own inter-
ests to foster poverty-alleviation strategies in Myanmar, policies to strengthen
Myanmar’s economic growth and stability and cooperation on issues affecting the
social fabric of both countries such as drug-suppression operations, prevention
and treatment of HIV/AIDS and human trafficking, all of which impinge on both
human and state security.
As a nuclear power, China’s support carries a good deal of bargaining weight.
In the wake of the ASEAN Bali summit, it is likely this relationship will grow as
the 10 members of ASEAN seek to enhance their economic security by hooking
onto China’s rapidly growing economy. Indicative of the strengthening of this
two-way relationship, is the visit to Myanmar on 18 November 2003, by an eight-
member Chinese delegation led by Mr Ye Xueming, President of the Chinese
Chamber of International Commerce. Discussions on increasing trade and
investment were held at the Yangon headquarters of the Union of Myanmar
Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (UMFCCI). Particular atten-
tion was paid to exports to China of Myanmar timber and wood furniture, with
corresponding imports of Chinese farm machinery and personal goods to
Myanmar, leading to signing of a formal trade agreement (Myanmar Information
Sheet, 19 November 2003). Further commercial delegations from China to
Myanmar, and a series of visits by dignitaries to each other’s countries continued
throughout the first half of 2004 and early 2005. A 25-member Chinese business
delegation led by Mr Wan Jifei, Chairman of the China Council for the Promotion
of International Trade, attended the Third Annual Meeting of the ASEAN–China
Business Council in Yangon in June 2004 (Myanmar Times, 14–20 June 2004).
This meeting was held subsequent to agreement on the establishment of
a China–ASEAN free-trade zone by 2010, which would cover 1.7 billion
consumers across the 11 countries with a combined gross domestic product of
2 trillion dollars, whose two-way trade already exceeded USD 100 billion in 2004
(Kuik 2005: 118). As the famous ‘back-door’ to China (see Chapter 3), Myanmar
is obviously a key link in China’s own security framework which is being pursued
through both multilateral and bilateral means. Kuik (2005: 118) is surely correct
in the emphasis he places on China’s policy imperatives to foster a multi-polar
world – NAFTA, EU and East Asian groups – wherein Asian regional economic
integration strengthens the common identity and ‘collectivity’ of the individual
Asian countries, serving to differentiate them increasingly from the US in future.
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It is therefore in China’s own interests to seek to foster political stability in
Myanmar; above all, China would be most unlikely to want to see the installation
of a US proxy-democratic regime which could provide a bastion for revival of
future US encirclement of China, as in the era of ‘containing communism’.
Memories of US support for the Kuomintang incursions in northern Myanmar in
the 1950s–60s remain strong in both Yangon and Beijing. Yangon has strictly
adhered to the ‘One-China’ policy, much to Beijing’s considerable satisfaction.
The Myanmar government can therefore feel reasonably sure of continued
Chinese support, politically and economically. To head-off any Chinese preten-
sions to treating Myanmar as a satellite state, however, all indications are that
Myanmar will seek to balance Chinese influence with that of India.
Noting the special strategic significance of Myanmar to its more populous and
wealthier neighbours, Uday Bhaskar, considers that Myanmar
[H]as the potential to emerge as the most significant swing state in the strate-
gic mutuality of India and China, and the bilateral relationship between them
will be affected considerably by the manner in which the two Asian giants
relate to their smaller neighbour.
(Bhaskar 2000: 349)
Myanmar’s geopolitical position, Bhaskar emphasizes, is ‘of abiding relevance’
(ibid.). As both China and India seek to establish themselves as major powers in
the twenty-first century, China’s access to the Indian Ocean/Bay of Bengal littoral
may become a key strategic security consideration. As Bhaskar (2000: 355) notes,
all major powers have been ‘two-ocean capable’; Myanmar’s continuing goodwill
and cooperation are therefore of special relevance to Chinese security planners, if
the ‘twenty-first century Silk Route’, the oil arc from the Persian Gulf across the
Indian Ocean and through the Straits of Malacca to the South China Sea is to be
protected. Protecting and enhancing energy security are prime considerations for
both China and India as these two emerging major powers seek to sustain their
phenomenal economic growth.
A friend in need – India and security enhancement
Around the Bay of Bengal, India, the other nuclear power sharing a border with
Myanmar, has also recently moved to offer substantial international, political and
economic support for Myanmar in what is quite clearly a concerted policy by
India to counter Chinese commercial and military influence in Myanmar. The
state visit to Myanmar on 2 November 2003 by former Indian Vice-President,
Mr Bhairon Singh Shekhawat, signalled a distinct warming in Myanmar–Indian
relations and a marked departure from that prevailing after the 1988 democracy
uprising in Yangon, when India gave sanctuary to those fleeing the civil unrest. At
the time, the former Indian Vice-President was the highest ranking Indian leader
to visit Myanmar since the visit of the late Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi in 1987.
In 2002, India resumed arms shipments to Myanmar to balance what it saw as the
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growing influence of China (Agence France Presse, 3 November 2003). India’s
economic growth of 6–7 per cent annually for the past 14 years, and large, afflu-
ent middle class provide an attractive export market to Myanmar, cut off as it is
from other potential markets by Western economic sanctions. India’s engagement
policy with Myanmar as part of its ‘Look East’ policy generally, offers the
Myanmar government a welcome counterweight to that of China.
The visit of the former Indian Vice-President was billed as a goodwill visit. On
3 November 2003 he paid a courtesy visit to the Chairman of the SPDC, Senior
General Than Shwe, at the diplomatic hall of the Pyithu Hluttaw (Parliament
House) and was hosted for dinner by Vice-Chairman of the SPDC, Vice-Senior
General Maung Aye. Indicative of the importance accorded the visit on the
Indian side, the former Vice-President was accompanied by a substantial
delegation including former Minister of State for External Affairs, Mr Digvijay
Singh, Member of Parliament (RS) Mr Anil Kumar, Member of Parliament (RS)
Mr B. J. Panda, Foreign Secretary Mr K. Sibal, Secretary to Vice-President
Mr Anil Kumar, and departmental officials.
However, it was more than a goodwill visit. It included the signing of an
India–Myanmar Bilateral Agreement on visa exemption for official and diplo-
matic passports, and a Memorandum of Understanding between the Myanmar
Ministry of Education and the Indian Ministry of Human Resource Development
to increase the number of scholarships provided by India, in order to enable
Myanmar students and teachers to gain the qualifications needed to assist the
country in its development. These agreements build on a series of others signed
in recent years dealing with border trade, drug control, cultural exchanges,
cooperation on agriculture and information technology development. India is also
providing assistance to Myanmar on biotechnology investment, and the two
countries have established a Joint Trade Committee.
During this visit, the former Indian Vice-President made available to Myanmar
a USD 57 million line of credit for assistance in upgrading the Yangon–Mandalay
railroad, which will enhance the country’s efforts in economic development, as
well as planning further development of the India–Myanmar–Thailand highway.
The new cooperation policy has been continued by the incoming Indian govern-
ment which sent a series of high-level delegations to Yangon in 2004 to strengthen
the bilateral relationship; and followed up in March 2005 with the state visit by
the new Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, together with the current
Indian Minister for External Affairs, Mr K. Natwar Singh. Discussions were
held with the top SPDC leadership on both border security issues and India’s
requirements in pursuit of energy security, on which, the Indian Prime Minister
frankly confessed, China was well ahead of India. (Asia Times, 17 March
2005). The world’s sixth energy consumer, India imports two thirds of its oil
consumption requirements, as compared to China’s one third; and India is
reported to have only 5 billion barrels of oil reserves compared to China’s proven
oil reserves of 18 billion barrels. India’s energy needs thus figure largely in its
new bilateral relationship with Myanmar in whose offshore gas reserves it has
considerable interest.
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These initiatives built on those announced previously in 2003 to increase
cooperation between India and Myanmar in the development of the hydroelectric
power and energy sectors, including the exploration of Myanmar’s oil and gas
reserves. Indian External Affairs ministry spokesman, Navtej Sarna, had previ-
ously announced on 22 January 2003 that two Indian teams would visit Myanmar
to explore the prospects of exploiting onshore hydrocarbon reserves, and exam-
ine the construction of a 1,000 megawatt hydroelectric dam on the Chindwin
River at Tamathi in Sagaing Division. It is planned that some of this electricity
will be sold to India (Myanmar Times, 17 October 2004). Discussions in Delhi in
July 2003 between U Win Aung, the first Myanmar Minister for Foreign Affairs
to visit India since 1987, and former Indian External Affairs Minister, Yashwant
Sinha, had foreshadowed this closer cooperation in the development of the hydro-
electric and energy sectors, as well as joint construction of roads, and collabora-
tion in regional organizations. These initiatives were reiterated during an October
2004 visit to Yangon by Indian Foreign Secretary, Shyam Saran, who highlighted
India–Myanmar plans to increase cross-border trade through the new checkpoint
at Reedkhawdhar in Chin State, and the construction of roads linking India’s
Mizoram state with Tiddim and Falam in Chin State. However, in late March
2005, Yangon suddenly announced a ban on foreign firms being involved in
onshore oil and gas exploration and production, stating that this activity is in
future to be reserved for state enterprises, although contracts with foreign firms
including those from China and India (as well as Canada, France, Korea,
Malaysia, Thailand and the US) engaged in offshore oil and gas exploration seem
to be unaffected.6 Export of natural gas is one of Myanmar’s largest earners of
foreign currency.
These series of strategic discussions with India to enhance bilateral economic
cooperation included strengthening their interactions in BIMST-EC as well as a
series of political issues arising from the current international situation in Iraq,
according to an Indian External Affairs Ministry spokesman. With respect to anti-
India insurgent groups operating in Myanmar, former Foreign Minister, U Win
Aung had specifically stated that Yangon would not allow its territory to be used
by any group that would harm New Delhi’s interests, a reference to cross-border
terrorist activities in north-west Myanmar. Both initiatives now appear to be tied
up with the changing international security scene; the overland 900 kms gas
pipeline from Myanmar’s offshore Shwe field to India proposed to cross
Bangladesh, which stands to gain USD 125 million in transit fees, access to the
gas and creation of a trade and transport corridor linking it with Nepal, as well as
access to India’s power grid. However, tensions over rising Islamic fundamental-
ism and anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh under the Bangladesh National Party
(BNP) have slowed progress on the project. It is noteworthy that during the
visit of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Senior General Than Shwe
reaffirmed Myanmar’s commitment to cooperation with India in maintaining
the security of their shared border, and not allowing insurgent groups to use
Myanmar territory to launch attacks against India in the north-west.7 It is possi-
ble that complications arising from the India–Bangladesh cooling in relations
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may have had some effect in leading to Yangon’s decision to discontinue onshore
oil exploration by foreign firms, or it may simply be a return to the nationalistic,
autarchic policies of former times. If the land pipeline proves impracticable, India
will need to consider an alternate, more expensive route under the Bay of Bengal
to by-pass Bangladesh, or a route through north-west Myanmar.
Despite these difficulties, the warming in relations between Myanmar and
India is proving productive for both countries. Economic ties between Myanmar
and India are becoming increasingly important. Bilateral trade grew from
USD 87.4 million in 1990–1 to USD 323.43 million in 2001–2; India’s exports to
Myanmar were worth USD 37.57 million and imports worth USD 285.86 million,
making a substantial trade balance in Myanmar’s favour. In the fiscal year
to March 2004, India–Myanmar bilateral trade was valued at more than
USD 400 million. Myanmar exports mainly beans and pulses, timber and gems to
India, from which it buys pharmaceuticals, building materials, steel and wheat.
Both sides have said they hope to boost trade to USD 1 billion by 2006. If recent
initiatives are sustained, this trade is likely to grow to the advantage of both
countries.8
The success of India’s Look East policy after a couple of ‘start-stops’ in the
mid-1990s and the consternation caused by its nuclear test in 1998, is directly
linked to both the changing international relations framework post-11 September,
2001, and the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. India is keen to strengthen
its ties with South-East Asian countries whose leaders also are exerting diplo-
matic efforts to develop stronger intra-Asian economic and political partnerships
as bulwarks against the new unilateralism, the US doctrine of pre-emptive strike
and continuing Western pressures on human rights, democracy and trade. The
success of India’s Look East policy is also linked to India having changed its
previous inward-looking economic policies, recovered from its reliance on the
former Soviet bloc, improved its relations with the US and revitalized its econ-
omy. India in effect has ‘come in from the cold’.
The success of its Asian diplomacy is seen in the initiatives being taken for
joint development of information technology, military exchanges and confidence-
building measures which have resulted in India’s membership of regional
organizations such as the ARF. Following the Bali summit, the ASEAN nations
both collectively and individually signed an ASEAN–India Regional Trade and
Investment Agreement (RTIA) which came into effect on 1 July 2004 for the
enhancement of economic cooperation. The provisions of this agreement specif-
ically are designed to enable the newer ASEAN members – Myanmar, Laos,
Cambodia and Vietnam – to accelerate their economic development through
participation in a range of trade-liberalization measures.
Now a dialogue-partner of ASEAN, India held discussions with former
Myanmar Prime Minister, General Khin Nyunt and other regional leaders, after
the Bali Summit,9 and in October 2005 hosted the state visit by Senior General
Than Shwe. From Myanmar’s point of view, it now has the friendship, economic
and political cooperation of the region’s two nuclear powers, with both of whom
the country shares sensitive, strategic borders.10 No longer in retreat from the
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world, India is embracing globalization as a means to realize its potential to
become a major power in the twenty-first century. In recognition of the key strate-
gic role India is likely to play in the coming decades in sustaining regional peace,
security and economic growth, China’s Premier Wen Jiabao visited India in April
2005 to discuss a possible free-trade agreement and to iron-out some of their con-
tentious border issues. As a result, in a remarkable about-face, China recognized
Sikkim as being within the Indian sphere of influence; in 2003, India had recog-
nized Tibet as part of China. However, India’s claims to part of northern Kashmir,
ceded to China by Pakistan, have yet to be resolved. In view of China’s long-
standing alliance with Pakistan, India is wary of any potential encirclement of
itself which could result from China’s relations with Myanmar. However, since
1997, and in view of its concerted policy to improve economic and political
relations with India, China has moved to distance itself from Pakistan’s nuclear
programmes. Clearly conflictual relations with India are now out of fashion in
Chinese international relations policy. Both these nuclear powers, India and
China, have come to realize that practical and strategic considerations move them
in the direction of further economic cooperation and collaboration, putting the
bitter memories of past conflict behind them. Their bilateral trade in 2004 grew
by a massive 79 per cent to USD 13.6 billion. From India, China imports iron ore,
steel, fodder, cotton, auto parts and jewellery; from China, India imports
chemicals, silk and consumer electronics. China is India’s second most important
trading partner after the US (The Australian, 5 April 2005). On good terms with
both, Myanmar stands to benefit substantially from further economic and strate-
gic cooperation with these two emerging major powers, and may form part of a
new growth quadrangle which includes South-West China/Yunnan, North-East
India, Myanmar and Bangladesh.11 One cannot but agree with Bhaskar (2000: 359)
therefore in suggesting that Myanmar ‘has the potential to impact significantly . . .
in the security calculus of India and China’. And both are clearly integral to
Myanmar’s own strategies for its security enhancement.
Ties with ASEAN – fortifying regional resilience
Thailand
It is no secret that historically Thailand and Myanmar (and their former incarna-
tions as Siam and Burma) have not enjoyed friendly relations. Before the irrup-
tion in mainland South-East Asia of the British and French colonial powers in the
nineteenth century, this region was torn asunder by the Siam–Burma wars of the
sixteenth–eighteenth centuries, as each country sought hegemony through control
of the international trade routes crossing the Malay Peninsula and around the Bay
of Bengal, and related revenues (James 2000: 75–108). That struggle culminated
in the Burmese sacking of the Siamese capital of Ayutthaya in 1767 and precipi-
tated 40 years of warfare between the two countries up to 1809. Although the
Siamese had the upper hand in this contest, driving the Burmese out of the coun-
try and establishing the new capital at Bangkok in 1782, it was only the British
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victory in the first Anglo-Burmese War (1824–6) which really broke Burmese
military power in that era in mainland South-East Asia. This is a conflict forever
relived in contemporary Thai film, novels and drama, becoming the making of
legend and contributing not a little to the modern Thai perception, in the popular
imagination, of the evil Burmese (Chutintaranond and U-Sha 2001). History has
been embellished in the process.
In recent years, relations between the two neighbours have, from time to time,
been strained over the flow of metamphetamines and other drugs flowing into
Thailand from the Myanmar border regions; the activities of refugees; Thai fish-
ing trawlers intruding into Myanmar waters; insurgent groups such as the KNU
which blew up a bridge on the Thai side at Mae Sot and border clashes (Maung
Aung Myoe 2002). From time to time, the government-controlled Myanmar press
has disparagingly referred to Thailand as Yodya (i.e. Ayutthaya) recalling the past
history of the two countries. In 2001–2, the takeover of a hospital at Ratburi near
the Thai–Myanmar border by Burmese insurgents who were later killed by Thai
forces and the attack on the Myanmar embassy in Bangkok by student activists
further added to strained relations.
Nevertheless, Thailand has maintained a policy of ‘constructive engagement’
with Myanmar throughout both the previous Democrat administration of Chuan
Leekpai (despite some attempts to change this to ‘flexible engagement’ during the
term of office of former Thai Foreign Minister, Surin Pitsuwan) and the current
conservative coalition of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. In early 2002
strategic initiatives by senior echelons of Thai society resulted in an exchange of
state visits between the two countries: Senior General Than Shwe and his wife
were received in audience at Chitrlada Palace by His Majesty, King Bhumibol
Adulyadej and Queen Sirikit; and the Thai Crown Princess, Maha Chakri
Sirindhorn, visited Myanmar. Other visits to Myanmar by key members of the
Thai government including the Prime Minister and the former Foreign Minister,
and then Deputy Prime Minister, Surakiat Sathirathai, followed. In turn, the
former Prime Minister, General Khin Nyunt visited Thailand in mid-2004 and
was also received in audience by His Majesty, King Bhumibol Adulyadej. It is no
secret that in general, relations between the two countries tend to be more amica-
ble during the tenure of conservative governments in Thailand than when the
Democrats are in office.
Following the 30 May 2003 debacle in Myanmar, Thai Prime Minister, Thaksin
Shinawatra, initiated what might be called a ‘good neighbour’ policy. As the
Myanmar government was reeling from the international reaction to the Depiyin
incident, Thailand announced its roadmap for Myanmar to return to democratic
governance; shortly afterwards, former Prime Minister, General Khin Nyunt
announced his own roadmap. To observers, it was a little mysterious that no-one,
including the Myanmar government, appeared to have any details of the Thai ver-
sion. There was a view that the Thai roadmap was a psychological prompt to
Myanmar to take this initiative. Since the 30 August 2003 announcement of
Myanmar’s seven-point plan to move to democratic governance, Thailand has
consistently supported Myanmar, both in the ASEAN forum and internationally,
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and on 15 December 2003 hosted a ten-nation conference in Bangkok on
Myanmar’s seven-point democracy plan.12 In 2004, Thailand supported
Myanmar’s admission to the EU–ASEM group; and Myanmar Foreign Minister,
U Nyan Win, attended the 8 October 2004 Hanoi summit. Established in 1996 by
7 ASEAN members and 15 EU members, the EU–ASEM group now includes
all 10 of the ASEAN countries and 25 of the EU countries. Speaking in Hanoi,
former Thai Foreign Minister, Surakiat Sathirathai, said the forum provided a
useful venue for Myanmar to be able to explain its progress with democratization
initiatives to the European countries (Myanmar Times, 8 October 2004). It may be
that the Thai leadership is conscious of the long road Thailand herself has trod,
not without some backward steps, from the military dictatorship of 1948–73; the
brief flirtation with democracy in 1974–5; the return of military rule in 1977–85;
and again in 1991–2, before finally finding its democratic feet. Indeed there are
some academics and civil society groups even now who fear that civil liberties in
Thailand are again being eroded in a return to authoritarian, personal-style gov-
ernance reminiscent of former eras under strongmen, Phibulsongkram (1948–57)
and Sarit Thannarat (1957–63).13 In mid 2006, public protests by these civil
society groups led to a constitutional crisis in Thailand.
Thailand’s firm stance in refusing to go down the US sanctions approach, and
in maintaining its engagement policy towards Myanmar, parallels that of India.
This approach resulted in the 12 November 2003 four-nation economic summit at
Bagan, sponsored by Thai Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, and including
Laos and Cambodia as well as Myanmar, in what Thaksin calls a ‘prosperity shar-
ing’ policy. The summit appears to have been very successful with an announced
agreement on principles for economic development resulting from it, and subse-
quent visits by senior officials to hold discussions on aspects of implementation.
The natural question has been asked, given the history of relations between the two
states, are the Thai sincere? In this case, the answer is probably in the affirmative. It
is in Thailand’s interest that her neighbours enjoy an increasing level of economic
prosperity, as this assists in fostering political and social development, and con-
tributes to stability in the region. Thailand does not want huge refugee outflows
which result from instability in neighbouring countries. It is still sending Cambodian
refugees home, years after the settlement (Bangkok Post, 21 September 2003).
In the lead up to the economic summit, the former Thai Minister of Commerce,
Adisai Bodharamik, announced support for the purchase of Myanmar manufac-
tured goods and raw materials. Seeking to increase trade between the two coun-
tries, he noted that in 2002, Thailand exported goods to Myanmar, both through
direct trade and border trade, worth around USD 300 million, with a 30 per cent
increase in trade in the first nine months of 2003, the largest increase up to that
date.14 Noting that Myanmar enjoyed a considerable trade surplus with its major
trading partners, Thailand, the US,15 India and Japan, the former Minister for
Commerce stated that trade facilitation was being supported by the new
regulations set by the Myanmar government. A team from Kasetsart and Mahidol
Universities in Bangkok arrived shortly after the Bagan summit to advise on
propagation of orchids and other plant species, and in a further sign of the
116 External relations in regional context
developing close relations between the two countries, a 77-member Thai delegation
led by President of the Thai–Myanmar Cultural and Economic Cooperation
Association, General Pat Akkanibut and General Secretary, Sanan Kajornklam
visited Myanmar on 23 November 2003 to attend the third meeting of the
Thai–Myanmar and Myanmar–Thai cultural and economic cooperation associa-
tions. It is clear, therefore, that both sides see it to their mutual benefit to increase
trade and commerce, cooperate on economic development and cultural matters,
and support the peaceful political evolution of Myanmar, as a ‘win-win’ situation
for the region.
Myanmar’s key role in enhancing the security of the region has been high-
lighted in the regional efforts towards eradicating terrorism, post-11 September,
2001, and the Bali bombings of 12 October 2002. Myanmar and Thailand initially
cooperated, with some success, in joint operations on the shared border along
their Andaman Sea coast, as Thailand and Malaysia have also done with respect
to the southern Thai provinces; and as Myanmar has also cooperated with India,
Bangladesh and China along their respective western and northern borders. The
‘war on terrorism’ has underlined the necessity for regional cooperation on this
issue. Since both Myanmar and Thailand have provinces with substantial Muslim
populations – Rakhine state along Myanmar’s exposed western coast, and the four
southern Thai provinces which have had an Islamic separatist movement for
decades – both countries are acutely aware of the necessity to manage the terror-
ist threat cooperatively.16 Both also cooperate in this matter with the major world
intelligence agencies. Indicative of the developing strategic relationship was the
26 November 2003 visit by then Thai Defence Minister, General Thammarak
Isarangura and delegation who was received by Head of State, Senior General
Than Shwe, and hosted for dinner in the evening by SPDC member, General
Thura Shwe Mann. Such visits not only provided opportunities for exchange of
information, but also, importantly contributed to the confidence-building
exercises which appeared to be going on between the two countries.17
Even the spate of urban bombings in Mandalay in late 2004, when two people
were killed in the main market, and in three busy shopping centres in Yangon in
early May 2005 which killed at least 16 people, did not unduly disturb the gener-
ally amicable relationship which has resulted from Thaksin’s diplomatic initia-
tives. In response to Yangon’s initial announcements that the bombings were the
work of terrorists based in a ‘neighbouring state’ with support from international
exile communities, Bangkok calmly declared that it does not, and did not support
any such groups carrying out terrorist missions in Myanmar. Alternate possibili-
ties were then canvassed in Yangon with eyes being turned towards some of the
remaining insurgent groups in the northern border areas of Shan State, although
these also denied involvement. However, to date, no clear perpetrators have been
found. It is noteworthy that the tragic incidents did not result in deterioration in
the Thai–Myanmar relationship and descent into acrimony as had happened at
other times in the past.
Thailand also declined to accede to calls from some sections of the ASEAN
community for Myanmar to forego the ASEAN chairmanship in 2006. Despite
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virulent accusations by some human rights groups based in the UK, and by
Alternate ASEAN (ALTSEAN) spokespersons, for Myanmar to be deprived of
this honour, Thailand stood firm both on Myanmar’s membership of ASEAN and
on its chairing the association in 2006. Thus Thailand, under the stewardship of
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, holds to its policy that economic development
in the long run is a more effective vehicle to bring about sustainable peaceful
evolution of Myanmar’s governance than punitive – and ultimately vindictive –
measures by a small number of external forces. The issue has tested ASEAN’s
long-established norms. In the wake of Myanmar’s decision not to take up the
ASEAN chair in 2006, in favour of concentrating on its domestic problems,
Thailand sought immediate consultations with Yangon. Like China and India,
Thailand has taken a long-term, strategic view of regional security and the
contribution a stable, and prosperous Myanmar will make to its sustainability.
Other ASEANs – perspectives on Myanmar
Amongst other ASEANs, Malaysia and Singapore have played key roles, both in
terms of political support, economic trade and investment as well as in support
for human resource development, including training opportunities in the health
sector. Both are key trading partners of Myanmar, with considerable commercial
interests in the tourism and industrial sectors. The Government of Singapore
Investment Corporation, for example, with USD 1.3 billion worth of investments
in Myanmar, is one of the biggest commercial stakeholders in the country, export-
ing USD 576 million to Myanmar in financial year 2002 (ADB 2002). In addi-
tion, Singapore has provided arms and military equipment and training to
Myanmar (Selth 1996) and takes a keen interest in its ongoing strategic develop-
ments. As Singapore’s Elder Statesman, Lee Kuan Yew observed (Straits Times,
11 August 2005), Myanmar ‘cannot stay frozen in time forever’.
Malaysia has also taken steps to increase its investments in Myanmar. In
August 2002, former Prime Minister Dr Mahathir, accompanied by a consider-
able business delegation, paid an official visit to Myanmar, which resulted in fur-
ther two-way trade and investment agreements. Both countries have provided
substantial educational opportunities for Myanmar students, academics and offi-
cials to gain qualifications from their tertiary and technical institutions. Malaysia
has taken a critical role, through UN special envoy, Tun Razali Ismail, in seeking
to broker a reconciliation pact between the Myanmar government and Daw Aung
San Suu Kyi. Whilst little of a substantial nature has been achieved through this
process yet, it is certain that it at least highlighted the need for confidence-building
interactions on both sides. Following Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s renewed incarcer-
ation after the 30 May 2003 incident, Tun Razali Ismail was one of the first for-
eign interlocuteurs to be given permission to visit the NLD leader. He was thus
able to assure the world that she was safe and unhurt. He has, however, not
received permission to enter the country again since this visit.
Other ASEAN countries, Indonesia and Brunei have played a similar
political–economic supportive role, although, since the passing of power from 
ex-President Suharto, the political relationship between Myanmar and Indonesia
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is not as close as it was during the Ne Win era.18 The new democratic era in
Indonesia has seen its newly empowered civil society call for similar strengthen-
ing of the institutions of civil society in Myanmar, which, at present, as one might
expect in a military-controlled state, are only nascent. The Sultan of Brunei and
his entourage paid a state visit to Myanmar in 1998 for the purpose of fostering
trade and investment. Being similarly economies-in-transition, and new members
of ASEAN, the former Indo-China countries have much in common with
Myanmar. Vietnam and Myanmar maintain a particularly close relationship. As
with China, Myanmar watches closely the progress of economic liberalization
initiatives, land reform and property rights policies in Vietnam. Indeed, it is not
impossible that the eventual outcome of the seven-point plan to return Myanmar
to democracy could take the one-party form of that found in Vietnam with a
continuing dominant role for the military assured in the new Constitution, whilst
administrative activities are carried out by an elected body (Clark 1999).19
The Philippines, the ASEAN state closest in political and historical ties to the
US, probably has the coolest relations with Myanmar and comparatively little
investment.
Relations with other regional organizations – BIMST-EC,
GMS, ARF
Myanmar has been promoting its international relations also through its member-
ship in various regional organizations, BIMST-EC (founded 1997), the Greater
Mekong Subregion (GMS) and the ARF.20 In addition to the four-nation Bagan eco-
nomic summit on 12 November 2003, Myanmar hosted, on 18–20 November 2003,
an Experts’ Meeting to work out an agreement for implementing a BIMST-EC
free-trade area during which trade and services for facilitating investment in the
region were discussed.21 A subsequent BIMST-EC summit planned for Phuket,
Thailand in early 2004 was postponed at the request of the former Indian Prime
Minister who cited pressing domestic concerns (Myanmar Times, 26 January 2004).
It had been intended to consider at the summit applications from Nepal and Bhutan
to join the group; these two countries formally joined in February 2004. At the
summit, finally convened on 30 July 2004 in Bangkok, plans were launched to
establish a free-trade zone amongst the members by 2017.
Similarly Myanmar participates in the 10 year development plan for the GMS
which is funded mostly by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and focuses
mainly on a number of large-scale infrastructure projects, particularly dams for
the generation of hydroelectricity. Some tourism and health promotion initiatives,
particularly prevention and control of HIV/AIDS, and initiatives to counter
human trafficking in the border regions are also sponsored through the GMS.
Myanmar’s participation in the ARF by virtue of its being a full member of
ASEAN (since 1997) provides the opportunity for participation in discussions on
regional security, arms limitations talks and counter-terrorism measures. Such par-
ticipation is seen as an important aspect of socialization, and confidence-building
measures amongst the ASEAN leaders with a keen interest in the nascent security
community potential of the ARF. As signalled by Lee Kuan Yew (noted earlier),
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there is a clear awareness in certain quarters of ASEAN that isolating Myanmar
is not in the long-term strategic interests of the region, and only plays into
the hands of the current SPDC leadership, some of whom would welcome the
opportunity to become disengaged from the international community.
Bangladesh
Myanmar’s border with Bangladesh has always been a sensitive region. Given the
predominantly Muslim population of Rakhine province abutting Bangladesh, the
Myanmar government is always alert to the possibilities of communal unrest and
terrorist elements taking refuge there. It was cross-border disturbances in this
region which became the cassus belli precipitating the first Anglo-Burmese War
in 1824. Thus a news report of 2 November 2003 that the border trade with
Bangladesh appeared to be operating as normal through the Maungdaw–Teknaf
transit point opposite Cox’s Bazaar indicates close official scrutiny of what was
occurring here at the same time as the Upper Myanmar communal disturbances
at Kyaukse, between local Muslims and Buddhists. That the local border was not
sealed shows that the Myanmar authorities felt confident of keeping control of
any outbreaks of unrest. However, Bangladesh’s security forces were on alert for
any influx of refugees from Myanmar’s Rakhine state, where groups of people
from Sittwe (Akyab) and Rathidaung were reported to be camped close to the
Bangladesh border fearful that the communal riots in Kyaukse could lead to fur-
ther repression of their own communities.22 The question of cross-border refugee
flows, with its attendant security risks, is at the forefront of Myanmar’s strategic
discussions with its neighbours, all of whom have a stake in the country’s stabil-
ity, economic development and capacity to provide a better living for its citizens.
As discussed earlier, the rise in Islamic fundamentalism in neighbouring
Bangladesh accompanied by anti-Indian sentiment has recently caused complica-
tions in India–Myanmar economic cooperation on energy security, a complication
which needs to be resolved with Bangladesh’s full participation if all three are to
benefit. In an effort to put some distance between itself and the India–Bangladesh
tensions, in July 2004 Myanmar separately entered into a series of discussions
with Bangladesh on trade protocols and joint minerals exploration. All of
Myanmar’s neighbours are thus closely interlinked, through economic and
security interactions, with the country’s gradual progress towards a prosperous,
modern polity. Since the consequences of poverty are a potential threat to all,
poverty-alleviation measures in the form of concrete trade and investment initia-
tives are at the forefront of their strategic initiatives.
North-East Asia
Japan
Japan has been a significant source of foreign aid and investment for Myanmar,
reflecting the close relationship between the two countries since the Second
World War, when over 100,000 Japanese soldiers lost their lives there. This close
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relationship is reflected in the several high-level visits to Myanmar since 1997:
by Japanese State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Masahiko Koumura (1997); by
Minister for International Trade and Industry, Takashi Fukaya (2000) and
by Minister for Foreign Affairs, Yoriko Kawaguchi (2002). Japan’s support leant
credibility to the Myanmar government’s efforts to improve the living standards
of the people. In 2001–2, Japan provided USD 29 million for maintenance on the
Baluchaung No. 2 hydroelectric power plant, built with Japanese aid. Ongoing
assistance has been provided by Japan in the form of debt-relief grants, aid for
agriculture, forestry, education, health (particularly HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and
malaria control and prevention) grass-roots projects, poverty-alleviation mea-
sures, information and communication technology equipment and training, exten-
sion of Yangon International Airport and building of a new headquarters in
Yangon for the Myanmar Maternal and Child Welfare Association (MMCWA),
the largest grass-roots, domestic non-government organization. Japan has been
Myanmar’s primary source of international aid totalling, as of November 2002,
1.29 billion yen in grants and a further 770 million in technical cooperation.23 In
April 2002, 7,920 million yen was provided for medical equipment for hospitals
in Yangon. Two new projects launched in November 2002, the project for
afforestation in the central dry zone (4,800 million yen) and the project for human
resource development scholarships (2,660 million yen), indicate Japan’s focus on
capacity building and sustainable development in its overseas aid programme. In
2002 also, Japan provided USD 1.2 million for drug eradication in Wa State, in
Upper Myanmar. In addition, the non-government Sasakawa Foundation funds
many capacity-building projects in Myanmar, and Japanese NGOs work in rural
areas on grass-roots projects aimed at assisting villagers to improve their standard
of living.
Japan has thus been doing a great deal to contribute to the development of
Myanmar’s socio-economic fabric and in November 2003 conducted a three-day
workshop in Yangon on industrial relations. (New Light of Myanmar, 27 November
2003). It was thus with some consternation that Myanmar heard Japan’s declara-
tion, after the 30 May 2003 incident, that no further assistance would be rendered
until Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and her comrades were released. Although this con-
dition has been only partially fulfilled, Japan has recommenced its humanitarian
assistance particularly for HIV/AIDS prevention and control, in view of the dire
need in this impoverished country.
Japan, which has large investments in all the ASEAN economies, joined the
ASEAN security pact in November 2003, further underlining the region’s
perspective that its search for security is being projected through the economic
lens (The Australian, 18 November 2003). The 11–12 December 2003 summit in
Tokyo which climaxed the ASEAN–Japan Exchange Year, saw Japan initiate an
ASEAN free-trade agreement to be implemented by 2012 along similar lines to
that between ASEAN and China. At this summit, the objective of which was to
set in train initiatives to narrow the development gap between the four newer
members of ASEAN – Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam – and the more
prosperous older members – the former Myanmar Prime Minister, General Khin
Nyunt, took the opportunity to have private discussions with his Japanese
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counterpart, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. Initiatives arising from this sum-
mit included Japan’s gift of 100,000 scholarships to ASEAN countries for study
in Japan; training in information technology by Japanese specialists, and assis-
tance to improve educational standards. The linkages between economics and
security are underpinned in the participants’ intention to expedite the currency
swap agreement first signed between Japan and ASEAN in 1999 to assist in sta-
bilizing ASEAN economies and strengthen their capacity to withstand financial
crises similar to that of 1997; the proposals by Japan to develop a regional capi-
tal market; provision of coast-guard facilities by Japan to counteract transborder
crime and piracy; and a network of government officials to assist in coordinating
regional security (Myanmar Times, 8–14 December 2003).
South Korea
Like Japan, South Korea also is an important trading partner of Myanmar with
substantial investment in the country. There is a strong empathy between the
two countries from the time when the former South Korean president, Chun 
Do-Whan, narrowly escaped assassination by a North Korean terrorist group,
when visiting the Aung San memorial in Yangon. Several members of the South
Korean cabinet were killed. Since then, South Korea has evolved from military
rule to a functioning democracy with a strong civil society, a development which
has gone in tandem with its economic development. Its example might encourage
Myanmar to try to follow a similar path. As a good international citizen, South
Korea maintains very friendly relations with Myanmar. On 21 November 2003,
the South Korean Ambassador to Myanmar was present at the ceremony when the
President of Daewoo International Corporation, Mr Tae-Yong Lee, and Vice-
President, Mr Chae-Moon Rim, and members donated medicines to the Myanmar
Ministry of Health. The ceremony was held at the meeting hall of the National
Health Committee in Yangon attended by the Minister for Health, the Deputy
Minister, directors-general of departments, the deputy directors-general, rectors
and medical superintendents (Myanmar Information Committee, 22 November
2003). A South Korean trade delegation subsequently arrived on 26 November
(New Light of Myanmar, 27 November 2003).
Against this backdrop of diplomatic initiatives and economic policy, articles in
the Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) in late October 2003 suggesting that
Myanmar is seeking to establish a nuclear programme with the assistance of mate-
rials and expertise from North Korea, need to be treated with caution. Not only
would nuclear China and nuclear India be likely to fiercely resist any attempt from
impoverished Myanmar to establish nuclear capacity, on their back-door step, but
the obvious question should be asked, who would pay for such a programme?
Should Myanmar proceed down the path of acquiring nuclear capacity, such a pol-
icy would be likely to disrupt the development of the supportive regional relations
within ASEAN which Myanmar’s government has been assiduously cultivating.
Such a programme would be at odds with the logic of Myanmar’s international
policy and its search for security through building friendly alliances with a
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politico-economic nexus. As signatory to the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality
(ZOPFAN) and Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) accords,
Myanmar would be courting the displeasure of its ASEAN neighbours and placing
at risk the regional security policy it has been carefully constructing over a number
of years. My discussions in Yangon in February 2004 on this issue elicited
forthright denials, and although Selth (2002) is a little ambivalent about
Myanmar’s plans to acquire nuclear capacity, it is my view that this construct is
part of the Western-originated international campaign against the country, and
without foundation in logic or fact.
Contemporary relations with Australia – the fruits 
of engagement
Under the Liberal–National Party coalition government of Prime Minister, John
Howard, since 1997 Australia has fostered an engagement policy with Myanmar
on the basis that the previous sanctions policy was not conducive to supporting
the country’s evolution to democratic governance. Officially, the Australian gov-
ernment provides some funds for humanitarian and health assistance, especially
for HIV/AIDS, and for educational assistance to the refugees in camps in the bor-
der areas with Thailand. This funding in financial year 2003–4 amounted to some
AUD 7.5 million inclusive of funding for the government-sponsored human rights
workshops, which are delivered to middle and senior ranking civil servants, edu-
cators and police. These workshops were suspended pending Daw Aung San Suu
Kyi’s release. At the time, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer stated that they
would be resumed once that condition had been fulfilled.
Such funding for health and humanitarian projects was markedly increased in
the May 2005 Australian government budget, and focussed on several commu-
nity, grass-roots level HIV/AIDS prevention and control projects, and health-care
improvement projects for vulnerable groups in the border areas of Eastern Shan
States, Rakhine and Chin States and on the Thai–Myanmar eastern border. This
humanitarian aid is delivered through INGOs such as the Australian Red Cross,
Medecins San Frontieres Australia (working in conjunction with its Dutch
counterpart), Care Australia and the MacFarlane Burnet Institute. Australia also
contributes over AUD 45 million through various regional initiatives in conjunc-
tion with ASEAN, as well as contributing to the UNODC drug-suppression
programmes. These regional initiatives take as their baseline the improvement of
Myanmar’s socio-economic fabric through assisting with prevention of human
trafficking and drug-control programmes. A special two-year programme called
Childwise, which commenced in 2004, provides assistance through UNICEF in
building capacity to prevent child sexual exploitation in regional tourism destina-
tions.24 By such initiatives, Australia is making a practical contribution to poverty
alleviation among Myanmar’s vulnerable social and ethnic groups.
In other areas, the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research
(ACIAR) has been cooperating on agricultural assistance to Myanmar to help in
improving seed quality and yield per hectare. In accordance with this humanitarian
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perspective, various Australian universities also assist with educational development
and special programmes in the health and agricultural sectors. Much needed
international assistance with the development of Myanmar’s educational sector
and economic capacity is presently available through the Australia-IMF
Scholarship Program for Asia which aims to train government and Central Bank
officials from ‘economies in transition’ in macroeconomic management. Together
with citizens of Cambodia, China, Lao PDR, Mongolia and Vietnam, Myanmar
citizens are eligible for scholarships under this innovative programme.
Australia’s engagement policy is in marked contrast to that of the US, UK and
EU and is a reflection of geopolitical issues, and the close relationship between
the two countries arising from the Second World War. However, Australian trade
and investment with Myanmar are minimal, amounting to only around AUD
10 million per year. Given the new economic and investment strategy being pursued
by Myanmar’s closest neighbours, it is possible that Australia may follow suit, as
a practical means to alleviate poverty and develop that capacity for pluralistic
democratic governance within Myanmar which all sectors – international and
domestic – claim they wish to see evolve. Australia has thus eschewed what
Nossal (1994: 29) identifies as the ‘rain dance’ policy of symbolic sanctions
which ‘makes participants feel better, but nothing of substance is actually accom-
plished’. By resisting the call of exile groups in the US, UK and EU to impose
economic sanctions on Myanmar because of its alleged human rights violations
and slow return to democratic governance, Australia implicitly recognizes that the
sanctions approach ‘ends up punishing entirely the wrong people’ (Nossal 1994:
264). Australia has instead taken a practical approach to improving the economic,
social and political ‘well-being’ of Myanmar’s deprived populations.25
Conclusion
Myanmar’s regional security enhancement strategy could therefore be seen as an
amalgam of both the realist ‘balance of power’ and constructivist ‘security through
cooperative partnerships with regional neighbours’ paradigms. Both approaches,
however, are focussed on state and regime security. The challenge for Myanmar will
be to integrate the socio-economic and political changes needed to enhance human
security with its traditional indigenous approaches to state and regime security. To
put the dilemma another way, the challenge will be for the state to acknowledge that
its own future security is predicated on its capacity to deliver the reforms necessary
for implementation of human security – a commitment to the protection of human
rights in accordance with international standards; a commitment to transparency
and participative practices in governance; a commitment to establishing an
accountable and independent judiciary and a commitment to pluralistic democratic
norms. Myanmar’s regional security enhancement strategy – winning friends and
influencing regional governments – will need to integrate these fundamental
platforms of human security into its indigenous state/regime framework, if its
objective of achieving holistic security is to deliver on its expectations.
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Introduction
Myanmar’s relations with the West – the EU, the UK, and the US – since 1988
have been fractious and conflictual, underpinned by policies of evertightening
economic and financial sanctions, public vilification campaigns aimed at
Myanmar’s military leaders by an assortment of international NGOs (Amnesty
International, Human Rights Watch, Christian Science Monitor, International
Committee of the Red Cross, the ILO), externally based democracy activist
groups and cyber attacks from the Burmese Diaspora. Despite repetitive themes
enunciating the suffering and endemic poverty of the majority of Myanmar’s cit-
izens, these strategies have been ineffectual in achieving their alleged intentions
of restoring democratic governance to the golden land of Myanmar, although
millions of dollars have been applied to their activities by such sources as the
National Endowment for Democracy and George Soros’ Open Society
Foundation. In mid-2005, Guy Horton, a friend of the late Michael Aris, the
Oxford academic who was married to Burmese opposition leader, Daw Aung San
Suu Kyi, compiled a 600-page document detailing the alleged ‘genocide’ by the
Burmese military government against ethnic rebels on the eastern border with
Thailand during the decades of civil war. He planned to present the document to
the UN as part of the Burma UK campaign to prevent Myanmar from assuming
the ASEAN chairmanship in 2006. Even Lee Kuan Yew (Straits Times, 11 August
2005) looked to the possibility of Myanmar’s population, motivated by compari-
son with the greater wealth enjoyed by citizens of Thailand, to rise against their
military government, a comparison immediately refuted by a Burmese interna-
tional citizen, Ma Thanegi (Free Burma Coalition, www.freeburmacoalition.org,
accessed 16 August 2005), in drawing attention to the very different world view
and values of Myanmar’s people. Neither poverty, nor decades of oppressive
domestic policies, nor human rights abuses, nor Western-based charges of alleged
genocide against various ethnic minority peoples, has led to the mooted civilian
displacement of the Burmese/Myanmar military government which might have
been expected, and indeed has occurred in other formerly authoritarian polities.
As Mary Callahan (2003) has asserted, Myanmar has defied the regional trend
to replace overtly military dictatorships with apparently civilian administrations,
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security
although it is sometimes difficult to identify any ‘full’ or ‘mature’ democracy
in the Asian region. More than 50 years after its hard-won independence from its
former colonial master, Britain, military governance in Myanmar remains as
resilient as ever, underpinned by policies of nationalism, self-reliance and a
determination to protect its sovereignty from foreign (i.e. Western) intrusions.
The latest contretemps over Myanmar’s turn to chair ASEAN in 2006 only served
to measure how far apart are the two very different world views – that of the
industrialized and democratized West, and that of mostly agrarian, authoritarian,
‘medieval’ Myanmar, which Lee Kuan Yew, in the article cited earlier, has pointed
out cannot ‘stay frozen in time’. The witch-hunt going on for the supporters of the
displaced reformist Prime Minister, General Khin Nyunt, who might have been
able to broker the needed changes in Myanmar’s governance, to bring it out of the
medieval world of personalized power and patron–client relationships into the
modern world of people power, only serves to underscore how frozen in time
Myanmar’s systems of governance are.
Frozen in time or not, the military leadership under Senior General Than Shwe
seems more entrenched in power than ever before, and even less inclined to be
influenced by the international community than in the previous 5 years. The ques-
tion needs to be addressed: Is this the result of the policies pursued by the West
towards Myanmar? Have these policies been counterproductive in achieving an
evolution from military to democratic governance in Myanmar? It is perhaps
timely to observe that during the Cold War which coincided with the high tide of
military rule in Burma, 1962–88, when the late General Ne Win was pursuing his
avowedly anti-Communist policies in the context of civil war and widespread eth-
nic insurgencies, no such Western sanctions were applied to the country; yet
human rights abuses were rampant, perpetuation of poverty for most citizens was
official policy under the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP) which systemat-
ically eliminated the middle classes, and no challenge to military governance from
any sector was countenanced. Some of those who lived through that era have told
me that everyday life then was even harsher than it is now, despite the more than
15 years of Western sanctions.
So what triggered the change in Western policy? Clearly not the fact of con-
tinuing military governance alone, as Western governments – the USA, UK and
the EU – maintain normal foreign relations and trading arrangements with a
range of countries which are either under military dictatorship (e.g. Pakistan), or
not democratic (e.g. The PRC). Indeed, if the sanctions ‘sender’ countries and
those who support the sanctions policies in their bureaucracies were to interact
only with those countries which they considered ‘true’ democracies, they would
have relations with very few countries. Along similar lines, at a recent conference
in Malmo, Sweden, John Badgley argued,
Burmese thrive on rumors about family fortunes made through links to Wa
drug lords, Chinese syndicates, and Thai politicians. But is the quest so
different from what one finds in neighboring societies – the Philippines,
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Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam and Cambodia – countries not
suffering from sanctions, despite corruption and violence tolerated within.
Only Burma must endure that substantial obstruction of economic sanctions.
Why? Do sanctions really ameliorate the aborted 1990 elections, Aung San
Suu Kyi’s house arrest, and the imprisoned opposition activists?
(Badgley 2004a: 7)
Since the answer to this rhetorical question is so clearly ‘No!’ we must ask why
this policy persists. In the same essay Badgley (2004a: 4) asserts, ‘sanctions are a
form of coercion, like an invasion, designed to humiliate and threaten the regime,
no matter the pain caused the common people’. If effect, there is no expectation in
the sender countries that sanctions will achieve the stated aims of bringing about
regime change, pluralistic democratic governance or installation of Daw Aung San
Suu Kyi as premier of Burma/Myanmar. Sanctions are merely a cynical exercise
in international theatre. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and her movement are as much
their victims as are the long-suffering people of Burma/ Myanmar.
In the sanctions decade of the 1990s the export of Western-style democracy
and the human rights framework became reified during the Clinton
Administration, but even this does not sufficiently explain the hard-line, myopic
approach to Myanmar; despite the prominence of the democracy and human
rights discourse in international affairs since the 1990s, there are again many
exceptions, Saudi Arabia being a notable one. Nor is it sufficient to point to the
timely development and efficiency of the World Wide Web in promoting the anti-
Myanmar discourse, or the iconic statue of the imprisoned opposition leader,
Nobel Peace Prize winner, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, in producing the vehement
isolationist policies which Myanmar’s enemies advocate. It is necessary to seek
some other hitherto elusive element in fathoming the continuance (now more than
15 years) of what is so clearly a zero-sum game in the Western sanctions policies
applied to Myanmar (and despite the misplaced triumphalism subsequent to
Myanmar foregoing its turn to chair ASEAN in 2006).
In the words of Myint Shwe (Bangkok Post, 18 April 2004), sanctions intended
to bring about regime change in Myanmar have missed their mark. Sanctions, he
avers, have become ‘part of the problem’ rather than ‘part of the solution as they
were meant to be’. Yet, given the domestic political considerations which keep
sanctions in place in the sender countries, and the lack of progress towards
political reform in Myanmar (the ‘target’ country), Western economic and
financial sanctions are unlikely to be lifted in the near future. Both sides have
taken up positions from which it is impossible to move without immense loss
of face entailing loss of political capital and support from their domestic
constituencies.
Myanmar fits the ‘war of attrition’ model of McGillivray and Stam (2004: 159)
in which sanctions continue for a long time because both the sender and target
states, for reasons of domestic politics, quite simply ‘prefer their continuance’
(ibid.). In this model, Myanmar is one of those target states, which prefers to
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‘bare [sic] the cost of sanctions indefinitely’ (ibid.) rather than comply with the
sender’s (foreign) demands to change its system of governance. Sanctions, in
Myanmar’s case, are intended to bring about regime and leadership change.
Though this approach has manifestly failed to bring about any policy concessions
in the target state, yet, as MacGillivray and Stam (2004: 155) observe, sanctions
have persisted ‘long after it is clear that they are ineffective foreign policy tools’.
In Myanmar’s case, sanctions have been not just ineffective, but counterproduc-
tive, stimulating nationalistic resistance to foreign-instigated demands, autarkchic
domestic policies, and rent-seeking socio-economic patterns which impede the
development of a robust civil society without impacting adversely on the leader-
ship. Sanctions, perversely, are welcomed; they shore up national identity in this
post-colonial polity with its legacy of profound xenophobia. In the ‘sanctions
decade’ of the 1990s when sanctions were said to be a preferred instrument of
Western foreign policy obviating recourse to war, yet few achieved even partial
success.1 As Mack and Khan (2000) argue,
The most damaging charge against sanctions, particularly comprehensive-
sanctions, is that they impose widespread suffering on ordinary people, while
leaving the regimes they target not only relatively unscathed, but also some-
times enriched and strengthened. In part as a consequence, almost all studies
today argue for one variant or other of what have come to be known as ‘smart
sanctions’, i.e. those sanctions intended to target regimes, not peoples. The
effect, though not the intent, of a number of recent sanctions regimes, most
notably in the case of Iraq, has been the reverse. Peoples have been harmed
far more than regimes.
(Mack and Khan 2000: 280)
At the heart of conventional sanctions theory lies a fallacy; this presupposes
that the economic hardship inflicted by sanctions on the citizens of the target state
will cause them to either rise up against their (authoritarian) government, or pres-
sure it for changes. On the contrary, Mack and Khan assert, ‘Those who bear the
brunt of the sanctions have no power to influence policy; those in power tend to
be relatively unaffected’ (Mack and Khan 2000: 281). Their perspective is shared
by Pape (1997) and by Nossal (1994: 266) who asks why should vulnerable pop-
ulations welcome those foreigners who have been instrumental in causing deteri-
oration in their well-being? The 1988 uprising in Burma, it should be noted,
occurred prior to the imposition of Western sanctions; and was instigated initially
in response to fears of further demonetizations by the almost defunct BSPP, that
is, an internally generated set of dynamics, not an externally sourced node of
political ideologies. How vulnerable populations really feel about those who orig-
inate and implement economic sanctions may be gauged by the bombing of the
UN building in Baghdad resulting in the deaths of Sergio de Mello and many of
his colleagues. Sanctions thus remain a ‘feel-good’ policy by the sender state
which wishes to send a message of censure, when substantial economic resources
in the target state are not at risk.
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In view of the impasse in international policy towards Myanmar, in November
2001, the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in conjunction with the
Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University initiated
the Stockholm Process on the Implementation of Targeted Sanctions (SPITS); the
subsequent ‘Stockholm Report’ was presented to the Security Council on
25 February 2003. Under this process, in April 2004, Wallensteen, Staibano and
Eriksson of the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University,
presented their short essay, ‘Routes to Democracy in Myanmar: the Uppsala Pilot
Study on Dialogue and International Strategies’. This study examines the possi-
bilities for a modified approach which could include targeted sanctions and inter-
national involvement such as the appointment of an EU special envoy, to mediate
the democratic dialogue process in Myanmar between the government, the oppo-
sition NLD and the ethnic minority groups. There is of course, already a UN
Special Envoy, the Malaysian diplomat, Tun Razali Ismail, whose best endeavours
have proved ineffective in moving the dialogue process forward, and whom, the
SPDC has made clear, is now not welcome in Myanmar. It is doubtful that yet
another ‘special envoy’ would be any more successful. That this dialogue, since
the 18 October 2004 removal of General Khin Nyunt and his faction, seems to be
irreparably stalled, perhaps serves to underline the necessity for reviewing present
Western international policy towards Myanmar. In the words of veteran Thai
diplomat, the former Foreign Minister, Surakiat Sathirathai, ‘sanctions do not
lead to democracy’; instead they ‘create hardships for the poor’ whilst leaving the
leadership untouched (Bangkok Post, 18 April 2004). Being closest to the issues,
and in view of their own history, Thailand is sure that economic sanctions are
indeed part of the problem, not the solution.
These issues were canvassed in depth in the NBR report, No.15, released in
March 2004, Reconciling Burma/Myanmar: Essays on U.S. Relations with Burma,
compiled by John Badgley and six other noted international scholars on Myanmar.
Their conclusions assert that Western economic sanctions, far from encouraging
the evolution of Myanmar to sustainable democratic governance, have impeded
that evolution; they have ‘undermined Western influence in the country by making
Myanmar increasingly impervious to the interests of Western nations’ (Badgley
2004: 8). Impervious also to Western blandishments, it might be added. On the
contrary, the report asserts ‘Involving states and societies in the web of interna-
tional trade and finance is the best way to link them to the norms of transparency
and the rule of law’ (ibid. 9). Those who believe in the efficacy of free trade as a
critical element in an evolving robust civil society ought to follow the logic of their
own convictions, and reverse the sanctions policy, if indeed they wish to see
Myanmar evolve to democratic governance. As Nossal asserts, ‘Economic sanc-
tions imposed for human rights violations end up punishing entirely the wrong
people’ and are ‘a blunt and crude tool of statecraft’ (Nossal 1994: 264) intended
to reassure the diaspora of the target country that the sender abhors its behaviour,
but without any expectation of substantial achievement – in effect ‘rain dancing’
as far as changing the behaviour of the target state is concerned, but diminishing
the well-being and life capabilities of its vulnerable populations.
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How to cut the Gordian knot, without appearing to either surrender to the
SPDC, or to give the appearance of approving its human rights violations, has
been at the heart of discussions in several international venues. Most recently, the
EU appears to be moving closer to the position of acknowledging that renewed
international humanitarian aid and economic investment are essential first steps
to alleviate the endemic poverty in Myanmar. They are also essential steps in
starting to build a critical mass of population able to support sustainable future
non-military governance in a polity which not only does not have a tradition of
civilian control of the military, but within which the field/staff officer rivalry and
co-relative disunity amongst the opposition forces have had serious flow-on
consequences for domestic governance. The real battle inside and outside Burma/
Myanmar since 1988, as Martin Smith (1991, rpt. 1999: 422) observed has been
for control of the transitional process, and it has been this site that the Burmese
armed forces are still very reluctant to relinquish. They are still conditioned by
the post-independence mindset which projects them as the saviours of the country
against internal and external forces of disintegration. Smith captures the time lag
afflicting Burma/Myanmar
[I]n the post-Cold War era, when the values of democratization and civil
society were being promoted by much of the international community, the
political relationships and language inside Burma were still very loosely
charted.
(Smith 1991, rpt. 1999: 424)
How loose can be gauged by the far-reaching purge of General Khin Nyunt and
his faction on 18 October 2004 – said to encompass over 8,000 people; and the
preceding move against some 14 regional commanders, senior officers and for-
mer ministers in November 1997. Whilst the now-stalled National Convention
process has been overtly structured around a continuing major role for the mili-
tary in any future constitutional form of government, the precise distribution of
power at the top echelons is not transparent. Larry Jagan (Bangkok Post, 7 July
2005) for instance, now seems to be suggesting that the people should put their
faith in Vice-Senior General Maung Aye to lead the national reconciliation
process with the NLD. Jagan may be attempting to foster a fall out between
Senior General Than Shwe and the number two in the top leadership group. In this
situation it seems judicious for the international community to move more pre-
cisely to privilege the majority of Burma/Myanmar’s vulnerable populations,
Burman and ethnic minority alike, rather than the minority few in the senior mil-
itary cadres. An official policy within the international community for an increase
in humanitarian aid, developmental assistance and economic investment would
start to redress the imbalance in the international sanctions discourse and begin
to recognize that the ‘art of the possible’ (Taylor 2004a) in Myanmar needs to be
designed around incremental steps which will gradually empower the majority of
its peoples.
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Myanmar and the EU
Whilst the EU imposed sanctions on Myanmar since 1996, including restrictions
on travel visas for members of the government and senior officials, an arms
embargo and freezing of assets, indications of a move in the EU position and of
that of some of its members in recent years suggests increasing acknowledgment
of the need to explore alternate approaches. The EU in 2001–2 promised contri-
butions of 5 million Euros to assist with HIV/AIDS programmes under the UN
Joint Plan of Action; and in 2002 participated in the ASEM with Myanmar rep-
resented. The previous meeting had not taken place when Asian governments
refused to hold it in view of EU insistence that Myanmar not be represented. Most
recently, despite vehement opposition, ASEAN was able to win the argument that
Myanmar should be able to participate in the 8–9 October 2004 ASEM summit
in Hanoi, if the 10 newly admitted EU members were to participate. EU–ASEM
Dialogue partners, China, Japan and South Korea also participated in this sum-
mit. Membership of ASEM has been an important step for Myanmar in being
seen as a fully fledged member of ASEAN, the ARF and their international
alliances. ASEM now includes all 25 EU members and all 10 ASEAN members.
Even renewed EU travel sanctions in late 2004, of little practicable effect, could
not diminish the sense of ASEAN triumph on this fiercely fought issue.2
Amongst individual EU members, France built and equipped a hospital in
Mandalay in 2001–2; Germany has some trade and investment in Myanmar and
has granted a number of scholarships to assist with Myanmar’s educational devel-
opment; and in November 2003 Hungarian Deputy Foreign Minister Andras
Barsony declared that the EU’s sanctions were not helping to bring democracy to
the country. In Bangkok for bilateral discussions with former Thai Foreign
Minister, Surakiat Sathirathai, Mr Barsony said, ‘changes must come through per-
manent dialogue, not by isolation’ adding that sanctions would not succeed in
making any targeted country change its ways.3 Mr Barsony did not say directly
whether he supported Yangon’s seven-point plan to return Myanmar to democ-
racy, but stated that every attempt to bring the people of Myanmar closer to real
democracy should be supported.
Barsony’s stance proceeds from the viewpoint that bringing Myanmar within
the socialization processes of the EU–ASEM framework opens the possibility of
greater influence being brought to bear on the country’s leadership to adapt to
international norms, than by isolating it within a symbolic sanctions regime. A
seven-member senior delegation which included the new Myanmar Foreign
Minister, U Nyan Win, and his deputy Minister, U Kyaw Thu, attended the 8–9
October 2004 EU–ASEM summit in Hanoi. In mid-2005, partly in response to an
independent report to the EU by academics, Robert Taylor and Morten Pedersen,
and despite the furore the report evoked from anti-government activist groups
based outside Myanmar, as discussed earlier, the EU gave indications of
reconsidering its position on resumption of humanitarian aid to Myanmar in
recognition of the parlous state of the country’s socio-economic fabric. As Taylor
and Pedersen have suggested, it is timely for the European Commission (EC) and
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EU Member States to develop an assistance strategy for Burma/Myanmar with
associated funding, which will assist to repair the ravages to the country’s socio-
economic fabric, disassociate the EU from the hard-line US position and consider
appointing a senior EC representative tasked with ensuring that the assistance
strategy is appropriately implemented according to EU guidelines (Taylor and
Pedersen 2005: 21).
Taylor and Pedersen’s recommendations build on Martin Smith’s (1991, rpt.
1999: 436) timely reminder that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s call for economic sanc-
tions ‘did not always win countrywide support, especially among those who
believed that international engagement and development were, by contrast, the
catalysts that would lay the foundations for change in such an isolated country as
Burma’. Smith highlights the fact that the call for sanctions and trade boycotts
has hurt the NLD within certain elements of what might otherwise have been its
natural domestic constituency. In recent years, there have been welcome sugges-
tions in the NLD leader’s statements that she is ameliorating her previous oppo-
sition to humanitarian aid. Taylor and Pedersen’s report thus gives substance to
the art of the possible; it privileges rebuilding the socio-economic fabric ahead of,
and not as a condition of, political change. It is therefore significantly distin-
guished from the February 2004 report of the US State Department, ‘Identifying
Resources for the Reconstruction of Burma’ which will entertain the provision of
developmental assistance only after the SPDC ‘is removed from power’ – by what
agency, the State Department’s report does not specify.4
A change in EU policy would therefore be a very significant first step towards
empowering Myanmar to adopt that pluralistic democratic governance which all
sides are said to desire, but which would entail a very significant loss of face, and
possibly funding, for some of the diaspora who have been intransigent, and viru-
lent, advocates of sanctions despite the harm done to vulnerable populations
amongst their own countrymen. The imperative of the report, The Responsibility
to Protect (see Chapter 1), ‘first do no harm’, in Myanmar’s case, ironically has
been subverted by both the government and the anti-government groups. This is
the dilemma for Myanmar’s vulnerable populations.
On the other hand, resumption of humanitarian aid by the EU and support for
rebuilding the socio-economic fabric in Myanmar would be within the interna-
tional norms – ‘the responsibility to protect’ and to ‘do no harm’ to vulnerable
populations – which are at the heart of the human security concept. Although
sanctions have been invoked in response to violation of key human rights norms,
they have had the effect of eroding the very rights they are allegedly intended to
uphold. By their imposition, the ‘right to development’, the right to robust
education and health systems and the right to make a decent living have been
jeopardized – rights which enhance the ‘capabilities’ of the population at large to
participate in pluralistic democratic governance. The ‘moral credence’ (Drezner
2000: 77) of the sender country too is impugned by the adverse effects its
sanctions policy has on already vulnerable populations. Where sanctions revolve
around a set of norms, not necessarily shared by the target country, but which,
on the contrary, invoke the highly prized norm of preservation of national
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sovereignty, especially in a post-colonial polity imbued with authoritarian
governance systems, the intention to sustain resistance to the sender sanctions in
perpetuity, is increased. As Drezner argues,
[T]hough the use of norms can strengthen the resolve of the sanctioning
coalition, it also allows target elites to construct an identity based on their
opposition to the proclaimed norm . . . . Target states can use their defiance of
global norms as a wayof counteracting the enhanced resolve of the sanctions
coalition . . . .
[I]n appealing to a consensual norm, the sender also endows the demand
with an all-or-nothing quality, increasing the likelihood of the target country
standing firm.
If the EU really moves to implement a policy of resumed humanitarian aid to
Myanmar and developmental assistance to rebuild its socio-economic fabric, it
would implicitly acknowledge the ineffectual nature of present Western interna-
tional policy on Myanmar; and, also implicitly, the comparatively greater efficacy
of the ASEAN norm of ‘quiet’, behind-the-scenes diplomacy.5 Similarly to when
Myanmar joined ASEAN in 1997, the country’s membership of ASEM will
increase its exposure to international norms, create more opportunities for the
socialization of its elites through their participation in international fora, and
enable EU policy makers to enhance their own avenues to influence the leader-
ship of Myanmar to move the country closer towards international expectations
of how a modern state should operate. This can only be beneficial for the millions
of Myanmar’s citizens presently enmired in poverty. If the Millennium goals, the
forgiving of third world debt initiative and the UN’s resolve to make poverty alle-
viation a reality for the over 1 billion people who live on USD1 per day, are to
have any significance, it is time for public recognition that a different approach
to Myanmar is required; that sanctions impede these goals and should be lifted so
that rebuilding Myanmar’s socio-economic fabric can proceed. The EU will then
have participated in the evolution of a more civil society in Myanmar.
Myanmar’s relations with the US and the UK
For over 15 years, since the failed democracy uprising of 1988, Myanmar’s
relations with the US and the UK have been permeated by mutually vitriolic
exchanges reminiscent of those which punctuated the Cold War era between the
communist and non-communist blocs. As Drezner notes, ‘The coercion of
adversaries is far more public than the coercion of allies’ (Drezner 1999: 309),
because there is little to be lost in the way of economic or political leverage.
Both sides know it is a zero-sum game, and are content for the war of attrition to
continue. Nevertheless, since the sanctions decade of the 1990s, economic coer-
cion has been a key feature of US foreign policy, driven by the twin poles in the
neoliberal institutionalist paradigm that economic interdependence fosters coop-
eration between states because it increases the costs of defection and, secondly,
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that strong economic sanctions ‘provide an incentive for cooperation’
(Drezner 1999: 9). For reasons of domestic politics, exemplified by Senator
Mitch McConnell and the anti-Burma bloc in Congress, the present Neo-
Conservative ascendancy in Washington has chosen to continue these twin policy
planks, despite the general realist tendency to put little faith in economic state-
craft. By doing so the US implicitly adopts the position that symbolic sanctions
have a moral, public policy value for the special interest groups in its own con-
stituencies; it has chosen to privilege these groups and their perspectives over the
welfare of the majority of Myanmar’s people, because the economic costs of
doing so are assumed to be minimal.6 As Lisa Martin has noted, while US sanc-
tions against Myanmar (and other countries, e.g. Latin America) allegedly derive
from its policies of exporting respect for human rights, violations of human rights
were systemic in its authoritarian governance ‘long before the U.S. considered
imposing sanctions’ (Martin 1992: 248).
The ever-tighter sanctions imposed on Myanmar by the US and UK since 1988
have not brought about the collapse of the military government or the collapse of
Myanmar’s terms of trade. Myanmar has found no difficulty in locating and
developing alternate markets amongst its Asian neighbours, many of whom
openly state their opposition to the sanctions policy as a tool in fostering
improved governance in Myanmar. ASEAN states earnestly desire Myanmar to
change its ways; to put its domestic house in order, and move towards adopting
international norms; they are conscious, as Lee Kuan Yew noted, that domestic
unrest in Myanmar will have serious spillover effects in neighbouring states.
Increasingly, Myanmar’s neighbours point to the adverse impact US and UK
sanctions have on its vulnerable populations. Not only have Western sanctions
resulted in the ‘rally round the flag’ syndrome within Myanmar, but also a ver-
sion of this syndrome is becoming obvious amongst some ASEAN countries,
impacted as they were by the 1997 financial crisis. Western economic sanctions
against Myanmar have been counterproductive to achieving their stated aim. The
activities of US- and UK-based exile communities in forcing companies to with-
draw their operations from Myanmar results, in the short term, in unemployment
for the very vulnerable at the bottom of society whose poorly paid factory jobs
have meant the difference between eating and not eating. The sanctions have no
effect on Myanmar’s ruling elites whose substantial business interests are not
aligned to US investment and hence insulated from its policy of economic coer-
cion; they have stimulated autarchy and nationalism, and a strong desire to resist
the pressures from Western-based exile groups perceived to be working to the
advantage of neocolonial interests. As an overwhelmingly agrarian country oper-
ating on a largely subsistence economy, with little exposure to the international
political economy, not economically dependent on any Western country,
Myanmar’s vulnerability to sanctions is slight. Drezner (2000: 76) is surely
correct in arguing that greater economic interdependence between the sender and
the target may have increased the likelihood of sanctions achieving the desired
change in domestic policies within a country such as Myanmar. ‘For sanctions
to work’ he states, ‘the primary sender must have the ability to alter the target
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country’s terms of trade regardless of the targeted regime’s efforts to substitute’
alternate markets. Given its geopolitical situation and cooperative relations with
emerging economic giants, China and India, these conditions are not present in
Myanmar. Myanmar’s leadership can in effect shrug off Western sanctions.
An example of the counterproductive consequences of economic sanctions
may be seen in the punitive measures imposed by the US following the Depiyin
incident in May 2003. Shortly thereafter, in response to domestic demand and
international outrage, President George W. Bush signed into law the Burmese
Freedom and Democracy Act 2003. This legislation closed down US trade in
textiles with Myanmar which had netted the country around USD 300 million
per year in foreign exchange. There was some evidence that discontinuance of
this trade with the US initially impacted adversely on Myanmar textile exporters,
and forced the closure of factories, at least some of which had connections to the
military leadership. The resultant loss of jobs to lowly paid women in this sector
increased the economic hardship for these already vulnerable women, forcing
them into prostitution to feed their families. To address this problem, Myanmar
has since then developed alternate markets in India, China and Thailand which
have resulted in the reopening of the closed factories and revival of employment
opportunities for these women. In this case, the sanctions applied were not only
unable to bring about a change in the domestic policies of the target country, but
also increased the animosity towards the sender country. Moreover, the loss of
economic opportunity, trade and market share which formerly accrued to the US
was quickly and happily taken up by its competitors in the world trading system,
the emerging economic giants, India and China. A similar pattern of lost eco-
nomic opportunity, which can be equated to lost capacity to influence the policy
directions of Myanmar’s government, is becoming apparent in other sectors, most
notably the energy sector with the recent bid by China for UNOCAL, the oil com-
pany which has up to now had substantial interests in Myanmar. Sanctions, in
effect have been symbolic, a function of US domestic politics, without the lever-
age to bring about the type of political changes their proponents advocate.
Conversely, greater economic leverage may have resulted in greater opportunity
to bring about policy change in Myanmar. In their analysis of the relationship
between use of economic sanctions and domestic institutions, Lektzian (2003:
655) concluded that, ‘States are more likely to sanction a nation with whom they
have low levels of trade than a nation with whom they have extensive trade ties’
since sanctions are a ‘two-edged sword’ which ‘entail losses for the sanctioning
state as well as the target state’. Moreover, in autocracies whose ‘leaders are
generally beholden to a small cadre of elites for their political survival, 
sanctions . . . may lead to a general decline in national welfare with little chance of
eliciting the desired policy change’ (Lektzian 2003: 649). Thus the zero-sum
game can continue indefinitely.
The US has also imposed financial sanctions on Myanmar with similar lack of
substantial impact. Under President Bush’s Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act
2003, provision of financial services to Myanmar was prohibited, resulting in
credit card services by American Express, Mastercard and Visa, being withdrawn.
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These measures had temporary impact on the tourist industry and trade sectors.
Freezing of (almost non-existent) Myanmar assets in the US netted a mere USD
700,000. Since then, Myanmar has put in place alternate means of conducting its
international transactions through the good offices of neighbouring states and
conducting at least some of its international trade in Euros. In addition, remit-
tances from Myanmar nationals living abroad, required by law if they are to keep
their citizenship and passports, have also reduced the vulnerability of the country
to financial sanctions. Myanmar thus exhibits the classic matrix of circumstances
in which economic and financial sanctions are unlikely to bring about the policy
changes which the sender country decrees (Oudrat 2000: 105–27). Moreover,
continuance of the unilateral sanctions provides opportunity for the target coun-
try to gain a propaganda advantage by pointing to actions of the sender country
in delaying its evolution to a sustainable democracy. After renewed US sanctions
in mid-2004, the Myanmar Times (12 July 2004) editorialized, ‘It is so obvious
that America will definitely benefit from a democratic Myanmar, yet Washington
ignores our invitations to work constructively towards this goal’ whilst ‘decisions
taken in Washington are hampering efforts in Myanmar to develop the economy,
fight the drug trade and play a bigger role in the international community’.
Within the US this perspective is shared by Professor Jeffrey Sachs,
Congressman Jim McDermott, Mike and Gail Billington, and the over 600 business
organizations which comprise USAEngage. Contrary to Senators Mitch McConnell
and Diane Feinstein, they reject the ‘hysteria in Washington’ and in the American
press, the ban on Myanmar’s imports, freeze on assets, travel restrictions and finan-
cial sanctions. They underline the declining moral authority of the Bush adminis-
tration in view of its human rights abuses in Iraq, Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay
and make the case for an economically and politically stable Myanmar contributing
to regional and international security. In the words of Mike and Gail Billington
(Economic International Review, 21 July 2004), it is the US, not Myanmar, which
is isolating itself. Like John Badgley, David Steinberg and their colleagues (2004)
they called for a rethink on US sanctions policy towards Myanmar. The organiza-
tions which comprise USAEngage go even further: they assert that US sanctions are
harming the US economy itself, denying markets to its businesses, and undermin-
ing that very national security which the sanctions proponents in the US purport to
protect (www.USAengage.org – accessed 25 June 2005).
Senator McConnell’s impassioned speech (8 April 2004, www.senate.gov –
accessed 10 April 2004) threatening to have funding to the World Bank and the
Asian Development Bank cut if they sought to re-engage with Myanmar, only
serves to underline how little is known or understood about Myanmar on Capitol
Hill. Rather than rhetorical declamations about ‘freedom and democracy’, as
David Steinberg (2000) has argued, there needs to be a concerted effort to under-
stand how Myanmar’s political culture functions, how patron–client relationships
work in pre-democratic polities, the nature of power and importance of status in
such a traditional society. As Steinberg asserts (2000: 105), ‘In societies where
power is highly personalized and patron–client relationships are important, polit-
ical parties play a secondary role to their leaders. Parties become the product and
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property of their leaders.’ Instead of being a vehicle for democratic governance,
they become a ‘means to retain or seek authority rather than a unifying force in
society’ (ibid.). Western sanctions policies take no account of these traditional
paradigms of power (ana) and influence (awza) in Myanmar political culture;
they thus lose the opportunity to bring about the very political changes they
supposedly wish to see enacted.
Proponents of the present policies often assert that Myanmar is ‘isolated’ by
these sanctions. This is untrue. Most of the international community conducts
normal international and trading relations with Myanmar; it is only the US and
UK which give the appearance of being out of step. Following the renewal of US
sanctions at the end of May 2004, the Myanmar Times, in derisive parody of the
Bush rhetoric, labelled the sanctions ‘weapons of mass destruction’ for their
negative impacts on Myanmar’s social fabric. It called on the US to be ‘more
responsible and realistic in helping the people of the developing countries reach
their common objective in becoming peaceful, stable and sustainable democra-
cies’ (Myanmar Times, 30 May 2004).
Similar views were expressed by noted economist, Professor Jeffrey Sachs,
director of the Earth Institute at Columbia University and a special adviser to UN
Secretary General Kofi Annan following a private visit to Myanmar in mid-2004.
In an interview for the Radio Free Asia Burmese Service, 25 August 2004, posted
on the Free Burma Coalition website (accessed 26 August 2004) he called for an
end to sanctions, saying that they were making worse an already distressing
situation. He stated,
Even the political opposition gets weakened – it doesn’t have the income,
talented Burmese people go abroad. In most cases, when you impose sanc-
tions, it may weaken the regime, but it weakens the people and it weakens
civil society. . . . I don’t think under any circumstances the international com-
munity should impose economic sanctions on such a poor country. Basically
you know there is a terrible political crisis – it’s an ongoing political stale-
mate – and I find it very distressing. But I also believe that impoverishing
Burma through sanctions won’t help the situation. I would like to see of
course the political situation improve and I would like to see democracy
come to the country. But I would also like to see hungry people in Burma
have more food; I would like to see people who don’t have jobs have the
chance to have jobs; and I would like to see investment come to Burma . . .
Sanctions hurt the people but they don’t necessarily help the political
situation at all.
Since neo-liberal institutional theory purports to maintain that economic
development fosters an open society and democratic pluralism, it would seem that
international sanctions are impeding the development of that very pluralism they
are supposed to strengthen. Greater economic investment in the country would
render significantly greater influence in seeking to bring about political changes.
Ironically, the government of Myanmar is perhaps more aware of this than are
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US policy makers. At a time when energy security is a top priority for the US and
its emerging competitors, China and India, the SPDC in early 2005 moved to
ensure that exploitation of the country’s onshore energy resources was reserved
to state-owned enterprises.
In the wake of continuing US and UK sanctions, Myanmar has now adopted an
international strategy which will enhance its political and economic security
regardless of the policies pursued by the UK and US. Had there been wiser coun-
sel behind these sanctions, the UK and US might have had more influence in the
turn of events in Myanmar. Some slight awareness of this appears to be creeping
into the UK consciousness at the parliamentary levels, despite the continued
virulence of the Burma UK campaign. In a parliamentary debate in the House of
Commons, June 2005, the speaker, Ian Pearson, Minister for Trade, was inclining
to policies suggestive of a more modified UK position on Myanmar.7 As the
balance of international power in the region changes over the next 5 years, with
the continued rise and rise of China and India (and concomitant decline of Japan)
there could be considerable regret that a more far-sighted policy was not pursued.8
Along similar lines, Beeson has raised the possibility of a shift in the fundamental
relationships in the region in the wake of what he identifies as America’s unilateral
pursuit of ‘its own narrow national interests’ (Beeson 2003: 256).
Conclusion
From the above discussion it is clear that the moral, economic, political and
strategic arguments behind the imposition and maintaining of Western sanctions
have little real weight. Given that their ineffectiveness in bringing about regime
change or evolution to democratic governance in Myanmar is patently clear, it is
necessary to ask why they are continued. Explanations which heed the call of
domestic constituents in the sender countries are also rather fragile arguments in
terms of realpolitik. The answer lies more in the realm of strategic imperatives of
the emerging international situation. For some years, there has been marked
cooperation between Myanmar and Western countries on the issues of primary
importance – sharing military intelligence, cooperating in the ‘War on Terrorism,’
cooperating on drug-suppression activities. It could be argued that this coopera-
tion goes on out of the public theatre in which the flamingo-like dance of the
sanctions is promulgated. Normal relations between Myanmar and its Western
critics proceed behind the scenes, whilst the ‘theatre’ of rhetorical denunciations
unfolds in public.
Given Myanmar’s geopolitical situation, strong economic relations with
neighbouring countries, China, India and Thailand, as well as Malaysia, South
Korea and Japan, and strategic international linkages both in the Asian region and
beyond, it seems highly unlikely that Washington strategists would be unaware of
the inefficacy of the sanctions policies. On the contrary, it is patently clear that
China’s support for Myanmar ensures that the status quo will continue;
China would also be highly unlikely to tolerate a Western-style and supported
democratic regime on its back-door step. As discussed in Chapter 4, one of
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China’s long-term strategic priorities is to ensure access across Myanmar to the
Indian Ocean and become ‘two-ocean operable’ as have been all other great
powers. For China, Myanmar is not just an economic investment but a key strate-
gic investment. Washington would be aware of this. In discussions with a highly
placed Chinese academic in mid-2005, I was assured that ‘I do not think China
will do anything [to bring about regime change in Myanmar]’. I agree: the last
thing China would want on its back-door step would be a democratic Myanmar
under a Western-influenced government. Myanmar’s leaders would also be aware
that their continued independence requires that they maintain excellent relations
with China; this is their priority, not the US which is just too far away.
From another perspective, Myanmar does not have the scale of oil reserves
which would be likely to make Washington consider the country essential to US
energy security policy; hence Myanmar’s strategic value, from the US perspective
is small, not worth challenging China over that country’s support for the
Myanmar government. There is thus a strong possibility that the status quo suits
both Beijing and Washington. However, because of its domestic constituency and
the current directions of its foreign policy which, under Secretary of State
Condoleeza Rice, claims to be based on ethical considerations of support for
democracy and human rights, Washington strategists could never publicly admit
that this is the case. A stable government in Myanmar – even a military one – suits
both Beijing and Washington, although for different reasons. With the ‘War on
Terror’ wallowing in the quagmire of Afghanistan and Iraq, an unstable govern-
ment in a volatile region confronting Islamic fundamentalism, situated between
the emerging economic and political giants, India and China, who will dominate
international relations in the twenty-first century, is not to the taste of either
Beijing or Washington. Summing up the strategic importance of a stable
Myanmar for the region, Mohan Malik (2000: 275) observed that the country
‘will remain an important factor in the regional security calculations of its neigh-
bours in the early 21st century’. Neighbours, unlike outsiders US and UK, need
to work together for the greater security of all. In contrast to the West, ASEAN’s
anti-sanctions policy responds to the realistic imperatives of enhancing security
in a volatile region.
There is no easy solution to the political impasse in Myanmar. However,
encouraging tourism rather than promoting boycotts, encouraging cultural and
scientific exchanges, fostering Myanmar’s integration into the world economy
and supporting its full participation in international organizations such as
ASEAN and ASEM are likely to be more conducive to bringing about democra-
tic change than are sanctions policies seeking to enforce isolation. Making
Myanmar a player rather than a pariah (Malik 2000: 256) will bring its leadership
within the circle of influence of international norms; excluding it will perpetuate
its flouting of those norms. During the reform era of former Prime Minister Khin
Nyunt, it is noteworthy that the country took public steps towards implementing
some of these norms in the areas of laws prohibiting money laundering, human
trafficking and recruitment of child soldiers. Those laws might not be perfectly
enforced, but they are now on the books, which they were not previously.
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Myanmar is capable of moving, incrementally to adopt and enforce key international
norms; its full participation in the international community will foster this development
in its governance.
Power-sharing arrangements have been mooted in some quarters. Sachs for
instance (interview for The Irrawaddy Magazine, October 2004) draws a parallel
with Poland where staged power sharing laid a basis to move forward towards
democratic governance and put the authoritarianism of the past behind it.9 How
would such arrangements work in Myanmar given the SPDC’s antipathy towards
the civilian opposition and apparent intention to ignore international pressure for
real dialogue with the NLD? If the now-stalled National Convention process were
to resume, would the SPDC consider civilian leadership of some socio-economic
portfolios, whilst, in an interim situation, the military retained control of those
ministries such as defence, home affairs and foreign affairs, which it judged to be
key national security concerns?
Pending resolution of these issues of high strategic moment, targeted humani-
tarian and developmental assistance to help rebuild Myanmar’s socio-economic
fabric, as Sachs suggests, cannot but benefit Myanmar’s vulnerable populations
in the long run. To the proponents of sanctions, it must be asked, how can assis-
tance to help control malaria and HIV/AIDS, keep children from poor families in
school, and ensure that women do not die in childbirth be unethical? Surely it is
unethical to prevent such assistance being provided. Richard Falk (2004: 18–26),
considering the international policy to use economic sanctions to foster improved
human rights, concluded that they ‘rarely’ do so. On the contrary, he asserts, to
‘create the sort of solidarity needed to promote dignity of persons throughout the
world, it is crucial to address economic deprivations associated with poverty as
human rights issues’. For wealthy Western nations to seek to deliberately promote
poverty and deprivation in a small developing country, as Falk argues, is an
‘obscenity’. Now that the West seems to have taken up the cause of poverty erad-
ication in Africa (coincidentally timed to fit in with the IOC decision on the site
for the 2012 Olympics), extending the same policy framework – humanitarian
and developmental assistance, debt forgiveness and measures to encourage trade
and investment – to poverty-stricken Myanmar might be more efficacious in
bringing about the institutional development which sustains democratic pluralism
and puts in place legal frameworks to protect human rights than continued
symbolic sanctions.
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Introduction
It is no secret that the short-lived ‘reform’ programme perceived to be in train in
Myanmar, 1997–2004, following its accession as a full member of ASEAN in
July 1997, may now be compared to the ‘Prague Spring’. And like that earlier
experiment at throwing off the shackles of authoritarian governance, the
Myanmar reform programme driven from the top by the former Prime Minister,
General Khin Nyunt, and his faction of technocrat internationalizers, has come to
a shuddering halt. The apparent promise of sustained political, economic and
social reforms articulated in the Myanmar Agenda 21 document (NCEA 1997)
has proven to be a mirage which held its shape only as long as General Khin
Nyunt was in power, and disappeared once he was removed from office. That
document had clearly been a blueprint, a code for the political transition
processes by which Myanmar may have been able to transform itself from within
and overcome its violent past (James 2003, 2004). Greater possibilities for
empowerment of the peoples, more opportunities for enhanced ‘capabilities’ –
economic, social and political – through direct and meaningful participation in
the governance of their country, have been aborted in the return to the indigenous
patterns of governance characteristic of Myanmar’s – and Western Europe’s –
medieval/early modern period (twelfth–eighteenth centuries). If there is a lesson
in this dismal episode, perhaps it is that a sustainable reform programme needs to
be engendered from below gradually and slowly through building the institutional
underpinning required to implement it. Reform programmes ‘from the top’ carry
all the cultural patterns of pre-modern paternalism, if not outright autocracy, and
are rarely sustained beyond the moment in power of their progenitors.
Such patterns of medieval governance locate actual, brute power in the hands of
the strongest general/warrior king, regardless of lineage or perceived legitimacy.
Thus the English King Henry IV of the House of Lancaster could depose and
imprison his cousin, King Richard II, who was later murdered; Henry’s grandson,
King Henry VI, in turn fell to Edward IV of the House of York whose descendants
were in turn eliminated by King Henry VIII during the subsequent Tudor era, in
order to remove potential challengers whose very existence, he thought, posed
a threat to the legitimacy of his rule. Similar patterns of strong-man/king rule





prevailed in Myanmar from the Bagan era (ninth–thirteenth centuries), through
the era of King Bayinnaung (1531–81) of the First Toungoo dynasty and through-
out the last Konbaung dynasty (1752–1885). ‘Legitimacy’ always lay with the
victor-warrior, with he who held the palace/capital, symbol of power (Lieberman
1984; Koenig 1990). Power resided with he who could manage the patron–client
relations and networks of influence in a way which enhanced his own charisma.
The late General Ne Win knew this and implemented it effectively, and ruthlessly,
removing any potential challengers to his rule (e.g. Aung Gyi, Tin Oo) as swiftly
as did the English King Henry VIII (Starkey 2004).
Legitimacy in medieval Western Europe and contemporary Myanmar resides
with he who holds the ‘palace’, the capital city, symbol of actual power. It is not
by chance that the SPDC leadership has moved to the new purpose-built ‘capital’
away from Yangon (the former seat of colonial power, 1885–1948) up-country to
Pyinmana; removal to the new site will reinforce the symbolism of actual power,
and re-enact the move to a new capital made numerous times in the past by legit-
imate Burmese monarchs (e.g. Thalun, Bodawpaya and Mindon). Legitimacy in
the Burmese/Myanmar world view is not perceived to reside in elections, nor
even in acknowledgment by the international community. Elections are consid-
ered merely a (foreign-originated) tool to a predetermined outcome, setting the
seal of approval on foreordained policies driven from the top echelons of actual
power. Such elections at local, regional and national levels were held frequently
during the high tide of military dictatorship in Burma (1962–88) without
changing or impacting on the overall pattern of authoritarian governance (Taylor
1987). National sovereignty, as spelled out to the UN General Assembly in 2005
by current Myanmar foreign minister, U Nyan Win, rather than Western notions
of electorally driven legitimacy, is the primary motivating principle for the
government in Myanmar. As Pedersen (2000) has suggested, trying to gain an
understanding of the value systems and world view of Myanmar leaders, rather
than seeking to impose contemporary Western notions of governance originating
in different value systems, may assist in achieving better outcomes for the people
of Myanmar as a whole.
Herein lies the basic divide between those activist groups living in exile in the
West, who re-iterate that the SPDC is ‘illegitimate’ because it did not, and will
not, acknowledge the results of the 1990 elections; and the government in
Myanmar which locates legitimacy in the hands of he who holds actual power,
and who controls the capital. It is noteworthy that even the Burmese
Parliamentary Democracy Party (PDP), in exile, has recently stated that in its
view the ‘mandate’ of the 1990 elections in Myanmar has expired (Free Burma
Coalition website, 20 October 2005). The widely divergent views on what
constitutes legitimacy between those who hold actual power in Myanmar and
those who would deprive them of it, are at the base of the zero-sum game which
has held Myanmar’s future hostage since the assassination of General Aung San
and six of his pre-independence cabinet on 19 July 1947, not by a foreigner, but
by Burmese gunmen in the service of a rival Burmese politician (Kin Oung
1996).1 It is a tragic fact of Burmese history that those with the talents to steer the
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country to a better future have often been violently removed from public life. Whilst
there is no doubt that the late General Ne Win on 2 March 1962 overthrew the
government of the late Premier U Nu, whose ‘Clean’ faction of the Anti-Fascist
Peoples Freedom League (AFPFL) had convincingly won the 1960 elections
against the ‘Stable’ faction of his military-backed rival, Ba Nyein, it should also
be noted that there was no international outcry at the time at Ne Win’s military
coup d’etat. In the era of containing the spread of communism in South-East Asia
it was considered essential to restore order amidst the internal chaos into which
U Nu’s administration was dissolving.2
The details of the precise political, social and economic environment in which
Ne Win’s 1962 coup was launched are often obscured amidst the emotional reac-
tions of those democracy activists who rightly decry the overthrowing of the
democratically elected government, the last in independent Burma/Myanmar, and
the ushering in of more than four decades of authoritarian, military governance.
Similar resistance paradigms are applied to the results of the 1990 elections, in
which the NLD won a majority of the constituencies, but was never passed the
reigns of government.3 In recent communication on this topic, Derek Tonkin,
former UK Ambassador to Thailand and Laos (1986–9) and Burma Desk Officer
in the British Foreign Office (1963–6) commented,
On a technicality, no government can be overthrown until it has first been
established, that is, until Parliament has met and the necessary procedures are
completed for the appointment of a new government. In Burma in 1990, the
National Assembly was never convened. It is not possible in logic to
overthrow a government which has never existed.
There was in any case a fundamental difference of opinion between the
military junta and the NLD in the run-up to the elections about what process
should be followed to arrange the transfer of power, which Daw Aung San
Suu Kyi herself fully recognised before she was placed under house arrest in
July 1989 and which she said could take ‘months and months, if not years’
to resolve. So while I accept that the NLD acquired national and international
legitimacy as the main elected representatives of the Burmese people, there
was unfortunately no prior agreement or even tacit understanding between
the military junta and the political parties about the mechanics for the trans-
fer of power, and this was with hindsight a sure recipe for conflict. The blame
lies overwhelmingly with the SLORC – it was their failure to communicate
which led to chaos.
(Personal communication with Derek Tonkin, 
26 September 2005)
It could in fact be queried, why the military government ever agreed to hold the
1990 election in the first place? Explanations resorting to an underestimation
of the extent of the populace’s desire for restoration of civilian rule seem to ring
hollow, given the widespread pro-democracy demonstrations in the 1988–90
period, their violent suppression, and civil unrest which announcement on
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18 September 1988 (the day the SLORC took power in a military coup) of the
forthcoming multiparty election (held 27 May 1990) and subsequent promulgation
of the election law on 31 May 1989 did nothing to quell.
Under the above framework, articulated by Derek Tonkin, 1962 was the last time
a democratically elected and constituted government was overthrown in
Burma/Myanmar. Whilst the NLD unquestionably won the popular vote in 1990
(52.44 per cent of all votes cast), it has not enjoyed the opportunity to constitute a
‘sworn in’ cabinet in a functioning government. The government-in-exile, the
National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB), from its vari-
ous bases external to the country, similarly has not enjoyed the opportunity to con-
stitute a cabinet in a functioning national government. Burma/Myanmar is yet to
learn how to manage the peaceful transition of power. Alaungpaya, first king of the
Konbaung dynasty, thought he had the answer when he allegedly decreed on his
deathbed that each of his sons would succeed in turn (James 2000), but this led to
internal fratricide, and ultimately a fatal weakening of the polity, predisposing it
to colonial takeover in 1824. In the post-independence era, Ne Win made sure there
were no obvious successors to his mantle, and various intelligence chiefs had their
careers short-circuited. Only the last, General Khin Nyunt, survived more than
20 years, spanning the SLORC/SPDC era; as soon as he appeared a creditable
threat to the current supreme commander, Senior General Than Shwe, he too was
removed. Power in Myanmar remains personal, medieval, constituted only at the
very top echelon, residing in networks of influence and factional deals, not
dispersed throughout the populace who remain politically disempowered,
economically disadvantaged and residing only on the margins of national life.
This is not a fascist, totalitarian state as Skidmore (2004) has sought to
construct; nor is it a socialist worker’s utopia or dystopia (depending on one’s per-
spective); it is a pre-modern medieval polity wherein the resources, both human
and natural, are at the personal disposal of whichever strongman happens to be at
the centre of power. Those in power may kin muang as the Thai say, or ‘eat up the
country’, as did the medieval barons in both monarchical Burma and medieval
Europe, without the contemporary litmus test of ‘corruption’ being activated.4
Anti-corruption measures, when acted out in the public arena, in Myanmar are
merely the theatrical props to a wider power play in the top echelons.
Myanmar lacks the institutional underpinning to move beyond this medieval
framework. Skidmore (2004) may critique the social change which sees golf
courses for the generals replace shanty towns on the edge of suburbia where the
country’s indigent formerly eked out a precarious living, but such a development
is not unique to Myanmar and merely parallels similar land-use schemes which
have occurred right around the region – in Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia – since
the 1960s. In a country where all land belongs to the state (regardless of whether
a democratic or military government is in control) under the Land Nationalization
Act of 1953,5 squatters in shanty towns, or elsewhere, have no secure property
rights, and can be moved at will, as indeed were the inhabitants of the old royal
capitals at Ava, Sagaing and Amarapura when the monarchs of the day decided
that a new location would be more propitious for the dynasty.
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With no indigenous cultural predisposition to enhancing peoples’ participation
in the political life of the country (there is no equivalent, for example, of the
Anglo-Saxon moot, the Petition of Rights or Bill of Rights) or culture of
protecting human rights and enhancing human well-being, Myanmar’s difficult
passage from medieval to modern polity is compounded by the dire poverty
which faces the more than 50 per cent of its 52 million people who live on less
than one USD 1 per day (the World Bank designated poverty measure); by the
severe strain on its health services caused by the increasing incidence of HIV/
AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, unacceptably high infant- and maternal-mortality
rate; increasing drug use and collateral socio-economic problems and resource-
starved educational system striving for parity with its South-East Asian neigh-
bours (James 2003, 2004; Skidmore 2004). One of the poorest countries in the
world, Myanmar substantiates the research of Land and Ersson (2000: 280–5) that
human rights are best upheld and protected in economically advantaged societies;
and, on the other hand, most abused in societies enmired in poverty. Affluence,
that necessary ingredient to build institutional frameworks which protect human
rights, enhance opportunity and empower the populace is restricted to a small
elite at the apex of national power in Myanmar. This asymmetrical dispersal of the
national resources and endemic poverty has been entrenched by the Western
sanctions applied to Myanmar since 1988. Far from promoting the democratic
transition in Myanmar, Western economic and financial sanctions are contribut-
ing to the abuse of human rights by subverting the institutional development
which fosters an enhanced civil society.
Whilst democracy activist groups among Burmese/Myanmar exiles in the US,
UK and Western Europe fondly plan their pressure campaigns on the assumption
that Myanmar’s medieval military governance is not sustainable, the cold hard
facts of international politics continually proves them wrong. In a trenchant edi-
torial in mid-August 2005, The Irrawaddy Magazine, funded by the National
Endowment for Democracy in Washington, reversed its previous stance and
called for a review by the international community of its long-standing policies
on sanctions and isolation of Myanmar. The editor writes,
Sanctions may give moral support to detained icon Aung San Suu Kyi and the
opposition, but there have been no indications the regime is about to fall. . . .
There is no doubt that Washington’s persistent criticism and sanctions are
highly appreciated by dissidents and the opposition. But in Rangoon, many
diplomats, UN agencies and other observers . . . point out that the US policy
of isolating Burma is rather counterproductive, because it means that by
shutting the door to Burma, Washington cannot talk to the generals. This pol-
icy would be fine if the regime was [sic] about to collapse soon, but it isn’t.
More people are becoming critical of sanctions because they hurt ordinary
people. . . . Sanctions cannot be really effective if neighbouring countries still
engage Burma. Treating Burmese generals as pariahs may draw newspaper
headlines and applause from dissidents, but it just makes the regime become
more introverted, xenophobic, oppressive and isolationist. You are dealing
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with a mediaeval [sic] dictatorship, not sophisticated politicians. It is no
secret that the U.S. has no strategy on Burma apart from sanctions. Its
earnestness in trying to promote democracy and human rights in Burma is
appreciated, but critics say it lacks vision, and its sanctions are ineffective.
Therefore it may be time for all concerned to adopt a more results-oriented
policy. A growing number of observers think it is time for a pro-active
engagement policy in Burma, but with a timeframe and well-thought out
strategy. This would require engaging both the regime and opposition, with
inducements for change such as aid and stronger diplomatic links. . . . [M]en
in uniform have ruled Burma for 43 years, and maybe it’s time for friends and
critics of the regime alike to review their Burma policy. There should be more
down-to-earth consideration for the hardships of ordinary Burmese, and not
just more lofty ideals of freedom and democracy.
(The Irrawaddy Magazine, 18 August 2005, 
accessed 20 August 2005)
Such an editorial represents a substantial change from the policy position
espoused by The Irrawaddy Magazine previously. Given its strong links to the
Washington funding agencies and political lobby groups on Capitol Hill, one can
only surmise that this editorial is a vehicle to test the waters on a possible change
in US policy towards Myanmar. But such a change would have to overcome the
intense opposition of such high-profile political opponents as Senators Mitch
McConnell and Dianne Feinstein. Will it be in vain that The Irrawaddy Magazine
has called for a more ‘results oriented’ policy and an eschewing of the failed ‘feel
good’ sanctions policies? Or will Burma/Myanmar just remain a ‘world trouble
spot’ which ‘few take seriously enough’? As Pedersen (2000: 225) has argued, the
cooperative approach to international democracy promotion, rather than coercion,
is likely to be more efficacious in modifying the authoritarian governance in
Myanmar.
Burma . . . lacks groups with independent economic power that can act as a
counterweight to the state and effectively push for an expansion of civil and
political freedoms. By fostering economic development, international actors
can facilitate the growth of such groups and thus pave the way for political
liberalization and ultimately democratization.
There is little doubt that economic development in the long term could
facilitate political change in Burma.
There is also broad agreement that both economic development and
empowerment is best promoted by channeling as much aid as possible
through NGOs working inside the country and in direct contact with the
recipients.
(Pedersen 2000: 226, 236)
But therein lies the rub; domestic NGOs and INGOs now perceived to be too
close to Western agencies have come under intense scrutiny in Yangon since the
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dismissal of General Khin Nyunt. The new leadership line up looks on some of
them with suspicion that they may be serving the interests of external groups
opposed to the government. International policies which support withholding
economic investment and financial aid are thus now contributing directly to the
entrenchment of authoritarian rule.
Civil society and sustainable development
These issues came to a head on 17 August 2005, with the decision by the Geneva-
based Global Fund to terminate its contributions to the programmes for control
and prevention of HIV/AIDS in Myanmar. Some USD 37 million funding three
programmes – HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria (cause of the highest number
of annual deaths) – through its in-country partner, the UNDP, will be withdrawn
over the next 2 years. With more than half-a-million people (about 2 per cent of
adults) estimated by UNAIDS to be suffering from HIV/AIDS, Brian Williams,
UNAIDS programme representative in Yangon, stated that at least USD 40 mil-
lion would be needed for 2005–6 alone to provide anti-retroviral drugs to the
46,000 seriously ill patients. The lack of resources means that only 1,000 of these
are presently able to receive the required medication. The US is the largest
contributor to the Global Fund which is administered by the UN. When in July
2005, the government of Myanmar’s new travel clearance procedures restricted
access to project areas (usually in the north or north-east) by the UNDP, contin-
ued funding for these programmes was put at risk. Under pressure from US based
domestic activist groups and their political supporters on Capitol Hill, the richest
country in the world then chose to terminate its contribution to the Global Fund
in respect of Myanmar, thus penalizing some of the poorest and most vulnerable
people, in one of the world’s most impoverished countries. Is this the action of a
‘Civil Society’? Ironically, the US legislation enacting discontinuance of US
contributions, the Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs
Appropriations Act 2006, draws the link between such funding and UNODC
reporting on human rights abuses. The sections of the Act relevant to Myanmar
state (H. R. 3057),
BURMA
SEC. 6031. (a) The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United
States executive director to each appropriate international financial institu-
tion in which the United States participates, to oppose and vote against the
extension by such institution of any loan or financial or technical assistance
or any other utilization of funds of the respective bank to and for Burma . . .
c) The President shall include amounts expended by the Global Fund to
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria to the State Peace and Development
Council in Burma, directly or through groups and organizations affiliated
with the Global Fund, in making determinations regarding the amount to be
withheld by the United States from its contribution to the Global Fund
pursuant to section 202(d)(4)(A)(ii) of Public Law 108-25 . . .
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(f) None of the funds appropriated by this Act may be made available for
the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) unless the
Secretary of State determines and reports to the Committees on
Appropriations that the UNODC in Burma is reporting to other relevant
United Nations organizations incidents of gross human rights violations
encountered during the conduct of its programs in Burma.
One would have thought that withholding assistance to HIV/AIDS sufferers could
itself be constituted a ‘gross human rights violation’ unworthy of a country which
constitutes to itself the role of protector of democracy.
Concurrently, in mid-2005 an increasingly negative stance by the Myanmar
government towards international and national humanitarian assistance has
become apparent, perhaps because it is an implicit criticism of government pol-
icy failures to enhance the well-being of the people. It thus calls into question the
nature of that dearly cherished ‘sovereignty’ which the Myanmar Foreign
Minister, U Nyan Win, defended to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA).
Sovereignty, after all, does not only reside in protecting artificially mandated bor-
ders; but also in ‘the responsibility to protect’ the people from the seven vectors
of human insecurity (see Chapter 1) identified in the Human Development Report
1994 – economic, food, health, environment, personal, communal and political
insecurity, all of which beset the people of Myanmar. This politicization of
humanitarian assistance victimizes the most vulnerable. It beggars belief to think
how those sponsoring this regrettable policy position – both in the US and in
Myanmar – could possibly consider that democracy would be promoted, fostered
or strengthened by penalizing HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis victims. Or
that such suffering human beings would somehow rise up and overthrow the
generals. But then reason and ethics have never inhered to international politics.6
There is no doubt that both foes and friends of Myanmar would like to see the
polity move towards a ‘more civil society’ where accusations of egregious human
rights abuses, child and forced labour, complicity in drug trafficking and exclu-
sion of the majority of its citizens from participation in the political and economic
life of this resource-rich country become archived in its violent past. Calls in
September 2005 by former President of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Havel and
former Nobel Peace Prize winner, Bishop Desmond Tutu, for UN Security
Council intervention in Myanmar on the basis that the country is a threat to
regional and world peace, are ill-founded, exaggerated, and reflect erroneous
premises, despite the impeccable credentials of the report’s sponsors.
Nevertheless, such a report is a reflection of the frustration of the international
community with its failure to achieve any substantial improvements in the gover-
nance of the country, whilst acknowledging the dismal humanitarian situation for
many of its citizens. But despite the earnestness of the report’s sponsors,
Myanmar is not Rwanda, or Bosnia, or Darfur and intervention (military or oth-
erwise) is not only not warranted but would also be unlikely to be acceded to by
China, one of the five permanent members of the Security Council with veto
power and a staunch supporter of the Myanmar government. In this regard,
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Myanmar’s international relations policy in building solid alliances with China,
as well as neighbouring India and ASEAN, will protect it from anything except
the usual annual UN disapproval of its record in failing to make more substantial
moves towards democratic reforms. Moreover, should the report actually
reach UN Security Council (UNSC) for consideration, given their stance on the
US-led war in Iraq, Russia and France, both permanent members of the UNSC
would also be unlikely to accede to US sponsored military intervention in
Myanmar; nor, one could suppose, given the embarrassment over Iraq, would the
UK be eager to follow the US into another Iraq-style military adventure, with or
without a UNSC resolution. Enmired in Iraq, it is difficult to see the US being
eager to take on China, India–ASEAN, Russia and France, over Myanmar, no
matter how low the esteem in which the current US administration holds the UN.
The Jared Genser–Vaclav Havel–Desmond Tutu initiative is thus likely to remain
Shakespearian theatrics, ‘full of sound and fury, signifying nothing’.
Myanmar is currently in a ‘holding pattern’. Its decision on 27 July 2005 at the
ASEAN summit in Vientiane to forego its alphabetically determined turn to Chair
ASEAN in 2006–7 was greeted with misplaced triumphalism by the US admin-
istration and activist groups around the world. Quite simply, Myanmar took this
decision because it did not want the hordes of journalists and international visi-
tors which assuming the Chair would have entailed. Chairing ASEAN in 2006–7
would have been rather inconvenient for the SPDC at this time. The decision
reflected a win-win situation for all parties. This incident is another example of
the parallel lines on which Western policy makers and the Myanmar government
run: never meeting because of the widely divergent origins of the value systems
conditioning their decisions. The decision should be seen more in terms of
sloughing off an unwanted burden, than in the traditional ‘loss of face’ or even
‘rubbing it in’ interpretations hitherto applied to this incident. Again a lost oppor-
tunity for those groups in the West who allegedly wish to see democratic gover-
nance emerge in Myanmar. Had the country taken on the responsibility of Chair
of ASEAN, the international community would have had significantly more
opportunity to bring the leadership group in Yangon within the parameters of
accepted international norms. As it is, the SPDC can simply steam ahead on its
own recognizance with whatever policies it deems fit for the people of Myanmar.
This tendency for international policy on Myanmar to run on parallel lines which
never intersect is responsible for the lack of any impetus to transition to democ-
ratic governance in the country. When the National Convention drafting the new
Constitution met in November 2005 it finalized a document which will perpetuate
a major role for the military as keeper of the nation’s security and sovereignty. A
referendum will be held on this document; and only a Parsifal would consider that
the subsequent results will be unfavourable for those in power.7 Such results of
course will not be accepted by democracy activists; the cries of ‘invalid’ for a
variety of reasons – no NLD participation; only the 1990 results are valid – will
be loud. Such protests can be expected to be brushed aside by the government as
the referendum produces the anticipated results. Many commentators will say
that nothing has changed; but the country will at least have a Constitution on
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which a referendum will have been held. Of course, should the electorate take the
opportunity to register its desire for real change, and for a ‘sunset’ clause on
military domination of the national political agenda, by voting in the referendum
not to accept the constitution, this might reopen the entire debate about the
people’s participation in the nation’s political life.
The urgent need for a new international approach to Myanmar, in the interest
of enhancing the well-being of future generations of its citizens, has been recog-
nized and articulated eloquently by Dr Khin Zaw Win, a dental surgeon impris-
oned for 11 years at Myitkyina in northern Myanmar for human rights work,8 and
the group calling themselves ‘Student Generations since 1988.’ Applauding the
INGO, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) which returned to
Myanmar in 1999 (despite unexpected opposition to its doing so), for the real
improvements to lives of political prisoners which it was able to bring about
through its work in visiting the prisons and convict labour camps, Dr Khin Zaw
Win comments,
The irony is inescapable: the economic decline during the previous one-party
state in Myanmar and its attendant hardships had been one main impetus
behind the upheaval of 1988. Now economic hardship is being prescribed to
bring about democracy. For 26 years Myanmar experienced impoverishment
in the name of socialism; it now appears there is to be impoverishment in the
name of democracy.
(Khin Zaw Win, ‘From a Frontline Trench’, 
Free Burma Coalition, 30 September 2005)
His realistic analysis of how to bring about sustained improvements in
Myanmar’s governance does not look to the international community, or to the
UNSC. He looks to the skills, determination, and savvy of the people of Myanmar
themselves. In presenting a thumbnail sketch of options for moving forward he
writes,
Myanmar is being subjected to economic warfare no less. In the assumptions
and hopes of some, this would lead to political instability. And then what? In
an atmosphere pervaded by coup and countercoup (actual and threatened),
regional rebellion and outright hostilities, orderly democratic transitions,
elections, constitutions and kindred things shall all come to naught. Even if
those extreme situations were averted, a divided and ineffectual military
set against a weak, faction-ridden and equally ineffective democratic
government are still invitations to disaster. These are not nightmares that only
happen to other people in other countries. They happened right in this
country not so long ago. The spectre of the years immediately fol-
lowing independence still haunts living memories. Have the lessons not been
learnt?
(Khin Zaw Win, ‘From a Frontline Trench’, 
Free Burma Coalition, 30 September 2005)
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Thus his suggestions for sustainable change reside in the realm of incremental
improvements, the developmental curve traversed by Myanmar’s prosperous
neighbours, Thailand and Malaysia. The ‘big bang’ approach is to be eschewed;
it is sensational, but not sustainable. In his view
What Myanmar needs is not just democracy, but stable and liberal democ-
racy. This isn’t merely a pious statement nor an academic one, nor a formula
that people from well-meaning international organizations recite. It is an
expression of painful necessity. The country’s past experiences with democ-
ratization have not been altogether happy. After four decades of alienation
there is now to be another, hopefully more sensible, attempt. It’s going to
include decentralization too. Call it multistage or phased democratization if
you will, but it’s certainly not a case of reverting to dictatorship.
If the real lessons of the setbacks and disappointments are taken and inter-
nalized, we can look forward to Myanmar’s future democracy being on a much
sounder footing. The Myanmar people should be enabled to make sober,
unemotional and responsible choices regarding their own political future.
At this particular juncture there is really just a straight choice between two
paths:
 Taking the most viable path there is and attempting to make it as liberal
as possible; [or]
 Conversely, taking the most-touted liberal path and attempting to make it
viable.
The international community could have a hand in either. Of one thing we
should be clear though: attempting to keep the country poor and undeveloped
is not the way to any kind of political solution, democratic or otherwise.
What can be seen in Myanmar is a society, a people, making the most of
what they’ve got, exploiting every new opening, stretching their own safety
nets, stepping into the unknown. Most of this is being done without any
formal assistance or guidance, whether from the state or from overseas. It is
a quiet but extensive and far-reaching exercise in self-help. If this country
makes it through, it is little thanks to those in high places, at home and
abroad. For any number of reasons, and in the long run, this really is the
best way.
Dr Khin Zaw Win was released from prison in July 2005. His article circulated
on the Internet in a number of Burma discussion groups. I have taken the trouble
to quote from his testimonial at length because of the insight it provides into how
Burmese/Myanmar see their civil society continuing to flourish at grass-roots
level, to improve the livelihoods of people at the coalface, separate from both the
state apparatus and the international community of aid-donor organizations. It is
also testimony to the enduring Burmese/Myanmar belief in the efficacy of self-
help. From a former political prisoner, imprisoned for seeking to improve human
rights in Myanmar, it should receive some credibility from ‘those in high places,
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at home and abroad’ whom he infers contribute little of practical worth to
improving human well-being in Myanmar. One could be forgiven for thinking
that present international policy on Myanmar, is, in the words of Ecclesiastes
(6: 9) ‘a chasing after the wind’, a bastion for some personal careers, but not for
the improvement of the well-being of the majority of Myanmar’s people.
In similar vein, the Student Generations since 1988 which include the student
activists, Min Ko Naing, Ko Ko Gyi, Htay Kywe, Min Zeya, and Zaw Min, on
6 September 2005 released a statement calling for greatly increased international
humanitarian assistance to Myanmar particularly for the health and education
sectors. I quote their statement below in full because it is diametrically opposed
to the policies which recently led to the withdrawal of the Global Fund. Again, the
credibility of this group of student activists has been tested in their own harsh
experiences of authoritarian governance; yet they do not resile from the urgency
and necessity of international humanitarian assistance to the country.
Statement by ‘The Student Generations since 1988’ on humanitarian
assistance to Myanmar – 6 September 2005
1 We are ‘The Student Generations since 1988’, who are carrying out
long-term national interests for Myanmar. We believe that effective
measures are crucial as requirements for national health and national
education in Myanmar are rapidly growing at present.
2 With the advancement of Information Technology, all the nations
throughout the world today have to share the pros and cons in every
aspect such as politics, economics, culture, health, crimes and terrorism.
No nation can cope with this situation on its own.
3 We firmly believe that it will be more effective, especially for a least
developed country like Myanmar, to receive humanitarian assistance
through cooperation with the international community in handling
health and education crises.
4 It is necessary to provide humanitarian assistance in accord with the
internationally recognized standards so that the assistance will reach
those who really need it. The mechanism for that assistance should be
unbiased and transparent, and be completely available for inspection. We
believe that it is the responsibility of the recipient country to create such
mechanism.
5 At present, remote border regions of ethnic minorities in Myanmar are
suffering from more serious crises in education and health sectors.
Therefore, cooperation with the international community is essential in
tackling the national crises such as the education and health ones.
6 In order to cooperate with the international community, it is crucial for
establishing an appropriate mechanism through coordination, coopera-
tion and joint implementation between the military government and all
democratic forces.
7 We, ‘the Student Generations Since 1988’, will fulfil with all our might
the national requirements. We would like to call for cooperation and
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coordination among the military government, the UN agencies,
donor countries, the international community, local non-governmental
organizations and independent associations for social services in order
to fulfil the humanitarian needs of Myanmar people together with us.
(The Student Generations since 1988,
6 September 2005)
Such appeals from these incontrovertibly credible sources should awaken
Senators McConnell and Feinstein, and the lobbyists behind them, to the fallacies
in the policies they have been pursuing. It is tragic that their moral vision pre-
cludes assistance to the very sectors in Myanmar which could, in the long run,
sustain the type of pluralistic democratic governance they allegedly wish to see
evolve.
Like Dr Khin Zaw Win, the Student Generations since 1988 highlight the
existence and work of local non-government organizations and independent asso-
ciations for social services in tending to the humanitarian needs of the population.
It is not correct to consider that there is no civil society in Myanmar: civil soci-
ety organizations are burgeoning. From over 50 such organizations a few years
ago (James 2005), the numbers have mushroomed. Myanmar seems to exemplify
Julie Fisher’s (2003) thesis that civil society gradually increases social and
political space through the operations of both horizontal and vertical networks in
proportion to the repressive apparatus of the authoritarian state in which it is
encapsulated. This is particularly so in response to need; where other help is not
available, self-help becomes mandatory, and Myanmar people have a long
indigenous tradition of self-help, through small, local organizations, religious and
professional associations, social groups (e.g. ‘book clubs’ such as the Nagani
Book Club which fostered early political opponents of colonial rule) and ethni-
cally based associations such as the Metta Development Foundation in Kachin
state. The religious sector in Myanmar has long been active in fostering social and
political change, both in pre- and post-independence Burma/Myanmar. On 28
September 2005, Toe Zaw Latt, a Burmese exile living in Thailand, who is
intensely critical of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s policy on Myanmar,
wrote in the Bangkok Post, identifying two senior Buddhist leaders in Myanmar
as having ‘appealed to both sides to be flexible and to end the suffering of the
Burmese people. They are Sayadaw U Zawtipala, abbot of Kyakhatwaing
Monastery in Pegu, and Ashin Kundalabiwuntha of Mahaghandharon Monastery
in Mandalay’.9
As Kyaw Yin Hlaing has demonstrated, the military government, contrary to
most academic opinion, ‘was never able to wipe out civil society organizations’
even during the Ne Win socialist era. A large number of what he calls social
movement organizations or SMOs then re-emerged after 1988.
Most of the SMOs that led the Four Eights democratic movement were not
the organizations that emerged after the breakdown of the socialist movement
but the groups, formal and informal, that survived the military’s cleansing
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campaign. Most Burma-watchers failed to acknowledge the existence of civil
society organizations because they thought that only formal organizations
could function within the limits set by the government. In their opinion, civil
society could not exist if there was no legitimate official space for civil
society organizations.
(Kyaw Yin Hlaing 2004a: 389–90)
His research supports Fisher’s (2003) thesis above. The more repressive the
governance, the more the people felt that ‘the state did not have the exclusive
right to establish the parameters of civil society. In politically unfavourable
circumstances, activists formed informal organizations’ (Kyaw Yin Hlaing 2004a:
389–90). Informal social groups then should, he believes, be included in civil
society because they function in a manner similar to their counterparts in demo-
cratic countries. Where activists sought to turn these informal groups into politi-
cally conscious SMOs, they could function in counterpoint to those legally
sponsored state groups established to strengthen social control, for example, the
Myanmar Women’s Affairs Organization and the Union of Myanmar Chamber of
Commerce and Industry, which, while established to generate greater public sup-
port for government policies, ‘engage mainly in apolitical activities’ (Kyaw Yin
Hlaing 2004a: 406). Kyaw Yin Hlaing sees these latter groups as being capable
only of bringing about gradual political change. He, however, accords local reli-
gious, social and, in some cases, business organizations, (e.g. the independent
Mandalay Traders, Brokers and Industrialists Association) and informal networks
the capacity to make significant contributions to enhancing social and political
space and even to become fully fledged social movements.10
Through such essentially self-help structures greater opportunity to participate
in the economic and social life of the country is being created, by the Myanmar
people themselves. Despite severe limitations on political empowerment, the
people of Myanmar do not inhabit the Kafka-esque world portrayed by Skidmore
(2004); as indicated by Dr Khin Zaw Win, utilizing their own limited resources,
and in the face of an inhospitable international environment, with grace and
dignity the people of Myanmar are gradually increasing their civil society space,
putting in place measures to alleviate poverty, foster peace amongst the conflict-
ing ethnic groups and deal with the scourges of HIV/AIDS, malaria and tubercu-
losis. They are developing their own civil society consistent with their own
cultural mores and domestic resources, in their own time-honoured ‘self-help’
fashion. In doing so they demonstrate greater efficacy and resilience than those
Western-based activists whose cyber-warfare and sophisticated lobbying
produced the ill-conceived and misnamed Burma Freedom and Democracy Act
2003. As Donald M. Seekins (2005: 452) has written, ‘the Burma Freedom and
Democracy Act is a half-measure that does more harm than good. It reflects
fundamental ignorance of Burmese society . . . The U.S. government, working
in cooperation with other countries, including those whose Burma policies dif-
fer from Washington’s, should support policies that help, not hurt, the people
of Burma.’ However, even if an unprecedented about-face occurred in
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Washington – unlikely, given the entrenched positions espoused by influential
politicians on Capitol Hill – Western influence in Myanmar is now so small, so inef-
fectual, that, in archetypal fashion, envoys bearing gifts would be likely to receive
short shrift. Myanmar’s most influential friends are those on its nearest borders. An
increasingly vibrant civil society in Myanmar and sustainable political and social
change will henceforth be more closely contingent on the political, economic and
social policies which proceed from interactions with China, India and Thailand.
Contrary to the notion that the concept of Civil Society is inherently tied to its
Western origins in European social and political thought, the volumes of
Alagappa (2004), Hann and Dunn (1996) and Schak and Hudson (2003) demon-
strate conclusively the integral role of civil society organizations in Asia in fos-
tering social and political change, their long history (sometimes pre-colonial) and
increasing presence and varied charters. These authors also demonstrate that civil
society in Asia does not always operate according to the corporate Western model,
in opposition to the state, nor is it entirely co-opted in the service of the state;
constantly evolving, civil society in Asia works across both horizontal and
vertical networks, both in cooperation with, and in contrast to, the state appara-
tus. Moreover, civil society in Burma/Myanmar, like in Sri Lanka and The
Philippines, in Alagappa’s view, evinces the neo-Gramscian, rather than the neo-
Tocquevillean, mode wherein counter-narratives are constructed to undermine the
hegemonic narrative of the state. Distinguishing what he calls, the two ‘frames’,
Alagappa comments,
If the state and the accompanying socio-political order have a high degree of
legitimacy and the state has a high capacity for governance, then the neo-
Tocquevillean frame is dominant. If there is widespread lack of agreement or
certain minority groups vehemently oppose the configuration and identity of
the state and its political system, then civil society organizations (along with
those in political society) are deeply divided espousing totalizing goals that
make for bitter contests. In these situations, civil society becomes the terrain
for struggle and dominance. The neo-Gramscian frame dominates in these
countries. The features and strengths of civil society hinge on the progress
made in construction of legitimate national states, political institutions and
processes. . . . Civil Society organizations are not passive; they are active
players in the state- and nation-building (or destruction) processes and in the
construction of the system of governance.
(Alagappa 2004: 468–9)
Consistent with the views of Cohen and Arato (1992) that civil society is broadly
the realm of social and political interactions between the state and the individual,
Alagappa correctly asserts that civil society in Asia should be treated as an arena
of governance in its own right, and not a mere tool to influence the state, political
society or the market (Alagappa 2004: 32). He considers civil society simultane-
ously a ‘space, a site, and an actor’ (ibid. 33) which is ‘a realm of power, inequal-
ity, struggle, and conflict among competing interests’ and which demonstrates
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that it is ‘self-organized, self-governing, non-state, non-profit, non-private
institutions that employ non-violent means to achieve a public interest or good
through collective action’ (ibid. 34). Asserting that the ‘balance should favor the
individual’s freedom to associate,’ Alagappa identifies the key characteristics
which make civil society ‘civil’; they are the ‘absence of violence and will to
dominate the entire public realm’ while ‘Groups that avowedly resort to violence
to achieve political goals, like the various liberation movements, cannot be part
of civil society’ (Alagappa 2004: 35). His definition nicely distinguishes between
the Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers, the All Burma Students Democratic Front (ABSDF)
in Burma/Myanmar,11 the CPB, Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and
Karen National Union (KNU), Lanzin Youth, and Union Solidarity Development
Association (USDA) on the one hand; and the Shalom Foundation, the Metta
Development Foundation, the Mandalay Traders, Brokers and Industrialists
Association, the Byamaso A-thin (Kyaw Yin Hlaing 2004a: 407) and the informal
professional, religious, community, social and study groups whose primary aims
are non-political and non-violent.
Alagappa, however, has too narrow a view of what is happening in Myanmar.
Whilst it is true that legal space for politically motivated groups aiming to
overthrow the state is severely restricted and their memberships are oppressed and
routinely jailed (as in other neighbouring South-East Asian countries), it is
going too far to assert that: ‘Burma allows almost no legal space for even
quasi-autonomous civil society organizations. Confrontation is the only mode of
interaction between unofficial civil society and the state’ (Alagappa 2004: 500).
In fact the most effective civil society organizations in Burma/Myanmar do not
operate in ‘confrontation’ with the state; working within the permitted parame-
ters, admittedly more restricted than might be enjoyed by their counterparts
in some Western countries, they are gradually carving out social space and
expanding their horizontal and vertical networks through measures to improve the
well-being of Myanmar’s vulnerable populations. Alagappa’s statement that,
owing to ‘suppression . . . some organizations altered their formal roles; some
operated informally or went underground; some relocated to border areas where
the government’s reach was limited or contested; some moved to neighbouring
Thailand or formed associations in the U.S. and the European Union’ (Alagappa
2004: 497) applies only to those politically driven organizations, often espousing
violent means to achieve their ends, which in fact do not meet his own criteria for
what constitutes a civil, Civil Society. It also devalues, and minimalizes the alter-
nate, non-violent means of achieving peaceful evolutionary social and political
development from within the society by its own resources. An evaluation of the
efficacy of the non-state, not-for-profit, voluntary sector in Myanmar needs to be
made within the envelopes proposed by Hann and Dunn (1996), and Schak and
Hudson (2003) mentioned earlier; that is, by looking at how civil society in Asia,
still using Alagappa’s valuable characterizations above, moves within norms
consistent with its communal, cooperative cultural outlook to achieve better
outcomes for the individual which would not be inconsistent with the standard
neo-Tocquevillean frame of its Western-based cousins.
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Human security and civil society
Civil society, consistent with Alagappa’s definition, is often seen as the lynchpin
in fostering greater human security and sustainable socio-economic and political
development. International aid organizations commit resources to its strengthen-
ing, viewing it as an alternative to the state where authoritarian governance has
put vulnerable populations at risk or failed to deliver the services and policies
necessary to avoid human insecurity. In such circumstances, civil society
becomes the key vehicle for achieving greater human security and for alleviating
the impact of policies which have increased human insecurity.
But civil society can also be uncivil in its own governance; to be effective, it
needs interaction with the state in developing and implementing the policies at the
core of its own justification for existence (Tendler 1997). Use of both vertical and
horizontal networks is essential for civil society to influence government policy
making and to implement service-delivery programmes. It cannot ‘bowl alone’
(Putnam 2000) without reducing its own social capital. Civil society is no easy
panacea for political and social ‘ill-being’. And, as Alagappa (2004) has shown,
civil society cannot deliver viable national-level democratic governance solely
under its own steam. In Thailand, for instance, in the 1974–5 period, civil society
fragmented and dissolved into competing groups which wreaked violence on
each other, a far cry from its civil objectives; then in 1976, some of the civil soci-
ety groups including sections of the media assisted the Thai military in retaking
control of the nation’s political life. Similarly in Myanmar, neither state nor civil
society on their own can deliver greater well-being to the people. Whilst many of
the non-political civil society groups working in the health and health education
sectors which would meet Alagappa’s definition cited earlier, go on doing excel-
lent work under difficult circumstances to alleviate the suffering of the vulnera-
ble (especially HIV/AIDS patients) other groups with overt political objectives,
such as the ABSDF, the KNU, the USDA, as Kyaw Yin Hlaing (2004a) has shown,
have not been able to resist the attraction of violence in achieving their ends. Such
groups, however, would not meet the ‘non-violent’ criterion in Alagappa’s
definition. They would, in effect, not be civil. Following this line of reasoning, we
would conclude that groups resorting to violence would exclude themselves from
the human security framework, since their actions would only serve to embed the
already great propensity to human insecurity.
On 7 May 2005, Rangoon was rocked by a series of bomb explosions at several
centres: at two supermarkets crowded with people shopping and at the convention
centre in west Yangon where a Thai trade fair was being held, resulting in several
deaths and many injuries. An eyewitness (The Irrawaddy Magazine, 13 May
2005) reported, ‘It was the most sickening thing I have ever seen – dead, wounded
and blood-covered monks, women, children piled up on stretchers and on the
floor of a third-world hospital.’ Earlier in the year a bomb in Mandalay market
had killed two women and wounded 15 others. Such attacks on civilians were
unprecedented in Myanmar’s recent history. They had obviously been carefully
planned to penetrate the tight security enveloping the city and were aimed at
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civilians rather than the military leadership. Initial attempts to seek the perpetrators
amongst the regime’s long-time, known political enemies – the KNU, Shan State
Army, Karenni National Progressive Party and the NCGUB – were discounted as
not credible. Internal origins amongst the displaced Military Intelligence group
were similarly discounted (as most of these operatives were in jail), as were
possible originators amongst the ceasefire groups, the opposition NLD, and the
government itself. Aung Zaw, The Irrawaddy Magazine, 13 May 2005, advanced the
theory that ‘a new radical group has arisen, with no ties to mainstream movements’
which draws support from sources external to Myanmar. However, the question still
arises, how such a group could penetrate the capital’s tight security; dissidents in
exile in turn pointed to internal sources amongst government ranks and the armed
forces as the only groups with both access to the requisite skills, bomb-making
expertise and opportunity to plant the devices. To date, no solution to questions of
who or why has been achieved. Rival power groups in Yangon would not normally
target civilians. The notion that the bombs were intended as a ‘message to the
regime’ also seems rather opaque. What message, one might ask? Could there have
been commercial rivalry at the bottom of these incidents? But this again begs the
question of opportunity and capacity. Whatever the origin of the perpetrators and
their objectives, it is clear that the bombings shook the top leadership group. Yangon
and Myanmar had hitherto been conceived as free from the type of urban terrorism
plaguing Iraq. The lack of satisfactory answers served to increase the state-security
framework and decrease the opportunity for civil society. The pendulum allocating
responsibility for human security was inexorably swinging back towards the state
apparatus, a trajectory likely to be accelerated by the latest bomb blast on 21 October
2005, outside the popular Traders’ Hotel, in downtown Yangon (Democratic Voice of
Burma, 22 October 2005). In this incident, no casualties were sustained.
In this context of a recognizably fragile environment for human security in
Myanmar, the Vaclav Havel–Desmond Tutu report was commissioned urging
UNSC intervention in Myanmar. Released on 20 September 2005, the report, enti-
tled, ‘Threat to the Peace: A Call for the UN Security Council to Act in Burma’
was prepared by DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary, a global law firm with over 2,900
lawyers in 53 offices and 20 countries around the world. It has already aroused
heated debate between those responsible for its authorship and those who respect-
fully point out its many inaccuracies, unfortunate timing and strategic imprudence.
Highlighting the inaccuracies which detract from its impact, Derek Tonkin
(Burmese Perspectives, Guildford, UK, 4 October 2005), a former senior UK
diplomat and long-time Burma watcher, suggested that if ‘specialist legal advice’
was sought ‘in the framing of this outline Resolution, they [i.e. the report’s spon-
sors] should certainly ask for their money back’. The statement released by the
Myanmar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 29 September 2005, predictably goes fur-
ther. Summarizing the government’s achievements in moving the country towards
peace and stability and greater protection of human rights, the statement asserts
The report contends that the government poses a threat to its own people and
to regional peace and security and strongly urges the UN Security Council to
take up the situation immediately . . .
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The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is of the view that the report is yet another
attempt to discredit the government of Myanmar. It is based on misinforma-
tion by a few remaining insurgents and foreign funded expatriates who are
now fearful that they will soon be irrelevant when Myanmar crosses the
threshold to a new era. They are after all expatriates who are funded by some
western countries with a hidden political agenda.
The government is striving to overcome the challenges faced by the nation
relying mainly on its own resources. It welcomes the understanding and sup-
port of the international community. However, reports as the above, are coun-
terproductive and not of assistance in the efforts of Myanmar towards
democratization. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs therefore rejects the report
in its entirety.
Whilst opponents will discount the government’s assertions of its achieve-
ments, the report’s claims that Myanmar is a threat to regional peace, asserting
that the HIV/AIDS strain originated in Myanmar and followed the drug routes out
to other parts of South-East Asia, are nonsense. Commenting firstly on this issue
of HIV/AIDS in Myanmar, Jean-Luc Lemahieu, Chair Joint Program on
HIV/AIDS and Representative of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
in Myanmar, personally advised Jared Genser, the compilers’ spokesperson for
the report, on 28 September 2005
Considering the highly-respected integrity of those who committed the
report, it is therefore regrettable that various inaccuracies appeared in the text
with the potential to take away some of the relevance of the arguments you
submitted. Kindly allow me to illustrate this for those areas falling under my
technical mandate as UNODC representative and Chair of the UN Joint
Program on HIV/AIDS.
The suggestion (no conclusive evidence) that HIV/AIDS originated in
Myanmar, was first made in a recent report titled ‘HIV and Security: Where
are the links?’ Exactly in order to avoid any misunderstandings, the UN made
an ensuing statement that different strains of HIV have been identified in
Myanmar, suggesting the meeting of various networks of HIV transmission.
There is no definitive evidence on the origin of the strain, or on the direction
of their spread. While published on many internet sites, I am afraid that this
important feature has been overlooked in your report.
Moreover, Jean-Luc Lemahieu supports the government’s assertions of the
efforts being made to eradicate drugs and to stem the production and outflow of
metamphetamines. He writes, and I quote at length because of the importance of
his testimony and the balanced perspective he gives to these emotive issues,
What concerns the chapter on the drug issue, the factual description recycles
a number of arguments about the drug situation in Myanmar that have been
and continue to be used in political, not technical, forums. Few will argue
that the drug control situation in Myanmar has reached the optimal levels the
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international community would like to see achieved. Especially what
concerns the synthetic drugs added efforts are required. Yet and perhaps
regretfully for those who want to argue the contrary, but in line with serving
objectivity, significant progress has been made over the most recent years
and many of the allegations contained in the report have proven inaccurate
from a technical perspective.
For instance, you state that the opium decline is a result not of government
policies, but of ‘other factors such as changing weather and soil conditions’
(p. 26). Allow me to explain that total opium production is a function of two
factors: the area under cultivation, and the yield. In the case of Myanmar, the
yield fluctuates significantly year on year, primarily because of the weather.
For this reason, when evaluating the effectiveness of policies in reducing
opium cultivation and the political will to implement such policies, the area
under cultivation is a better indicator. In Myanmar, the area under opium
cultivation declined by 79% between 1996 and 2005.
Yet, turn it around, when accounting for opium production instead of
opium acreage ‘the former being an aggregate of acreage and yields and
thereby allowing the inclusion of weather conditions’ the decline in the same
period is 81%. This does not suite [sic] well the statement ‘Although the
regime claims to have undertaken substantial steps to reduce opium produc-
tion in recent years, these efforts have failed to produce any substantial
decrease in drug production’ (p. 26). In case the UN figures are in doubt,
kindly refer to the published figures of the US Government which confirm
our trends-analysis although, in nominal terms, the US data are even more
optimistic than ours. . . . You correctly refer (p. 26, footnote 313) to an
interview in which I stated that drug burning ceremonies have essentially a
public relations function. It seems rather obvious to me that, as with any
other ceremonial undertaking, the substance behind these official declara-
tions should remain decisive. This is the rationale why the UN engages in its
annual comprehensive opium surveys. I trust that the conclusive data gath-
ered during these exercises speak for themselves. Not for nothing the article
in which I was interviewed was titled ‘Making Inroads’ (The Irrawaddy
Magazine, Vol. 11, No. 4, 17 May 2003).
The extent of and reasons for the decline of opium cultivation in Myanmar
are often used to serve a political score. Very regretfully, one critical point is
rarely touched in these discourses – that opium reductions in Myanmar are
affecting the livelihoods of an estimated 2 million already very vulnerable
and economically deprived people (UNODC, 2003 Opium Survey).
For the UN as an entity, replacing one social evil with another must not be
considered a victory. For this reason, the international community, regional
and local partners are combining forces in order to provide for the basic
human needs of those affected, meanwhile extending protective shields
against human trafficking, human right abuses, forced relocations, chronic
food deficiencies, malnutrition, reduced school enrolment, and poverty, to
name a few. I assume that we easily can agree that objectivity benefits a
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mature discussion and opens better perspectives towards a broad coalition
providing sustainable solutions for those who are today most in need. We will
also agree on the notion that humanitarian assistance should bridge the
political divide, not widen it.
I will close off by referring to a statement made by Mr. Costa, Executive
Director of UNODC, during the launch of the 2004 opium survey publica-
tion. ‘The world has watched as various countries have struggled to eliminate
the cultivation of opium. Some states have succeeded others have failed. In
Myanmar there remains a fine line between sustained success and failure.
The UN continues to believe that the international community, the region, the
country itself and its people have a shared interest related [sic] to drug
control. Translating this convergence in joint action will finally determine the
success or failure of the drug efforts in Myanmar.
(Jean-Luc Lemahieu, quoted on Free Burma 
Coalition website, www.freeburmacoalition.org,
28 September 2005)
To try to construct a threat to the peace out of such material is clutching at the
proverbial straws and denigrates the otherwise worthy aims – improving human
security and human rights – of the report. Derek Tonkin notes that the overreach
of such claims not only undermines the reports credibility, but also reduces the
chances of any substantial UNSC action and in fact becomes counterproductive.12
This long time Burma watcher summarizes the situation as follows:
The Havel–Tutu report makes the valid case that there are transnational
issues which are of serious regional concern, such as the spread of HIV/AIDS,
the trafficking of narcotics and the flow of refugees into Thailand and India.
However, in characterising these and other issues as ‘a threat to peace’ mer-
iting action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Havel–Tutu report fails
to mention that not a single country in the region affected by these transna-
tional issues has characterised them in this sense. Without their support it is
difficult to see how the US and her partners thousands of miles away from
the scene of action can secure general agreement in the Security Council that
a Chapter VII situation exists. I doubt they would even try.
As recently as June this year China and Russia, two Permanent Members
of the Security Council with veto rights, declined to accept Burma/Myanmar
as an agenda item for a Security Council meeting. More recently, US
State Department Assistant Deputy Secretary Eric John told a House Sub-
Committee on 21 September that the US was working with their partners to
place Burma/Myanmar on this month’s (October) Security Council agenda.
I believe that they and their partners, including the UK, would be more than
pleased to secure Chinese and Russian acquiescence to a discussion, even if
only informal and unrecorded. The recommendation however for a Security
Council Resolution under Chapter VII which should be, as the report
also recommends, ‘consistent with its powers under Article 41 of the
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Charter’ (Page 65 of the report – the powers relate to measures to be taken,
particularly sanctions in the event of non-compliance) is likely to strike UN
delegations, and particularly Members of the Security Council, as well out-
side the realms of what is politically possible, however much they may agree
with the broad sentiments expressed in the outline Resolution. . . .
There are times when an overstated and too dogmatic an approach in
pursuit of a worthy objective can be counterproductive. Already the Havel–
Tutu report has unfortunately aroused unrealistic expectations, particularly
among ethnic groups fighting for autonomy in Burma/Myanmar, that the
Security Council is poised for action in which China and Russia are likely to
acquiesce. This is very unlikely to happen. A possible result of such deception
could be to polarise further East-West differences over how best to handle the
situation in Burma/Myanmar, to cause unnecessary psychological depression
and to set back the transition to civilian rule by consent in Burma/Myanmar.
(Derek Tonkin, Free Burma Coalition website at
www.freeburmacoalition.org, 28 September 2005)
On the other hand, the NLD, the Committee Representing the People’s
Parliament, the Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB), and the Student Generations
since 1988 warmly welcomed the report, stating that it correctly presents the
situation in Burma/Myanmar, and commented on its ‘goodwill’ and ‘sincere
motives’. Perhaps the NLD’s comments may be taken as representative.
The National League for Democracy is therefore grateful to the former
Czech president and the Archbishop for the detailed and accurate report they
have submitted. We believe that the report has been prepared out of genuine
and sincere motives.
Moreover, in their report, these two outstanding and respected world
figures have not in anyway cast a slur or blemish on any organization or
country. The report focuses on Burma’ s problems and its needs and the way
to solve them. For these reasons we are convinced that this is the outcome of
genuine goodwill.
When this subject is brought before the Security Council we urge and
solicit all members to unite and cooperate and work together for a successful
outcome and to refrain from exercising their veto powers.
(NLD 21 September 2005; posted on Free Burma Coalition 
website at www.freeburmacoalition.org, 28 September 2005)
No detailed assessment of the report, however, has been provided by any of the
opposition groups. This may be expected as their objectives are to support
the philosophy of the report rather than its substance. It seems that in terms of the
harsh realities of international politics, the report will be one more stage prop in
the theatrical drama that is contemporary Myanmar. Closer to political reality are
the views of Professor Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, UN Special Rapporteur of the
Commission on Human Rights, on BBC ‘Hardtalk’ 1 September 2005 – ‘China,
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India and Thailand . . . I think that they have the key to change in Myanmar, I think
that in their own way, in their own style they have some qualities to convince the
Myanmar authorities that, for instance, the road map cannot be stuck and waiting
for ever . . . ‘His recognition of the importance of Myanmar’s closest neighbours,
their own styles of communications, their own modes of diplomatic address,
should be treated with great respect by the international community. Since their
own national interests and national security are closely impacted on by what hap-
pens in Myanmar, in very real ways, more so than that of far-away Western coun-
tries, their role in achieving peaceful change in Myanmar should be accorded
greater prominence in the security discourse. As Derek Tonkin has noted, ‘the
importance of these three countries in assisting the process of democratization,
security and stability in Burma/Myanmar may offer a more practical way forward
for the Security Council to consider than Chapter VII action’ (Derek Tonkin, Free
Burma Coalition website at www.freeburmacolition.org, 28 September 2005).
Since the publication of the NBR report, Reconciling Burma/Myanmar: Essays
on U.S. relations with Burma, in March 2004, ‘rethinking Burma policy’ has
become somewhat of a small industry. Not only did The Irrawaddy Magazine pub-
lish a substantial editorial in August 2005 on the subject (referred to earlier) but
also, a little earlier in the year, the redoubtable magazine, The Economist, in July
2005, also began preparing the ground for some move in the West’s no-surrender
policies on Myanmar. It proclaimed, ‘Ostracizing Myanmar has not helped its
people. It is time to explore the possibility of a deal.’ Noting that ‘Even Miss Suu
Kyi herself has already conceded that an absolutist approach is not practical,’ The
Economist proposes a phasing out of sanctions in parallel with agreed changes in
Myanmar, including the release of Daw Suu Kyi from detention. It argues
The world needs to recognize that there is little hope of influencing the
regime unless a more coherent policy can be found, even if that has to mean
easing up on the generals in some limited respects. As a start, Europe and
America should at least co-operate with one another. They might also try
harder to persuade their allies in Asia that a better-run Myanmar is in every-
one’s interests. The United Nations should also play a more active part . . .
Diehard opponents of the regime will complain that any concessions simply
reward the generals for their intransigence, and give them an incentive to
haggle over every step down the road to reform. But the alternative, an
insistence on the regime’s unconditional surrender, has got them precisely
nowhere over the past 15 years . . . And there is no doubt that ordinary
Burmese have an interest in improving the government’s disastrous economic
management, checking the alarming spread of AIDS and putting an end to
Myanmar’s endless guerrilla wars, in addition to political reforms . . . Maybe
a step by step plan, implying a degree of cautious engagement in return for
real reform can do better.
(The Economist, 21 July 2005, on Free Burma 
Coalition website, at www.freeburmacoalition.org, 
22 July 2005)
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The day before, on 20 July 2005, the US Senate had voted overwhelmingly, by
a vote of 97 to one, to renew the ban on the import of Burmese products to the
US, a symbolic act since Myanmar has long since replaced this lost market with
others closer at hand in India, China and Thailand. It is not only the generals in
Yangon or in Pyinmana where the centre of government is now located who are
intransigent.
Conclusion
In the present impasse, enduring political change in Myanmar seems very distant.
The deck chairs on the Titanic may eventually be moved as prophesied by Larry
Jagan in the Bangkok Post, 12 October 2005, but a sustainable political system
which returns sovereignty to the people through ‘free and fair’ multiparty elec-
tions is not likely to evolve from the processes which will be set in train after the
conclusion of the National Convention reconvened in December 2005, it met
until 31 January 2006. Whether the Senior General Than Shwe becomes a ‘civilian’
president for life; whether Vice Senior General Maung Aye is edged out to make
way for General Thura Swe Mann; whether another generation of generals
replaces the present leadership group will all make little contribution to either
enhancing the well-being of Myanmar’s people or moving the country towards
genuine democratic governance. Myanmar’s institutional underpinnings to
support democratic governance are so fragile that any real change from its present
authoritarian governance will need to be incremental. The value systems and
legal frameworks from which norms are derived and which inculcate a political
culture able to uphold human rights need to be developed from first principles.
In the current hostile international policy towards Myanmar, no such change
in value systems, legal or institutional frameworks is possible, as the country
prioritizes state and national security ahead of human security. To enable
Myanmar to undertake sustainable reform from within, the only approach which
will enable the processes to become embedded and indigenized through their
ownership, the current international policy towards Myanmar needs to be totally
stood on its head.
164 Civil society and the political ecology
Introduction
In my discussion of security and sustainable development in Myanmar – concepts
crucial to the domestic and international policies of most countries, both first and
third world – I have emphasized that Myanmar is a normal, poor, developing
country with all the political, economic and social problems which this entails.
Such problems have been exacerbated both by its domestic governance and the
policies of the international community towards the country. Myanmar’s unenvi-
able record on abuses of both political and civil rights and economic and social
rights, from the perspective of current international norms, has placed its
government in the position of being perceived to be unable to deliver either ‘free-
dom from fear’ or ‘freedom from want,’ the bases of human security, for the
majority of its citizens. Prioritizing state and regime security, it is a long way from
achieving that holistic security discussed in Chapter 1 which recognizes that the
security of the state is predicated on the security of the people. When the human
security of the people is in jeopardy, the state risks becoming a ‘failed state;’ and
‘regime security’ is usually washed away in the torrent of social, economic and
political chaos. The parlous conditions for human security in Myanmar have
consequently led to the polity being subjected to an abnormal level of cyber and
economic warfare from its diaspora and sections of the international community –
abnormal, because even such poor, developing, war torn, violence-ridden, non-
democratic polities as Sierra Leone or Liberia have not been subjected to the
same level of censure from the international community as has Myanmar.
That Myanmar has been singled out for special treatment is a measure of the
success of its diaspora in mobilizing international support, when the military gov-
ernment did not hand over power to a civilian administration after the May 1990
elections. It is also a function of the iconic status attained by Daw Aung San Suu
Kyi as a result of several periods of house arrest since 1989 and her capacity to
symbolize resistance to continued military domination of the nation’s political,
economic and social structures. Finally, it is an outcome of the fact that the
world’s only remaining superpower, the US, has chosen to make an example of
Myanmar, for being tardy in following the developmental path of its South-East
Asian neighbours from military dictatorship to demi-democracy, a developmental
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path which is still ongoing for many of the 10 members of ASEAN. This hostility,
in mid-2005, even extended to enactment of legislation in the US Congress,
which required termination of funding to ASEAN projects, if Myanmar had
assumed the ASEAN chair in 2006–7.
A snapshot of the parlous state of Myanmar’s governance was provided on
12 August 2005 by the UN Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human
Rights, Professor Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, in his report to the sixtieth session of the
UNGA. In balanced, measured tones, he details the positive steps taken on some
socio-economic issues, and the initiatives to curb poppy cultivation, forced labour
and human trafficking, but does not resile from direct, detailed commentary on
the governance failures with respect to human rights, use of landmines, lack of
freedom of association, arbitrary arrest of political dissidents, mistreatment of
prisoners and lack of an independent judiciary. His 18 recommendations, based
on information received in July 2005, if implemented, would go a long way
towards the full restoration of political and civil, economic and social rights in
Myanmar.1 However, Professor Pinheiro has not been permitted to visit the coun-
try since November 2003. There is no indication that his assurance that the UN
and the international community stand ready to work with the government of
Myanmar, political parties and civil society organizations in effecting national
reconciliation and the transition to democracy, has been digested. Nor has there
been any direct reaction by the government of Myanmar to his statement, ‘By
improving its human rights record and governance policies and strengthening its
cooperation with international organizations, the Government [of Myanmar] can
be assured of support for conflict resolution, political and economic reform,
institution- and capacity-building, humanitarian assistance and human development’
(see recommendations para.100, p. 20). This does not mean that the government
is unaware of the report and its recommendations; merely that it chooses not to
take up the proffered olive branch at this time. For, despite the criticisms in
Professor Pinheiro’s report, its detailing of ongoing abuses of the over 1,100 polit-
ical prisoners still in custody (despite releases in mid-2005 of more than 200
other political and common-law prisoners) and acknowledgement that since the
end of 2004 restrictions on the operations of both domestic and international
NGOs have become more overt, the formulations of the recommendations
suggest a way forward, out of the current impasse which has adversely impacted
on Myanmar’s relations with the international community. The report is notice-
ably lacking in the absolutist positions which have characterized much of the
international discourse on Myanmar’s problems. It is couched in terms of recom-
mendations, rather than demands – repealing onerous statutes (see recommendation
at para. 108, p. 21) which curtail civil and political freedoms – which, if the
Myanmar government took steps to implement them, as it has done with enacting
legislation to curb the use of forced labour, human trafficking, and money
laundering – would be useful steps indicating to the international community a
genuine desire on the part of the government to move the country forward, out of its
authoritarian governance. If such steps were forthcoming, would the international
community, especially the US, respond? What would be the chances of Myanmar
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being treated as a normal, developing country, like some of its peers in ASEAN
(Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam), needing the assistance of the international community
to bring a better quality of life to its citizens?
Implications of present international policies
The Myanmar government feels it is an administration under siege from both
internal and external enemies. The relocation of key ministries integral to state
security upcountry to Pyinmana is one outcome of this perspective. Maintaining
legislation restricting freedom of association, freedom of the press, the 1950
Emergency Provisions Act, the 1962 Printers and Publishers Registration Act,
Unlawful Associations Act and the 1975 State Protection Law is another obvious
indicator of a polity which feels it is under siege from domestic and foreign
sources. This legislative framework impacts adversely on all civil and political
rights in Myanmar; it goes far beyond the policies of economic autarchy which in
early 2005 led the government to reserve all onshore oil exploration for national
government enterprises. It is emblematic of the privileging of state security over
human security in Myanmar. Professor Pinheiro, in this August 2005 report on the
‘Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar’ called on the government of Myanmar
to ‘review and repeal those provisions in the 1975 State Protection Law that allow
detention by Executive order without charge or trial’ (p. 22). Repeal of such dra-
conian measures will be necessary to underpin any democratic transition process
in Myanmar. As long as such legislation remains in force, restitution of civil and
political rights in Myanmar remains impossible; and the promised new era in
Myanmar’s political development, expected to arise from the National
Convention processes, will be a case of ‘back to the future’.
Ironically, the government of Myanmar could look around some of the estab-
lished democracies in the industrialized world and see comparable legislation
being re-enacted as part of those states’ defences against terrorism. In an address
to the Isaacs Law Society, the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) Chief Justice
Terence Higgins, on 13 October 2005, condemned the Australian government’s
draft legislation which would confer additional powers on its intelligence agency,
Australian Secret Intelligence Organization (ASIO), and give the police unprece-
dented powers to arrest and hold citizens incommunicado without trial in secret
locations for extended periods. This draft legislation empowers the authorities to
detain people without charge for 14 days even when a person is not suspected of
engaging in, or supporting terrorist activities. Other aspects of the draft legisla-
tion make it a crime for those detained to advise their families of their situation
or where they are. On 15 October 2005, the ACT Law Society also spoke out in
support of Chief Justice Higgins’ views, labelling the draft legislation draconian.
In an unprecedented move which drew the ire of the Federal Attorney General, the
Hon Philip Ruddock, the ACT Chief Minister, the Hon Jon Stanhope, on 15
October 2005, also posted a copy of the draft legislation, which had been provided
to him in confidence, on his website (see http://cmd.act.gov.au), on the justification
that not only did it breach the undertakings given to him and other State Premiers
Conclusion 167
by the Prime Minister, John Howard, but that it was the right of all Australians to
be able to read this draft legislation and that it should not be kept secret in view
of the potentially enormous impact it could have on the lives of all Australian
citizens in undermining their civil rights. Two State Premiers and a former Prime
Minister, the Hon Malcolm Fraser, also spoke publicly condemning the draft
legislation as draconian and an infringement of human rights laws. Since the
legislation was still draft, it was possible, even likely, that it might not pass the
Senate in its present form: government backbenchers indicated grave reservations
about such draconian provisions. Forced onto the back foot by community
backlash, the Australian government then claimed that the draft legislation was a
‘work-in-progress’ document which would be modified; but public commentary
on the airwaves continued to label the draft legislation ‘draconian’ and to castigate
the government for an ill-conceived attempt to railroad the legislation through in
secret, without adequate public commentary. Human Rights Watch Asia Director,
Brad Adams, commented, ‘Putting people under house arrest for a year by a
control order is tantamount to jailing people without trial.’ In the view of Human
Rights Watch, such legislation ‘not only threatened Australians’ civil liberties, but
also violated international law’ (The Canberra Times, 14 October 2005, p. 1).
Comparable legislation has been enacted in other industrialized Western democ-
racies where reactive pragmatism has taken precedence over long-established
principles of civil and human rights. In such a crucible, judicial murder such as
that of Brazilian, Jean Charles de Menezes, gunned down by British police in a
London railway station in the mistaken assumption that he was linked to the
terrorists who perpetrated the underground bombings in July 2005, becomes
justified on specious grounds of expediency. The subsequent undermining of
public trust in key institutions as a result of prevarication and cover-ups by senior
public officials entrusted with preserving human security does not augur well for
the continued viability of democratic principles. The very basic principles of
Magna Carta (1215), the Petition of Rights (1628) and the Bill of Rights (1689),
which have governed the civil and political legislative frameworks in certain
Western democracies for hundreds of years, are being discarded, as key Western
leaders, elected through established democratic processes, increasingly take on
the powers and postures of old-style autocrats. Simon de Montfort and the Barons
who forced King John to sign Magna Carta at Runnymede in 1215 must think that
this too is a case of Back to the Future. One begins to ask if democratic principles
are only skin deep, when they can be so quickly discarded by those entrusted by
the electorate with safeguarding them for future generations.
With such moves afoot, how are democracies and dictatorships to be distin-
guished? Certainly not through the espousal of mere electoral processes; this
approach has been patently discredited by Zimbabwe where elections have been
manipulated to keep a ruthless dictator in power. The line is becoming increas-
ingly blurred between ‘dictatorial’ democracies which seem eager to embrace ter-
ror politics as justification for discarding the basic underlying principles of the
individual’s civil and political rights, and ‘democratic’ dictatorships which pay lip
service to electoral and constitutional procedural practice in order to retain the
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established power elites. Zimbabwe is not the only offending polity. Is the concept
of the ‘rights-bearing individual’ (Seligman 1992: 196), which has formed the
cornerstone of international human rights policy and law since 1948, being sub-
merged in the politics of fear instigated as justification for the ‘War on Terror?’
If so, then the focus of international policy since September 11, 2001, whilst
allegedly making human security its priority, is again privileging state and regime
security over human security, in exactly the same way as does the government of
Myanmar; citizens, to whom the state/regime owes a duty of care and a ‘respon-
sibility to protect’ are being projected as ‘enemies of the state’. It is a very fine
line that democracies must tread in protecting the security of their citizens that
they do not cross the threshold at which the civil and political rights of those
citizens are made subservient to the political expediency of the regime in power.
When that line is crossed, democracies slide into dictatorships.
It is comparatively easy for the respected UN rapporteur on Human Rights to
call for the Myanmar government to repeal its oppressive laws, but will Western
governments which are now introducing similarly onerous legislation impacting
on civil liberties be ready to repeal their own? Many voices doubt it. There are no
‘sunset clauses’ envisaged for the draconian legislation discussed above; the War
on Terror is being proclaimed to justify the reintroduction of legislated ‘state
terror’ where police are given the power to ‘shoot to kill’ merely on the possibility
that someone they consider may be a threat, may have information on a plot
against state security. No proof is required. The unfortunate gap between princi-
ple and practice in those Western democracies which consider themselves
guardians of human rights norms, seems to be growing wider; it is not likely to
encourage the Myanmar government to undertake the required legislative reforms
essential to underpin enhanced human security in that country. Myanmar too can
point to urban bombings and terrorist activity within its borders as justification
for retaining state (and regime) protection laws.
However, in robust democracies such as Australia, the sophisticated institu-
tional underpinning which subjects the actions of politicians to intense public
scrutiny, the electoral processes and independent judiciary, combined with laws
protecting freedom of association, speech and the press usually provide a guar-
antee that legislation impacting adversely on citizens’ civil and political rights
will not be enacted, at least in the form proposed by its sponsors. In the recent
case in Australia discussed earlier, the Internet was used with dramatic effect to
bring to citizens’ attention the draconian proposals which would have undermined
their civil and political rights. Such application of the Internet in Myanmar or
other dictatorships would be highly unlikely. Moreover, in Australia and other
Western democracies, regular free and fair elections, governed by strictly
enforced electoral laws, provide citizens with the opportunity to vote against
politicians whose actions impact adversely on their civil and political rights. In
Myanmar, such robust institutional underpinning is lacking; the very processes
and procedures of the National Convention inhibit free and open debate. The
National Convention process becomes another vehicle for giving the appearance
of popular participation in the country’s political life whilst guaranteeing the
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government’s desired outcome of continued military control of the country’s
systems of governance. Commenting on the lack of transparency and capacity for
democratic debate in the National Convention, Professor Pinheiro (para. 32, p. 8)
states,
[T]he very procedures and conditions under which the National Convention
operates involve restrictions on and violations of the rights of its civilian
participants. The procedural code, order 5/96, issued in 1996, outlaws any
criticism of the convention and provides for imprisonment of up to 20 years
and the imprisonment of related organizations for those who violate
this code.
Myanmar will clearly remain at the dictatorial end of the democratic institu-
tional parabola, even at the conclusion of the National Convention processes.
Robust Western democracies intent on enacting legislation which similarly
impinges on the civil and political rights of their citizens would not be providing
good examples to such an authoritarian regime, if they continued to allow
themselves to slide towards the dictatorial end of the parabola.
The international civil and political rights regime embedded in international
law since 1948, privileges the individual. However, as Professor Simon Bronitt
(The Canberra Times, 14 October 2005, p. 1), ANU academic and a specialist in
international human rights law states, these new legislative initiatives in Western
democracies are reverting to the collective approach: the punishment of a person
because of the group to which he (or she) belongs, rather than for what he (or she)
has done on his (or her) own recognizance. In Chapter 1, I discussed the call by
James Mayall and others for greater international recognition of group rights; this
approach arises from this very problem in that the individual’s life, civil and per-
sonal liberties and right to the pursuit of happiness is so often impugned by the
group or collective context to which he/she belongs. As Seligman (1992: 196) has
warned, ‘The squaring of justice and solidarity, of private interest and public
good, remains the problem of civil society and of citizenship in the modern
world . . . [However] an attempt to return to an ethical solidarity not based on the
idea of the individual as autonomous moral agent leads nowhere (or rather has led
to some of the most horrible murders of this murderous century [i.e. the twenti-
eth century])’. Seligman (1992: 200–2) highlights the difficulties with a ‘Western
liberal-individualist model of civil society’ taking root in multi-ethnic societies
(such as Eastern Europe) where the religious institutions have played a very
different role from what they have done in Western Europe. He questions the via-
bility of the idea of civil society in a political sense ‘in societies whose terms of
collective membership and solidarity are not those of an ideology of individual-
ism (as in the United States)’ (ibid.). In the Age of Terror, the relationship of the
individual – person or state – to the wider collective identity remains the problem
for civil society. As established Western democracies enact new draconian legis-
lation more evocative of fifteenth century Spain than of the UDHR, group rights
seem to be dramatically reduced.
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Yet it is these very group rights, especially of indigenous ethnic minority
peoples, which have attracted so much of the international censure of Myanmar.
Professor Pinheiro notes (p. 3) the continuing reports of serious human rights
violations against Myanmar’s ethnic minority peoples. When the National
Convention reconvened 17 February–31 March 2005, some 1,071 out of 1,083
invited delegates from eight community groups (political parties, representatives-
elect, ceasefire groups, intellectuals and intelligentsia, peasants, workers,
national races and State service personnel) participated; this included representa-
tives from six of the legally recognized ethnic minority parties. However, two
others, the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy and the Shan State Kokang
Democracy Party did not participate. Nor did the main opposition party, the NLD.
Professor Pinheiro marks the need for inclusiveness, openness of discussions, and
rolling back of restrictive procedural measures, if the National Convention
processes and any Constitution which results, are to have credibility in the
international arena. At the present time, and despite the participation of some of
the ceasefire groups and ethnic minority representatives, the National Convention
processes fall short of adequately redressing civil and political rights in Myanmar.
The seven-point ‘road map’ announced in August 20032 may be eventually
implemented in its entirety, but the substance of ‘democracy’ will be missing.
How can this situation be improved? Gellner (1994) looks to ‘civil society’
rather than democracy, as being a more useful set of concepts by which to
measure steps towards improved human security and well-being. In Conditions of
Liberty: Civil Society and its Rivals, he emphasizes the economic wellsprings
from which he believes civil society grows. He cuts through the Gordian knot of
whether restoration of democracy in authoritarian states requires restoration of
civil and political rights to precede that of economic and social rights. Civil
Society, he argues, ‘is markedly superior to a notion such as “democracy”, which,
though it may highlight the fact that we prefer consent over coercion, tells us pre-
cious little concerning the social pre-conditions of the effectiveness of general
consent and participation’ (Gellner 1994: 211). Here he gets down to what I call
the necessary ‘institutional underpinning’ to enable authoritarian polities to move
towards the democratic end of the parabola: Is the ‘consent and participation’
freely given or derived from coercion? If the latter, then clearly no movement
along the democratic spectrum has occurred. Since the end of the Second World
War, many authoritarian polities have incorporated the word democratic in their
formal state identities, without practicing democratic norms in their institutional
life. Hence Gellner prefers the social and economic complexities inherent in civil
society to indicate the openness or otherwise of a country’s systems of gover-
nance. Defining civil society, he argues,
Civil Society is a notion which serves a double function: it helps us under-
stand how a given society actually works, and how it differs from alternative
forms of social organization. It is a society in which polity and economy are
distinct, where polity is instrumental but can and does check extremes of
individual interest, but where the state in turn is checked by institutions with
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an economic base; it relies on economic growth which, by requiring
cognitive growth, makes ideological monopoly impossible. This is its loca-
tion on the map of possible forms of social organization.
(Gellner 1994: 211)
Moreover, he suggests,
Civil Society is based on the separation of the polity from economic and
social life. . . . The autonomy of the economy is needed, not merely in the
name of efficiency . . . but so as to provide pluralism with a social base which
it cannot any longer find anywhere else. It requires intellectual or ideologi-
cal pluralism: the growing economy which is indispensable to the system is
impossible without science, and science is incompatible with a cognitive pic-
ture of the world which is socially sustained, enforced and endowed with a
priori authority.
(Gellner 1994: 212)
Where polity and economy are fused into one state identity, as in socialist
Myanmar or pre-1989 Eastern Europe, civil society struggles for existence; and
civil and political rights, as well as economic and social rights are submerged in
mantra upholding the state identity. In Gellner’s experience, totalitarianism
required total domination of the economy as this prevented the emergence of
independent centres of power capable of challenging the authoritarian powerbase.
Thus, in his theoretical framework, ‘Political authoritarianisms, even totalitari-
anisms, which tolerate an autonomous economy, thereby unwittingly also create
a Civil Society, or at least the social potential for the emergence of a Civil
Society’ (Gellner 1994: 145).
On the other hand, if the economy is left free, or encouraged to operate on free-
market terms, it will become too powerful for the authoritarian centre to control
(ibid. 147). Current China watchers observe this dynamic and wonder when and
how the balance between market economy energies and China’s totalitarian identity
will tip so far in favour of the former that its Communist party hierarchy will be rel-
egated to history. International policy is presently geared to encouraging the change
to happen gradually and naturally, in response to the country’s own internal politics.
Why should this approach not be taken with respect to Myanmar which in practical
terms is so closely aligned with China? That is, why should not the international
community consider Myanmar a normal developing country transitioning out of
authoritarianism, whose transition would be accelerated by a buoyant economy and
vibrant civil society? Such a change in international policy would of course require
a reversal on economic sanctions inhibiting trade and investment with the country.
In turn, this would mean possible loss of face, not for Myanmar, but for those
Western countries which have hitherto espoused the absolutist approach. Since this
would be difficult, if not impossible in terms of domestic constituencies and activist
groups in the US and the UK, a way forward needs to be found which achieves a
win-win, rather than win-lose for both Myanmar and its opponents.
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Current international policy based on sanctions and isolation is not only
irrelevant, but also incapable of facilitating that democratic governance in Myanmar
which is purported to be the objective of the policy. In effect, the country’s lead-
ership benefits from such an international policy: not only does it engender
nationalistic support for the military regime, but also it serves as a convenient
focus for anti-Western, anti-colonialistic propaganda (Badgley 2004). It could be
said, that in large measure the policy of sanctions and isolation has in effect
undermined the chances of the NLD ever being able to come to power in Yangon.
Not only is the NLD, in the minds of many Myanmar people, associated with for-
eign powers (in a country which still sees the traumatic colonial experience as the
yardstick against which everything else is measured), but also because of its sup-
port for sanctions the NLD is associated with the apparent economic hardship
which impacts on the most vulnerable socio-economic sectors of the society,
whilst having no impact at all on the wealthy elite. Economic inequality, as
Ehrenberg (1999: 247) argues, mitigates against a vibrant civil society and the
development of institutions able to hold governments to account. In effect, current
international policy works against the objectives it wishes to foster.
International financial and economic sanctions, it is argued in this book,
express symbolic disapproval and provide a ‘feel good’ effect for the sanctioner.
But, by restricting the businesses of the sanctioner from investing in the target
country, sanctions also reduce the leverage of the sanctioner and adversely impact
on its potential influence in moving the country away from its authoritarian gov-
ernance systems. Western economic sanctions enable the businesses of those
countries which disagree with the policy to benefit. This is especially obvious in
the case of Myanmar’s neighbours, Thailand, India and China.3
In view of Myanmar’s borders and geopolitical position, sanctions are an inef-
fective instrument of foreign policy. Myanmar has robust trading relationships
with its Asian neighbours (James 2004a), which strongly disagree with the sanc-
tions approach. Despite being recently (mid-2005) urged by Washington to mod-
ify its policy towards Myanmar, Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra
declined to oblige. Being close to the issues, and unable to afford the dire conse-
quences of state failure in Myanmar, its neighbours are conscious that the only
way to approach the problem is to invest in the country, to support the rebuilding
of its socio-economic fabric through economic development which provides the
resources for institutional development; to support the rebuilding of its education
system (dismantled during the Ne Win era 1962–88) to assist the country develop
a skilled workforce capable of sustaining its economic growth, and to play a key
role in fostering Myanmar’s re-integration into international society. Many of
Myanmar’s neighbours have come from the same position in which Myanmar
now finds itself; they recognize the issues as ones they have themselves con-
fronted in managing their own development away from overt military dictator-
ship. Of the 10 members of ASEAN of which Myanmar became a full member
in 1997, few are fully fledged democracies, yet they receive international
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developmental assistance and are not subject to the same level of hostility in the
international arena as is Myanmar. Their collective identity and shared anti-colonial
history place them in the best position to be able to persuade Myanmar, within the
ASEAN norms, to develop a system of governance more commensurate with the
expectations of the original members of ASEAN.
In this context, civil society in Myanmar is nascent and resurgent. It is grow-
ing through a variety of professional associations, religious associations, special
interest associations and ethnic minority development associations. This is
distinct from the State-sponsored incipient political party, the USDA with its over
16 million members; or the Myanmar Maternal and Child Welfare Association,
with its over 3 million members, which, although it does very good work at grass-
roots level in terms of poverty alleviation and health education, has been placed
at the service of government development policies. Civil society in Myanmar
needs to be supported, internationally, to increase its capacity to contribute to the
political and socio-economic development of the society. Whilst a number of US
private foundations and religious groups work with civil society in Myanmar, it
would be advantageous for this type of interaction to be gradually increased.
Further leadership changes appear imminent in Myanmar. For international
support, interaction with and assistance to the (oppressed) education, health and
civil society sectors to be effective, and even permitted, it will be necessary to
decouple such initiatives from policies espoused by the displaced Khin Nyunt
faction. Whoever is ultimately in charge in Yangon, is likely to continue to culti-
vate good relations with both India and China, foster their investments and look
to them most importantly as buffers against any US threats of intervention.
Being able to count on China, has been the most important card in Myanmar’s
deck since 1988 and the single most significant reason why current US/UK inter-
national policy towards Myanmar is ineffective. This is unlikely to change.
China’s most important regional strategic interest lies with the future of Taiwan.
China is highly unlikely to go along with any international policies which would
result in her back door being exposed to a Western-oriented regime aligned with
Washington, and which could in future contribute to ‘encirclement’ of China. In
other words, the sanctions policy suits the Myanmar leadership; they know that
they can safely get along with doing whatever they wish in terms of running their
own country, their own way. The sanctions policy also suits China, as, by imped-
ing the growth of civil society, economic and institutional development, it ensures
that no democratic regime will come to office in Yangon. The sanctions policy
suits Myanmar’s regional neighbours who can also safely get along with the busi-
ness of investment without too much competition from US firms. It also suits
Washington; status quo ensures that a weak, unstable democratic state sharing a
border with Muslim Bangladesh on its western rim, and southern Thailand on the
south-east rim where a full-scale Muslim insurgency has re-emerged, will not
arise to add to the difficulties of prosecuting the ‘War on Terror’. The losers of
course are the millions of Myanmar citizens who are not closely allied with the
military government and who struggle to educate their children and want a better
future, within their own cultural and national parameters.
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Achieving a more civil society in Myanmar requires policies privileging
human security to displace those currently geared to prioritizing state and regime
security. Yet the state too has a major role to play in exercising its responsibility
to protect its citizens from ill-being – both socio-economic and civil–political –
arising from its non-optimal institutional development. It will require a major
conceptual leap for the Myanmar leadership to acknowledge that the security of
the state derives from the security of the people.
Given the history of hostile relations with the West, how can movement be
achieved which enables both sides to save face? It is not realistic to assume that a
solution can be found, or that the required transformation in Myanmar’s governance
can be sustained, without such an approach. Certainly, any moves to ameliorate
international policy towards Myanmar will need to be initiated gradually, taking due
cognizance of any further leadership changes in the Myanmar government. As part
of a more effective policy package towards Myanmar, consideration should be
given to making some support available to civil society groups; to increasing the
educational opportunities for the younger generation through re-instituting the
scholarship schemes for Myanmar, which are available to other developing coun-
tries in the region, and to changing the sanctions regime to a visa-restriction regime
which applies only to certain individuals against whom there is substantial
evidence of human rights abuses or other criminal activity. Consideration should
also be given to measures which will foster economic development in Myanmar as
the crucible from which a viable middle class and robust civil society can grow.
International policy might then be re-focussed on the well-being of the majority of
Myanmar’s citizens and disengaged from its present primary focus on one heroic
individual. It will then be possible for the international community to encourage a
policy matrix which fosters the rebuilding of Myanmar’s socio-economic fabric, in
recognition that this will create the institutional underpinning for the emergence of
sustainable transformation in Myanmar’s political governance.
Since this multi-pronged approach presupposes a change in the value systems
which have dominated Myanmar’s authoritarian political culture, some cog-
nizance will need to be taken of that sector in Myanmar society which is most
credited with upholding its present system of governance: the military. If the
principles of civilian control of the military, fundamental to robust systems of
democratic governance, are to become established within Myanmar corporate
identity (as they are slowly doing in Thailand), it will be necessary to expose the
middle ranks of the Myanmar military to training opportunities in the academies
of the West – West Point, Sandhurst, Duntroon – similar to those already available
to its ASEAN neighbours. It should be noted that the principles underpinning the
drafting of Myanmar’s new constitution currently do not provide for civilian con-
trol of the military in any future democratic government. An entrenched culture
of human rights abuses against the civilian population, perpetrated largely by the
military and the police, cannot be changed overnight; it will require a sustained
programme of culture change to bring this about. It certainly will not happen
through policies of isolation and sanctions which, in effect, remove any possibility
of alternate influences being brought to bear.
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Simultaneously with the above multi-pronged approach, interactions on
international ‘public goods’ programmes such as drug control and eradication;
HIV/AIDS prevention and control; prevention of money laundering and human
trafficking and intelligence sharing within the War on Terror context should be
enhanced. If the international community can change its perspective to consider
Myanmar a ‘normal’ developing country transitioning from socialism, and,
instead of sanctions and isolation policies, embrace policies which encourage
economic development, tourism, international interactions and ‘opening up’ the
country, transforming Myanmar’s value systems to create a climate for the robust
institutions needed to uphold democratic governance will become possible. Both
Myanmar and the international community might then move towards a ‘more
civil society’.
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1 Introduction: holistic and human security – concepts and contexts
1 Michael Gove, ‘Ideology, not tribal hate, spurred massacre,’ The Australian,
8 September 2004, p. 12, writes,
When we contemplate the horror of Beslan, we should realize there is nothing
specifically Muslim, Chechen or “other” about the deliberate mass murder of
children. In the lifetime of our parents, in the heart of the Christian West, men who
had been brought up to enjoy the fruits of European civilization killed infants as
casually as a gardener dispatching greenfly. The enormity of what happened in
Beslan last week, like the actions of Nazi Germany, still defies understanding. . . .
But the history of Europe in the past century reminds us that it is only a short
distance from Beslan to Belsen. The motivation in both cases was not ancient
antipathy, but modern ideology . . . Although the Chechens have a long history of
resistance towards those they consider enemies, the nature of modern Chechen
terror has far more in common with contemporary fundamentalist practice than
historic Caucasian resistance. . . .When Russia did grant Chechnya greater autonomy
in the 1990s, it was only to find the territory become a launch pad for fundamen-
talist groups intent on exporting slaughter well beyond their borders. When others
abuse their freedom to threaten your safety there is a need to act.
2 UN Special Envoy to the Sudan, Jan Pronk, has cited the Sudan government’s com-
plicity in the Arab militia’s 18-month terror campaign of murder and rape against
African villagers over arable land and other issues. Amnesty International has called
on the UN Security Council to hold the Sudanese government to account for gross
human rights violations in Darfur which is seen as a critical test of the Security
Council’s resolve to compel the Sudanese government to abide by a UN resolution call-
ing on it to disarm the militia and stop attacks against civilians. See AFP, Reuters,
‘Darfur crisis a critical test for UN, says Amnesty’, The Canberra Times, 4 September
2004, p. 18.
3 See http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/t_fund21/what.html (30 June 2003). In
line with this policy, in March 2003 USD 1.2 million was made available through the
Trust Fund for Human Security for ‘Drug Control and Development in the Wa Region
of the Shan State’ in the Union of Myanmar, implemented by the United Nations Drug
Control Programme (UNDCP). The press release by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs states that the ‘goal of this project is to support the opium poppy eradication
plan of the Wa Special Region where opium has been largely produced and the living
standard is low. Activities include training in construction of irrigation system, devel-
oping flat paddy fields, and introducing double cropping of rice. This project is
expected to contribute to increasing the food security of opium farmers, improving
their living standard, and eventually, eradicating opium poppy cultivation.’ See
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/ announce/2003/3/0328-2.html
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4 The sensitivity of newly decolonized states to the principles of state sovereignty and
non-interference in the internal affairs of nation states was recognized by the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001), The
Responsibility to Protect, Ottawa: International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty, p. 12. The report states, ‘the norm of non-intervention is enshrined in
Article 2.7 of the UN Charter – a sovereign state is empowered in international law to
exercise exclusive and total jurisdiction within its territorial borders. Other states have
the corresponding duty not to intervene in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. If
that duty is violated, the victim state has the further right to defend its territorial
integrity and political independence. In the era of decolonization, the sovereign equal-
ity of states and the correlative norm of non-intervention received its most emphatic
affirmation from the newly independent states.’ The difficulty for the international
community has been how to reconcile state sovereignty and non-interference with the
frequent spectacles of appalling human suffering precipitated by states against their
own citizens. This led the Commission to propose a set of parameters for international
intervention which would ‘operationalize’ the concept of human security. It is note-
worthy that in the wake of the tsunami disaster at the end of 2004 which has taken over
250,000 lives in 10 countries and seen unprecedented international assistance rendered
to the affected countries both at governmental and people levels, the Australian Prime
Minister, John Howard, moved quickly to assure the Indonesian government that the
presence of unarmed Australian troops in the separatist-prone region of Aceh was
purely for humanitarian assistance, with no implications for support to the Acehnese
separatist groups (Gerakan Acheh Merdeka – GAM) which he pointedly described as
an internal matter for the Indonesian government. Still sensitive to Australian military
intervention in East Timor in 1999, the Indonesian government at first called for all
foreign troops to be withdrawn from Aceh in three months, then on 17 January 2004
reversed its decision.
5 The number of ‘interventions for human protection purposes’ has increased since the
early 1990s. Dunne, Hill and Hanson (2001) view this new direction in international
policy as signalling a marked change in the international order ‘where sovereignty no
longer acts as a wall behind which human rights abuses can be committed with
impunity’. See Dunne, T., Hill, C. and Hanson, M. (2001) ‘The New Humanitarian
Interventionism’, in Hanson, M. and Tow, W. (eds) International Relations in the
New Century: An Australian Perspective, Melbourne: Oxford University Press,
pp. 93–116.
6 At the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights, the former UN Secretary
General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, asked, ‘What are the links between development and
the enjoyment of economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights? . . . I wish to
emphasize here that civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights
are equally important and worthy of attention.’ See United Nations (1993) World
Conference on Human Rights: The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, New
York: UN Department of Public Information, pp. 6, 12. Mary Robinson, former UN
High Commissioner for Human Rights, assessing the ‘rhetoric and reality’ of the rights
debate stated, ‘As High Commissioner I have a responsibility to bridge the gap in per-
ceptions about human rights and foster a rights-based approach across the whole spec-
trum of civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights, to enhance understanding
of the right to development as the synthesis of other rights and to include women’s
rights as human rights.’ She reminded the international community that there are ‘some
countries with an exemplary record of civil and political rights who continue to neglect
economic, social, or cultural rights of many of their people. And there are countries
that have made great strides in economic and social rights, but have failed to make
progress on civil and political rights. We do wrong to emphasize some rights and
neglect others.’ Mary Robinson (1999) ‘Addressing the Gap between Rhetoric and
Reality’, in Yael Danieli, Elsa Stamatopoulou and Clarence J. Dias (eds) The Universal
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Declaration of Human Rights: Fifty Years and Beyond, Amityville, New York:
Baywood Publications Co., pp. 426–7.
Her position supports the intercivilizational approach fostered by Yasuaki Onuma: the
171 nations who adopted the Vienna Declaration under the observation of some 1,500
Civil Society organizations approached human rights not from a Western-centric, but
from a transnational perspective. Whilst economic, cultural and social rights, as well
as civil and political rights, provide data on which to make a meaningful assessment of
the state of well-being of human populations, the electoral processes by themselves,
amidst the framework of participatory governance, cannot sustain a viable democratic
political fabric. Yasuaki Onuma (2000) ‘Towards an Intercivilizational Approach to
Human Rights’, in William Krull (ed.) Helen Schoop (trans.) Debates on Issues of Our
Common Future, Gottingen: Velbruck Wissenschaft, p. 62. It is necessary to build and
strengthen the socio-economic and political institutions which support that fabric. On
this issue, Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated, ‘The supervision and monitoring of elections
do not in themselves constitute long-term guarantees of democratization and respect
for human rights.’ UN (1993) Vienna Declaration, p. 20.
7 I use ‘capabilities’ in the same sense as does the Nobel Prize-winning economist,
Professor Amartya Sen, in his book (1999), Development as Freedom, New York:
Alfred A Knopf, that is, the enhancement of all human potential through a framework
of democratic governance, respect for human rights, and inclusive, participatory
development.
8 In qualifying ‘intervention’, the ICISS asserts, ‘whatever the motives of those engag-
ing in the intervention, it is anathema for the humanitarian relief and assistance sector
to have this word appropriated to describe any kind of military action. The Commission
has also been responsive to the suggestion in some political quarters that use in this
context of an inherently approving word like “humanitarian” tends to prejudge the very
question in issue – that is, whether the intervention is in fact defensible’ ICISS (2001)
Responsibility to Protect, p. 9.
9 Proposals to expand the composition of the 15-member Security Council mooted in
late 2004 include providing for six new permanent members without the power of veto,
plus three members appointed for 2-year terms. Countries being suggested include
India, Brazil, Germany, Japan and South Africa amongst others. It is unlikely, however,
that such expansion would be able to counter the weight of the five permanent mem-
bers, the original nuclear powers who were the victors in the Second World War, China,
Russia (USSR), Britain, United States and France, who retain their veto power. Some
proposed new members are vigorously lobbying to have the veto power extended to
them. Without the veto power, the asymmetrical power structure may not be materially
altered, and the proposed changes are not considered to enhance the decision-making
propensities of the Security Council. Amidst calls by certain US senators for the res-
ignation of current Secretary General, Kofi Annan, over the alleged corruption scan-
dal involving ‘oil for food’ for former Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein’s sanctions
impaired country, are not so strident calls for the US to pay its long overdue UN mem-
bership fees. Its failure to pay up, and strident attacks on the UN, increasingly raises
the prospect of the US bringing about the demise of this experiment in international
governance, just as US non-membership of the earlier League of Nations is widely
considered to have been a key element in the demise of that organization.
10 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (2000) Greed and Grievance in Civil War, New York:
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2355 identify two models of civil
conflict: greed and grievance. In the ‘greed model’ civil conflict has analogies with
organized crime, generates its own income from extortion and receives ‘start-up’
finance for rebellion from the diaspora living in OECD countries who are usually
wealthier than the population in the country of origin and do not suffer the conse-
quences of the conflicts they finance. The objective in this model is said to be predation.
In the ‘grievance model’ the impetus for rebellion derives from inter-group hatred,
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political exclusion and desire for vengeance. This model exhibits a high degree of
economic inequality, marginalization and exclusion from the political processes.
11 Shannon Tow (2004) ‘Southeast Asia in the Sino-U.S. Strategic Balance’,
Contemporary Southeast Asia, 26(3): 434–59 contends that the international policies
of smaller South-East Asian states are driven by the overriding desire to maintain their
autonomy and not be co-opted or coerced by either China or the US, whilst maintain-
ing political and economic relations with both major powers consistent with their own
short- and long-term national interests. By analysing what she calls the ‘nuances’ (Tow
2004: 249) of South-East Asian states’ foreign policies she rejects the notion that these
are driven by the geopolitical perspectives of the two Asia-Pacific major powers.
12 Acharya (1998: 212) argues that it is easy to be sceptical of the ASEAN Way; ASEAN
is not as informal an institution as it claims to be. ASEAN summits are marked by ‘for-
mal agenda, structured meetings, and legalistic procedures [which] are quite evident in
ASEAN’s approach to political and economic cooperation (particularly the develop-
ment of the ASEAN Free Trade Area and the recently created Southeast Asia Nuclear
Weapon-Free Zone Treaty). But the ASEAN brand of “soft regionalism” which relies
primarily on consultations and consensus, serves as a useful, if not entirely accurate,
symbol of its collective uniqueness, and has been a source of considerable satisfaction
and pride for ASEAN members in the international stage. ASEAN members have
become so confident of their approach that they have offered it as the basis for a wider
framework of confidence-building and conflict reduction in the Asia Pacific region. Eg
The ASEAN Regional Forum, a newly created security institution for the wider region,
is self-consciously emulating ASEAN’s norms (such as those contained in the Treaty
of Amity and Cooperation) and procedures (especially the consensus method). This has
meant the rejection of the “heavily institutionalized” CSCE/OSCE with its Conflict
Prevention Centre, Missions of Long Duration, and the Valletta Mechanism for
Peaceful Resolution of Disputes, as a possible model for conflict resolution in the Asia
Pacific region, as suggested in early Russian, Australian and Canadian proposals.’
13 Ramesh Thakur (1997) suggests that collective security has always been ephemeral. He
argues, ‘The Veto clause thus effectively negates the collective security aspect of the
UN. The reality of the Cold War, which registered profound irreconcilable . . . differ-
ences between the two blocs, produced a frequent resort to the veto clause by
whichever permanent member saw its or its clients interests under threat from an
assertive majority coalition. . . .
Collective security is a system designed to deter and defeat inter-state aggression, as
against Kuwait by Iraq. It fails to match the requirements of civil strife, which is the
more common type of conflict to confront the UN. Collective security requires multi-
lateralism; successful military operations require centralized command and control.’
Thakur, R. (1997) ‘From National to Human Security’, in Harris, S. and Mack, A. (eds)
Asia-Pacific Security: The Economics–Politics Nexus, St Leonards: Allen and Unwin,
p. 70. In effect, collective security privileges the major powers, who are not deterred
from taking military measures against smaller powers in the name of national security.
Such a development signals a return to the Hobbesian view of international society,
brutish and nasty.
14 For trenchant discussions of the ASEAN Concord II intention to establish an ASEAN
economic-, security- and socio-cultural community, mapped out at the Ninth ASEAN
summit in Bali in November 2003, see R. J. Ferguson (2004) ‘Policy Prospects for
Participant Regional “Development” ’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 26(3): 393–415
and A. L. Smith, (2004) ‘Solidifying Regional Cohesion, Advancing External
Linkages’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 26(3): 416–33. While Ferguson remains
sceptical that the announcement represents anything more substantial than rhetoric,
Smith emphasizes ASEAN Concord II’s contribution to developing ASEAN’s external
regional linkages with China, India and Japan. Smith thus looks at ASEAN Concord II
as a regional building block for further policy development.
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2 The security discourse in Myanmar: regime, state and people
1 Burma (as the country was called before 1989) withdrew from the NAM at the 1979
conference in Havana when it considered that the NAM policy was being skewed
towards the then USSR.
2 New Light of Myanmar, 24 November 2004.
3 For an informed analysis of this security mantra and its symbolism in state-building
and regime-survival terms, see Tin Maung Maung Than (1998) ‘Myanmar:
Preoccupation with Regime Survival, National Unity and Stability’, in Muthiah
Alagappa (ed.) Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences, Stanford:
Stanford University Press, pp. 390–416. Regarding the state’s contested concept of
security, which is conflated with regime security, Tin Maung Maung Than argues that
it will ‘have to be modified to incorporate societal elements if the goals of national sol-
idarity and political stability are to be achieved. At the regional and international lev-
els, it remains to be seen whether the cautious steps taken thus far to incorporate
regionalism into the traditional neutralism are sufficient to keep up with the dynamic
regional and international developments that impinge upon state security’ (ibid.
p. 416). In the 6 years since this article appeared, the military Government’s hold on
power has strengthened, despite its external critics, continuing Western (US, UK and
EU) sanctions and a fragile economy. A detailed discussion of these and related issues
is set out in Badgley, J. (ed.) (2004) Reconciling Burma/Myanmar: Essays on U.S.
Relations with Burma, vol. 15, no. 1, Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research.
4 See Pedersen, M., Rudland, E. and May, R. (eds) (2000) Burma–Myanmar: Strong
Regime, Weak State? Adelaide: Crawford Publishing House.
5 New Light of Myanmar, 26 September 2004.
6 An extended discussion of social development initiatives undertaken by the Myanmar
government since 1997 is set out in James, H. (2003) ‘Cooperation and Community
Empowerment in Myanmar in the Context of Myanmar Agenda 21’, Journal of Asian
Pacific Economic Literature, 17(1): 1–21.
7 Seng Raw, an ethnic Kachin and director of the domestic NGO, the Metta Development
Foundation, argues, ‘Given that this is the first positive initiative to emerge after more
than a decade of political stagnation, the ethnic leaders feel that all parties should come
together to work toward a common goal. Challenging the road map at this juncture,
they believe, is not a constructive exercise. The National Convention will be meaning-
ful to the extent that all political players are willing and able to participate in the
process in good faith. Against this backdrop, ethnic leaders say that they are preparing
to come up with safeguards to ensure that a history of failure does not repeat itself, and
that the political legacy of the Panglong spirit lives on.’ For further discussion, see Seng
Raw (2004) ‘The Role of Minorities in the Transitional Process’, in Badgley, J. (ed.)
Reconciling Burma/Myanmar: Essays on U.S. Relations with Burma, vol. 15, no. 1,
Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research, pp. 67–72.
8 Analysing the role of war in state creation and the endurance of military government
in Burma/Myanmar since 1962 despite contrary moves amongst the country’s regional
neighbours, Mary Callahan (2003: 8) writes, ‘Although warfare debilitates fragile
states, war also builds states, as the scholars of European absolutism have demon-
strated. In the Burmese case, unlike that of Europe, warfare built a state thoroughly
beholden to war fighters.’ This view continues to be reflected in the post-18 October
2004 statements emerging from the military subsequent to the announcement in late
November 2004 (reconfirmed in mid-2006) of the continued house arrest of Daw Aung
San Suu Kyi. The military considers that if the NLD General-Secretary ever became
the national leader she would preside over the break-up of the Union through granting
autonomy to various ethnic minority groups. Since the creation and preservation of the
state has been the military’s main objective and justification for its continued role in
government, the military leadership in Myanmar is determined to prevent such
Balkans-style disintegration at all costs. This perspective informs their ideological
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opposition to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi whom they identify with the former colonial
power, Britain. However this position is specious; some of the ceasefire groups have
already been granted de facto local autonomy by the Myanmar government without
prejudicial impact on the Union. The position clearly is another reiteration of
justification for retaining power.
9 See Heather Rae (2002) State Identity and the Homogenisation of Peoples, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, for an informative discussion of state policies in these eras
unleashed on individuals of these communities for the purpose of enhancing state security.
10 Chris Hann and Dunn (1996: 10–14) draws attention to the fading popularity of the
term, Civil Society, in Eastern Europe where it was resurrected post-1989, but its
continued vitality in other parts of the world operating under authoritarian systems of
governance where ‘the expansion of democracy is articulated explicitly in terms of
civil society’. He emphasizes the lack of uniformity even in contemporary Western
models of civil society, and draws attention to the need ‘to shift the debates about civil
society away from formal structures and organizations and towards an investigation of
beliefs, values and everyday practices’. Hann calls for greater involvement of anthro-
pologists in the academic civil society discourse and proposes the term ‘Civil
Anthropology’ to apply to the investigation of the moral codes and tensions underpinning
social cohesion within communities (Hann 1996: 24).
11 In this connection, two former senior members of the NIB, Col. Than Tun and Col. San
Pwint, are said to have been placed in solitary confinement.
12 Amitav Acharya (1998: 209–10) emphasizes the fact that ASEAN’s normative
framework ‘served as the basis of its collective opposition to Vietnam’s invasion and
occupation of Cambodia during the 1978–89 [sic] period. ASEAN, which had earlier
sought to co-opt Vietnam into a system of regional order founded on these norms, now
saw the Vietnamese invasion as a gross violation of non-use of force in inter-state rela-
tions. As a result, ASEAN not only organized an international campaign to isolate
Vietnam, but also spearheaded the diplomatic search for a settlement of the Cambodia
conflict that would undo the Vietnamese occupation. In this process, ASEAN lost no
opportunity to present itself in a more favourable international light vis-à-vis Hanoi.
Vietnamese “expansionism” was contrasted with ASEAN’s “good-neighbourliness” and
desire for regional political stability (implying territorial and political status quo in
Southeast Asia), Vietnam’s alliance with the Soviet Union with ASEAN’s professed goal
of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in Southeast Asia (SEA), Viet
Nam’s intense nationalism and ideological fervour with ASEAN’s pragmatism and
developmentalism, and Viet Nam’s military suppression of the Cambodian rebels with
ASEAN’s efforts for a political settlement of the conflict. ASEAN’s Cambodia posture
served not only to enhance its international stature (hence giving it a distinctive identity
in international diplomacy), but also to strengthen its intra-mural solidarity. It motivated
ASEAN members to overcome conflicting security interests and territorial disputes
within the grouping, thereby moving it further in the path toward a security community.’
13 For a detailed discussion, see Jurgen Haacke (2003) ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security
Culture: Origins, Development and Prospects, London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon,
chapter 7. Following Acharya, and Alagappa, Haacke examines the sociological
aspects ASEAN security culture and the symbolic power of the ASEAN Way which was
challenged both by the Thai proposal for flexible engagement and by Dr Mahathir’s
public criticism of the SPDC following the 30 May 2003 incident. His criticism was
perceived to deliberately infringe the norm of non-interference in the internal affairs of
member states, although he had himself been the subject of similar criticism from the
former Philippines president, Estrada, over his dismissal and subsequent jailing of
former Deputy Malaysian Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim.
14 On the power of symbols in community building, Acharya (1998: 210) comments,
‘Deutsch’s work suggests that institutions and organizations by themselves cannot
sustain a security community in the absence of a common devotion to some symbol or
symbols representing this security community. Prominent ASEAN symbols in the
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arena of conflict-management are the so-called “ASEAN Spirit” and the ASEAN Way.
These symbols have been invoked on countless occasions to reduce bilateral tensions
among the ASEAN members.’ Along similar lines, Ylva I. Blondel (2004) Power of
Symbolic Power: An Application of O’Neill’s Game of Honour to Asymmetric Internal
Conflict, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, analyses
how the challenged state mobilizes its symbolic power to manage external and internal
perceptions of its honour and the comparative status of the challenger. This principle
has obvious applications to the internal dynamics of Myanmar’s domestic politics and
its external foreign relations, and was notably employed by ASEAN in its relations
with Vietnam in the 1978–89 era as noted earlier.
15 Concern that the international human rights framework has been wilfully set aside by
the George W. Bush administration’s policy of detaining prisoners for lengthy periods
without trial at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, has led to the release of a number of prisoners
including the Australian citizen, Mamdouh Habib, ‘rendered’ to Egypt for torture on
behalf of the US before finally being released after more than 2 years in captivity.
Democracies, as well as dictatorships, are not immune to trampling on human rights
when their leaders feel that domestic political mileage is to be gained by policies
arising from the securitization of human rights.
3 The seven horsemen of the apocalypse: strategies for effective poverty 
alleviation amongst the peoples of the poppy cultures
1 Paul Keal (2003: 7) points out that there is no fixed definition of ‘indigenous peoples’
which remains a contested term; however, the most widely cited definition is that of
the UN Special Rapporteur Jose Martinez Cobo:
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical
continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their ter-
ritories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now pre-
vailing in those territories or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant
sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop, and transmit to future
generations of their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, the basis of their
continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their cultural patterns, social
institutions and legal systems.
[see Jose Martinez Cobo, ‘Study of the Problem against Indigenous Populations’, vol.v,
Conclusions, Proposals and Recommendations, UNDoc E/CN 4/Sub 2 1986/7, Add 4,
paras 379 and 381, cited by Sarah Pritchard (ed.) (1998) Indigenous Peoples, the
United Nations and Human Rights (London: Zed Books). See also Sharon Venne
(1998) Our Elders Understand our rights: Evolving International Law Regarding
Indigenous Rights (Penticon, BC: Theytus Books.)] Keal (2003) argues that This
means an indigenous person is
One who belongs to these indigenous populations through self-identification as
Indigenous (group consciousness) and is recognized and accepted by these
populations as one of its members (acceptance by the group). Moreover, Cobo’s
definition encompasses four key inter-related factors common to most definitions
of indigenous peoples: subjection to colonial settlement, historical continuity with
pre-invasion or pre-colonial societies, an identity that is distinct from the domi-
nant society in which they are encased and a concern with the preservation and
replication of culture. Of these, continuity with pre-invasion societies and social,
cultural and economic conditions are written also into the definitions contained in
Article 1 of the ILO Convention 169 and the Draft of the Inter-American
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. This includes peoples brought
involuntarily to the New World. Belonging to non-dominant sectors of society and
being concerned with the preservation of culture are attributes indigenous people
share with minorities that might not be indigenous.
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2 Professor Ross Buckley, at the Tim Fischer Centre for Global Trade and Finance, Bond
University, in his article, ‘A Nomination that’s Likely to be Deeply Divisive’, The
Canberra Times, 21 March 2005, suggested that an appropriate candidate for President
of the World Bank would have been Ernesto Zedillo, former President of Mexico, who
heads the Centre for the Study of Globalization at Yale University. Buckley points out
that Wolfowitz, the architect of the Bush Administration’s policy of using pre-emptive
military action to impose democracy on the Muslim world, ‘has no development expe-
rience’ and ‘plainly believes in promoting liberty and freedom by war’. Moreover,
Buckley, who insists that the World Bank’s core mission is to assist poor countries fight
poverty, states that the Bank ‘needs to be led by an exceptional person with a deep
understanding of the huge challenges of development for poor countries and with the
ability to persuade the rich countries of the world to support this task even more gen-
erously than in the past’. Paul Wolfowitz, Buckley asserts ‘is not that person’. Not only
was process ignored, he argues, but also it was subverted: the Bank’s 24 Executive
Directors whose responsibility it is to select the next President initially rejected
Wolfowitz when his name was informally circulated amongst them some time previ-
ously. However, with the support of the Europeans, Wolfowitz has subsequently been
confirmed.
3 Renard (2001: 138) commenting on the transformation processes in the north of
Thailand after 30 years of development projects, observes, ‘I realized that hill people
have no alternative but to accept the state in particular and lowland society and “devel-
opment” in general. Where the hill people were once beyond the reach of valley king-
doms and their rulers, such conditions no longer exist.’
4 See James (2005) Governance and Civil Society in Myanmar: Education, Health and
Environment, London: RoutledgeCurzon, pp. 33–4. Even under the country’s 5-year
development plan announced in 1997, one third or 2,575 km of the projected new roads
were to be only laterite; about one ninth or 1,648 km were to be sealed roads; and the
majority or 5,253 km were to be left as metalled roads. Historically of course, trans-
port through these regions was either on foot or by mule caravan used to transport the
illicit drugs. Government helicopters can be used only outside the monsoon season
(May–October); in practical terms, not after March when the upward wind drafts make
it too hazardous to use helicopters.
5 Keal (2003: 122) observes, ‘Land is a crucial element in the recovery and continuation
of indigenous ways of life. Land, culture and government are inseparable in traditional
philosophies; each depends on the others, and this means that denial of one aspect pre-
cludes recovery of the whole. . . . The importance of the link between land and culture
was recognized by the UN Human Rights committee.’
6 The dilemmas of the UN human rights regime for indigenous peoples, both with
respect to the legal distinctions made between ‘people’, ‘peoples’ and ‘groups’ by the
ICCPR and ICESCR and the way states interpret these to fend off secession move-
ments; and the substantive issues involved in group rights being defined as human
rights in order to reduce states’ propensity for ethnocide have been cogently delineated
by Keal (2003). He argues, ‘The right to self-determination in particular is a collective
right that cannot be claimed by individuals. . . . If there are just human rights then
groups of indigenous peoples have no legally defined rights that set them, their culture
and place of attachment, apart from others. Without safeguards for collective or group
rights cultural identity is at risk. Article 6 of the Draft Declaration [on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples] stipulates the collective right to live as distinct peoples.
Indigenous peoples argue that group rights are the only way to ensure protection
against ethnocide’ (Keal 2003: 126).
And ‘In the end indigenous rights might be a species of human rights, but if they are,
they require human rights to be redefined in ways that include the collective human
rights of groups.’ Moreover, although the right to self-determination is set out in Article 1
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of both the ICCPR and the ICESCR, ‘neither Convention was written with indigenous
peoples explicitly in mind. Any appeal to these instruments must be made on the
grounds that indigenous groups belong to the general category of “peoples”.
Consequently the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples seeks to estab-
lish the right of self-determination as a specific right of “indigenous peoples” ’ (Keal
2003: 141). Whether it becomes formally enacted, will be determined by whether the
member states of the UN, which have substantial indigenous ethnic minority peoples
within their borders, can be convinced that the reconceptualization of self-determination
is not a passport to secession and fragmentation of their sovereignty. In Myanmar’s case,
this has been the critical issue since the 1947 Panglong agreements set the scene for sub-
sequent secession demands by the Shan and Kayah, and underpinned both the long
years of civil war and the contemporary political impasse with its underlying question
of whether the future corporate identity of the state of Myanmar will be that of a
centralist or federalist state. The clear answer from successive governments in Yangon
since 1948 is that the corporate identity of the state is, and will remain, a centralist one;
this has not however, silenced demands, particularly from the Shan groups, for a feder-
alist system. The dichotomy – centralist versus federalist – continues to be played out
within the National Convention processes. Further implementation of a reconceptual-
ized approach to self-determination within the life of the nation state, along the lines of
that accorded the Palaung and Pa-O in Upper Myanmar, is not likely to happen soon;
nor for the larger ethnic minority groups (approximately 23 per cent of the population)
such as the Shan, Kachin, Karen, Mon, Kayah, Chin and Rakhine each of whom is
associated with a formal administrative division or ‘state’ at regional government level.
The application of the experiment in self-determination in Myanmar appears to be only
to some of the smaller groups of indigenous ethnic minority peoples.
7 According to the Myanmar Information Sheet, No. D-3018 (I) 3 May 2004, the joint
Myanmar–US opium poppy survey team visited Mongpan, Hsiseng, Namsan, Leikha
and Mongshu townships in Shan State (South); Mongpyin, Kengtung and Mongkhat in
Shan State (East); the Wa regions of Khwinmar, Mongmaw, Namtit, Lonhtan, Panglong
and Hopan; the Kokang regions of Laukai and Shaukhaw in Kutkai Township; and
Kaungkha in Shan State (North). The team surveyed poppy fields and collected poppy
bulbs and raw opium, met with poppy growers in the regions and interviewed them, stud-
ied the destroyed poppy fields and viewed agriculture and livestock breeding tasks being
carried out within the poppy-substitution programme. The following summary of 
drug-confiscation activities listed in the same information sheet as evidence of Myanmar’s
cooperation with regional and international authorities to interdict the flow of illegal
drugs across its borders into neighbouring countries is typical of such news items; whilst
exact quantities may be subject to question, the mix of drugs is indicative of the extent
of the problem. Crop-substitution programmes are only one aspect of the solution; the
other clearly is closing down the illegal factories operating within the rugged
terrain of Myanmar’s border regions. The summary in Myanmar Information Sheet, No.
D-3018 (I) 3 May 2004, reports, ‘In the drug elimination sector, there were seizures of
1,806 cases of opium, 5,694 cases of heroin, 1,924 cases of marijuana, 2,637 cases of
stimulant tablets, 142 cases of ephedrine, 12 cases of diazepan tablets, 81 cases of cough
syrup, 10 cases of acetic anhydrate, 72 cases of chemical liquid and 16 cases of chemical
powder. In doing so 7,333 kilos of opium, 1,357 kilos of heroin, 1,651 kilos of marijuana,
100,064,106 stimulant tablets, 13,997 kilos of ephedrine, 456 litres of cough syrup,
596,066 tablets of diazepan, 20,533 litres of acetic anhydride, 60,903 litres of chemical
liquid and 62,641 kilos of chemical precursors were seized. Likewise, 33 opium refiner-
ies and 69,562 acres of poppy plantations were destroyed in the 5-year period [of the first
5-years (1999–2004) of the 15-year drug-elimination plan]’.
8 This is not the first time Burmese/Myanmar governments have sought to implement
a poppy-substitution programme in the northern opium-producing regions. In 1965,
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following the 1 October prohibition on the sale of opium in Shan State that year, the
military government of the late General Ne Win announced a Kokang Development
Project to improve the socio-economic conditions of the primary opium-producing
areas. This initiative was stillborn in the wake of the Burmese Communist Party (CPB)
seizure of Kokang in 1968 and renewed hostilities thereafter. In the mid-1970s after
the Ne Win government’s agreement with the US for cooperation and assistance on
drug-suppression operations, the joint United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control
(UNFDAC) Burma Programme for Drug Abuse Control, supported establishment of
poppy-substitution programmes at Monghsat in Shan State and in Kachin State. Cash
crops such as peanuts, tea and coffee were favoured; livestock development was
encouraged and efforts made to establish a dairy cattle industry and apiaries. Under
this programme, three 5-year poppy-reduction programmes, 1976–80, 1981–6,
1986–91, were funded. From 1974–88, by means of 15 separate bilateral pacts, the US
provided Burma with over USD 86 million to fund projects aimed at reducing the
supply of poppy (Renard 1996: 50). In 1916, the British colonial government had
also made some desultory attempts to promote sericulture among the Kachins as an
alternative to poppy cultivation, attempts which Renard (1996: 38) characterizes as
‘uninspired’. When Western anti-narcotics aid was discontinued after the 1988 sup-
pression of the democracy uprising, ‘opium cultivation continued in the opium-growing
areas such as Kokang, much as it had for over a century previously’ (ibid. 69).
9 A termed coined in 1971 by Marshall Green (US Assistant Secretary of State, later
Ambassador to Thailand) at a press conference 12 July 1971, three days prior to the
announcement that President Richard Nixon would visit China in February 1972. Thus
the US ‘implicitly recognized the absence of opium in China’ (Renard 2001: 8).
Kokang was ceded to Britain under the 1897 Peking Convention with China. Having
been the northern base for the CPB since 1968, in 1989 Kokang units of the CPB
revolted against their aging Burmese leadership (which fled to China) and signed a
peace accord with the N.E. Command of the Burmese Army. The period 1968–89 had
seen Kokang become a battleground for Ka Kwe Ye (KKY) militia, drug warlords such
as Lo Hsing-han, and the Burmese military. The former CPB units of Kokang, Wa and
Shan formed the Burma National Democratic Alliance Party. Yang Li (1997: 106)
states that following meetings with General Khin Nyunt and military intelligence
chiefs at Kunlong, on 3 January 1990 an agreement was drawn up between the Yangon
military regime and the Kokang units by which Kokang was classified as a Special
Area and the ex-CPB operative, Peng Kya Shen, was recognized as the chief civil and
military administrator. Under the agreement, some 1,000 men of the Kokang units
would draw their salary and supplies from the Burmese army which had to seek per-
mission from the Kokangese before entering Kokang territory. Yang Li asserts that the
carrying of arms by the Burmese military within Kokang territory was forbidden. This
is interpreted as ‘autonomy’. Subsequent to the ceasefire agreement, the Myanmar
government granted the Kokangese Myanmar citizenship (Renard 1996: 69). It
remains to be seen how robust such an arrangement is in the wake of the 18 October
2004 purge of Khin Nyunt and his faction. The Burmese military has shown on earlier
occasions (1962/3) that it can move swiftly to remove local leaders whom it considers a
challenge to the authority of the centralizing state.
10 Recognition of the international dimensions of Burma/Myanmar’s drug trade have long
since addressed McCoy’s (1991) concern that effective drug-suppression operations in
the Golden Triangle needed to take into account that opium poppy cultivation was not
merely a domestic Burmese/Myanmar problem but that it required cross-border coop-
eration, concerted action by international agencies and funding assistance to the
Burmese/Myanmar authorities to successively interdict the flow of drugs onto the
international markets. Linter (2000) claims that in the late 1980s opium production in
Burma ‘more than doubled’. He quotes US statistics to the effect that Burma’s 1987
harvest yielded 836 tons of raw opium, which, by 1995, had increased to 2,340 tons.
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He claims, ‘Satellite imagery showed that the area under poppy cultivation increased
from 92,300 hectares in 1987 to 142,700 in 1989 and 154,000 in 1995 (Bureau for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 1987, 1989, 1995)’ (Lintner 2000: 165)
with a parallel rise in heroin output from 54 tons in 1987 to 166 tons in 1995; and a
rise in the production of methamphetamines (yaa baa) and ecstasy (yaa ee) from the
same laboratories on the Thai–Myanmar border. Lintner also notes that the ephedra
plant used to make ephedrine grows wild all over the southern China–Yunnan frontier
and is sold locally ‘without the need for extensive overseas networks as in heroin’
(ibid.). The potential heroin output from the crop, from 54 tons in 1987 to 166 tons in
1995, made ‘drugs the country’s only growth industry’ (ibid.). However, Renard (1996:
92–3) doubts the provenance of the US statistics and suggests that they have more to
do with registering displeasure over the political developments in 1988 and subsequent
years, which saw the suppression of the democracy movement in the country. Lintner’s
claim that drugs are the country’s ‘only growth industry’ is an exaggeration (James
2003: 1–21) driven by a similar political perspective.
11 James George Scott (1851–1935) was born in Dairsie, Scotland, where his father, the
Reverend George Scott, was the Minister. After the death of his father when Scott was
10 years old, his mother, who had some independent means, 3 years later took Scott
and his elder brother Robert to Mannheim, Germany, for their education. Robert later
became Master of St John’s College, Cambridge University, to which J. G. Scott’s
papers were later bequeathed. J. G. Scott himself went to King’s College School, then
to Lincoln College, Oxford. After missing a scholarship by one place, he went East,
and in the mid-1870s appears to have spent some time teaching English in Malaya then
writing journalism and teaching in British Burma. In 1881 he was back in England, try-
ing again for a scholarship to continue studies in law at the Inner Temple, but missing
out again, once more went East and joined an expedition to Tongking in 1883. In 1886,
he joined the Burma Commission and thus set out on a career which led to his being
made CIE in 1892 and KCIE in 1901. In the course of several expeditions to the Shan,
Wa, Kokang and Trans-Salween regions, he defeated the Limbin Confederacy which
was challenging British authority in the Northern Shan States, and saw the Limbin
Prince (an illegitimate son of the late Crown Prince, Kanaung) off to exile in India. He
was an accomplished author; his volume, The Burman: His Life and Notions. written
under the nom-de-plume of ‘Shway Yoe’ (first published 1882) went through many
editions. It remains his best known and most readable work. In 1891 he was directed
to write the encyclopaedic, Gazetteer of Upper Burma and the Shan States, for which
he was promised Rs. 2,000. The fee was never paid. Having been responsible for bring-
ing the Shan States under the British umbrella, in 1902–3 he escorted their Sawbwas
(hereditary rulers) and wives to the Delhi Durbar. To supplement his meagre income in
retirement in Surrey where he lived with his third wife, G. E. Mitton, he wrote a series
of unsuccessful novels. None of his later writings achieved the fame of The Burman.
12 As a result of a joint China–Myanmar drug-abuse survey on both sides of the porous
border, it was agreed between the two countries that detoxification and rehabilitation
services would be implemented. Detoxification hospitals currently exist at Putao,
Myitkyina and Mong Pauk (where I spoke with some of the Shan patients), on the bor-
der with China, which funds the hospital in an area where most people speak Chinese
as their first language. The hospital name is written in Chinese characters.
13 Renard highlights the comparison with Thai policies for the development of the ethnic
minority people living in the mountainous northern regions. ‘In this formerly remote
area that is now undergoing rapid change, it remains to be seen how effective these
efforts will be. Even in Thailand, where the political situation is much more stable,
highland development has been unable to resolve many of the problems facing the hill
people there’ (Renard 1996: 87).
14 Some of the indigenous peoples in northern Myanmar, for example the Kachin and
Palaung, smoked opium mixed with chopped tobacco; others cooked it to a thick syrup,
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added chopped plantain, then made it into balls which were placed on the tip of a pipe.
(Renard 1996: 17)
15 In the 1949–57 period, the Thai police general and strongman, Pao Sriyanond
(McCoy’s cherub with a Cheshire cat smile), controlled most of the opium trade trans-
versing Thailand, in collaboration with key Thai–Chinese businessmen. Pao fled to
Switzerland when Sarit Thanarat took power in a coup in 1957. Pao was then one of
the wealthiest men in the world. His compatriot, Chin Sophonpanich, founder of the
Bangkok Bank, fled to Hong Kong. The flight of money with Pao and Chin is said to
have brought Thailand to the brink of bankruptcy. This did not deter Sarit Thanarat dur-
ing his term as strongman, 1957–63, from similarly amassing a vast fortune, a trait in
turn emulated by his successors in the Thai dictatorship, Thanom Kittikachorn and
Prapass Charusatien. Pao, Sarit and Prapass all had early career linkages with the
Northern Command of the Thai army, thus having the opportunity to establish their
interactions with the KMT warlords and drug barons of the Golden Triangle. Lintner
(1994: 156) points out that after Iran and China banned poppy cultivation in 1946/9,
Pao needed alternate sources of supply; the KMT filled this void. By 1955, the Thai
police under Pao ‘had become the largest opium-trafficking syndicate in Thailand,
involved in every phase of the narcotics trade; with forces exceeding 48,000 they were
larger than Sarit’s regular army of 45,000. Although Sarit formally abolished the Thai
Opium Monopoly, established in 1855, in response to British pressure during the era
of King Mongkut (1851–68), Lintner (1994: 158) notes, ‘But narcotics related corrup-
tion, and private business activities, were already rampant in Thailand; no serious
attempts were made to stop the enormous traffic from the poppy fields of Burma and
northern Thailand down to the sea lanes. Thailand remained the most important
transshipment centre for Burmese opium, and Bangkok remained the major Asian drug
capital.’ This pattern continues up to the present time.
16 See Renard (1996: 49–59) for a discussion of drug-suppression initiatives taken by the
governments of independent Burma in the period 1948–88. In 1974 a formal agreement
was signed between Ne Win and the US to cooperate on drug-suppression operations,
for which the US provided a number of Bell Helicopters and contributed towards a
UNFDAC poppy-replacement programme. Norway also contributed funding to this
programme. Ne Win’s predecessor, U Nu, a devout Buddhist, on 11 February 1948 had
announced a plan to eradicate poppy, and in 1953 established an Opium Enquiry
Committee which, in the face of the growing insurgencies, met with little success. In
1964, the Opium Enquiry Committee sought statistics on the number of addicts in the
union, the causes of addiction, the need for substitute crops, and revision of the existing
laws. The cultivation and sale of opium in the Shan States was prohibited as from
1 October 1965. With the closure of opium dens and elimination of the special exemp-
tion for growing opium in Eastern Shan States, ‘opium kings’ became ‘opium insur-
gents’. In face of the growing threat after 1968 from the CPB, which drew income from
the narcotics trade, international anti-narcotics agencies were prepared to help Burma,
motivated, as Renard points out by the ‘flow to US and Europe’, not by the problems in
Burma where opium users, in 1977 were said to be 20,269 registered users, mainly older
and tribal people; however, heroin usage was already spreading amongst the younger
generation. ‘Besides helicopters, US aid included fixed-wing aircraft and communica-
tions equipment that supported Burmese military operations, called Mohein, which
were directed against refineries and base camps near Tachilek, just opposite Thailand’s
northernmost point. Mohein also aimed at interdicting caravan routes by which opium
was transported to these camps’ (Renard 1996: 52). The 1974 Narcotic and Dangerous
Drugs Law prohibited the cultivation, production, possession, trafficking, transfer and
sale of narcotic drugs with penalties ranging from 10-years imprisonment to death, but
called for compulsory medical treatment for all users. ‘The 1974 law provided a grace
period until 1979 for persons who had made their living by opium cultivation and the
manufacture of crude opium . . . to find alternative sources of income’ (ibid.).
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17 This counter-insurgency policy, called Pya Lei Pya, was initiated in 1963. It was designed
to deny the insurgents access to food, funds, intelligence and recruits. Villagers in a
designated area were forcibly moved to a ‘safe’ (i.e. Government controlled) or ‘white
area’. The designated ‘black’ zone was then subject to aggressive clearance operations
and any person caught within that area was considered an enemy of the state.
18 See Lintner (1994: 92–106) for a succinct account of the ‘secret war’ in northern
Burma, 1950–1, when the CIA supported the KMT as part of Washington’s wider
policy to contain the spread of Communism in South-East Asia, and its direct links to
the outbreak of the Korean War. After Truman sacked Macarthur in April 1951 for the
latter’s overt policy to try to foster an all-out war with China, the CIA continued to
secretly fund and supply the KMT with assistance from Taiwan. Lintner writes that in
May 1951
two divisions of heavily armed [KMT] troops climbed the grassy, barren moun-
tain range that separates Burma’s Kokang district from China. They then entered
Yunnan. The first unit, led by Li Mi himself, targeted Kengma, which was cap-
tured within a week. The other column advanced from the Wa hills south of
Kokang towards Teetan, another border town in Yunnan. Li Mi’s men continued
their advance, and headed for Mengsa, sixty kilometers northeast of Kengma. The
aim was to capture the airfield in Mengsa, the closest to the Burmese border, and
set up a base area there.
Following the first debacle at Kengma, the PLA had regrouped and counter-
attacked. Li Mi was beaten, and within less than a month in Yunnan, he retreated
to Mong Mau in the northern Wa hills. On hearing about the defeat, the second
column also turned back and never even approached Teetang. Undercover
Burmese intelligence agents, who nervously monitored the fighting, reported that
unidentified four-engine aircraft had dropped supplies on the KMT bases in
Kokang and around Mong Mau throughout the campaign. It is not known where
the planes came from, but they must presumably have taken off from airfields in
northern Thailand, which were frequently used by Taiwan intelligence agencies
for flying supplies to Mong Hsat, and to survey the Yunnan frontier. Following the
first, abortive attempt to invade Yunnan, a second foray was mounted in July. This
time a 2,000 strong force was mustered under the command of General Liu Kuo
Chwan, the Mong Hsat-based commander of the 26th Army. The area chosen this
time was closer to the bases along the Thai border: Sipsongpanna in southern
Yunnan, just across the frontier from Kengtung . . . [but] the PLA was too tough; the
local people did not welcome the KMT as they had expected.
(Linter 1994: 101–2)
In April 1952, the US Ambassador in Rangoon, David Key, resigned ‘in disgust’ that his
government had not even advised him of the secret war in the north. Key is said to have
commented that US support for Li Mi’s operations in Burma had ‘cost us heavily in terms
of Burmese goodwill and trust’ (Linter 1994: 106). That legacy continues until today.
19 Scott’s Diary of a Tour to the Shan States (1897) records his receiving the following
instructions:
If you are able to enter into friendly communication with any of the chieftains of
the outlying Wa circles, there will be no objection to your doing so. The Governor-
General in Council entirely concurs in the Lieutenant-Governor’s view that it is
unnecessary to interfere with the Was by the establishment of a post in their midst
or otherwise, and that there is little to be gained at present by sending further
expeditions into the Wa country.
(From Secretary to the Government of India, 
W J Cunningham, to Chief Secretary to the 
Government of Burma [Scott U.L. 1.5])
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However, on the successful conclusion of his expedition, he gleefully records
these words of approval:
[H]is tour . . . has added very considerably to our knowledge of the Wa country and
its people.’ From Chief Secretary Government of Burma (E S Symes) to Secretary
Government of India. Symes’ summary of the expedition records: ‘Mr. Scott left
the Salween on the 2nd January [1897] and, proceeding by slow marches, reached
Loinung on the 13th February. At Loinung he received a letter from Wei, the
Chenpien Prefect, whom he had invited to meet him at Mongpa, expressing his
regret that he was unable to do so without instructions from Yunnan. Here also
Mr Scott received various conflicting accounts of the position and strength of the
Chinese garrisons on the frontier, and in order to verify the facts with regard to
these garrisons, and also to give the Prefect a further opportunity of meeting him,
he decided to proceed to Monghsaw. After passing through the British villages of
Hsupso, Pangpe and Hinkwang, at all of which he was received in a very friendly
manner, he, at the last named village, inadvertently crossed the frontier into China
and continued in Chinese territory for about 25 miles, re-entering British territory
some 5 miles south of Monghsaw. At Mongshaw he was received in a friendly way
by the villagers and was visited by Wang, the Military Officer Commanding in the
Chenpien Prefecture and by another Chinese Military Officer named Tao. He held
several conferences with these two officers and, at their invitation, subsequently
proceeded to Monglem. While at Mongshaw Mr Scott received a formal protest
from Wei, the Chenpien Prefect, against his march through Chinese territory, but
a later letter from that official directed that he was to be escorted with all honour
to Monglem and promised to meet him there if authorized to do so from
Yunnanfu. At Monglem Mr Scott remained for 10 days, maintaining throughout
the most cordial relations both with the Sawbwa and with the Chinese officials.
At the end of this time, as there seemed no prospect of a meeting with Wei,
Mr Scott left Monglem and returned to Panghsang. As the results of his tour so
far he had ascertained that there were no longer any Chinese posts in what we
regard as British territory, he had learnt the position and strength of the Chinese
posts near the border, he had fully explained the frontier as claimed by us to the
Military Officer Commanding in Chenpien, and had obtained from that officer an
undertaking that no further military operations should, pending delimitation, be
undertaken (except to resist aggression) west of that frontier; and finally, he had
ascertained the precise position of Monghsaw and obtained an accurate map of a
portion of the border land hitherto little known.
However, the Wa states were never tightly integrated into the British colonial adminis-
tration, and remained largely autonomous, as long as they received the occasional
British column with friendly gestures.
20 In 1892, during a tour of the upper Mekong Valley, Scott had observed the trading
arrangements taking place between the local hill tribes and the Chinese Haws. He wrote,
‘I may say that these Chinamen are the first I had met anywhere in or close to Siamese
territory other than immigrants by way of Bangkok. Most of the caravans that we met
near the salt mines, and later towards Muang Sai, ply between Yipang, as well as other
northern districts of Chienghung and the territories of Luang Prabang and Muang Nan.
They bring down opium, which they sell or exchange for raw cotton. The trade consists
almost entirely of these two articles, the opium being disposed of and the cotton col-
lected on the way amongst the hill people. The greater part of the trade of these regions
is therefore local, and foreign goods have very little share in it; nor are any imported
goods likely to compete with the local demand for raw cotton in the north and opium in
the south.’ His interest in the opium trade continued throughout his career.
21 In 1900 Scott states, ‘The market price for a kilogram of opium was 6–7 rupees just
after the harvest and 10 rupees during the off-season’ (Scott and Hardiman 1901, pt. 2,
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vol. 3: 263). Renard calculates that based on ‘a production of 80 metric tons, something
over 1 million rupees was traded for opium. In 1903, about 6 rupees equalled
one pound. Therefore about 160,000 pound would be a high estimate of what could
be expected to be reaching Kokang as part of the opium trade at that time in an average
year. A sum of at least half that should have been reaching opium traders in the Wa
area’ (Renard 1996: 28–9). Kokang was ceded to the British by the Chinese
government, in 1897 at the Treaty of Peking as supposed compensation for alleged
infringement of the 1894 boundary agreements.
22 See Owen (1934), Trocki (1999) and Scott (1969) for a brief discussion on the ancient
origins of poppy traced to the Swiss Alps, its spread to the near East in prehistoric times,
and eastward dispersion by Arab traders during fourth–eighth centuries; its medicinal
and ritual usages and short life cycle from poppy flower to opium ‘cakes’; widespread
usage in Moghul India prior to the Portuguese irruption in the sixteenth century and the
Portuguese readiness to incorporate opium as a regular item of trade underpinning
imperial expansion. Scott asserts, ‘The time and place of the discovery of opium cannot
be fixed. Among relics of the Stone Age lake dwellers in Switzerland, and therefore dat-
ing from about 4,000 years ago, the seeds and large seedheads of the cultivated poppy
have been found. But Europeans were not the original discoverers. Opium was known
in the Middle East long before. In Sumerian ideograms of 6,000 years ago the poppy is
referred to as the plant of joy. It probably reached Asia Minor from Egypt. If Egypt was
not its birthplace it provides the earliest records of its uses and properties. It was at first
a monopoly of the priests, valuable in their mysteries. . . . Later, when Egypt became the
centre of medical knowledge, it was widely used and studied by physicians . . . During
ten days of its life of less than one year, Papaver somniferum [i.e. the opium poppy] pro-
duces a highly complex chemical which is beyond the capacity of our laboratories to
reproduce, and after those ten days destroys it’ (Scott 1969: 2). Trocki (1999: 14–16)
provides further detail of the poppy’s uses in prehistoric times: ‘The earliest evidence of
opium usage dates from around 3100BC. The fossilized remains of the seeds and seed
capsules of Papaver somniferum (the opium poppy) were discovered in ancient lake
beds in the Alpine region of western Europe. There is a cluster of sites dating from late
Neolithic and early Bronze Age in parts of what are today Switzerland, France and
Germany. In these places, archaeologists have found fossilized poppy seeds, poppy seed
cake and poppy capsules. The sites are associated with settlements of lake-dwellers var-
iously identified as the Michelsburg, Cortaillod, Horgen, Lagozza and Pfyn cultures
which flourished between 3000BC and 2500BC.’ However, Trocki (1999: 14–16) states,
‘There is no conclusive proof that these people were using the seeds or seed capsules
for their psychoactive properties . . . The presence of the capsules in a number of these
sites suggests an awareness of the plant’s mind-altering properties. There are few other
uses for green poppy capsules. These are the source of the sap from which all opiates
are made. It thus seems reasonable to assume that these lake-dwellers were making use
of the alkaloids produced by the opium poppy. It is possible that these lake-dwellers not
only used opium, but they may even have been the ones who developed the plant.’Trocki
suggests that since there are no truly wild varieties of Papaver somniferum and all
known varieties are cultivars for which a wild ancestor no longer exists, the ‘plant is the
product of an extensive and sophisticated process of primitive “genetic engineering”
that was accomplished almost five millennia ago’. The poppy was known and used in
Greece, around 2000 BC, and appeared in the Fertile Crescent in the second millennium
BC. Trocki disagrees with Scott that it was known to the Sumerians. As the industry
developed in India, the opium poppy cycle spanned some 18 months from sowing to
harvesting and auctions. Blake (1999: 27) states that poppies sown in Bengal in October
1826 (i.e. autumn) would be harvested in the February–April 1827 (i.e. spring) period;
then made into 6-inch cakes in the factory during May–September and finally sent by
river to Calcutta at the beginning of November. Auctions would be held just after
Christmas until July 1828.
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23 At the beginning of the nineteenth century, 1800–21, the India–China opium trade
averaged just over 4,500 chests (at 133–60 pounds per chest) per year. In 1821–2 it
began to increase rapidly. From 1822 to 1832 some 10,000 cases were exported to China
annually. This escalated in 1831–2 to 19,000 chests and then 40,000 chests in 1838–9,
on the eve of the first ‘Opium War’ (Blake 1999: 26). The three way trade – opium for
tea and silk – turned a 26 million British pounds Chinese trade surplus in 1800–10 into
a 38 million British pounds trade deficit 1828–36 (ibid.). Opium paid for the tea and
silk which Britain purchased from China; the duties on the tea sold in Britain paid a
large part of the expenses of the Royal navy and financed Britain’s imperial expansion.
Wong (1998: 353) has shown that in 1856 duties on Chinese tea sold in Britain
‘provided 35.7 per cent of the expenses of the Royal Navy; 51.57 per cent in 1857 when
Canton was captured; and 57.22 per cent in 1858’. Thus ‘Chinese tea financed the war
on China’ (ibid.). With one sixth of its revenues derived from the opium trade at mid-
century (Blake 1999: 123), the Government of India opposed all measures which might
deny it continued access to that revenue. In 1857, the year of the Indian Mutiny after
which the British Government formally superseded the EIC, Jardine-Matheson wrote
to its agent in Bombay, Rustomjee Jeejeebhoy (son of Jamsetjee Jeejeebhoy) on
23 May, stating ‘2,400 chests per month will meet the demand [for the drug in China]
(Private Letter Books, J-M C9/5). Statistics of the Imperial Maritime Customs Service
provide the following figures on the amounts of opium imported into China between
1863 (i.e. post-‘Arrow War’) and 1879, regarded as the high point of the trade:
Piculs of opium imported into China (133 pounds per chest for Patna; 140 pounds
per chest for Malwa; 160 pounds per chest for Bengal opium)
Year Amount
1863 – 50,087 chests
1867 – 60,948 chests
1879 – 82,927 chests
It is said that another 20,000 piculs were smuggled into China in each of these years.
The figures started to decline a little after 1888 when 82,612 piculs were said to be
imported; and again in 1897 (49,309), rising slightly in 1905 (51,920) just before the
Chinese agreement with Britain to start reducing the imports. It is said a further 5,000
piculs imported went ‘unreported’ in each of these years. By 1911, the year of the
Chinese Revolution, the figures had fallen to 27,758 piculs (with 3,000 unreported)
ahead of formal British prohibition of the trade in 1917. At the Chefoo Convention of
1876, the duty on opium was set at 80 HK ticuls per picul, giving a total duty of 110 HK
ticuls per picul. Annual value of the opium imports was 30–40 million HK ticuls. See
Lodwick (1996: 12ff). Owen (1934: 69) states, ‘A picul is equal to 100 catties, each
weighing roughly one and one-third pounds. Malwa was packed in chests containing
about 140 pounds, while a chest of Bengal weighed 120 catties (160 pounds).’
24 Independent traders were heavily engaged in smuggling the opium out of Gujarat,
Rajasthan and the central Indian states. Much of it went out through Daman and
Diu. Farooqui (1998: 185–6) has identified at least 17 non-indigenous firms/mer-
chants engaged in the Malwa opium trade 1803–30; and at least eight Portuguese
firms/merchants.
25 With opium businesses already operating in Calcutta and Singapore, Sassoons opened
a branch in Hong Kong as soon as it became a British colony in 1842. This gave the
company a stake in every link in the India–China opium trade except the coastal trade;
this final link was provided by Peninsular and Oriental (P&O) Steamship Company’s
services in the early 1850s (Le Fevour 1968: 27). Their rise to prominence in the trade
was marked by the mid-1850s, characterized by entrepreneurial business practices
which included buying in advance unharvested poppy crops in India utilizing experi-
enced agents. Speculating on the Bombay sales and purchasing in agreement with
others at the Calcutta auctions, Sassoons adopted the practice of holding their stocks
192 Notes
for some time in China in order to obtain the best prices. By contrast, Jardine-Matheson’s
Bombay agents did not buy directly from the poppy cultivators or purchase in advance; as
a consequence they lost market share in China to Sassoons by the mid-1870s, and by
1879 were diversifying their interests into shipping, banking and insurance. The finan-
cial collapse of their agent in Bombay, Rustomjee Eduljee, in 1872, precipitated
Jardine-Matheson’s withdrawal from large-scale operations in the opium trade,
although some smaller scale transactions on consignment were still being carried out
until 1879. In the 1880s, Jardine-Matheson’s took on a different role as mediators
between the Chinese ‘reform’ group at Court, who sought to modernize China with
Western technology before it was too late, and the European centres of business exper-
tise. The firm continued to do business in China until 1951 when their last chief exec-
utive, Walter Keswick, received his exit visa from Mao’s government.
26 Carol Benedict (1996) has traced the periodic outbreaks of bubonic plague and the par-
allel development of the international opium-trading networks. Noting that opium
poppy had long been cultivated in western China since the seventh century Tang
dynasty, she claims that before the nineteenth century it had been grown in the moun-
tains of Yunnan only on a limited basis. Its spread amongst the general population fol-
lowed the introduction of Patna and Malwa opium by the English trading companies,
but, since this was too costly for most Chinese, demand for the cheaper domestically
grown drug increased. Whilst the first record of opium cultivation in Yunnan is dated
to 1736, production for the domestic market increased from the 1820s, impelled by
improved transportation along the West River region between Yunnan and Lingnan,
and development of a Cantonese distribution network in Guangxi and Guangdong.
Benedict believes that evidence of the ‘consolidation of the Yunnan-Lingnan opium
trade dates to about 1840’ (Benedict 1996: 51–5). The town of Beihai was, by the mid-
nineteenth century, the major centre for the Yunnan–Lingnan opium trade. Ten years
before the ‘Arrow War’, opium from Guangdong yielded around 8,000–10,000 piculs
per year. John Anderson (1876) on the 1868 expedition to Tengyueh with Edward Bosc
Sladen found opium from Yunnan in Burmese markets in Bhamo and Mandalay.
Opium growing in Yunnan in the early nineteenth century may have increased in
response to the recession conditions in the province in the 1790s following exhaustion
of the copper deposits and downturn in the mining industry. When British explorers,
Colquhoun (1883, 2: 137) and Gill passed through western Yunnan in 1883, they wit-
nessed the great devastation caused by plaque in the towns between Kunming and Dali.
Gill (1883: 272) states, ‘the plain of Fu-Piau . . . had been entirely depopulated by an
extraordinary disease, of which the symptoms were like those of the plague, and which
had, during the months of August and September, carried off upwards of a thousand
people. . . . Now . . . the disease had ceased at that place, and had moved in a southerly
direction to Niu-Wa, where it was raging.’
27 In 1902, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Frederick Temple, sent the Prime Minister,
Lord Salisbury, a memorial from the Anti-Opium Societies in England signed by lead-
ers of the Church of England, the Church of Ireland, the Church of Scotland, the
Congregational, Baptist and Methodist Churches and the Society of Friends, stating
that the opium trade ‘hurt other aspects of British commerce in China’ and ‘fostered
profound feelings of hostility to British subjects’, a viewpoint attested to during the
Boxer Rebellion in 1900 when over 79 missionaries and their children were killed,
despite the fact that missionaries had been in the forefront of the fight to halt the opium
trade (Broomhall 1930: 221). Medical missionaries had been instrumental in assem-
bling the scientific data on opium addiction to confront the apologists for the trade with
its widespread harmful effects. Lodwick (1996: 31–63) notes that while missionaries
kept the opium question before the British public and government until the trade ended,
they ‘had little to do with suppression of the use of opium because they did not inter-
act with the key decision makers in the Chinese government, and little understood how
the Chinese government worked’. Ironically, at the time of the Communist takeover in
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1949, several missionaries, including women, were publicly executed in various parts
of China because they were regarded as ‘agents of imperialism’.
28 At the time of the Japanese advance across South-East Asia in 1941, the colony with the
largest number of opium smokers was said to be Malaya (130,000). French Indochina
had 120,000 addicts, followed by the Dutch East Indies (60,000). Thailand, though still
an independent kingdom, but largely under British influence and tied to British
commercial treaties, had operated a government monopoly since the Bowring Treaty of
1855. It had around 80,000 opium addicts (Jennings 1997: 93). Unable to access opium
from India and Turkey after the outbreak of the Second World War, Japan drew on the
200,000 tons of Iranian opium shipped to Shanghai in 1937, in addition to the areas
under poppy in Manchukuo (Manchuria). The leading opium merchants in Shanghai
were said to have fled to Hong Kong and elsewhere before the Japanese intrusion.
29 Walker (1991: 148) observes that opium undermined the morale of Japanese troops in
Burma during the Second World War. He states, ‘As the OSS learned from the exploits
of Detachment 101, opium’s place in Upper Burma remained unassailable despite the
ferocity of the war there. Tokyo’s forces failed to turn the trade to their economic advan-
tage and were left trying to induce the Shans, somewhat successfully, and the Kachins,
whose antipathy to the Japanese the Allies would call upon, to collaborate in return for
additional supplies of opium to help them best their Chinese competitors in the
commerce.’ He quotes Colonel William Peers and Dean Brelis of OSS Detachment 101:
‘Our mission to use opium was based on the fact that it would give our troops a certain
amount of freedom, of buying power; we did not question it as just or unjust . . . Simply
stated, paper currency and even silver were often useless, as there was nothing to buy
with money; opium, however, was the form of payment which everybody used. Not to
use it would spell an end to our operations’ (OSS Detachment 101).
30 Walker (1991: 182) comments that Burma at independence in 1948 ‘was not closely
linked to the global narcotics trade’. Its annual production was said to be in the vicinity
of 30 tons of raw opium (Lintner 1994: vii). On 11 February 1948, Premier U Nu, a
devout Buddhist, announced his plan to eradicate poppy growing and rehabilitate
addicts. On 24 July 1948, he announced his decision to keep open 100 official opium
shops, and to restrict the influx of illegal opium from India, Yunnan and rebellious areas
of Shan States, much to the disappointment of Robert Lovett, Acting US Secretary of
State. (Walker 1991: 182). In 1953, U Nu established an Opium Enquiry Committee,
and in 1955 the Compulsory Registration Act for users. In face of the spreading insur-
gencies, these early efforts met with little success. In 1961, U Nu presented a plan to the
UN asking it to recognize poppy growing in the Trans-Salween states as legal, as a way
for farmers to make a living, and in view of similar conditions applying to India where
it was cultivated ‘for medicinal purposes’. The UN refused on the grounds that the
insurgencies precluded adequate controls. At the time, a Burmese, U Thant, was
Secretary General of the UN and another Burmese, U Nyunt, had been appointed
President of the General Assembly. Renard (1996: 49) recounts that ‘The U.N. decision
so irritated the Burmese government that it refused to cooperate with U.N. control mea-
sures for many years and refused to meet with U Thant to discuss the issue.’The matter
still rankled in 1972, when Burma under the military government of Ne Win, did not
sign the Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotics Control. Myanmar is
now a signatory to the UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotrophic Substances. Walker (1991: 182) notes that at the country’s independence
in 1948 ‘U.S. narcotics policy tended to be out of touch with conditions in Burma.’
31 A final attempt to maintain prices for the drug was made by a group of India-based
merchants in league with corrupt Chinese politicians, characterized by Owen (1934) as
the ‘Peking clique’. Called the ‘combine’, or syndicate, it endeavoured to purchase
some 1,500 chests of opium for resale on the Chinese domestic market at a time when
a large part of China’s domestic supplies had been officially eradicated. However,
when the links with the corrupt politicians were exposed there was such a hue and cry
from both the public and the diligent Chinese officials who had taken responsibility for
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eradicating the drug, that, as Owen puts it, ‘The Peking clique wilted under the attack.’
Witnessed by representatives of welfare and civic organizations, the opium was burned
with full public ceremony, lasting 8 days. The final chest of Indian opium was ‘given
to the flames’ on 25 January 1919 (Owen 1934: 351). As in the beginning of the trade,
opium and other drugs made their inroads into Chinese and other Asian societies with
the overt and covert assistance of corrupt officials, a situation not dissimilar to the sit-
uation prevailing in contemporary societies. Yet, if ‘opium brokers, merchants and
smugglers profited immensely’ (Blake 1999: 29) the efforts of the reformers – Prince
Kung, Chang Chih Tung, Tang Shao Yi (Owen 1934: 331–2) – should also be remem-
bered as the pioneers of the law-enforcement practices which presently govern the
international drug-suppression regime. Corruption knows no international boundaries:
from the officials squeezing the early-nineteenth-century Chinese Cohong merchants
in Canton (Downs 1997: 80) to the former Executive Director of Macquarie bank in
Sydney 2005, corruption is synonymous with the opium and narcotics trade, fed by the
enormous illicit wealth – and human misery – it engenders.
32 Demand during the First World War pushed the prices for raw opium to new heights.
From a base price for Indian raw opium of 937 yen per chest in 1914; and 1,056 yen
per chest for Persian raw opium, the prices rose by 1916 to 2,336 yen and 2,460 yen
respectively (Jennings 1997: 43).
33 In the report to the League of Nations, Britain divided the FSS into three parts: in the
first, under British control, opium was prohibited in 1923 and used only by registered
users in licensed dens; in the second, under the control of the Shan Sawbwas, mostly
west of the Salween, there was a policy of control and suppression; in the third, where
most of the poppy was grown, suppression was said to be difficult and expensive.
Renard has characterized the British report to the League of Nations as ‘deliberately
obscured’ (Renard 1996: 36).
34 In 1959, the Shan rulers agreed to surrender their hereditary rights. In 1961, the
Frontier Areas Administration (FAA) was established for parts of the Shan States
which had not been subject to Burmese legislation. The FAA was in charge of the
Kunlong District bordering Yunnan and composed of the Kokang, Northern and
Southern Wa States, and Eastern Frontier Region, including Kengtung, Tachilek and
Mong Ton. The ‘Shan States’ became ‘Shan State’.
35 Lo Hsing-han became the dominant drug warlord in Kokang after Olive Yang’s removal
in 1962. He had been one of her retainers. Placed in charge of one of the KKY militia
groups after the assistance he rendered the Burmese army at the 45-day battle of
Kunlong Bridge in 1971, Lo fell out with the military government after making con-
tact with the Shan State Army (SSA) in 1973. Seeking to sell some 400 tons of opium
to the US government for USD 20 million, he stepped into a Thai helicopter near the
Thai border and was instead escorted to a Burmese jail. His subsequent trial was
aborted when it seemed likely he would implicate high-ranking officials in his drug-
smuggling operations. Sentenced to 7 years jail on charges of treason for contact with
the SSA, he was freed under amnesty in 1980. A similar story attends his rival, Khun
Sa (born Chang Chi-fu). Initially an independent drug warlord operating in Wa State,
he joined the KKY. His attempt to challenge the KMT for control of the drug trade in
the area in 1967 went awry when the Lao Air Force intercepted his drug caravan of 300
mules. He re-established contact with the SSA which led to the Burmese military
government arresting him and charging him with treason. He was released from prison
in 1976.
4 Myanmar’s external relations in regional context:
security enhancement
1 For an incisive discussion of the distinction between the two approaches as applied to
the Asia-Pacific region, see Stuart Harris and Andrew Mack (1997) Asia-Pacific
Security: The Economics–Politics Nexus, St Leonards: Allen and Unwin.
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2 Confrontation between supporters of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, General Secretary of the
opposition NLD, and supporters of the government led to a number of people losing
their lives. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and 35 of her supporters were taken into custody.
The incident caused international outrage and unanimous calls for the release of both
her and her supporters, most of whom have now been released; on 9 November 2003,
following recuperation at home from surgery, restrictions were reportedly lifted on Daw
Aung San Suu Kyi, although she declined to accept her freedom until all her supporters
were also released. As of mid-2006, she remains in protective custody at her home in
Yangon. The Depiyin incident was widely interpreted in the international press as a pre-
meditated attack on Daw Suu Kyi’s cavalcade with the intention of disrupting her polit-
ical activities in northern Myanmar, and is said to have been masterminded by the
current Prime Minister, Lt. Gen. Soe Win, in his previous capacity as Secretary-1 of the
SPDC. He had formerly been the regional commander in the Sagaing Division where
the attack took place. Following the purge of General Khin Nyunt and his faction in
October 2004, the SPDC announced that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi would not be released
until at least November 2005. This has now been extended. Her position is considered
to be more precarious now than during the stewardship of General Khin Nyunt.
3 A term usefully explored by Likhit Dhiravegin (1992) Demi-Democracy: The
Evolution of the Thai Political System, Singapore: Times Academic Press.
4 On 27 November 2003, Myanmar denied US Treasury allegations that two private
banks in Myanmar are engaged in ‘money laundering’, despite the country’s new anti-
money laundering legislation introduced in 2002. It is possible that this is an alternate
means of transacting some of Myanmar’s international trade and goes to demonstrate
that such US sanctions undermine legitimate business activity. See Myanmar
Information Sheet, 27 November 2003.
5 For an incisive discussion of China’s motivations in joining the ASEAN Regional
Forum, see Thammy Evans (2003) ‘The PRC’s Relationship with the ASEAN Regional
Forum: Realpolitik, Regime Theory or a Continuation of the Sinic Zone of Influence
System?’ Modern Asian Studies, 37(3): 737–63. The author favours realistic ‘sinic self-
interest’ in the PRC’s relations with regional states. This ‘self-interest’ encompasses
being considered a responsible international citizen. It is also useful to note the assess-
ment provided by Gerald Chan et al. (2000: 3) of the significance of the paradigm shift
in China’s relations with the region and the rest of the international community. China’s
leaders, they say, ‘have become more receptive of modern norms in international
relations but, at the same time, they still firmly uphold some traditional norms and
values in foreign policy making, such as sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national
interests’. On this point I wish to gratefully acknowledge the helpful discussions with
my colleague, Dr Gerald Chan, Senior Fellow, Centre of International Studies,
Cambridge University.
6 Two Indian energy majors, ONGC Videsh and GAIL India, hold joint equity stakes
with Korea’s Daewoo International and Korean Gas Company in the substantial gas
reserves off Myanmar’s Rakhine coast.
7 Myanmar’s forces have frequently carried out operations against insurgent forces
operating from India’s north-east.
8 The Hindustan Times, 3 November 2003, noted India’s official stance that Myanmar
has a ‘special place’ in its Look East policy; the aim of the India–Myanmar Joint Trade
Committee is to double bilateral trade turnover to USD 1 billion in the next 3 years
with particular attention to joint projects in areas of information technology, telecom-
munications, hydrocarbons, engineering goods and pharmaceuticals. During former
Foreign Minister U Win Aung’s visit to India, a further USD 7 million loan from India
to Myanmar was announced to establish a direct telephone link between the two
countries. The Myanmar Times, 2 August 2004, reported that a letter of undertaking
was signed in Yangon on July 27 between Myanmar Post and Telecommunications and
the state-owned Telecommunications Consultants Limited of India. The project will
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include installing new telecommunications equipment in Yangon and Mandalay, as
well as establishing an optical fibre cable connection between Tamu and Moreh on the
Myanmar–India border. The present telephone connection between Myanmar and
India routed through Britain, makes the tariff on phone calls between the two countries
expensive. The direct telephone link between India and Myanmar is expected to
promote trade, commerce, tourism and cultural relations.
9 Satu P. Limaye, Director of Research, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies,
Hawaii, views the re-emergence of India in Asia in the mid-1990s as ‘derived from the
twin shocks of Soviet collapse and near financial default in the early 1990s. The impor-
tance of being Asian became stark. Enhanced ties with Asia were seen as a step to pos-
sible inclusion in the broader Asia Pacific community, including regional economic
and political organizations. This web of inclusion was deemed vital if India was to
avoid over-dependence upon any one power; compensate for the loss of political, eco-
nomic, and military support from the ex-Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries; and
escape isolation and marginalization in a new world order. Temporarily interrupted by
the 1998 nuclear test.’ India has since then enhanced its regional economic and politi-
cal role. See India–East Relations: India’s Latest Asian Incarnation, Comparative
Connections, Pacific Forum CSIS, Honolulu, Hawaii, October 2000.
10 Agence France Presse, 3 November 2003 noted that since Myanmar maintains strong
trading links with China and India, Western sanctions have minimal effect.
11 Gulshan Sachdeva (2000: 219–28) suggests that not only would further India–China
cooperation be enhanced through such a growth quadrangle, but that it would also
foster further regional economic integration.
12 The countries attending were: Australia, Germany, France, Italy, Austria, China, Japan,
India, Singapore, Indonesia plus Thailand and Myanmar. Special envoy of the UN
Secretary General, the Malaysian diplomat, Tun Razali Ismail, also participated.
13 See Bangkok Post, 21 September 2003, p. 3.
14 This trade is exclusive of Thailand’s purchase of natural gas from Myanmar which, in
2002–3 was said to be AUD 875 million. See DFAT Burma Country Brief at
www.dfat.gov.au
15 The latest round of US sanctions, confirmed again in 2005 and 2006, now closes this
market to Myanmar exporters.
16 Although the majority of the Muslim population of both countries are peaceful, law-
abiding citizens, both countries have a small minority of Islamic militants whom it is
feared could easily be infiltrated by al-Qaeda agents. It is known that some Myanmar
Muslims sought training in Pakistan with al-Qaeda before September 11, 2001. When
Muslim–Buddhist community disturbances broke out in Upper Myanmar in late 2003,
the government took firm action to ensure there was no widespread civil unrest. See
Agence France Presse, 2 November 2003. Ordinary Muslims in Myanmar who are
amongst the poorest, fear that the terrorist threat could be used to further suppress their
community. In recognition of the sensitivity of this issue and how critical it is to
national security, at the time of the cabinet reshuffle in early September 2003, the civil-
ian Religious Affairs minister was replaced with a military man. Myanmar has keen
memories of widespread communal violence between Buddhists and non-Buddhists
during the U Nu era of parliamentary democracy when the late Prime Minister was
planning to make Buddhism the state religion. Myanmar is a secular state which has
an official policy of religious toleration, although from time to time there continues to
be reports of Buddhist–Christian conflict in Chin State and Buddhist–Muslim conflict
in Rakhine State. It is noteworthy that there is also a Synagogue in Yangon.
17 In an important indicator of the new rapprochement between Thailand and Myanmar,
the Thai Prime Minister would not allow even the incident of a Thai fishing trawler
fired on by Myanmar authorities off Ranong, the day before the visit by the Thai
Defence Minister, to impact on the cordial relations at the top. The incident was put
down to imperfect communications at local level.
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18 The late General Ne Win was a close personal friend of ex-President Suharto and went
to visit him as late as 1999.
19 The 104 principles drafted previously as the basis for a new national constitution, and
continued under the reconvened National Convention, ensure that the military in
Myanmar will continue to have a controlling role in government.
20 BIMST-EC stands for Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand-Economic
Cooperation.
21 BIMST-EC was launched in 1997 with the aim of promoting cooperation among its
members in trade and investment, technology, transportation, communications, energy,
tourism and fisheries.
22 See Agence France Presse, 2 November 2003. In 1991–2, some 20,000 Myanmar
Muslims from Rakhine state (known as Rohingyas) fled repression. Some later
returned under a United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) initia-
tive. The Myanmar government initially agreed to accept only 7,500 whose identities
as Myanmar nationals had been verified. The UNHCR requested Bangladesh to inte-
grate around 14,000 with local Bangladeshi, but Bangladesh did not agree to the
request. Some further repatriations have taken place since 1997, but the process stalled
over the refugees’ unwillingness to return and the lengthy verification process on the
Myanmar side.
23 See www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/myanmar/index.html. In September 2002, Japan
also provided emergency humanitarian aid for the flood victims in Monywa at the
request of the Myanmar government.
24 See www.AusAID.gov.au. Australia’s International AusAID Development Cooperation
Budget 2005–2006.htm and AusAID Country brief-Burma 2005.htm
25 Nossal (1994) writes from the perspective that economic sanctions are ‘a blunt and crude
tool of statecraft’ by which vulnerable populations are ‘doubly punished’. Nossal asserts:
‘Not only do the people have to suffer the human rights abuses being visited on them by
their own state apparatus; in addition, they have to suffer the economic deprivations vis-
ited on them by other states’ (ibid. 266) in the mistaken notion that such deprivation will
make these populations turn against their own governments and welcome those who are
instrumental in causing deterioration in their economic well-being.
5 Myanmar and the West: sanctions, engagement and security
1 In the 1990s, the UN Security Council authorized 16 multilateral sanctions resolutions,
compared to only two (Rhodesia and South Africa) previously. However, over one hun-
dred unilateral sanctions were imposed in the twentieth century. Coercive unilateral
economic sanctions/diplomacy by a superpower like the US can be effective against a
smaller, weaker opponent which is dependent on it for trade, aid and investment (Mack
and Khan 2000: 279, 281). However, in Myanmar’s case, which now has no trade with
the US following the Burma Freedom Act 2003 and renewed sanctions in mid-2004,
the lack of economic dependency on the sender country and support from neighbour-
ing countries with which it has substantial trade relations, enhance Myanmar’s capac-
ity to withstand the sanctions regime and serves to underline the essentially symbolic
and rhetorical nature of US sanctions against the Myanmar military government.
Myanmar’s main trading partners, as discussed in Chapter 4, are all in the Asian region.
If the US had more substantial economic investments in the country, it would have had
more economic leverage. Moreover, even amongst anti-government groups there is
now more open admission that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s espousal of Western sanctions
has not been to her advantage amongst the majority of Burmese/Myanmar citizens (see
Aung Zaw, The Irrawaddy Magazine, 27 May 2005).
2 ASEM was formed in 1996 by seven ASEAN members Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia,
The Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam – as well as Japan, South Korea and
China and the then 15 members of the EU. The EU dropped its objections to approving
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ASEM membership for Myanmar at a meeting of its 25 foreign ministers in the Dutch
city of Maastricht on 3 September 2004. At a two-day dialogue partner meeting on
6 September 2004 a draft declaration on closer Asia–Europe economic ties was
prepared, to be submitted to the October 2004 summit for approval, according to the
Vietnam News Agency report on 7 September 2004. Officials from Myanmar and the
other new members of ASEM – Laos, Cambodia and the 10 new members of the EU –
attended the meeting (Myanmar Times, 13–19 September 2004).
3 See Bangkok Post, 1 November 2003. Hungary is among the 10 new countries to join
the EU. The other nine are Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus.
4 This report states that Under the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003, Public
Law No. 108–61, the Secretary of State is required to provide a report ‘identifying
resources that will be necessary for the reconstruction of Burma, after the State Peace
and Development Council (SPDC) is removed from power, including:
(A) the formation of democratic institutions;
(B) establishing the rule of law;
(C) establishing freedom of the press;
(D) providing for the successful reintegration of military officers and personnel
into Burmese society; and providing health, educational and economic
development.’
Since the SPDC is both unlikely to relinquish power in the near future, and unlikely to
be ‘removed from power’ by the US or any other external agency, the resources to
foster a vigorous civil society are destined to be forever withheld, at least from US
sources.
5 Derek Tonkin, former UK Ambassador to Thailand 1986–9 and Chairman of the Beta
Mekong Fund 1994–2000, noted that on 11 October 2004 EU Foreign Ministers stood
poised to apply new sanctions against the SPDC, ‘while aiming to provide further
humanitarian (but not development) assistance to the Burmese people (though to be
frank only politicians see any difference)’. He commented,
However, the sanctions threatened by the EU seem unlikely to cause the junta to
lose much sleep. Two of them, a visa ban from entering the EU on serving offi-
cers of Brigadier-General rank and above and their families, and a refusal by the
EU to support financing for Burma from international institutions, already exist
in practice, while the third proposed sanction, suspending loan and equity finance
from EU companies for State enterprises, is hardly relevant since such direct
foreign financing is not technically possible under current Burmese foreign
investment legislation. The junta know all this perfectly well, so Rangoon
(Yangon) seems bound to call the EU’s bluff. . . . After 11 October, when the
sanctions are imposed, EU Ministers are likely to call once more on their hapless
officials to chase that elusive will o’ the wisp, the targeted sanction, and come up
with further recommendations for use in the next confrontational round. The
merry-go-round of pin-prick sanctions and junta intransigence seems sure to con-
tinue . . . Meanwhile, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is likely to remain under house
arrest, the hand of the hard-liners in Rangoon has been strengthened, the UN
General Assembly will later this year, and with the expected sole sponsorship of
South Korea among Asian countries, pass its ritual annual Resolution condemn-
ing human rights abuses in Burma, and the UN Security Council will continue to
fight shy of any discussion of mandatory sanctions.
(Burmese Perspectives, Guildford, 
27 September 2004)
I am indebted to my colleague, Professor John Badgley, for making this communication
available to me.
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6 Sanctions on Libya were lifted in 2004 when its leader, Muammar Gaddafi, paid the
required compensation for Libyan complicity in the bombing of the Pan-Am airliner
over Lockerbie, Scotland. The timing coincided with US energy security needs: the
need to ensure access to Libya’s oil supplies in face of continuing disruption of oil sup-
plies from insurgency-ridden Iraq. At this stage, Myanmar’s onshore oil reserves, now
retained for exploitation only by government enterprises, are perceived to be insuffi-
cient to induce the US to wish to negotiate a less zero-sum game position.
7 The UK Foreign Office Minister for Trade, Ian Pearson, during the adjournment debate
on Human Rights in Burma in the House of Commons on 15 June 2005, observed that
the NLD had recently reiterated that it is not NLD policy to call for sanctions. The
Minister said, ‘We have to bear in mind the circumstances of the people in Burma. If
the NLD is not explicitly calling on us to impose broad sanctions, we have to take
account of that fact. We need to see whether there is something more effective that we
can do, and I am happy to engage in debate and dialogue with people on that.’
Commenting on the Minister’s statement, Derek Tonkin, former UK Ambassador to
Thailand, on 5 July 2005 commented,
The Minister’s statement is welcome, because it may help to restore a measure of
sanity to the debate on sanctions in the context of Burma. It should be noted that
the Minister said that the NLD was reiterating its position on sanctions, not mak-
ing a fresh statement nor advocating a new policy. Indeed, if NLD statements
since 2000 are studied closely, it will be apparent that they have mellowed since
the 1990s, in that they welcome humanitarian aid under appropriate conditions,
and express understanding about why development aid and foreign investment
may yet take time and why it may be premature to promote tourism. This nuanced
policy has hitherto rarely, if ever, been reflected in ministerial statements in the
UK, where fire and brimstone have generally been the order of the day. At the
same time, it is clear that if the NLD were to push openly for broad sanctions
against their country, the party would be dissolved on the grounds that they were
advocating economic sabotage.
(Posted on Free Burma Coalition website, 
6 July 2005, accessed 7 July 2005)
8 Mark Beeson (2003: 256) has highlighted the ‘widespread unease about America’s
rather heavy-handed interventions in regional affairs’ and has expressed the view that
although most Asian nations still look to the system of bilateral American alliances in
the region to maintain the balance of power between China, Japan, Korea and ASEAN,
‘if the “war on terror” goes badly, and if East Asia is generally seen to be damaged by
events over which it has little control, then it is not inconceivable that a new, more
inclusive calculus of the region’s strategic interests may emerge’.
9 Posted on Free Burma Coalition website, 5 December 2004 (accessed 5 July 2005).
6 Civil society and the political ecology of sustainable development:
empowerment, opportunity and participation
1 See U Kin Oung’s meticulous study of the assassination of Bogyoke Aung San and six
of his cabinet, plus two others: U Ohn Maung, 34 years old, Deputy Secretary of the
Department of Transport and Communications who had come to deliver a report and
Ko Htwe, 18, the bodyguard of U Abdul Razak, Councillor for Education and National
Planning (a Muslim from Mandalay) who was shot four times by the retreating assas-
sins, shows the ferocity with which the assassins gunned down the nine men in the
Secretariat building that fateful morning. Aung San ‘received 13 bullet wounds and
died on the spot’; Deedok U Ba Choe, Councillor for Information, took five bullets,
one in the brain, and died in Rangoon General Hospital that afternoon; Thakin Mya,
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Councillor for Finance was ‘shot through the lungs and died on the spot’; U Abdul
Razak received six wounds and ‘died on the spot’; U Ba Win, Aung San’s elder brother,
received eight bullet wounds and ‘died on the spot’; Sao Sam Htun, Sawbwa of the
Shan State of Mong Pawn and Councillor for Frontier Areas received ‘two wounds in
the head and died in Rangoon General Hospital at noon’ on 20 July 1947. The ring-
leader of the assassins, U Saw, and five of the gunmen were later tried and executed in
May 1948; three others received 20 years’ imprisonment; and one, Ba Nyunt, turned
King’s evidence and was sentenced to 10 years and 6 months ‘rigorous imprisonment’.
(Kin Oung 1996: 1–2). This fine study highlights the problematic nature of political
governance in Burma/Myanmar, the endemic culture of political assassinations, fac-
tionalism, personal power politics and intrigue. Whilst U Kin Oung’s painstaking
research raises questions both about the complicity of certain British personnel and
the role Ne Win may have played behind the scenes, it demonstrates above all how
fragile the institutional framework for democratic governance was, and has been, in
post-independence Burma/Myanmar.
2 See Donald Eugene Smith (1965), Religion and Politics in Burma, Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
3 In recent communication concerning errors in the Tutu–Havel (2005) report on the
results of the 1990 elections, Derek Tonkin points out that the NLD secured 59.87 per cent
of valid votes cast, 52.44 per cent of all votes cast (valid and invalid) and 38.11 per cent
of all eligible votes which could have been cast. The Tutu–Havel report used a report of
a social anthropologist, John Dennis as its source. This report, ‘A Review of National
Social Policies: Myanmar’, prepared for the Regional Environmental Technical
Assistance 5771 Poverty Reduction & Environmental Management in Remote Greater
Mekong Subregion (GMS) Watersheds Project (Phase I) can be found at
http://www.mekonginfo.org/mrc_en/doclib.nsf/0/AE24021D05C497DDC725682E003
722D4/$FILE/FULLTEXT.html. Personal communication with Derek Tonkin, 6
October 2005.
4 Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index for 2003 ranked Myanmar
at number 129 (out of 133 countries) and allocated it a score of 1.6 on the corruptions
index wherein a score of 10 is ‘very clean’ (Finland was scored at 9.7) and a score of
O is ‘highly corrupt.’ In this last grouping were also Paraguay (also scored 1.6), Haiti
(1.5), Nigeria (1.4) and Bangladesh (1.3).
See http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2003/cpi2003.en.html (accessed 17 March 2005).
5 See James, H. (2005) Governance and Civil Society in Myanmar: Education, Health
and Environment, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 112–52, for an in-depth discussion of
land-use policies in Myanmar and their implications for effective poverty-alleviation
programmes.
6 Commenting on the ethical issues involved in this series of regrettable decisions, Bruce
Kent, writing in The Irrawaddy Magazine, 28 September 2005, ‘Turbulence Ahead’, states:
maybe it’s time now to think about what all this achieves, when the rhetoric falls
on deaf ears and the sanctions bounce off the armour in Rangoon. As one senior
aid worker who often visits Burma says: ‘The lobbyists in Washington are among
those to blame for the poor state of humanitarian aid to Burma.’ . . . UN agency
workers in Burma were known to be unhappy about the straits in which humani-
tarian aid in Burma has been mired. A recent internal memo among senior UN
officials had lamented humanitarian help for the country was a ‘moral and ethi-
cal necessity’ and an international obligation, according to a UN source . . . When
the Global Fund announced its cut-off decision, it said ‘the regime is making it
impossible for us to work there.’ That’s easy to believe, because a paranoid junta
so suspicious of any foreigner moving around the country has made it difficult for
all UN agencies and NGOs to operate in Burma. When the relevant government
committee, headed by the Health Ministry, responded to the Global Fund move, it
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admitted that new restrictions on movements by aid workers had been introduced,
but said these were only temporary and should not lead to an irreversible cut-off
by the Global Fund [italics mine].
Clearly, the temporary travel restrictions, for which there may well have been sound
reasons given the upsurge in fighting in some of the border areas, were merely an
excuse, compounded by the activities of lobbyists in Washington, for the US to
withdraw its contributions to the Global Fund.
7 The official government view of Myanmar’s timeline is set out in the 29 September
2005 statement by the Myanmar Ministry of Foreign Affairs as follows:
[T]he government announced a seven-step political programme in August 2003
which would definitely lead to the establishment of a modern, prosperous and
democratic nation based on enduring institutions.
The first crucial step of this process was the successful reconvening of the
national convention. The convention is [sic] attended by 1,088 delegates from
eight categories. Sixty per cent of the delegates come from the national races.
Representatives of 17 armed groups who have returned to the legal fold are also
participating. The delegates are identifying basic principles for a new democratic
state constitution by which to build a common future after decades of disunity and
stagnation.
A constitution will be drafted with the principles agreed upon, and put to a
national referendum. If approved, the constitution will pave the way for elections
to the national and regional parliaments thereby ensuring a smooth transition to
democracy. Myanmar is poised at the threshold of a new era.
The likely reaction of the US administration to the above processes may be found at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/46836.htm
8 Dr Khin Zaw Win, a dental surgeon, worked in the health services of Myanmar and
Malaysia. He served as consultant to UNICEF’s Yangon office. While attending a mas-
ter’s course at the National University of Singapore, he returned briefly to Myanmar
and was arrested in July 1994. Sentenced to 15 years in prison, he spent 11 years in
jail, mainly at Myitkyina in the far north of the country.
9 Toe Zaw Latt, ‘What Reconciliation?’, Bangkok Post, 28 September 2005, at
www.bangkokpost.com/news/28 Sept2005_news21ph
10 Kyaw Yin Hlaing points out that ‘Although there were no formal civil society organi-
zations in precolonial Burma, by the time the military took control . . . in 1962, there
were a number of them. Thanks to Western education and the advent of print capital-
ism under the British, Burmese came to learn how formal associations could be formed
and how people in other parts of the world, especially in the West, tried to achieve
social and political objectives by forming associations. Burmese saw how Christian
missionaries and European, Indian and Chinese business people formed religious,
social and business associations soon after their arrival in Burma. Making use of this
knowledge themselves, they began to form trade and student unions as well as
religious, social welfare, business, community and native-place associations. . . . This is
the chief reason why the military had to deal with so many civil society organizations
in establishing the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP). . . . As a final move to curb
the growth of civil society organizations, the government issued the National Solidarity
Act of 1964 outlawing all political organizations and forbidding the formation of new
political associations without government permission.’ Although the socialist govern-
ment narrowed legal space for non-political religious and business groups, some were
condoned and continued to exist as long they were judged not to pose a political threat
to the government. At other times, ‘students, teachers, lawyers and writers created
informal discussion groups and engaged in illegal political activities’ (Kyaw Yin
Hlaing 2004a: 392–5). This uneasy relationship continued in the post-1988 era.
‘Community, professional, ethnic, native-place organizations have emerged . . . local
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environmental and social welfare organizations have done well as NGOs. They have
engaged in several activities aimed at containing environmental degradation, alleviating
poverty, and educating the public about HIV/AIDS . . . social, business, and religious
organizations have resisted the junta’s attempt to co-opt them’ (Kyaw Yin Hlaing
2004a: 406–7). In assessing the contribution and potential for civil society organiza-
tions to impact on social and political change, it is necessary to ‘look beyond the legal
space . . . set by the state’ (ibid.: 414).
11 See Kyaw Yin Hlaing (2004: 409–10) for a succinct account of the internal power
struggles and violence which rent the ABSDF in 1991; and his interesting comparison
with the Free Burma Coalition which, based in the US was able to appropriate the
networking capabilities and norms of its social and political envelope to achieve a mea-
sure of success in heightening awareness of Burma/Myanmar’s socio-economic and
political fabric in Western countries. Kyaw Yin Hlaing (2004: 396–8) also highlights
the activities of CPB affiliated student groups in the 1988 civil disturbances, their
suppression by the military government as a continuation of civil war type power
paradigms which had been ongoing in the country since independence and the resort
to again going underground by some of these elements. From his study of 42 such
informal groups, he states that 12 confined their activities to political discussions,
while eight took an active role in anti-government protests. He states, ‘Members of
CPB-connected study groups participated in both covert and overt anti-government
activities’ and most had been established for 15 to 20 years. Because of mutual lack of
trust, the CPB-connected groups and the independent student groups found it difficult
to work together; however, by co-opting the foreign media (VOA and BBC) they were
able to disseminate news of their uprising (Kyaw Yin Hlaing 2004: 403).
12 Succinctly summarizing some of the key inaccuracies in the report, Derek Tonkin writes,
I feel that there are several inaccuracies and doubtful assessments in the report.
Some of these are matters of detail easily corrected. On certain issues of sub-
stance, however, the authors of the report might perhaps have sought comments
on the draft from a wider group of advisers. In this context, the following points
seem relevant:
a. I doubt the wisdom of defining the action recommended as coming under
‘Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Article 41).’Article 41 is concerned with the
application of enforcement measures in the event of non-compliance with a
Resolution made under Article 39, including in particular sanctions. The pre-
determining reference to Article 41 is likely to create a measure of confusion,
since it places a possibly unwelcome and in any case unacceptable restriction
on Security Council action in the event of non-compliance. It would have
been better if the reference to Article 41 had been omitted.
b. The argument that the 1962 coup in Burma should be perceived 43 years later
in 2005 as a current ‘threat to the peace’ is not compelling. It is in any case
doubtful that the claim that ‘the current government in Burma came to power
in 1962 by overthrowing the elected government’ (Page 51) correctly reflects
historical fact. It is true that governments in Burma/Myanmar since 1962
have been dominated by the military, but in terms of constitutional law there
have been two qualitative changes since 1962, the first in 1974 and the sec-
ond in 1988. In December 1973 a new Constitution, designed to bring the
post-coup period of unconstitutional rule to an end, was approved in a
national referendum and came into effect in March 1974. Many Burmese
would argue that the process was contrived, but nonetheless there was a
process and the government changed from a Revolutionary Council to a
National Assembly. The 1974 Constitution was abrogated in a military coup
on 18 September 1988. Again, there are some who would argue that the coup
was contrived, but even if this were the case, there was a qualitative constitu-
tional change as power was taken from the National Assembly by the State
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Law and Order Restoration Council, which subsequently changed its name to
the State Peace and Development Council.
c. The report claims that: ‘In 1990 . . . the National League for Democracy
(NLD) became the democratically-elected government of Burma . . . ’. Not
even the NLD would claim this, since the National Assembly was never
convened and no government was ever formed by the NLD as election vic-
tors. It would be correct to say that the NLD was prevented from forming a
government. This resulted from a fundamental difference of view between the
junta and the NLD about the process for the preparation and approval of a
new Constitution and the subsequent transfer of power. This thoroughly
unsatisfactory situation, for which the junta was overwhelmingly responsible
for failing to hold consultations with political parties prior to the elections in
May 1990, was recognised by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi herself prior to her
detention in July 1989. (See her Freedom from Fear Chapter 17 – Interview
with Dominic Faulder of AsiaWeek July 1989.)
d. The sections on narcotics and HIV/Aids have proved to be highly controver-
sial, with UN agencies in Burma/Myanmar contesting on technical grounds
some of the basic assertions in the report, for example (Page 57) that ‘the
primary strain of the HIV virus present throughout Southeast Asia has
conclusively [my emphasis – DT] been shown to have originated in Burma,
where it followed opium and heroin trafficking routes out of the country’
when the evidence for this was publicly contested by UN agencies in
Burma/Myanmar even before the report was published. There are continuing
exchanges on these issues.
e. The assertion on Page 13 that ‘the government prohibits full foreign owner-
ship of companies operating in Burma’ is incorrect, since this is permitted
under Article 5 of the Foreign Investment Law 1988. Two such 100%
owned foreign companies were incorrectly listed in EU legislation in 2004
as ‘Joint Ventures’ with a military conglomerate. They were Myanmar
Hotels and Cruises Ltd (a UK owned company) and Myanmar Hwa Fu
International Ltd (a Hong Kong owned company), and were later removed
from the EU list.
f. There are numerous omissions in the report which detract from its objectivity.
There is no account of previous unsuccessful attempts, particularly during the
last two years, to raise the situation of Burma/Myanmar in the Security
Council. There are no references to statements in the UK Parliament that there
is no consensus for such action in the Security Council. The extent of Chinese,
Indian and Japanese interests in Burma/Myanmar on Pages 38 and 39 is too
briefly examined and seriously understated. There is no consideration of the
likely attitude of Russia, which has significant interests in Burma/Myanmar,
to the recommendation for Chapter VII action. There is no assessment of the
very unfortunate consequences if China and/or Russia were to veto a
Resolution forced under congressional pressure on to the Security Council’s
agenda.
I thank Derek Tonkin for permission to quote at length from his article which may now
be found on the Free Burma Coalition website at www.freeburmacoalition.org. A
summary of further historical inaccuracies in the report is available at http//www.
freeburmacoalition.org/derektonkinonhaveltutureport.htm
7 Conclusion: towards a more civil society?
1 The full report and recommendations can be found at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/
docs3/GA2005-SRM-rep-en.pdf
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2 The government of Myanmar’s seven-point ‘road map’ to democracy announced in
August 2003, is as follows:
(a) The reconvening of the National Convention, which had been adjourned
since 1996;
(b) After the successful holding of the National Convention, step-by-step
implementation of the process necessary for the emergence of a genuine and
disciplined democratic State;
(c) The drafting of a new constitution in accordance with basic principles and
detailed basic principles laid down by the National Convention;
(d) The adoption of the constitution through national referendum;
(e) The holding of free and fair elections for legislative bodies (Hluttaws)
according to the new constitution;
(f) The convening of legislative bodies attended by legislative body members in
accordance with the new constitution;
(g) The building of a modern, developed and democratic nation by the State
leaders elected by the legislative bodies, the Government and other central
organs.
As Professor Pinheiro’s report makes clear (para. 18) the new Prime Minister, Lt. Gen.
Soe Win, expressed the continued commitment of the government of Myanmar to
implementation of the seven-point road map. Furthermore, at a press conference on
1 February 2005, the new Minister for Information stated that ‘the detailed basic prin-
ciples for sharing legislative power which had been discussed during the last phase of
the National Convention would be approved in its next phase, starting on 17 February
2005. He added that discussion and coordination would also take place for formulat-
ing detailed basic principles for sharing executive and judicial powers.’ Professor
Pinheiro (paras 18–22) provides the following summary of the background, composition,
focus and issues surrounding the National Convention:
First convened in 1993, the National Convention had the task of laying down the
basic principles for the drafting of a firm and stable constitution (State Law and
Order Restoration Committee Declaration 11/92, 1992). Comprising delegates
chosen by the Government, it met sporadically for three years, having been
instructed by the Government to develop language based on the six objectives that
had been drawn up three months earlier. The objectives upon which the future
constitution was to be based were: the maintenance of the integrity of the Union;
the maintenance of national solidarity; the perpetuation of sovereignty; the flour-
ishing of a genuine multiparty democratic system; the development of the eternal
principles of justice, liberty and equality in the State; and the participation of the
Tatmadaw (army) in the national political leadership role of the State. Included in
the principles laid down was the assurance of a leading role for the army in any
future Government, including in the choice of the Head of State; the allocation of
25 per cent of the seats in the legislature to the military; the proviso that the
Tatmadaw be free to administer itself, without any parliamentary supervision; and
the appointment of members of the military to the positions of Minister of
Defence, Minister for Security/Home Affairs and Minister for Border Affairs. The
six objectives, together with the 104 principles and subsequent seven detailed
basic principles (regarding the judiciary, the executive, the legislature, self admin-
istered areas, the State, the State structure and the Head of State), dictate the para-
meters and language and provide a skeleton structure for the future constitution.
Throughout the various sessions of the National Convention, the Government
made it clear to the delegates that participation in the Convention should entail
the acceptance of the fact that the above-mentioned principles governed the
constitution-drafting process.
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The National Convention has now been in existence for over 12 years. By 1996,
the National League for Democracy (NLD), the winners of the 1990 election, had
boycotted some of the Convention sessions, citing the undemocratic nature of its
procedures and the human rights abuses perpetrated during its
proceedings . . . Adjourned in May 1996, the National Convention remained sus-
pended until 2004, when it was reconvened for an eight-week period from 17 May
to 9 July 2004 and resumed work on the detailed basic principles. The reconven-
ing of the National Convention represented ‘the first step of the seven point road
map for national reconciliation and democratic transition’, according to the then
Prime Minister, General Khin Nyunt . . . The NLD . . . did not join the reconvened
National Convention. NLD offices remain closed and sealed by the Government,
with the sole exception of the Yangon Office. The General-Secretary of NLD,
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and the Vice-Chairman, U Tin Oo, remain under house
arrest, with no date given by the Government for their release. NLD members
continue to suffer intimidation and arrest by Government forces. Other political
party activists, including Members of Parliament-elect, remain in detention for
their political activities.
3 Underlining the importance of India and China to the world economy, Australian
Treasurer, Peter Costello, in an extraordinary statement at the Group of 20 meeting of
finance leaders and central bank chiefs outside Beijing, 15–16 October 2005, labelled
the IMF and the World Bank as ‘outdated institutions from a bygone era with
questionable relevance to a world in which China and India are emerging as economic
powers’ (The Australian, 17 October 2005, p. 27). The Treasurer’s stance is said to be
part of a concerted strategy designed to break down US and European dominance of
the IMF and the World Bank and to give emerging Asian economies a greater say in
running the world economy.
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